intelligence handbook
the deterioration of sino-soviet relations:
approved for riuase dak jui7di1
directorate of intelligence office of current intelligence
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This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United Stales within the meaning or the espionage laws. US Code.. The law prohibit! lLs transmisston or the revelation or Its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as iU use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or Interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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FOREWORD
This handbook traces the Sino-Soviet dispute as it has developed during the past ten years. Individual sections of the handbook have been separatelyto enable the reader to use the material herein to fullest advantage.
The Office of Current Intelligence wishes tothe contributions of the Research Staff of the Office of the Deputy Director/Intelligence, theof Research and Reports, and the Cartographic Division of the Office of Basic Intelligence.
Comments should be directed to the Office ofIntelligence.
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FOREWORD
I. INTRODUCTION II. SELECTED CHRONOLOGY III. LANDMARKS OF THE DISPUTE
20th CPSU Congress and Its
7 Moscow
The Soviet Military Proposals of April
Chinese Communes and the "Great Leap
Taiwan Straits Crisis of
Tho Peng Te-huai
Sino-Indian Border
Tho Soviet Attempt to Reach Detente With
the US,
0 Anti-Soviet
Withdrawal of Soviet
The0 Moscow
d CPSU Congress and the Break With
Sino-Soviet Border
Tho Cuban Missile Crisis and Its
Chinese Challenge to Soviet Far East Ter-
The Chinese3
Moscow Exploits Chinese Rejection of Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty. KhrushchevResolute Rebuff,"
Sino-Soviet Conflict Continues Despite
Ouster of Khrushchev and Chinese Visit-.
to Moscow, Fall
i1
P SECRET TRINE-
Involvement In Vietnam: irect
Challenge to Peking, Spring
Talks With Mao Reflect tho Dopth
of 32
Meeting ofommunist Parties in Mos-
Obstruction of "Unity of Action"
on
Validity of Sino-Soviet Defense
Chinese Party Underscores Rift wilh Mos-
cow, Early
ANNEX: The Soviet Cutback in Economic and Military
Assistance to
I. INTRODUCTION
Relations between the Soviet Union andChina have deteriorated so far in the past ten years lhat we can say with validity that they are now engaged in their own "cold war." The twono longer see eye-to-eye on how to conduct their campaign against the West, on how Communist parties in the free world should come to power, on domestic policies that those in power shouldor even on whatrue "Marxist-Leninist" party today.
Party, economic, military, and even statebetween them have dwindled to the smallest possible correct minimum. The validity of0 Sino-Soviet Treaty now is debatable. ile common frontier has againocus of trouble and conflict, as it was many times The two countries can be regarded as heading two avowedly separate wings of the Communistengagedead-on struggle for leadership of the entire movement.
The virulence of the present confrontation, the directness of the insults and accusations that have been hurled from each side, and the theological certainty of both disputants reflect dimensions of antagonism which are too extensive to be bridged. Because both regimes are headed by dedicatedthe dispute has been couched in doctrinal terms; each attempts to prove the heresy of the other by quoting from the scriptures of Marxism-Leninism.
This propensity for dialectics has led someto believe that the dispute was merely an "ideological" one,utter of counting the number ofwould fit on the headin. Nothing could be lurther from the truth. The dispute, fundamentally, Is one of deep nationalower clash of opposinginterests. This is recognized by both sides and has been expressed by their leaders in private in the past.
That the doctrinal argumentation has tended to obscure the existence of diametric differences over
basic policies and interests does nol moan that the doctrinal or ideological issues are not themselves an Important part of tho dispute. Couching thein doctrinal terms has enabled the Chinese to pretend to be more Communist than the Soviets, and at the same time to demand the right to lead theCommunist movement. The Chinese attempt, beginning openly about the middle to gain at least an equal voice in the establishment of bloc policies so that they would support Chinesehas led inevitablyrofound Chineseof Soviet authority.
The struggle that ensued for the support ofCommunist parties has resulted in theof two centers of Communist truth and opened the wayultiplicity of interpretations. This has exaggerated the problem that has haunted Soviet leaders ever since Stalin's death led to aof the structure of the Soviet bloc and theworld. Soviet policy makers, and theas well, now are unable to impose their wills on unwilling satraps, or to manipulate them for their foreign political and economic policiestaking their Interest* into account.
The present rupture signifies that Communist ideology has not only failed to overcome nationalism within the bloc, but has Indeed aggravated such sentiment. The fSSR, of necessity places its ownit defines as blocthose of China. Peking, believing that such Soviet behavior Imperils China's ambitions, at home and abroad, insists in turn that only the Chinese interpretation of Leninist doctrine can save the Communist movement--and China'sharm.
These basic positions seem unlikely to change under successor leaderships, as ihey did not change with the replacement of Khrushcnev with new Soviet leaders. Theyrofound competition for authority. They will probably be intensified to the degree that China emergesreat world power. For these reasons, the prospect is probably forlevels of tension between these two states. Thoy may remain nominal allies for some time, but even so this tension will almost certainly bein increased opposition, more attempted
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subversion of the other's supporters, and morefor border defenses. There will consequentlyrowing incompatibility between Soviet and Chinese interests accompanied by an accelerated emergence of two competing and hostile Communist world centers.
The history of the Sino-Soviet relationship over the past ten years is an extremely complex one, not easily summarized. By concentrating onlandmarks, however, this handbook attempts to present an account of the struggle as it developed6 elected chronology attempts torameworklearer understanding of the decisive events. An annex describes Sino-Soviet economic and military relatione,'
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NO
H. SELECTED CHRONOLOGY
April
June
October
CPSUmakesspeech attacking Stalin, setting in motion Eastern European attempts toSoviet control. The Chinese, for the first time,ole in decisions that had once been only Moscow's to make,*
Chinese article implicitly corrects"one-sided appraisal" of Stalin.
Togliatti article advocates "polycen-trism" for Communist movement. CPSUCommittee resolution responds to foreign CP criticism on Stalin issue, rebuking Togliatti.
During unrest in Eastern Europe, Gomulka is restored to power in Poland overopposition, with Chinese support.
cow. on breaks out and is crushed by Soviets, urged on by.
November
December
Government statement promisesof "errors" in intrabloc Chinese Government applaudscriticizes "big-power chauvinism."
Tito publicly criticizes Soviets over Hungary, demands "democratization" of bloc relations.
Chinese politburo article rebukes Tito, defines limits of tolerable diversity.
numbered items areandmarks of the dispute which arc treated in detail in Part III.
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Series of high-level Chinese partymap out radical turn in Chinese domestic policies.
reject secret Soviet military proposals designed to put rein on Mao makes secret speech belittling value of Soviet military assistance.
Khrushchev-Mao talks in Peking,objects to Chinese plans for.
'( DICGKU.
21st CPSU Congress, Khrushchev makes indirect attack on principles ofcommune system. The CPSU declares that war can be eliminated whileremains.
first time, CCP, in private talks with visiting Communist leaders,Soviet authority to lead world movement.
June
revolt against Chinese rule. Chinese press attacks India for aid given to Dalai Lama, Soviet press does not.
Soviets refuse to give "sample atomic bomb" to Peking, thereby "tearing up"7 military aid agreement.
Minister Peng Te-huai returns from visit to Moscow, challenges Mao's economic and military policies withencouragement and is
September
border clashes begin. USSR adopts unprecedented posture of public neutrality, infuriating
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Spring
Summer
observer at Warsaw Pact meeting voices strong opposition to Sovietand detente policies.
Chinese launch massive press attack online. Afterlight. Mao re(uses secret invitation to visit Moscow, and Khrushchev retreats from detente line by torpedoing summit conference withleaders. Chinese lobby againstat WFTU meeting in Peking. Soviets organize unsuccessful counterattack at Communist gathering at
Soviets abruptly pull thousands of aid technicians out of China and break off aid to unfinished industrial contracts, greatly worsening Chineso oconomicand delaying Peking's advanced weapons program. )
Sino-Soviet border incidents bringof Foreign Ministry protests.plot to overthrow pro-Pokingleadership tails. Soviets and Chinese send secret letters throughout world Communist movement attacking each other.
