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preparation ot this estimate: Ihc Lentral Intelligence Ageiu and the intelligence- organizations ot Ihe
CENTRAL IRTELLIGBHCE
6
SUBJECT: ; REACTIONSOSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION
THE PROBLEM
To assess the principal reactions in ConmuniBt and non-Ccmoiunist countries to reconnaissance over China and Horth Vietnam by OXCART vehicles based in Okinawa.
DISCUBSIOB
1. China. We believe that the Chinese would quickly acquire knowledge of the operation. Mission aircraft vould almost certainly be detected by Chinese radar and, by virtue of speed and altitude, be identified as the new and advanced type of aircraft announced by the Presidentt. The chances are good that Chinese agents on Okinawa would become aware of the operation and that Peiping would quickly relate tho new overflights to the base at Kadena.
The Chinese vould of course try to destroy the aircraft. Assuming their failure to do so, and given their practice of not acknowledgingverflights, tbey vould probably not draw any special attention to this operation. Furthermore, in this contingency the kind of pressure they might try to apply to Japan or to any other country which might have afforded assistance vould be of tbe most general sortif any at all.
The situation would be quite different if an OXCART aircraft came down on Chinese territory. Such an incident would be tbe occasionajor political and propaganda campaign, particularlyive American pilot fell into Chinese hands. In dramatizing the affair, Peiping would hope to persuade the world, including the American public, of Chinese strength and of the reckless aggressiveness of US policy. They would also use what resources tbey bad to mobilize public opinion in Japan and in Okinawa against US control of the latter island and against the existence of US bases in Japan itself.
k. It remains to consider how tbe Chinese Ccanonists would interpret US intentions in the light of this overflight. The Chinese reactions would be related to the presence of large US ground forces in South
Vietnam, US bombing of North Vietnam, and apprehensions regarding the possibilityS attack on China itself. The Chinese, in theirhave been stressing tbe danger of such an attack. Although they may Indeederies of actions aod reactions in Vietnam and elsewhere which would lead in timeino-US war, they probably do not expect It to occur at an early date. Their apprehensions regarding the likelihoodS attack on China may grow or diminish depending upon developments between now and the time the overflights begin.
Upon detecting OXCART intrusions, there Is some chance that Peiping would conclude that the US, in unveiling an advanced system at this time, was seeking target intelligence which it meant to use at an early date. This chance vould be greater if the program began intensively,arge number of overflightshort period, or if it began concurrentlyajor expansion of US air attacks upon Northn the other hand, the Chinese have become accustomed to frequent probes of their air space by different vehicles, and they are aware thatin their own defenses have increased the vulnerability of older US
* Mr. Thoxas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and Dr. Louis V. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency, believe the following sentence should be inserted at this point: "In any case tbe US employment ofophisticated reconnaissance vehicle would tend to increase Chinese fears that the US was expecting an eventual escalation of the Vietnam conflict into open conflict with China."
systems. We conclude that, barring the special circumstancec mentioned above, tbe Chinese vould soon cose to regard this vehicle, despite Its advanced character, as another stageontinuing US collection program, vith no special significance for broader US intentions. Thus we think that these nloslone would not lead thorn to take any drastic new Military action.
6, Worth Vietnam. The DHV is already subjected to heavy US air attack and reconnaissance. It would1 attach little extra significance to the OXCART operation.
I' The USSR- ariety of its own sources agents, satellite photography, intercepted communications, and possibly rodar returnsthe Soviets vould quicklyairly coaplete picture of tne operation. They vould probably reinforce any Chinese or North Vietnenece propaganda campaigns built around the downing of an aircraft. Their primary concern in this rogsrd would be to forestall use of the aircraft over their own territory. They slight make private ccamunJcetionn to the US stressing the seriousness with which they would view anyinto Soviet airspace, but tbey would almost certainly not make US overflights of China the occasionajor crisis in US-Soviet relations.
RET
The mere deployment of the aircraft could Its presence on Okinawa would soon become known andvigorously publicized by Japaneee or American newspapers. with or without inspiration from the Chinese Ccantaniats,to make on issue of it, probably portraying the aircraft aa anuclear-capable weapon. They would probably try to raisethis US activity would lead to Japanese involvement in theor in actions directly against Ccanonist China. We believe thatthat the development did not comeomplete surprise toprobably deal with the situation, and that he wouldontinuance of OXCART operations. if an aircraft came
down in China, however, and the Chinese Ccomunlste extensively publicized the event, the difficulties of the Japanese government would be greater. We still believe that Sato could probably weather the storm, though he might have to ask the US to discontinue the program from ths Okinawa base.
Fqn-ConsauniBt Reactions. In other non-Carmrnniatelements would try to make an issue out of the deployment of theto the Far East. There would be some fairly vociferousmost governments would ignore or play down the matter. Thebe considerably more agitated if an aircraft came down In China,
and nunercAJi people, especially perhaps in the US itself, vould urge the President to discontinue the operation lest it increase tha risk of Chinese Ccaounlst overt intervention in the Vietnam var. Even so, there would In our opinion be nothing approaching the outcry overffairhich was used toummit conference. There la no developing detente between the US and Cormninist China to he dlaturbed by tbe event, and ve have estimated above that tbe USSR would almost certainly notajor crisis over the matter. Few foreign governments, whether or not they actually approved tbe US reconnaissance effort, would be unhappy that It was going on. In such circumstances adverae reaetlone and pressures on the US are unlikely to be very powerful.
Original document.
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