SPECIAL REPORT
JAPAN RETHINKING SECURITY POLICY
central intelligence agency
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
JAPAN RETHINKING SECURITY POLI
CY
the first time since their devastatingIn World tbe Japanese haveerious and responsible debate on nationalThe major aspect of this debate Is the degroo of defense capability required if Japan is toirst-class power status commensurate with Its pre-eminence as the fourth industrial power in the free world and the economic leader in the Far East. Government leaders, taking advantage of risingare stressing that Japan mustreater effort to provide for its own dofense, while maintaining the US-Japan Uutual Security Treaty as an indispensable adjunct of national security. Nevertheless, Japanese defense planners are still handicapped by the postwar legacy ofand pacifism.
Provision for Nationa1 Security
Doth popular attitudes and constitutional proscription have handicapped the development of Japan's defense. Deep-seated antipathy toward the military arising from the experience of military domination and the shock of defeat in World War II has only recently begun to fade. Pacifism was enshrined inIX of Japan's postwarwhich bars theof "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential." This restriction was circumvented beginning with the creation of the National Police Reserve under USaegis0 and theof the Self-Defense Forces four years later. ACourt decision subsequently upheld by implication theof these forces, butconservative governments have shied away from attempting to remove tho constitutionalbecause the combined opposition has the votes to block amendment.
Today the Self-Defense Forces (SDP) consist ofen, principally in the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDFX By policy, however, theyurely defensive role, and in fact are considered to haveimited Military policy does not envision morn than arole for Japan's armed forcesajor conflict. Planning has boen based on the belief that successful dofense of Japan depends upon US naval and air force*.
The CSDF is capable oferving internal order, butargely equipped with obsolescent
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US-supplled weapons and Isto cope with major.
Tnc Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has been formally given th* mission of defending coastal waters and seabut Its surface force and air an, despite theirequlpnent, are barelyto carry out this task.
Thu Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Is capable of providing adequate tactical support for both ground and naval forces, but does not have thelo defend independentlyetermined attack by either Communist China or the
USSR.
Budget allocations forhave been consistently parsimonious. While thesuns appropriated have nounted yearly, the proportion of tho budget devoted to defense has remained neur eight percent for the past five years. The arced forces' share of the GNP has barely exceeded oneigure far below the norm for countries of comparablestrength.
Japan's defense continues to depend, as lt hasn tho US. The terms of the relationship, expressed In the Security Treaty signed2 and revised provide the US with Important bases In the Far East. Beginning0 the treaty can be revised or terminated on one year's notice. The leftistrincipally the JapanParty astampaign to end the US alliance Playing on the public's fears that the treaty will drag Japan ajor war over Vietnam, tho JSP is trying to set offlike those It used to bring down the Kishi government
In the face of continuing Socialist attacks on tho treaty and "Americanrime Minister Sato has beenincreasingly forthright statements about the necessity of continuing the alliance He has even hinted that the troaty should be revised to provideixed term rather than possible abrogationne-year notice. Although Sato's Liberal Democratic Party
is deeply split on this issue, the encouragement of publicemphasizes Sato'sthat Japanese attitudes have matured on the problem.
New Approaches
The government'sto face defense problems reflects the revival ofand the growingthat Japan is one of the great nations of the world. Japanese policy makers, faced with the hard facts of power, arc embarrassed to discover their countryipher, dependent upon the US. They want anposture even though it would probably closelymost US policies, to enhance their country's stature in the eyes of its citizens.
However, Sato, althoughationalist who favored increased defenses, did notit politically feasible until5 to support stronger security policies The way for this new stand was opened by Peking's two nuclear explosions and the crises in Southeast Asia which have obliged the Japanese to think more seriously aboutproblems. While more heat than light has beenin the popular debate, at least some Japanese have come to recognize that Japan's voice carries little weight incouncils withoutstrength to back it up.
Further, the growth ofpower and the instability in the Malay archipelago have suggestedew that Japan must think about defense of its "lifeline" to its markets throughout South and East Asia. About half of Japan's energy resources depend on tankers traversing those waters, and one third of its trade is with the underdeveloped lands there. Naval chief Admiral Tomoharu Nishimura has stressed the need for escorting tankers on Japan's "lifeline" to the Middle East. The reappraisal of Japanesepolicy probably willmore meaningful as Japanese realization of dependence grows.
New Roles for the SDF
Officials charged with planning Japan's defenseong-range basis face several problems. In trying toneeds five years or more hence they must take intothe possibility that the Security Treaty way beat any timeoredible defenseavailableapan would have to embark at onceajor rearmamentpossibly including acapability. In addition to the political hazards inher-herent in any nuclear weaponsefense buildup will seem wasted to the Japanese if the conservatives continue In control and the treaty remains in force.
Japan's leaders nay be trying to influence popular opinion in favorefense buildup by encouragingof SDF missions goingthe present conception and capability. In5 the director general of theAgency, ftaizo Matsuno,rial-balloon appeal to nationalism by stating that Japan must achieve andefense capabilitye claimed that Japan could not depend on the US in case of emergency and that it wasfor an independent country to have foreigninstallations on its soil permanently. Since then he has continued to call for andefense structure in keeping with Japan's advanced status in other fields and has raised the specterhinese Communist nuclear threat.