Communist movement holds another
conference in Moscow. Soviets fail in all-out effort to force Chinese toCPSU)
Spring
Spring
September
Fall
Soviets stage extensive military maneuvers near Vladivostok simulating repulse ofby "aggressors" from Chinese territory.
Public polemics are temporarily dampened. Moscow and Peking spar in secretover terms for convening new world Communist meeting.
Unrest in Sinkiang among minority peoples, allegedly encouraged by Soviets, leads to mass flight into USSR. Central Asianare reinforced on both sides. Soviet consulates are thereafter closed by)
Secret, report to Chinese 8th Centralplenum says Chinese are rightful leaders of Communist world.
Cuban missile crisis coincides withinvasion of India. Soviet backdown over Cuba brings violent Chinese attacks on Soviet "Munich." Soviets organize counterattacks on Peking at East European party)
publicly challenges Soviet right to Far Eastern territories once belonging to China. )
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Summer
September
call on all Communists to revolt against Sovietnd announce"general line" to replaceino-Soviet party talks infail. )
Soviets accept partial test ban with US on terms previously rejected. Moscow uses Chi-neso rejection of test ban in propagandato attempt to isolate Peking.polemics on both sides hit all-time)
Train carrying Chinese nationals home from USSR with anti-CPSU propaganda is halted by Soviet troops; Chinese, forced fromrinate all over Soviet railroad station. Foreign Ministries exchange protests over.
drive to convene world Communistwithout Chinese ia stalled byoi some parties in Soviet camp. CPSU temporarily mutes polemics, Chinese do not.
resume polemics with publication of
Suslov Central Committee report attacking Mao's cult, calling Chinese Trotskyites.
Spring
opens all-out new campaign for
world Communist meeting to Isolate Chinese and bolster CPSU authority, despite Chinese refusal to attend and continued opposition in Soviet)
is ousted from CPSU leadership.
New Soviet leaders hold talks with Chou En-lai, but offer for the record to renewassistance but refuse to promiseof all old Soviet policies and aapology. After initial hiatus, Chinese resume attacks on CPSU. )
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no t'um.Hi'i nrii'ni
explode firsI
device. Soviets strei Irder.
February Kosygin visits North Vietnam and Northreflecting decision of new Sovietto seek expansion of Soviet influence at Chinese expense in Asia and among radical anti-US wing of Communist movement)
February Mao and Kosygin talk in Peking. Maorejects Soviet request for end of Chinese attacks on CPSU, says polemic will go on0)
Communistby
Khrushchev to prepare worldin Moscow without Chinese or their Soviets forced to put off worldindefinitely, but Chinese violentlyMarch meeting anyway. )
Embassy in Moscow exploits anti-US
demonstration In attempt to create violence at US Embassy. Soviet police beat offdemonstrators. Chinese then organize demonstration against Soviet Embassy in Foreign Ministries exchange protests.
obstruct and delay transit through
China of Soviet air defense aid to North Vietnam. Chinese reject Soviet private call for "unity of action" over Vietnam, despite Hanoi's sympathy for idea. )
September India and Pakistan fight over Kashmir.issue ultimatum to India, then back down. Soviets send secret letter to PekingIndia, warning Chinese of danger of US involvement. Later, Soviets sponsortalks at Tashkent, attacked by Chinese.
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He I'liiii.iuH wwa
November
coup in Indonesia leads to major Chinese foreign policy disaster, decimation ol Indonostan Communist Party, largest pro-Chinese party outside of the bloc. Soviets privately denounce Peking as instigator of foolish coup attempt.
Chinese publicly call for organizational split in Communist movement.
exploit bloc meeting's proposal for coordination of aid to North Vietnam, which Chinese oppose. Chinese openly dare Soviet* to ship military aid to Vietnam by sea,creation of crisis in Europe to help Hanoi.
January
January
letter denouncing Chinese disseminated to CPSU and throughout world Communistand details of letter are leaked to Western press. Moscow accuses Peking of seek-ing to provoke Soviet-US war.
In secret letter to Moscow, Chinese mock Sino-Soviet military alliance, terra Soviets "negative factor" in any Sino-US)
Shclepln visits Hanoi, obtains public North Vietnamese promise tod CPSU.
publish refusal to attend CPSU andful of parties follow Chinese example. Soviets score important victory as North Korea and North VietnamCPSU Congress, endorse Soviet "unity of action")
(TOW Sh'CHCT TfflNFFfflfFTrUf MSiSFw)
m. LANDMARKS OF THE DISPUTE
1. h CPSU Congress and Its Aftermath
the Chinese Communists for the first timeolicy disagreement with Moscow into the public arena to asole for themselves as arbiter of intrabloc relations. The Chinese were affronted by the violent attack on Stalin made byh CPSU Congress and by the fact that thoy had not been consulted in advance. Above all, Mao saw the So-vite assaults on Stalin's "cult of the personality" as an implicit rebuke to his own very similar cult. In April, the CCPajor statemont "correcting" the of Stalin andarxist "explanation" of how Stalin's "mistakes" had occurred and how similar mistakes could be prevented. eries of private protests over the manner of de-Stalinization were conveyed by Mao, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai in conversations with Sovietoscow and Peking in6 and
When de-Stalinization helped torisis in Moscow's relations with Eastern Europe in the fallhe Chinese intervened, first to make matters worse for the CPSU, and then to help reassemble the pieces for the Soviets. There is good evidence that the Chinese party encouraged the Poles to assert their autonomy in October, and thehave claimed that they warned Khrushchev against using force against the new Gomulka regime. When the Hungarian Revolution broke out, however, Liu Shao-chi secretly went to Moscow, andto thethe Soviets to use force to prevent Nagy from taking Hungary out of the Communist bloc. Thus Peking intervened todecisions which had previously been Moscow's alone.
Subsequently, alarmed by what had happened in Hungary, Mao stopped encouraging the expansion of autonomy inEurope. In7 he sent Chou En-lai to Warsaw, Budapest, and Moscow to warn Gomulka and Kadar to respect the USSR's position as head of the bloc, and to warn theagainst repeating the error of "great power chauvinism. (Map) Although this helped stabilize the Soviet position in Eastern Europe for the time being, the Soviets continued to resent the effrontery of the Chinese in presuming to define the relationship between the USSR and bloc countries. As the Chinese have said, the Soviets thereafter "nursed rancor" against them and regarded the CCP as their "biggestEIMUll MO roriEICy PT^FiQ
2. 7 Moscow Conference
Inonth after theof an agreement providing for Soviet assistance to China in the area of "new technology for nationalcame to Moscow toeeting of the leaders of the world Communist movement. Perhaps in part payment for the agreement, he publicly acknowledged Soviet "leadership" of the bloc. Thiw public concession was largely negated, however, by attacks on Khrushchev's
"peaceful coexistence" strategy in "heated exchanges" during the private negotiations between the Chinese and
Soviet delegations.
engthy secret speech to the conferencehole, Mao sought to demonstrate that there hadecisive change in the East-West balance of forces whichew forward strategy for theCommunist movement. Mao belittled the military and economic power of the West, and minimizeduclear war should one resultew bloc offensive. The Chinese followed up withattempts to force the Soviets to correct "errors" in their draft of the final declaration to be published by the bloc parties attending the conference. The changes the Chinese compelled the Soviets to accept all testified to Peking's desirearsher bloc foreign policytoward tho Unitedand for greater emphasis on the need for violence by nonbloc Communist parties.
The Sino-Soviet confrontation in Novemberfollowing on the heels of the Chinese intervention in Eastern Europe the yearSovietat Mao's growing assertiveneas in bloc policy determination. At the same time, the Soviets began to become alarmed at the adventurous tone of the policy the Chinese were pressing. This Soviet uneasiness over Mao's advocacyore aggressive and hazardousline probablyarge part in the Soviet decision in8 to make major military proposals to Peking calculated to give the USSR greater control over Chinese actions. n rnnfitittt aaUMl
3. The Soviet Military Proposals of8
In the springhe Soviet Union presentedChina with far-reaching proposals which thepublicly described as "unreasonable demandsbring China under Soviet military control." One ofleadersdeclared that Moscow proposed
ong-rangeaaar station be established on Chinese soil andoint Chinese-Soviet fleet be set up. This event, the Chinese have stated, marked the real turning point after which Sino-Soviet relationsharp decline. Khrushchev has confirmed that such Soviet proposals were made. Other clandestine reports, which lack complete confirmation, speak variously of Soviet proposals tooviet radio station and Soviet or joint Sino-Soviet submarine, air, and missile bases in Chinaspecialand control nuclear weapons in China. All clandestine reports confirm the Chinese public statement that "these unjust demands" were "firmly rejected."
