A GENERAL OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF GROUPS FORMING IN THE MILITARY WITH THE AIM O

Created: 4/25/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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LBJ LIBRARY Mandatory Review

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A GENERAL OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF .GROUPS FORMING IN THE. MILITARY KITH THE AIM OF MAKING DEMANDS ON THE GOVERNMENT

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1- (SUMMARYI THEREOOSE ASSOCIATION WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICE, RATHER THAN AN ACTIVE CONSPIRACY, OF FIELD-GRADE AND JUNIOR OFFICERS ADVOCATING REFORMS. IN .GENERAL, THESE OFFICERS WITH TO SEE THE GOVERN MEIvT REMAIN IN POWER . THEY WANT STRICT MEASURES mGAINSTORE ACTIVE PROSECUTION CF THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG,

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IRM HANDLING OF OPPOSITION ELE^NTS. THEY ARE NOT IDENTIFIED WITH AKY EXISTING POLITICAL

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THE, MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAVE RECENTLY FORMED GROUPS FAVORING MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT REFORMS ARE MORE "FRIENDS TOGETHER"ONSPIRACY. EY SHARE THE SAME GENERAL BACKGROUNDS, FACE THE SAME PROBLEMS AND FRUSTRATIONS OF LOW-AND MIDDLE-LEVEL COMMAND, AND RAVE THE SAME PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THEY ARE DISSATISFIED AND UNHAPPY,

EXCITABLE, AND LIKELY TO BE PRECIPITOUS IN THEIR ACTIONS. SINCEOF THESE OFFICERS COMMAND COMPANIES AND BATTALIONS, THEY COULD BRING EFFECTIVE FORCEEAR-OUP D'ETAT IF THEY ACTED IN CONCERT. AT PRESENT THERE ARE" NO SIGNS OF EMERGENCE OF LEADERSHIP OR EVIDENCE OF PLANS FOR ACT ION IfcJ THEHEY ARE, NOW. LACKING IN CENTRAL LEADERSHIP, SOMETHING THEY MUST DEVELOP BEFORE THEY CAN MOVE.

3. LKSENERAL NATURE, AND PERHAPSISCUSSIONS Cr THE PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY, HAVE TAKEN,PLACE AMONG THESE OFFICERS. GENERALLY THEY ARE IN AGREEMENT OH THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE GOVERNMENT Cr PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY SHOULDN, PCpER.

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,ND THEHEY CITE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUUORRUPTO ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO GENERALS' NGUYEN

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C. ALL NATIONAL DIFFERENCES MUST BE SUBMERGED IN AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO PROSECUTE THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG. RATHER IDEALIST-CALLY AND EMOTIONALLY THEY BELIEVERULY MILITARY AND DIRECT APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE ONLY ANSWER.

THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT MAKE COMPROMISES WHICH WEAKEN

THE SOLIDARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEY CITE, AS AN EXAMPLE, THE "WEAK"

APPROACH TO THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TC FORCEFULLY SUPPRESS THE OPPOSITION REPRESENTED BY THICH TRI QUANG.

4. THESE OFFICERS ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE KY GOVERNMENT AS SUCH BUT ONLYORE HONEST, FORCEFUL, AND DIRECT APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION CF PROBLEMS FACING THEHEY DO NOT SUPPORT OR REPRESENT THE CATHOLICS, BUDDHISTS, OR ANY POLITICAL PARTY, NOR DO THEY. HAVE A- PLAlFOhuROUP IN TERMS OF JOINT PLANNING OR AGREEMENT REGARDING ACTION TO BE TAKEN. THEY DO NOT APPEAR TC BE COALESCINGOHESIVE FORCE. BCTH COLONEL NGUYEN NGOCHIEF OF THE MILITARY

SECURITY SERVICE AND DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, AND GENERAL LE NGUYEN RHANG, COMMAND fNG OFFICER OF THE.MARINE CORPS AND

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CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THESE OFFICERS, BUT NEITHEREADER OR

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OF THESE OFFICERS. (FIELDESCRIBED COLONEL LOANLEADER" OF ONE OF THE FACTIONS COMPOSED OF OFFICERS SEEKING REFORM,ORE ACCURATE DESIGNATION PROBABLY WOULO BE "SPOKESMAN",)

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Original document.

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