intelligence memorandum
THE NEW REGIME IN GHANA
directorate of intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The New Regime in Ghana
years of steady leftward movement the political pendulum in Ghana hassharply to the right. atterebruary, long disaffected senior arsy andofficers toppled the Osagyefo'spower structure and set Ghana ondifferent course. In terms of theforoign affairs, this has already resulted In
a dramatic curtailment of the old regime's extensive Involvement with the Communist world and brought other changes having the effect of putting Ghana in line with the moderate African states. Ghana had been the most dependable African base of operations for the Communist world. Internally, the intention at least for the present apparently is to reconstruct the body politicramework inspired in large measure by liberal Western values. So far, thisupheaval has received overwhelming popular.
this early date, however, it cannotcertain that Ghana will make orderlyalong the altered course. The new regimeto have taken hold quickly and effectively,
but It is still very much in its initial shakedown phase, and lines of real authority and influence ore embryonic. Above all there Is the extremelyeconomic situation inherited from the Nkrumah era. The new leaders seem realistically appreciative of the magnitude of the problem racing then on this frontindeed, thenomic plight ofealthy Ghaiu^HMMlMVrinary consideration prompting them to depose Nkrumah. However, the
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realities are such that it would seem very likely that neither the new leadership nor foreign friends can appreciably ease the severe economic squeeze on the populace in the weeks immediately ahead. The degree of severity will depend in part on how iar the austerity reform measures are actually implemented Another conditioning factor will be the new regime's success in obtaining fast delivery of desperately needed imports.
The Current Situation in Ghana
Two weeks after the coup there is nothat the forces which carried it out are firmly in control throughout the country. All regular army units and even the special presidential guardrallied to the elements which spearheaded the operationew hours of its initiation. The well-organized network of police, disarmed and purged by Nkrumah two years ago following an attempt on his lifeoliceman, has been rearmed,tho new regime additional musilt-. The small air force and navy have also endorsed the change.
It is similarly clear thai Ghana's present rulers enjoy the enthusiastic support of the vast majority of the populace. The US Embassy in Accra has reported that the publicized anti-Skrumahthere have for the most part been genuinely spontaneous. No curlew has been imposed and none has been needed at any time since tho coup, and military personnel were removed early from the streets and most nonmilitary installations. not one of the many prominent Ghanaiansthe country at the time of the coup hasfor Nkrumah. Most top officials who were traveling with Nkrumah, even old ones who wereclose to him, have returned to Ghana and pledged support to the new government.
This reaction among Ghanaians bears outindications tn recent years that virtually all segments of the country's society had become alienated from NkruBahA,Bt^-Fi,lenS1^ independence nine years ago. Thestemmed mainlyWbitrary rule, his pro-Communist proclivities, and, especially, the economic
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squeeze and dislocations felt at all
ebruary Ghanaian affairsdirectedational Liberation Councilno* of eight army and police officers. headed by popular General Ankrah, whomfired on suspicion of disloyalty last summer,
and includes the two prime movers of the coup, police chief Harllcy and General (then Colonel) Kotoka. The latter lined up the essential military support from his former position in command of one of Ghana's two army brigades. Althoughreat dealnown about any of the members of tho government, they all have reputations for professional competence. The key leaders, at least, are personallyand pro-Western, although thoy haveeschewed active politics in accordance with the British tradition in which they were schooled. They seem likely to be particularly friendly to the US.
new leadership, inexperienced in is backed up by some half dozennew functional committees made up ofservants and specialists. Apparently theof these is an Administrative andwhich reportedly stands between thethe other committees dealing with suchas foreign affairs and the economy. Again,
all persons named to these various committees are reputed to be competent professionals. Most of them, including all members of the key economicare believed to be favorably disposed to the West.
Britain's African dependencies,all of Black Africa, the indigenous civilinherited by free Ghana7 was theand best prepared for independence. progressive estrangement fromost of these civilWestorn oriented. Some top-flightso keenly dissatisfied with Nkrumah'sthey found employment outside the country.
Many of those who reraaine*fPW"^MfHB|lbkeniy critical, in private, of Nkrumah's flVMWH'y rule andpolicies.
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of Nkrumah's Instruments of personal ruleimmediately and since the day of tho coup thehas been focusing heavily on dismantlingpower structure and laying the foundations forGhana." Beginning with the dissolution ofpervasive political party, all theinstitutions used to perpetuate his control havesuppressed entirely or, like the press and theUnion Congressreoroughtyrevamped. All available political officials andparty activists of the old regime ari* evidentlydetained, although reportedly most are to bequickly. Commissions of inquiry have been set upofficial corruption under Nkrumah. prisoners, most of whom had been incarcerated underPreventive Detention Act first passedset free. Not included among these were the twoclose Nkrumah associates whose acquittal at3 prompted Nkrumah to emasculate Ghana'sliTlndependent judiciary.
Among major policy changes actuallynotably by General Ankrah in Important speechesnd 2in the economic realm are the most basic and significant. They have been accompanied byof the mismanagement, waste, and corruption of the old regime.