The USSR apparently made these proposals because ofabout some of the promises of assistance inmade or implied in the Sino-Sovietarticularly in view of the adventurousstatements made by Mao in Moscow the followingrejected the April demands, the Chineseto count less on Soviet help. In May or June, Maoimportantspeech to the Military Affairs Com-
mittee ofe disparaged the importance of nuclear weapons and the value of Soviet military assistance. There is evidence that Khrushchev and Maoersonalabout the April proposals when the two leaders met in Peking in
The following year the Soviets refused what wasspecific Chinese demand pursuant to thesample atomicnd reportedlyunacceptable proposaloint defense systemFar East with Soviet control of nuclear weapons andsystems in China. The mutual suspicion andby the events of8 were to be greatlyfollowing the9 fall of DefenseTe-huai, who was apparently the leading Chineseacceptance of the Soviet proposals. -frTOfl SECRET TR1NF
ho rortuiOH DioniiM
4. The Chinese Communes and tho 'Great Leap Forward"
A new area of friction between Moscow and Peking was created by the radical turn in Chinese domestic policy The ChineseGreat Leap Forward" intended to transform Chinaajor industrial poweringle decade. They pressed China's hundreds of millions of peasants into0 giant communes capable of organizing their labor in semi-militarized fashion. They deliberately turned away from the Soviet model of relatively cautious planning, investment, andon material incentives, and sought to achieveIncreases in industrial and agricultural production through maximum propaganda exhortation, intensive use of cheap labor, and native "innovations" such as backyard steel furnaces. These irrational policies produced havoc throughout the economy, and helped bringubsequent general economic decline.
Worst of all, from the Soviet point of view, theclaimed8 that the final achievement of full Communism in China was no longer far off, and thus Implied that tho Chinese would reach Communism before the Soviets. In these claims and the policies of the "Great Leap"hole, the CPSUew and dangerous challenge to its leadership of the Communist world. ovietstatedthings were depicted as though only they (the Chinese) were really engaged in Communistleaving other countriesnd theleaders tried to present their "totally unsound and harmfuls an objectivend "as aor recipe for other countries.1'
In his talks with Mao in earlyhrushchev personally protested these "innovations," Later, aseconomic conditiens in China forced theof the "Great Leap" and the abandonment of thein all but name, Khrushchev tepeatedly gibed at the Chinese with thinly veiled references to Communist leaders who had become "estranged from theo disobedient "children" who had "burned theirnd to the foolishness of those who desirod "pantless Since Khrushchev's fall, the new CPSU leaders in secret correspondence with other Communist parties have continued to attack Mao and his cronies for the mistakes of the "Great Leap" and the commune program. liTBSTni-srui.
sllrkt
5. Taiwan StraitB Crisis8
In the summer8 tho Chinese precipitated the Taiwan Straits crisis. "Liberate'" Taiwan propaganda rose sharply and onustained bombardment of tho offshore island of Quemoy began. It was achallenge to the US, and it risked counteraction which would bring the mutual assistance treaty with Moscow into play.
The Chinese intention soems to have been not so much toajor Invasion of the offshore islands as to exercise political and psychological pressure on the Quemoy garrison and the Washington-Taipei alliance. To make its threat fully effective, Pekingirm, early, public, and high-level Soviet commitment of This it did not get until after the crisis had passed its peak, and evon then Khrushchev pledgedonly if the US directly attacked China.
during the critical first two weeks con-tained ambiguously worded pledges of support for China's "Justut Moscow refused to commit Itself to any specific military follow-up. In particular, it avoided assurances of support with nuclearthe pledge Peking wanted most.
Meanwhile, the US 7th Fleet moved forces Into the area in support of the Chinese Nationalists. Faced with lukewarm Soviet backing and this demonstration ofdetermination, Chou En-lai suddenly offeredeptember to renew ambassadorial-level talks with tho US. Chou's statement marked the turning point. The Chinese reduced pressure on the offshore islands and theof an expanding conflict diminished.
It was not until after Chou's offer to negotiate that Khrushchev wrote President EisenhowerS attack on China would be regarded as an attack against the USSR. econd letter warned that an atomic attack on China would be rebuffed "by the same moans."
Five years later, at the height of the polemical exchanges, the Chinese accused thethink perfidiously tronguntil it could be given without risk. Thecourse taken by Moscow in the Straits crisissuggests that Soviet leadors were seriously con-curned that they might be draggeduclear conflict
of lnterests not shared withE.yr lali' -
6. The Peng Te-huai Affair
At the Lushan plenum of the Chinese Communist central committee in July andhinese Defense Minister Marshal Pong Te-huai, with Soviet encouragement, directly challenged Mao's leadership and policies, and was purgedviolentwith Mao. Peng had returned to China in Juneix weeks' tour in the USSR and Eastern Europe. While in Moscow, he apparently had discussed with the Soviets his dissatisfaction with Mao's domestic and militarynd he may have been warned of Soviet sanctions if the Chinese did not mako further retreats in their "Great Leap Forward" and commune programs. Soon after Peng's return home, the Soviets formallyhinese requestsample atomic bomb." The Chinese later claimed that by this action, the Soviets had "torn up" the7 agreement on military assistance. Peng apparently used these Sovietin arguinghange of line in July.
At the central committee plenum, Penga memorandum attacking the "Great Leapand the communes and urging an "abouteng also evidently demanded that Mao makeon military policy in order to ensuroSoviet military, technological, and economic There is evidence that the Soviet asking price for such assistanceaddition to abandonment of the "Greatoint defense system in the Far East featuring Soviet control over nuclear weapons and theirsystems in China. Both Soviet and Chinese sources report that Peng pressed to have tho CCPthis demand.
Instead, Mao rallied his supporters,and defeated Peng, with the defensefell the amy chief of staffumber of other senior military figures. The events of the Lushan plenum constituted another decisive turning point in Sino-Soviet relations, and Mao and his party-machine supporters have not forgiven theattempt to undermine their authority at home by using other Chinese loaders on this occasion.
CHINA-INDIA FRONTIER AREA
7. Sino-Indian Border Conflict
Tho border dispute between China and India from the first skirmishing9 to the outbreak of2 further inflamed Sino-Soviet differences. (Map) The Soviet refusal to stand beside Peking against bourgeois India was viewed as outright betrayal.
China and India had long pressed conflicting claims to hundreds of thousands of square miles along the remote frontier. In the fall9 forward patrolling was stepped up and tension rose rapidly. Peking clearly hoped for at least tacit support from Moscow, but the Sovietseptemberompletely neutral stand, despite frantic, last-minute efforts by Peking toMoscow from any public announcement. The Soviets later accused the Chinese of deliberately timing their military action against India to embarrass Khrushchev on the ovo of his trip to the US.
The Soviet premier's public statements did nothing to appease the Chinese. In November he described the Sino-Indian disputesad and stupid story" and hinted that he favored compromise. He disparaged the disputed area as uninhabited and practically valueless and drew attention to how amicably the USSR had settled itawith Iran over similar barren territory. His obvious concern that Chinese military actions were Moscow's relations with New Delhi was another sore point with the Chinese.
In2 the Chineserief full-scale military offensive at both ends of the frontier, but Moscow, much to Peking's rage, subsequently continued its extensive aid to India, sold transports andto be used in deployment of Indian forces, and talked ofIG-fighter factory.
Tension again rose in5 when, during the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir, Peking threatened military intervention and Moscow counseled Chineso In the end Peking ignominously backed down, and the subsequent success of the Soviet mediation effort at Tashkent only added salt to China's wounds. XWIUW-
Some timerominent Western statesman declared that Khrushchev is afraid of war and that therefore he will not start it. onversation with Mr.sked him: What do you think? Is this statement correct ore replied: m aman and frankly,m very much afraid of war. You are quite right,old him. Only anperson can bo fearless of war in our days.
