96
SC6 Copy No.
100
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE CURRENT STATUS OF PAVN IN FILTRATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Current Intelligence
THIS POCUMCHT CONTAINS GODfc WQflP MATi
Socumcnt contains classified information affecting the national secun*%of the United Stales within lhe meaning of the espionage laws. USaodeM.he law prohibits Its transmission oi the revelation of its convents in any manner to an unauthcTizeasjerson, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or intSesi of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government tdShe detriment of the United States.
It is to be seen only by US>eJsonnel especially indoctrinated and authorised to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCEIts security must be iraimajned in accordance withINTELLIGENCE RECHJLATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONSwhich may be contained herein.of thelo be gained, unless such action is flmajjproved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
SC So.6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Current Status of PAVN Infiltration
to South Vietnam
SUMMARY
The number of PAVN troops in South Vietnamto growignificant rale. (See CIA/0CI Memo SCStatus of PAVN Infiltration to South Vietnam") The presence of ton PAVN units of regimental strength along with four separate battalions, totalling0 men, has now been confirmed in South Vietnam. In addition, there are at least eight to ten other suspect PAVN units in the South which, if confirmed, could raise the total number of PAVN to Available evidence indicates that large-scale infiltration is continuing as the Communists prepare for their rainy season offensive.
In addition to infiltrating regular units, Hanoi has been forced to sendonsiderable number of replacements for Vict Cong and PAVN casualties. Many of these replacement troops are being assigned to what had once been purely Viet Cong units as well as filling out depleted PAVN units. Hanoi is alsoto send in cadro personnel destined foreconomic, and support units of the VC main force. Estimates of infiltration5en, and preliminary estimates for the first twoalf monthsotal more.
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CURRENT SITUATION
Recent Infiltration Developments
5ignificantin Hanoi's pattern of infiltration. early5 that their goals in thewithin reach, the Communists began to commitof regular army units to South Vietnam into achieve decisive victory over thesometime The large US buildupVietnam has probably frustrated thesebecame necessary instead for Hanoi to continuein more units and more men to counter the US It has not been confirmed that someinfiltrated South Vietnam duringof one regimentonth. Thisaercent increase over the confirmedof any previous year.
stepped up infiltration now confirmedhas been even further accelerated duringquarter In late December and early
there ms | oct lv
|pat- lAiMiMSYn
terns which accompanied the inf
3. It is estimated thatroops may have been involved In the6 infiltration activity. The new units, like theroups are believed to have been organized and trained by thelh Division.
Lf each one equatedman regiment,strength coulden. Two of these have appeared in South Vietnam. One of honfirmed intrengthen. from this unit claim that it beganin late
h
"B" regiment participated in the early March attack which overranhau Special Forces camp in Tbua Thieu Province.
4. th regiment,as also been reported in South Vietnam. orth Vietnamese soldier captured onarch in Pleiku Province
5 of regimental-sized units of theth Division.
6-Brefleet Ion:. Infiltration, however, giveartial plcturo of the number of men en-route to the South from the DRV. More than half of the PAVN regiments now confirmed or reported In South Vietnam, for example, completed their infiltration without any discernible refl
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in addition to the units associated withth, there are numerous indications from prisoners, defectors and captured documents, of the presence of at least eight other PAVN regiments in South Vietnam. These includest, 6th,h,umber of unidentified regiments. Two such unidentified units have been reported infiltrating western Quang Tri Provinceorps in the past two weeks.
of the scarcity of informationreported units they have not yet beenthe order of battle. The weight of evidenceexperience, however, suggests that thesome of these uoits will eventually be confirmed.
Thi; North Vietnamese Capability to Sustain
the infiltration of substantialof cadre and regular units from the NorthArmy into South Vietnam during the past few
years, there Is little doubt that the North Vietnamese Army has been taking in new recruitsate that adequately fills the gaps caused by infiltration as well as those created by attrition and retirement. DRV public statements together with reports of visitors to North Vietnam Indicatearge-scaleof manpower has been underway in the DRV during the past year. Most ofillion draft-age males in the DRV are now believed to be enrolled in thearmed forces, some paramilitary organization, or labor repair and maintenance battalions.
II Is probable that Hanoi will continue, at least to draw both on these mobilized personnel, and on regular North Vietnamese Army units for the manpower to make up infiltration units. In addition,ales reach draft age each year in North Vietnam, and of these, slightlyill be physically fit for military duty.anpower standpoint the North Vietnamese should have no difficulty sustainingman pace of covert infiltration into South Vietnam which wasduring the past year, and at the same timean increase of as muchn the strength of PAVN forces remaining in North Vietnam.
raining standpoint Hanoi should also have no difficulty in sustaining the infiltration rate The North Vietnamese have beenumber of their organic regular army regiments (in addition toth Division) to provide thefacilities and staff for infiltreesiven the currently estimated strength of the North Vietnamese Army, it is conceivable that tho PAVN could train up toegiments for infiltration per year. This would be on the order0 men.