The acquisition of acapability, despitepublic sensitivities, is being increasingly airedogical corollary of andefense posture. Former chiefs of the services haveadvocating the use ofnuclear weapons for defense only and the development of an antimissile capability. they justify nuclear arms as necessary to givetrategic deterrent. Admiral Iclilzo Sugle, chairman of the Joint Staff Council, reportedly feels that even with theof the US guarantee, Japanreat power should acquire nuclear weapons.
Conservative PrimeSato has been quitein reaffirming pastof nuclear arms. He has made it clear, however, that he welcomes thelthoughconservatives as well as the leftist opposition have pointed to tbe inconsistency ofnuclear arms while still depending on them ultimately. He has been careful not to close the doorutureweapons program.
Two revolutionary for using Japanese forces overseas have received wideand some publicinasmuch as they concern subjects close to JapaneseUnited Nations and Okinawa. Japanesein the UN as the harbinger of world order is strong, and national defense policy calls for support of UN activities. Following Japan's recent election to the Security the raising of theof cooperation inoperations gave the government the opportunity to state that participation in observation-type missions did not contravene the Considerableopposition, however, government spokesmen to backtrack somewhat on theor legal obstacles toand there seems little Immediate prospect that such supervisory missions can bo authorized without revising prosent legislation.
A second possibility for sending troops abroad wasby Sato's suggestion that Japanese forces might be used in the defense of Okinawa if US bases there were attacked. The Socialists charged Sato with scheming to violate theby dispatching the SDF to American-administered territory. Socialist obstruction in the Diet influenced Sato to explain that he was merelyfrank, fraternal expression of Japanese nationalnd that in fact the constitution, thetreaty, and present SDF laws rule out an exercise of the right of self-defense by Japan on Okinawa. The exchangesleft the public with the impressionoreand independent policy for national defense.
Popular Attitudes
The Sato government's failure to disclaim the more extreme statements on military matters indicates its estimate that the public is ready to considerproblemsore realistic framework. The relatively quiet public acceptance of the visits by US nuclear-powered submarines to Sasebo illustrates the growing popular tolerance even on nuclear natters. The Socialists, however, continue to emphasize nuclear dangers In pushing the "peace" theme on which they have depended so heavily in the past to develop "nass" appeal. They have recently accused the Sato government of "stockpiling" legal precedents through its stepped-up program of visits by nuclear-powered vessels and of planning to add visits by
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Socialists claim that the government is trying to prepare the public for the introduction of nuclear arms.
The government's effort to isolate the Socialists byto the more moderate opinion groups appears to besome success. There have been recent indications thatwithin the opposition(particularly the small Democratic Socialist and the Buddhist Komeito) acknowledge the value of the US role in Japjn's dwfxnse. In fact WJBmmmmmmmml HmmnmmmmmfmmTrrSoka Gakkai, Komeito's parent organizatioiummmmmmlmm"* [fjugsi
y-.ru,- stand for nonallgnment in foreignot only supported the present security system but also felt that Japan should eventually have nuclear arms. Public opinion pollsrowingof the SDF and of Japan's alignment with the free world,trong minority still resists both of these.
Even among Japanese whothe need for defense forces there are many who believe that Japan's rising standard ofmade possible by minimum de-fenso outlays, has enabled the country to avoid Communism, and that this should not beby substantial increases in defense spending. Most in fact, probably prefer that the US guarantee theirand spare then the expense, risk,and responsibilities They argue that Japan cannot afford the effort to provide
a nuclear capability of its own and should rely on the US Many, however, would be willing toreater Japanese defense effort to bring about the removal of US bases but wish to retain the USof security.
More nationalistichave appeared among groups who may have taken their cue from Defense Agency chief katsu-no's remarks last summer. They find dependence on theompletelydefense effort, and are willing to pay the costs. Some of them advocate theof an Independent nuclear capability, although theirforrogram isat present.
plan will be completed fairly close to its targets.
As now dm lied the Third Defense Plan, to be launched in callsomewhat greater effort in the provision of firepower, mobility, and general modernization, and the improvement of air anddefense. ajorinnovation creates small reserves for the air anddefense forces In addition to those for the ground forces. For the latter, the draft the same authorization as the Second Defense Planersonnel, but this may well remain academic since the less prestigious ground forces have continuing problems inand retaining
Effort and The Third Defense Plan
Of tidal and publicof the defense problemgeneral support for the limited buildup envisaged under the prospective five-year Third Defense Plan, the draft of which is being prepared by the Defease Agency Tor submission to the Sa-tional Defense Council by For the last year of the present Second Defense, tho SDFizableercent over thefor fiscal rising costs will make it much less in real terms. Nevertheless, the
Three major goals of the present proposalot deficiencies In the SDF; development of aIndustrial defense base;aising budgetprogressively to the level Of two percent of the CNP. The total cost of the package has been estimated5igure more than double that for the previous plan.
While the anticipatedwill increase the credibility of Japan's defense efforts, the modest modernization possible under the limitation to twoof GNP is quite Inadequate
"SEVRES
relieve the US of itsfor Japan's defense. The government continues to count on the Security Treaty for Japan's defense and considers the continuing offer of bases to the US the least It can do in the absenceonstitutional sanction for participating more fullyruly common defense.
If present trends in public opinion continue to move as rapidly and in the saneas they have over the past few months, however, it may prove possible to go beyond present limitations before the period of the Third Defense Plan is completed. (liaTin'T JiQ.
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Original document.
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