Khrushchev speech in Vladivostok after visit to9
8. The Soviet Attempt to Reach Detente With the US.9
The9arkedly fasterof Sino-Soviet relations, in large part because of Soviet moves toward easing tensions with the United States. Moscow's intention to make moreefforts along this line was signaled byDeputy Premier Mikoyan's exploratory visit to the United States in January. Khrushchev's arrival in the United States and his meeting with President Elsenhower ensued in the fall, accompanied andby the softest line Soviet propaganda had taken toward the US since World Warhas taken since.
All this was anathema to Peking, which considered the United States the principal obstacle to itsin Asia and viewed the exertion of maximum Communist revolutionary pressure against the US in all parts of thethe creation ofessential to China's national When Khrushchev came to Peking to see Mao at the end of September, on the heels of his US trip, this final meeting between the two mentormy one. Khrushchev and Mao argued over the Sino-Indian border dispute, which had meanwhile broken out. Khrushchev also is said by the Chinese to have asked Mao to accept an independent status for Taiwan, and thus to remove it ause of crises with the United States. Mao vehemently refused, and thelater said that their party "has not forgotten and will not forget this." Moreover, the Soviet leader further outraged his hosts by warning them,ublic address oneptember, againstby force the stability of the capitalistfter Khrushchev had gone home, Chinese propaganda began to voice disbelief in US peaceful intentions more and more vigorously. Six months later, Peking opened an all-out attack on Soviet policy. tfOMM-
Peaceful coexistence, while not retarding social changes in countries where these conditions are ripe, must at the same timeituation in which internal processes in particular countries do not lead to military clashes of the two systems,
International Affairs. Moscow,0
9. Peking's0 Anti-Soviet Offensive
As the Chinese saw it, Khrushchev's actions9 hadew record of error and betrayal: he had rebuffed then on the question of atomic militaryinterfered in Chinese internal affairs against Mao, hobnobbed with the leaders of USuggested that Peking should renounce its claim to'Tai-wan, and upbraided the Chinese publicly for their do--mestic and foreign policies.
In April onthcheduled Soviet summit conference with Western leaders, the CCPa massive propaganda assault aimed at theimplicitly, the authority--of the Soviet Communist Party. Central to the many indirectof Khrushchev's policies published in the leading Chinese organs was the contention that the "peaceful coexistence" line as applied by the Soviets wasrevolutionaries throughout the world from staging violent uprisings. In effect, the Chinese were appealing to the interests of anti-US radicals and bloc leaders around the world both to diminishinfluence and to bring pressure on the USSRodification of Soviet policy.
Khrushchev's position was made more difficult by the Soviet presidium's decision to publicizencident in early May, and shortlytep back from9 detente line by torpedoing the Paris summit meeting. At about the same time,had Justecret Sovietto come to Moscow fortauntedoverncident.
In early June, the Chinesetep further byeeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking to lobby against the Soviets among bothand non-Communist delegates. The Soviets now began to counterattack. Late in June, they organized aassault" on the Chinese at closed sessions of aparty congress in Bucharest, where secret CPSU documents attacking Peking were read and foreigndelegates were urged to demand that the Chinese yield to Soviet dictates. This attempt to cow the CCP was totally unsuccessful, and the Chinese and Sovietat Bucharest finally agreed to puthowdownoneral conference of the worldmovement in the fall. ffiF^TUIT^
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PiV lUlitlliH DIUOIJM
10. Withdrawal of Soviet Technicians
nf crtI?LCSre,of China's industrialization program consisted ?se5 toacilitiGSMoscow had prom-
Sr^nse"
0 collftpsed China'sSe'
nortedMiT ?UrerWestern observers in Pekingwav anrflarge-seale withdrawal of Soviethat Chinese author-
in Sin"lltUe advance warnin^ Poking protested ZL 'n Justifymg its move to Communists abroad, Mos-
t WaS Caused by Chlnese attempts to Indoctrinate technicians, by abuse of Soviet equipment, and
by refusal to accept technical advice. The primary factor
tionably Moscow's desire il forceback down in tho Sino-Soviet
erSOnnel remained-the withdrawal of iUSr d1claris wasomplete. In recalling
iCftlbruP"y. Moscow showed noa smooth transfer of responsibilities to
XPert8' -The effect OD Chip's industrialprogram was immediate and devastating.
rtnn^fJT*ajor project that had to be aban-
2am ss Hoover ni?al siJrvi^n 59 under Sovietsupervision. It was designed to be equipped with eightilowatt generators madHnthe ?SSR, butSlivered. This arrived just beforend wa8 later severely damaged when the SeS bvffte? t0hemselves. The lake cre-CMnesoSafidly slltinK up. One disgruntled lution JflC.al has co,wn*"ted that the onlyis to blow the whole dam up.
Chined Sf!!eLarJaa SUCh f8 modern capons development the vaJuaMe headwiv KabandODcompletely but lost 7SyVhJ* theuSovlet Union had not renounced its rapabirSf nr^?hlneSe1by theai*ht have been
5 lt wastheet fighter. fSRPRFTr,
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In the absolute majority of theparties rejected the incorrect viows andof the CCP leadership. The Chlnose delegation at this meeting stubbornly upheld its own particular views and signed the statement only when the danger of its complete Isolation became clear. It is now perfectly clear that in appending their signatures to0 statement, the CCP leaders wore only Shortly after the meeting they resumed the propaganda of their policy, using as theirthe leadership of the Albanianehind the back of our party theyampaign against the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government.
CPSU Open Letter of3
*
lndeavored to bring
gre
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11. The0 Moscow Conference
The Soviets regarded the gathering of leaders of the world Communist movement in Moscow ins an opportunity to bring pressure on the Chinese, to show them how isolated they were in the world movement, and thus perhaps to induce them to abandon their challenge to Soviet policy. The Soviet leaders had hoped that the heavy economic sanctions applied in the summer would force the Chinese to accept this position. The Chinese regarded the meeting as an opportunity to disseminate their views before this unique audience and to demonstrate to theleaders ofarties that Moscow's will could be successfully resisted. It was the Chinese who won.
When the conference opened, the Soviets startedas they hadengthy new letter condemning Peking. During the weeks of debate that followed, tho CPSU mustered its adherents and, in Peking's words, "engineered converging assaults on the CCP." party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping vehemently refused to yield to the pro-Soviet majority. In the end, an ambiguous document was produced and signed, embodying the mutually contradictory positions of the two parties on many issues. While the CPSU perhaps succeeded In getting more of its points included than did the Chinese, Moscow neverthelessajor defeat on theissue of authority by falling to establish the principle of "majority rule" in the internationalmovement. What is more, the Soviets also failed in efforts toondemnation of "factional activities" which would inhibit future Chinese opposition to Soviet policies. The Chinese later boasted that this was "an event of great historical significance" because it "changed the previous highly abnormal situation in which not even the slightest criticism of tho errors of the CPSUwas tolerated and its word was final."
Although the signing of the conference statement was accompanied by public pledges of undying solidarity and mutual affection, privately neither Moscow nor Pekingthe document as anythingemporary makeshift. Nor did either intend to abandon the struggle for Soon after the conference, in fact, Khrushchevhis attack on the Chinese position at what heregarded as Its weakest the chief CCP ally in Peking's battles with Moscow
'fnrifiiFrj_
" 1QP secret trine
12. d CPSU Congress and the Break With Albania
As early as the summer the Soviet Union had begun to move against the Albanians, who had been the most ardent supporters of the Chinese atin In August, the Soviets incited certain Albanian military and political leaders to try to overthrow party leader Hoxha. This plot failed, and the pro-Soviet leaders were arrested. Soviet economic pressures followed, culminating in theof all Soviet technicians and the complete termination of Soviet economic aid in1 and the withdrawal of Soviet naval units from Vlore in Hay (Map-Photo). An acrimonious exchange of secret messages was climaxediolent CPSU letter to the Albanian party in
Byhend CPSU Congress opened, the Soviets were apparently determined to force the Albanian issue into the open, presumably hoping thereby to repair the damage done to their authority by the Chinese at the0 Moscow conference. An unprecedented torrent of abuse was hurled publicly at the absent Albanians by CPSUof all by Khrushchev, who went so far as to call explicitly for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership. The Soviet leaders at the same time renewed their attack on Stalin, in obviousto Chinese views.