Although the stated general aim of theprogressive welfarehe Intent clearly is to reverse the official commitment, under Nkrumah,uinously inefficient variant of state socialism. Ankrah, guided by tho Western-oriented economic committee, has indicated that future emphasis will be on enlarging the private sector, partly at the expense of some of the existing state corporations. Government spending,for nonproduclve prestige projects and Africanso favored by Nkrumah, is to be sharply retrenched. Publicly, stress has been placed on national self-reliance, but the new regime obviously is counting upon major help from Western countries
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actions already taken underguidelines designed to get the econonyInclude curtailment of operations by thea heavy moneyof Nkrumah's overly ambitiousplan. ew plan is to be prepareda two-year stock-taking period beginningintroductionew, reduced-expenditurenext July. To provide some immediate reliefpopulace, the stiff social security tax andduties and sales taxes on certainhave been reduced. Existing tradewhich an increasing proportion of Ghana'sbeen diverted to Communist countries inare to be respected, but will beeneral, long-term move toward greatlytrade controls. All Soviet and Chineseprojects have been suspended for theand Ghana's representation abroad reportedly
is to be cut back sharply. At the same time,have been made for0 million in Western aid for the remainder6 to meetliabilities and to finance imports.
This profound economic shift comesine when Ghana's economy hadew nadir. For the average Ghanaian, visiblo ills includepercent over the pastrising unemployment, declining real incomes, and food and consumer goods shortages. ational perspective, they are highlightedational debt massiveountry such asand serious trade and budget deficits.
Less visible, but equally serious, is the general structural imbalance of the economy. government spending not only generated the deficits and debt, but also led to Investment in long-term projects which are nonproductive and in some instances totally useless. Many of theso debts will fall due in the next few years. Such investment was most often financed by short- or medium-term "supplier credits" at high interest rates. Imports were progressively directed to the public sector whileeconomy were reduced, with the Mr^Mrr'niat prices ofgoods spiraled upward and manufacturing and commercial firms wore frequently forced to reduce or suspend operations for lack of vital materials.
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Nkrumah blamed Ghana's economic woes on the decline In world prices forchiefthe. Actually, however, cocoa earnings have remained remarkably stableprice fluctuations. The current criticalis almost wholly attributable to irrational expenditure by the government. osult offorced-pace socialisit, at least two thirds of the wage-earning labor force was employed by the government on the eve of the coup. At the same time, declines in private investment and employment had not been counterbalanced by increased production from the enlarged public sector.
From the outset the new rulers havedenied that their accession to power meant any "automatic" changes in foreign policy and have stressed their adherence to Ghana's long-standing official po}icy of nonallgnment. According to Ankrah, the only difference would be thatthis posture would be followed strictly "in theory and practice" in contrast to the "lip-service' observance byclear allusion to thepresident's general identification with the Communist world.
So far both deeds and private words have in fact added upery abrupt and extensive curtailment of Ghana's involvement with Communist countries In favor of closer ties with the West. This basic policy shift was most dramaticallyby the expulsion of all Soviet and Chinese technicians ordered onebruary, presumably largelyecurity measure. Tho evacuation of the Chinese, totalingdvisers and their families, was substantially completed within four days. The exodus of the much largerechnicians plusexpected to continue until mid-March. After that tho presence of Chinese and Soviets in Ghana is supposed to be confined to lS-membcrstaffsew press representatives. pressure from some military members of the NLComplete rupture with tho two Communist powers has so tarjy concern,ially on the part of nBSSSiythe credibility of the new regime's professions of nonallgnment.
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IS Other actions Immediately detrimental to" the Communists include the expulsion of East Germany's small trade mission, which had enjoyedstatus under Nkrumah, and the revocation of Aeroflot's landing rights,uspension of its Accra service- The latter action followedof news onebruarypecialof the Soviet civil air line was transporting Nkrumah from Peking to Moscow and reflected fear that the Russians might try to fly him back into Accra.
19- Ghanaian missions in Eastern Europe evidently will be among the first to bo closed out in the current economy drive. Communist countries are likely to be distressed, however,ass exodus of Ghanaian students there set inesulteported invitation by the NLC to all students who are "unhappy" with their conditions to .come home. There areuch Ghanaians in Communist countries and thev have frequently been at the center of altercations involving African students.
in contrast with these developments, the new regime has already resumed diplomatic relations with Britain, which Nkrumah had severed lastover Rhodesia. Moreover, the key leaders have repeatedly expressed in private their good will toward the US. On one occasion. Ankrah, in anot entirely happy parallel, said he looked forward to developing with the USelationship just as close as Nkrumah had had with the Soviet representative.
A similarly sharp policy reversal is being implemented in Africanphere in which Nkrumah expended major sums of money and much energy in pursuit of grandiose dreams of primacyolitically united continent. Announcing flatly that "the davs of harboring and training politicalto subvert other independent states arenkrah has pledged to honor the nonintervention principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) The new leaders" sincerity in this connection was underscored by their cl <tfpMffHFtttElttrv of
the coup, of the secret Mn?WFfIuiTy camP at whichgroups of "freedom fighters"ariety
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of independent countries and still dependentreceived training in guerrilla techniques from Chinese Communist instructors. Subsequently, some of the refugees involved in such activities were placed under detention.
reconciliation missions arevisit Ghana's immediate neighbors, allNhrumah, who regarded them as Ankrah has also indicated that hiswill work to strengthen the OAU as anof equal sovereign states. He pledgedfor efforts of'lts African Liberationignored by* Nkrumah, to speed theremaining colonial territories. Such actionshave contributed to the promptthe new Ghana regimeignificant numbermoderate African states.