Training Prior to Infiltration
amount and quality of trainingprospective infiltrators in North Vietnamdeparture for the South varies widely. Fora recent studyorth5 indicates that the amount ofvaried from none at all for two prisoners upmonths for one battalion. For the mostdraftees generallyinimumtraining. Cadreform theofigorous
trine
viet cong/north vietnamese army command structure in south vietnam
ii tabY begion i
militaryfob miuiary matte'S)
OR SUB-REGION (QUANG Til-THUA IWFN MOVINCES)
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UNITS
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M*NS.
DIVISIONSAO VANG Ol M) FORWARD STAfI)
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("PORTED N. VIETNAMESE UNITSit, Art, InMPORTED VC UNIT 03
selection and training procedure. Almost all of the captured leadership-cadre in the study groupa large number recalled into the army from civilian life) were products of efficient training schools in North Vietnam. Many battalion-level cadre sent south are combat veterans of the French-Indo-chinese.conflict. The quality of cadre personnel probably accounts, in large measure, for relatively good military showing made by PAVN units in the South.
many of the prisoners ingroup described their training asbutf the soldiers were draftees. Overhad less than one year of militarya third had been in the army less than
Utilization of PAVN Personnel in South Vietnam
In the last few months North and Southpersonnel are being increasingly integrated into mixed units. One South Vietnamese captive stated that he was one ofouth Vietnameseinth Transportation Battalion of the Sao Vangth Division. orthear old youth fromhthat at least two battalions of his unit wereercent North Vietnameseouth Vietnamese. Other reports havethat North Vietnamese replacements have been assigned to Viet Cong units such asstandth Battalion.
The assignment of replacements based solely upon their availability and without regard for unit integrity iseflection of the increased number of casualties inflicted on Communist forces in the last year. The replacement problem also points up Viet Cong difficulties in recruitingin South Vietnam and the necessity for North Vietnam to fill the gap caused by mounting combat losses.
There is no hard evidence available tothat the mixing of North and South Vietnamese personnel is causing any serious morale problems.
-5-
VC/PAVN Military Organization in South Vietnam
Communist nain force militarytotals0 personneliet Cong andAVN) and
a number of independent battalions. For many years, the largest operating Communist force inegiment. Inronts or tactical command headquarters appeared in which severalor other diverse unitH wore placed under tho controligher headquarters to conduct amilitary operation. The first identified "front" appeared in Phuoc Tuy Province of Military Region VII inhis front participated in the major VC campaigns near Binh Gia in5 and again In5 near the Michelin Plantation. Six different "front" organizations have been identifiedil NT
the expansion of main forcethe Communist command apparatusa further evolutionumber ofunits as well as territorial commands. of the command apparatus based onand prisoner Interrogations is providedI). It now appears that the commandfive division-level unitsumbercommands, subordinate either toV or Military Headquarters Nambo.
Outlook
It has been estimated that the Northcould maintain an average infiltration rate to South Vietnam6 ofenman regiments) per month.owever, it appears that, on the average, only one man regiment infiltrated per month.
It is now estimated that the Communists can, if they so desire, Infiltrate moreen per month. ate is also within theof DRV manpower rusources, at least in the foreseeable future. The evidence on recruitment of men Into the DRV armed forces suggests that Hanoi has encountered little difficulty in replacing those personnel sent south. In fact, it appears that there
-6-
hasubstantial augmentation in the over-all strength of the DRV Army through steppcd-up.
21. The growing Communist military main force with its improved command structure, coupled with the increased Infiltration effort through Laosthe basis for an Increase in Communistaction in the future. The increasinglyorganizational development of division level units with as many as five regiments may alsotep up to more conventional warfareby the Communist forces.
PAVN UNITS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
95th Reg
UNIT
h Inf Div
OF ARRIVAL
Dec 64
LAST LOCATION
Phu Yen
Reg
65
Due
18th
h
33rd or
66th
21st
Quyet Taa
95th B
h AA
h AA
h
h
65
h Inf65
65
h5
h65
h65
65
h6
hto 1st VC Reg)
65
Binh Dinh Quang Due rioiku
Ilelku Quang Ngal Binh Dinh Thua Thien Quang Ngai
Kontum
Thuahua Thien
Original document.
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