The leader of the Chinese delegation, Premier Chou En-lai, responded by reproving Khrushchev publicly for his open attack on the Albanian party, byreath on Stalin's tomb, and by suddenly leaving for Peking before the congress ended. According to Chinese statements, Chou also "frankly criticized the errors of the CPSU leadership" in private talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders.
Following the congress, the CPSU steppedampaign to mobilize the bulk of the world'sparties against the Albanians and Chinese. In the Albaniansutualof diplomatic representatives from Tirana and Moscow. Soviet-Albanian state, party, andrelations have been effectively ruptured ever
13. Sino-Soviet Border Tensions
As Sino-Soviet verbal mudslinglng intensified in the, both sides attempted to exploit theirfrontier claims and to strengthen border security. Inccording to refugees, the Soviets began spreading reports among border tribesmen in Sinkiang that living conditions were better on the Soviet side and that there would be no Soviet restrictions on border crossing. Two separate major migrations appear to have resulted.order tribesmen crossed during2 and more0 followed in May. Riots broke out when the Chinese belatedly acted to stop the flow. Peking promptly closed the two Soviet consulates in Sinkiang which had been centers of subversion. Soviet consulates elsewhere in China were shut down shortly thereafter.
The Chinese are clearly concerned over Sovietto foment unrest among ethnic minorities, and probably fear that tribesmen who crossod over to Soviet asylum may roturn on subversive missions. Chineseon several occasions have explicitly accused theof subversion.
2 the Chinese have been steadily tightening border controls in the Sinkiang area. They have moved in "agricultural"settle key stretches of the frontier, and3 they beganpeople in ovorpopulated areas of East China toin Sinkiang. Native inhabitants have since been moved back aboutiles from the border, creating the kind of cordon sanitalre that exists elsewhere between Communist and non-Communist states. In tho Manchurian sector of the frontier, no large-scale incidents have been detected, but the Chinese have tightened security controls there, too, by establishing dozens of new border defense stations.
There is also evidence of Soviet concern over Chinese intentions alongile common frontier. h
prisis*,US*imperialisn to pursue.ever more in-policies; of aggression-oforoutheastern part ot Czechoslovakia, or the .
fPeople's. Dally.
Just'.what'. do these people who call
bvactedxplainlyi as.:tfchet -
viltijiv
Ti^or'ldVthermonuclearwri'ar.^
IMisVinteresting 'howntthey stconjihemselves" inI do notwould liketakeheyiouldit;ityout-;iv-Butrises-X. why: dovthey- reallyfeer ipeoples'ofialist countries to be spilled?frS-'O it*< Khrushchev Supreme Soviet speech,3
The Chinese Communist Party made an extreme effort to use tbe Cuban missile crisis of late2 to injure the Soviet position both in Cuba and throughout' the world- Shortly before and during the crisis, the Soviets had made conciliatory gestures to Peking in the vain hope of buying Chinese forbearance. In mid-October talks with the Chinese ambassador. Khrushchev asked that Mao forget the past and "start our relationslear page." Onctober. Pravda carried an editorial on the Sino-Indian hostilities which for the first and last time in the years of Sino-Indian border conflict leaned toward Poking. When these acts of appeasement proved useless, the Soviets quickly edged back to public neutrality on the Sino-lndion issue, and began toa thorough-going counterattack against Peking's campaign of denunciation.
Once Khrushchev had backed down in the Cuban crisis, the Chineseorrent of vituperative editorials, broadcasts, speeches, and diplomatic notes to Cubathe Soviet "Munich." The Chinese*did their best to complicate .Mlkoyan's post-crisis discussions with Castro by denouncing Khrushchev's agreement to allow inspection of the missile sites and to remove theombers as infringements of Cuban sovereignty. This was done both in the press and in private conversations with Cubaneking and in other costs around the world
The Soviets respondedampaign organized in November and the first week, of December at fourparty congresses of Moscow's European followers-Each of these gatheringsounting number of the CPSU's foreign adherents dragooned intohorus of denunciation first against the Albanians and later against the Chinese as well. The climax came onecember, when Khrushchev delivered an angry speech before the USSR Supreme Soviet impugning Chinese motives and policies. Soon thereafter, the Chinese at last made their challenge to Soviet authority over the worldmovement puftlic and official.
Challenge to Soviet Far East Tcrritori
conduct during the Cuban missileKhrushchevpeech in2 remarked^oration of the "colonialist outhouses"
of Hong Kong and Macao. This prompted bitter Chinesereaction, ineking pointedly raised
andRu?sian imperialist aggression against China and listed Tsarist Russia among the "colonial powers" that
Hn0xed territory by compelling Chinese governmentseaties." The Chinese citedh cen-
Jni*
the riih? t and assortedPeking reserved
"une"ual treaties" at some
time 'when conditions are ripe." (MAP)
3 by attacking those
sion or nistorically developed fron-
the "artificial creation" of territorial problems.
lfelf raised tneu an
apacese delegation. Afterreturn of tho southern Kurile Islands to Japan he ac-
Eurooe andTRin both Easter
, ThlS Was China'spublic support forK!!rlle Islandawhich hadajor stumbling blockoviet-Japanese peace treaty, and Mao's remarkseated Soviet denunciation of Chinese ex-
raVdVn Carl* September ac^useSalf million square miles of
I.nd CalJed this clear evidence of "how
SincSe leaders have Bone in their 'cold war' against the Soviet Union."
Jii intensity of the polemical invective made itotnlne had come of the Sino-Soviet border talksKUn ln Peking ln From the star?been reports of Chinese intransigence, and the
Peking Claimedwere
insistingritten acknowledgement that the existina border resulted from unequal treaties imposed by TsarJsf
letters towrangling, '3 StSi'KSif'JS.SW
territorial question.
""CUNMMNUAL
East and West in Moscow,3
Teng Htlao-ping, Chinese Communis) Porty CenKol Committee Secretory Generaleceive) chilly reception from Soviet Com-monlit Parly Prettdium member Mikhail Suslov as he arrive) In Moscow far "comradely" talks in
Soviet leader Khrushehe* warmly green Wetiern negotiator) Ave'ell Horrimon (L) and lord Hailsham (R) at the beginning of three power nuclear arms talk) In Moscow In
rONHPENTtAl
16. The Chinese3 Offensive
Beginning in the Chinese party at last made explicit its past grievances and present ambitions. Peking now openly called on all Communists to revolt against the "baton" of the CPSU, and derided the Soviets' "temporary majority" in the world Communist movement. It publicly challenged Moscow toeeting of the world movement, apparently expecting to profit at Soviet expense as it had inLater, when Khrushchev tried to turn this to hisby seeking toorld meeting which would condemn the Chinese, Peking reversed its position, and has since refused to take part in any world Communist gathering.) The Chinese at last attacked, by name, the CPSU and its leading adherents in the West asof revolution, and repeated over and over that the real focus of revolutionary struggle was in the underdeveloped world and that the real leader of this struggle was the CCP. The Sovietssomethe Chinese were seeking to divide the revolutionary movement along geographical and racial lines.
The high point of the3 offensive came on Juneweeks before the schcdulod opening of Sino-Soviet bilateral talks in Moscow--when Peking published its first explicit attack on Soviet domestic policies and threatened to split every Communist party whose leadership continued to support Moscow. Thealso promised to anoint as honoraryall revolutionaries outside the Communist movement who would carry their banner.
The CPSU responded forcefully. The Chinese officials who had distributed the offensive document ln the Soviet Union were formally expelled, and the CPSU published its answer in an "Open Letter" of mid-July. igh-level Chinese party delegation had arrived in Moscow for scheduled bilateral talks with the Soviet party. After each side had privately reiterated its Implacable opposition to the other's views and actions, the talks petered out, and the Chinese eventually went home. In contrast to the icy reception given the Chinese leaders inS delegation led by Under Secretarywhich arrived simultaneously to negotiate the future partial test-bangreeted with ostentatious warmth by Khrushchev.