The Short-Term Outlook
seems to be no reason why Ankrahassociates should not remain securely incontinue Ghana's new Westward-inclination inimmediately ahead. No domesticor interest groupsignificantfor threatening the new status quo have Nkrumah's leftist sycophants, evenreleased from detention, would haveof stirring up trouble should they be so With the possible exception of laborTettegah, they had no "constituency" ofbut were always entirely dependent on ribal brother of theleaders and above all an opportunist,land on his feet somewhere in the newany event, the security services, now beingunder Harlley's supervision, willa close watch over possible dissidents. clearly favorable in terms ofwould be adversely affected by anyout or factionalism among NLC members,not now in sight.
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the new leaders have professed ato return to representative civilian governmentashey apparently will be in noimplement their promiseew constitutionelections. Moreover, Ankrah, at least, seems to
be rapidly developing the personal political ambition he has denied and Initially seemed not to have. arch he indicated privately his disinclination to turn back power any time soon to politicians, including any of the antl-Nkrumah exiles who now may try to resume an active role in Ghana. He reportedly now favorsof control by the NLC for approximately two years and is considering offering himself foras heada civilian governmentis formed, For the present all political parties and activity arc banned and all the politicians are out of the picture.
As the new regime settles in, the special new committees of high-powered civil servants seem likely to play an increasingly important role. They are already reported to be exercising more and more influence on the NLC, most of whose members are not equipped for policy formulation. Recent statements asserting the IXC'Sto the "fight" against colonialism and racial"in overy part of the world" may wellirect reflection of this. The composition of theaffairsof its members formerly headed Nkrumah's activist African Affairs suggests that it Is probably trying to move the NLC backore milltantly "African" posturo. In the future greater efforts may also be made to strengthen the regime's avowed nonaligned image.
The new leaders will for some time probably be highly jumpy about the intentions of Nkrumah, but hisfor obtaining any significant material supportdim. The ousted president's continued presence in Guinea has helped sustain this nervousness and the NLC's consequent susceptibility to all sorts of unconfirmedabout foreign-supported plans to restore Nkrumah
by force. Two such reports available hero aro certainly highly exaggerated at best. At present thore is no firm evidence that any power which couldeaningfultoroject has agreed to do so. Moreover, Nkrumah himself, rivaUVIOVHiFMPUUlHon late last week
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and again in his speech broadcast from Conakryarch, appeared resigned to his inability for now to do anything to reverse the coup.
At the least, the new regime's intra-African relations promise to bo complicated for some time by Lhe more radical African regimes' emotional opposition to Nkrumah's ouster. In addition to Tourers frenetic and essentially empty gestures in Nkrumah's behalf, Egypt's Nasir now appears inclined toeading role infurther African expressions of disapproval of the coup. There are indications that plans are afoot toonference partly for this purpose in Cairo later this month. Meanwhile, Zambia has moved formally toactive relations with Accra, while the NLC itself hasupture with Guinea.
For the immediate future, however, thecrisis will almost certainly remain the mostanoTpotentially damaging problem facing the new Serious foreign trade deficits cannot bein the short run, since rising imports are necessary to relieve shortages of consumer goods and to revivemanufacturing and commercial activity. Similarly, exports cannot be quickly diversified or markedly Most of the cocoa crop has already been sold for this year, much of it committed to the USSR. Other importantgold, manganese, timber, andbeen stagnant or declining. Domestic food production cannot be increased immediately either,lhe government has appealed to the farmersplantings during the coming rainy season. Moreover, the apparent determination to reduce government spending and otherwise to decrease governmental participation in the economy promises to swell unemployment until thebattered private sector can be rejuvenatedto take up the slack.
The government's proposed tough economic measures would probably accelerate the dissipation of the euphoria in which most Ghanians currently appear to share. If the further hardships which appear Inevitable over the next few months are severe, they could lead to grumbling and perhaps even some strikes and disturbances, although hardly, it would
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seem to any ground swell of support for Nkrumah's Sensitive to these possible repercussions, the NLC has begun to warn the populace that the country's economic problems cannot be resolved quickly and that continued austerity will be required for about two years. Efforts are being made to foster aidentification of the economic troubles with the old regime.
30. Some significant help is in sight. With the new leaders evidently prepared to move forward quicklytabilization program along the lines recommended by the International Monetary Fund last year, Ghana's prospects of obtaining upwardsillion from the IMF now are bright. Meanwhile, West Germany and Britain are evidently prepared to help keep the new regime afloat financially andbasic food supplies until the internationalare worked out. In addition, British technical assistance will bo offered, and London banks are expected not to press for Immediateof Ghana's short term debt to them.
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