"ini hi urrTnrvr
17. Moscow Exploits Chinese Rejection of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 3
In latehrushchev, In the face of China's open defiance, signed the nuclear test ban agreement and proceeded to exploit the issueonvenient andweapon to isolate and discredit Peking. He portrayed the agreementuccess for his policies toward the West and played on fears of Peking's nuclear ambitionsew campaign to undercut China's pretensions to leadership of the world Communist movement.
China counteredtepped-up volley ofviolent polemical attacks. Mutual recriminations multiplied, culminating with an official governmentin mid-September whichcathingof the attitudes and ambitions of the "wlldmen" in Peking.
The Russian statement pointed to the "irresponsible stand" taken by the Chinese on the test ban treaty as an indication of their overriding compulsion to obtain nuclear weapons. The Russians7 statements attributed to Mao himself to drive home the point that Peking was pushing the world toward nuclear war, afterto theof mankind would remain alive anyway and would build an even more wonderfulhe Soviet statement even attributed to the Chinesethe view that "the more people perish, the better for the cause of the revolution."
Exaggerated and distorted as these Soviet charges wore, they tended to highlight China's isolation anddisrepute on the key issues of war and peace. Largely dropping the ideological garment in which the conflict had previously been cloaked, Moscow was able to nake thelook more chauvinistic than ever before. The Russians paintod an image of the Chinese party as one led by hard-boiled, fanatical, self-seeking nationalists.
Khrushchev then tried to administer the coup de grace byultiparty meeting to condemn China. He was forced to back off, however, by foreign party reluctance to excommunicate the Chinese. In the falloscow revertedosture of relative restraint, suspending its anti-Chinese propaganda and callingchance to ralm down" before carrying tho struggle any further. (CON-
^'Apparently-the leaders oi,tcm-selves the natural leaders ,vwho*cah" lord: it overall the fraternalccording to their logic, their programs,ndare all infalliblevery' remark and every word of Khrushchev's" are -imperial edicts, however, wrong or absurdthe fraternal parties must submissively bear and
- obey and are absolutely forbidden tooppose then. This is outright- tyranny. the ideology of feudal autocrats, pure-
/However, we must tell the,CPSU&leaders^hatinternational Communist movemehtj^sSndtj
Flagal ^TTeBruary
Tho Chinese leaders are now holding as an object of special pride their complete disdain of thediscipline of The Chinese loadors are now creating many difficulties for the Communist parties /Tn capitalistuch Insulting epiThets are applied to the well-tried leaders /of these parlies/ asnd sohe Chinese leadersto plant at the head of the working class movement in someall sorts of renegades, degenerates,he CCPas openly chosen to knocka counterbalance to the world Communistbloc of those who share its views, with its own platform, with group discipline, and with its center in Peking.
Suslov Report to4 CPSU Central Committee Plenum
secret trine
no ronncr nivvwai
18. KhrushchevResolute
The restrained, "statesmanlike" posture assumed by Khrushchev in3 failed to check or appease Peking, and Moscow seemed to be losing ground before the abusive Chinese onslaught. At the turn of the year, as China's attacks Increased ln Intensity, Khrushchev decided to fight fire with fire.
Angered by Peking's scornful characterization of the Russian leaders as "untrustworthy cowards" and the USSR asin-pointedhrushchev attempted to implement the "most resolute rebuff" he had threatened earlier. In early April,ive-month suspension of polemics, the Sovietsublic counterof-fensive stressing that the USSR and China "differ on all basic questions." Moscow took steps to gatherforeign support in an attempt to ensure that the rebuff wouldcollective" one.
From4 until his ouster in October,engagedlt-for-tat polemical exchange with China and tried to force other parties to join thein ostracizing Peking. Many prominent foreign Communists, however, were reluctant to endorse thestep proposed byinternational meeting of Communist parties to discredit and Isolate China.
Khrushchev was so obsessedompulsion to quash thehad begun to attack him bythat he was essentially unmoved by the objections voiced by key parties such as the Italian, Polish, and Rumanian, and oblivious to the consequences of his strong-willed esult, his self-defeating tactics evoked increasing consternation abroad and weakened Moscow's position in the movement. Khrushchev's flamboyant and compulsive style also met with some disapproval ln the Kremlin, strengthened the hand of dissatisfied members of the top Soviet leadership, and contributed to hie overthrow.
When the new leaders took over ln October, they revertedestrained though firm public attitude toward China. They also chose the course of leastbyontroversial multiparty meeting toorld conference whichthe refusal of China and others to participate--had scheduled for December. tSBCMl Mfi ITrBTIfiy ntgSh'M)
W FOBEJilM IMIIIjiih
ino-Soviet Conflict Continues Despite Ouster Of Khrushchev and Chinese Visit To4
The Chinese, of course, took great delight in the overthrow of Khrushchev, but they were probably not overly optimistic that his successors would make any essential changes in Soviet policy. Although both sidesait-and-see attitude andfrom polemicsime, it was clear at the outset that neither had the slightesttoward compromise or concession on theissues in dispute.
Private remarks by Soviet and Chinese officials reflected considerable skepticism over thethat Sino-Soviet relations could be appreciably improved, even with Khrushchev gone. remlin reception only days after his removal, the Chinese ambassador expressed Peking's continuing contempt when,esture toward Soviet presidium members, he remarked that "they are all responsible" forwith China.
The new Soviet leaders, however,autious attitude with regard to the anti-Chinese meeting of Communist parties which Khrushchev had scheduled for December and which hadause celebre, the focus of Sino-Soviet tactical As the propaganda lull continued, Pekingtoop-level delegation headed byChou En-lai to Moscow to sound out the situation
In private talks with the Soviets, the Chinese premier pressed them to repudiate Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West and abandon all plansultiparty rump meeting. Chouhome empty handed, however,eek later the Chinese renewed their offensive, demanding total Soviet surrender as the price of any improvement in relations. sskv.1
'onnicH dhjch:u
20. Soviet Involvement inirect Challenge to Peking,
Beneath the "correct" and nonpolemicaI posture assumed by Khrushchev's successorsasic decision to meet Peking's challenge and to disprove its allegations that Moscow is soft on "US imperialism." irst step, the USSRampaign to make inroads among the Asian parties which Peking considered within its exclusive sphere of influence.
The Russian leaders appeared convinced that theof their new tactics against China depended in large measureigorous assertion of Soviet support for Northonly Communist state engaged in active, though indirect, hostilities with the leader of thecamp. Accordingly, Moscow took the dramatic stop ofigh-powered delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Hanoi in early February. The Kosygin missionirect challenge to Chinese influence in North Vietnam and throughout the Communist movement.
The situationrastic, unanticipated turn when the Viet Cong attacked the US base at Pleiku and tho US began bombing raids over North Vietnam. The Soviets nevertheless made clear their determination to honor their commitment to Hanoi's defense, despite thedeterioration in Soviet-US relations.
The Soviets have already supplied North Vietnam with surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft,guns, and other military, economic, andsupport. This aid has not, of course, prevented Chinese charges of Soviet treachery and cowardice. Nevertheless, Moscow probably deems its record to date, together with repented expressions of "profoundfrom Hanoi, evidence enough toollow ring to Peking's allegations. The bitterness of China's reaction was demonstrated by its efforts last spring to obstruct the passage of Russian aid to North Vietnam.
The post-Khrushchev approach lnprovednot only with the North Vietnamese butNorth Korea. The North Koreans have taken aback from Pekingosition ofthe Sino-Soviet dispute. Pyongyang'sno longer follow China's lead in condemningSoviets have even resumed certain military aid,ln return for the more forthcoming Koreanon intrabloc affairs. l-fJjBM ;
I'W lUI'.L'ONM
lUP&LVRLTTMXE -
21. Kosygln's Talks With Mao Reflect tho Depth Of Sino-Soviet Antagonisn--Fcbruary5
Soviet Premier Kosygin stopped over in Peking en route home from Hanoi in5 and talked with Mao Tse-tung and other top Chinese leaders. Kosygin professed to desire unity, but the Chinese dismissed the idea out of hand. He then tried to get them at least to halt their abusive polemics, but on all counts he rantone wall.
Actually, Kosygin's confrontation with Mao was anevenfor the new Soviet leaders. The encounter helps to explain the
remark: LmmRmmmmmmmmmmi
and Kosygin to thead place
today" and the oriental mind is indeed "inscrutable."
In answer to Kosygln's plea for an end to polemics, Mao waxed poetic. "Open discussion causes noe contended. "The sky will not fall, fish will not stop swimming, women will continue to give birth. The battle of pen and paper does not kill. m in favor of it, and it will continue0 years more."
The Russian premier claimed that, with Khrushchev gone, "things have changed. We are meeting you half way, fraternally." Summarily rejecting this approach, Mao berated the Soviets once again for the policies laid down athd party congresses, and thoir "mistreatment" of Albania. Both Chou En-lai, and Liu Shao-chi joined in this denunciation of Moscow. The Chinese leaders demanded that the Soviets publicly apologize for all their pastnd this Kosygin Indignantly rejected as "impossible."
Kosygin's stress on the nood for Communistthe "imperialists" elicited the responsethat unity will be possible only "when they riseone of us." HeS attackyears. Angered and perplexed, Kosygin abruptly tookand returned to Moscow to report on theand "inscrutability" he encountered in theCity. iur mon.
22 The Meet inn, of ommunist. Parties5
From the outset. Khrushchev's successors were faced withay to retreat, at tolerable political cost, froro the anti-Chinese preparatory conference Khrushchev had scheduled for Although talks with Chou En-lai in Moscow in early November produced no agreement, the Soviets worked out an arrangement in consultation with othor parties, to postpone the meeting. in order to avoid grantingomplete tactical victory.than canceling tho gatheringthat it had been rescheduled
The Russian leaders knew only too well that they would comefire from many quarters on this issue, and werenot to repeat the mistakes of their heavy-handed Accordingly innder pressure frominfluential foreign parties, the Soviets downgraded tho status ofparty mooting that took placearch In Moscow.
Khrushchev had calledormal sessionparty "editorial committee" to prepare an all-party conference, and had made It clear that plans would proceed whether or not the Chinese agreed to attend His successors reduced the deferred project ere "consultative" gathering and gave special stress to their ostensible hope that all invitees would Nevertheless, as expected, the Chinese and six other invited parties boycotted the session, and the Italians and others attended very reluctantly
The March meeting was the scene of serious dissension over how best to meet the Chinese challenge No consensus could be reached. The bland communique released after the meeting reflected its inconclusive results and. tnMoscow's retreat on the questionorld Communist conf
Nevertheless the Soviets still periodically pay lip to the conference proposal. Evidently they feel they cannot afford to let it collapse completely. Moreover,seeks to exploit China's opposition toeeting in order to demonstrate that Peking is not at all interested in resolving interparty differences and that it fears the views of the "vast majority" of parties. The Chinese, for their part, attacked the March meeting in characteristically scurrilous terms and repeated their demand that the USSRpubliclyall major Issues in dispute
23. Chinese Obstruction of "Unity of Action" on Vietnam
Throughouthere were bitter and protracted negotiations among Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam over Soviet military aid shipments to the DRV. The Chinesethatobstruct and delay the growthoviet militaryin North Vietnam for fear Soviet political Influence would follow. To this end. theyoviet request in late February for an "air corridor" across China, andassive Soviet airlift of military goods to the DRV.
About the same time, the Chinese vehementlyoviet request for air bases in South China, near the Vietnamese border, to be manned by Soviet personnel. The USSR apparently lntonded these bases to serve as assembly points for MIG fighters shipped by rail from the Soviet Union, but may also have wished to use them to permitpilots to give advanced training to DRV pilots over Chinese airspace. In denouncing this Soviet requestemand for "militaryhe CCP presumably recalled the Soviet military proposals it had rejected inS.
In addition, rail shipment of Soviet air defense weapons across China was delayed for many weeks in the early spring5 by an impasse in Sino-Soviet In the fall, long after this problem had been solved, the Chinese used procedural excuses toother Soviet military rail shipmont to Northfor several months.
the Chinesere-
peatedly rejected Soviet proposaTs^Torj^^jirit state-ment" by Moscow, Peking, and Hanoioint summit meeting of the three countries to coordinate aid to NorthNorth Vietnamese support for these proposals. In the fall, the Soviets further exploited Chinese obduracy by lobbyingloc conference on aid to the DRV, which the Chinese predictably also Peking has countered by challenging Moscow to ship its military aid to North Vietnam by sea, despite the risk of confrontation with the United States, and by demanding that the Sovietsrisis ln Europe to divert US energies. (MAP) The CPSU has responded by accusing the Chinese of seeking toar between the Soviet Union and the United States.Frnrff ^hno I'omkiw DISSEM)
24. Validity oi Sino-Soviet Defense Treaty
The treaty of friendship and mutual assistance worked out by Mao and Stalin0 no longer has real validity.
The secret Chinese letter6 to theUnion reinforced earlier evidence that Peking no longer expects Moscow to honor its treaty commitment. The letterwide-ranging polemical assault on the Sovietthat Moscow has attempted to use the treatyever to force Peking into line and added that the Chinese look on the Russiansnegative factor" in the event the Vietnam war spreads to China.
Soviet apprehensions over Peking's recklessness appear to have increased rapidly in recent years. Moscow'ssupport during8 Taiwan Straits crisis sorely disappointed Peking, as did Khrushchev's advice, after his talks with President Eisenhower, topeacefulwhich would result in accepting "two Chinas."
By the end2 the Chinese were implying that the treatyorthless document and the following year they said so openly. Inhinese representativeonference in Tokyo angrilylaim by the Soviet delegate that Russian nuclear weaponsrotective umbrolla for Peking. He claimed the Chinese relied mainly on their own strength to discourage US at-
A Benior Chinese official toldem-
ber at about the same time tha' thedead letter."
In an interview with Egyptian newsmen last spring, Chou En-lai implied that the USSR might not come to China's assistance if the US attacked and claimed that Peking would prefer the Soviets to stand clear. Chou alsoestern diplomat last November that the USSR would not holp Peking or even try toS attack. Foreign Minister Chen Yi had gone even further in Septemberan obvious attempt to blackensuggested that the Soviets might join the US and its allies if they attacked China.
The Soviets have been more cautious, but have warned publicly that Peking does notlank check on Russian military support. In private tney have circulated awhich charges that China is trying toar between tho USSR and the US. This accusation may be intended to prepare the ground for disavowing any military obligation to China should the latter become embroiled in war with the US. oitrKr.vnvtm hsf nm.vi
MQ fcOnttU'iHiiV
are
ere beommonm" between the Marxist-Leniniststs? Mow cantthore basis forhe relation"be-ushchev revisionists andot one in which "what binds us .much stronger than what dividesiby.the new leaders of the CPSU. On ndamental issues of the present epoch on is one of sharp opposition; there that divide us and nothing that unites usy things that are antagonistic and nothing that
People'sed Flag5
^ghg^ues^
fFaV'f ro'm .pub'Xicly'.theannot send.to attend this congress of*
;^CCP Letter to CPSU ofeplying to Sovietd CPSU Congress
25. Chinese Party Underscores Rift With Moscow, Early6
The USSR sent another high-level delegation to North Vietnam in early This group was headedop Sovietmember and party secretary Aleksar.dr Shelepin. As in the case of Kosygln's visitonths earlier, Moscow's paramount aim was to increase its influence in Hanoi at China's expense.
Initially it looked as though Shelepin had failed. His cautious efforts to persuade the North Vietnamese to give serious consideration to political alternatives to the war, and to disregard Chinese advice, were clearly Nor could he obtain much in the way of support for Moscow's anti-Chinese line.
The only commitment he elicitedorthpromise toelegation to the Soviet partyin late March. This hardly seemed angain but when contrasted with Peking's later arrogant rejection of the Soviet invitation it gained added
The Russians were delighted at the self-imposedof the Chinese, particularly since both Northand North Korea sent high-level delegates. These representatives pleased Moscow by their clear, if cautious, appeals for Communistactical line Moscow has used to underscore China's isolation and intransigence.
Thanks to Peking's absence the Soviet leaders were able to conduct their congress without fear of disruption. Predictably, they assumed an above-tho-battle attitude. More in sorrow than in anger, they pointed out that-through no fault of theirwith Chinaunsatisfactory."
The absence of the Chinese from the Soviet party congresseasure of Peking's determination toegmatic, uncompromising course. China's aging leaders apparently felt compelled to demonstrate in this manner their scornful and total rejection of Soviet policies. Only the Albanian, Japanese, Indonesian, and New Zealander Communists joined China in boycotting theJapanese onlyood deal of pressure by the Chinese.
Explaining his party's rejection of the Russianthe Japanese party chief declared that "the Japanese and Soviet Communist parties are, so to speak,tate of diplomatic break." The same can be said of party relations between Moscow and Pekine. fSFfPiT
ANNEX: The Soviet Cutback Inilitary Assistance to China
I. incf
The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the abandonment of major aid projects0evastating blow to Peking. The Chinese economy has never fully recovered, and bitterness over Lhe Sovietout has been an important factor in the deterioration in relations between Moscow and Peking.
The massive program of Soviet assistance was the key element in Communist China's rapidand technological growth in. the decade the USSR provided moreorth of machinery and equipment for complete industrial plants. At0 Soviet advisers and hundreds of tons of blueprints and technicalwere sent to China. hinese technicians and researchers went to the Soviet Union for training and anhineseacademic studies there.
hina has sharply reduced itson the Soviet Union and has paid off its debts to Moscow. In the past six yearseconomic cooperation has declinedCHART)
A. Trade and Aid
hen Sino-Soviet commercialwere at their high point, tho Soviet Union accounted forercent of China's foreign trade. The USSR exported to China as much as It did to all free world underdeveloped countries combined. Half of all Soviet exports of machinery and nearly three out of every four complete plants sent abroad went to China.
9 China rivaled East Germany as the USSR's principal trading partner, supplying twice as much to the Soviet Union as all free world
underdeveloped countries together. Chinaifth of the Soviet Union's total imports, two thirds of its food imports, and three quarters of its textile imports. Soviet willingness to accept Chinese agricultural raw materials and large amounts of Industrial consumer goods, especially textiles, helped China pay for the large-scale imports foron. (GRAPHS)
Communist China has acknowledged the receipt of long-term Soviet loans amounting to Of this, the lion's share was probably used for military purposes. The share allocated tobeen small.
thoro have been major changes in the pattern of China's foreign trade. After the collapse of the "Leap Forward" and the withdrawal of Soviet techniciansrain from the free world began to replace machinery and equipment from the Soviet bloc as China's chief import item.1 Communist China has beenillion tons of Western grain each year at ancost00 million.
Sino-Soviet trade has declined each yearnd4 it droppedevelne quarter the levelespite this reduction, however, Chinaarge export surplua^to^Dav off its indebtedness ahead of schedule.
B. Soviet Industrial Projects in China
The Soviet withdrawal crippled Communist China's program for rapid Industrialization which depended on the Soviet commitment to assist in the buildingajor industrial plantshe Soviet equipment for these plants was valued3 billion. By the endillion worth of equipment for these projects had been delivered androjects had been With Soviet and Eastern European support, Communist China expanded production of29 at an annual average rate of aboutate of growth impossible to achieve without the aid. This flow of equipment
and technical assistanceital effect on the quality of China's industrialization, enabling China to produce such prestige items as jet aircraft, sub-narines, large electric generating equipment, nctal-cuttlng machine tools, tractors, trucks, andequipment. (MAP)
When the Soviet technicians left, much work remained to be done on the important steel complexes of Pao-tou and Wu-han, and on construction of large hydroelectric stations on the Yellow River. which never got beyond the planning stagefacilities for the production of chemicals (nitrogen fertilizer, plastics, and synthetiche developmentore balanced steel industry, additional support to defense industries (aircraft, shipbuilding, and groundnd theof specj^Ljj^ifidinachine tools and precision instruments.
II. Military Assistance
Communist China was determined to growodern military power and Soviet military aida good start along this path. Immediately following the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty inoviet advisers beganin China. China's entry into the Korean War later0 greatly accelerated tha flow of Soviet military hardware.
As the Chinese industrial and scientific base grew, the Soviet Union provided an increasing amount of industrial technology. This permitted thefirst to assemble and then toroad array of Soviet military hardware, including tanks, interceptor aircraft, submarines, andequipment. Similar Soviet assistance was provided to the Chinese nuclear and missile programs. Chinese scientists and technicians were trained toase which could support native Chinese production of Soviet-designed weapons. (Map)
Inowever, the blow fell. TheUnion withdrew almost all the specialists participating in these military-related programs, the Soviet military mission was terminated, and the program of massive military assistance to Chinaalso ended about this time. jtaaaaBaBBBBBBBBBBBBB^
A. Ground Forces Support
The Chinese Communist army0 wasa mass of infantry men armed with riflesew automatic weapons, withinimum of artillery and an extremely haphazard logistical organization. There wereroops, organized intoll-equipped infantry3 artillerynderstrengthunits, and other support units.
ational Military Service and Conscription Law was promulgated and the conversion of what wasuerrilla-type ground forceodern army began. At that time the army
had grownroops. The infantry was reorganizedivisions, but these were stronger and better equipped. The number of artillery and armored units had increasedwith the flow of Soviet artillery and tanks into the Korean conflict. By the end8 when the4 type tank rolled off the assembly line at Pao-tou, the Chinesehad4mall number of heavy JS tanks, sufficient toittle more than half the tank regiments. Although the Pao-tou tank plant is large and is capable of producing atanks per year, there is good evidence that production has not reached this figure and may even have dwindled
Aircraft
Apart from providing a large number of military aircraft, the Soviet Union had embarkedrogram designed to give theapability to manufacture certain types of In4 the Chinese produced their first native-builtpiston trainer. In6 the first Jet engine reportedly was produced. In6 the firstresdo--was turned outSoviet aid" plant at Shenyang. 7irstoIt light transport was producedhinese plant at Nanchang. Assembly ofarmer jet aircraft at Shenyang began0 but wasew months lateresult of the Sdviet withdrawal.
It is not clear whether Soviet deliveries of combat aircraft were completely discontinued after Theishbeds now in the Chlnose air force were first detected2 and apparently were received sometimehere can be no doubt, however, that the supply of spare parts was cut off, and that this was the reason for the decline in thenventory from0 tot present.
A reduction in numbers of MIC fighters and Soviet-madehort-ago of sparealso occurred over
C. Naval Support
From an almost nonexistent basehe Chinese Communists, with the support of the Soviet Union, proceeded toavalindustry. Under Soviet supervisionyards built five distinct classes of naval ves sels: medium-range submarines, destroyer escorts, subchasers, minesweepers, and motor torpedo boats.he Chinese appeared to have assumedfor the ship assembly aspect of those programs, the most important of which was the one forlass torpedo-attack submarine. When the Soviets withdrew their technicians and stopped ship ping naval equipment to China, the industry wasdisrupted. Althoughf thelass un its that had been launched0 had been it took the Chinese three more years before they could finish the last seven units. of two orlass submarines didnd construction oflass sub marine was not completed H
Soviet assistance to the Chineso advanced weapons program began in5 and expanded rapidly in the following throe years. Construction of the rail line that was to serve the missile test range at Shuangchengtzu was begun innd preparationsuclear test program apparently began In Tho scope of these activities In the early years clearly Indicated that Chinesepersonnel were to have been trained in tbe operation of Soviet delivery systems.
Nevertheless, by the spring8 strains in Sino-Soviet relations evidently prompted the Soviets to put forward explicit proposals for joint control of any Sovlot weapons systems provided
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to China. The dispute soon cut into the wholeof Soviet aid to Peking's advanced weapons program, causing the Soviets infrom Chinaample atomic weapon and the halting of construction of an important uranium metals plant. By the time of the departure of the Soviet technicians in the entireprogram in the advanced weapons field had evidently been withdrawn.
In the atomic energy field, the Chinese were able to overcome the Soviet withdrawal, but still were unable to detonate their first nuclear device until the fall In the missile field, on the other hand, available evidencethat they have had more difficulty. Most Of the firings at Shuangchengtzu probably have involved missiles left behind by the Soviets, During the past few years, however, there have been signs of tho development of an indigenous Chinese missile test program, k^m
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