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ORR Contribution to MB
MAIN TRENDS IH SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
CIA/RR1 (ORR)
6
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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
CENTRAL IKTEtrriCKRCE AGENCY Office Of Research and Reports
FOREWORD
Thlo contribution has been prepared by the Office of Research and Reporto (ORR) in response to the Terns of Reference for, Main Trends In Soviet Military Policy. The .Judgments presented in this contribution represent the current views of ORR and have not beenwith other offices of CIA. In this contribution, especially ln the Statistical Appendix, we have presented somewhat greater detail than would be appropriate for the final estimate. We have attempted, in general, to show our reasoning with respect to tho evidencethe contribution.
This estimate comesarticularly difficult time for assessments of long-range trends ln Soviet policy. The Soviet Union has been goingeriod of leadership transition vhlch has been complicated by the war in Vietnam and by the disruptive tactics of the Chinese. it Is clear that certain long-range policy decisions have been hammered out during this period, it is not yet clear what these decisions involve in terms of the structure of future commitments, particularly in the military sphere. The uncertainties created by this situation are particularly relevant to the estimates of expenditures in the most rect.lt tine, for auch estimates must be affected by theedge of expenditurei. on programs that ve assume will be implemented in the near future. Yet, aa Important aa are the uneer taint lea, ve believe it to be equally important to atretic that the trend in military expenditures over the next few years appears to be pointing upward.
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COhTEffTS
P-fie
I. Factors Affecting Soviet Policy5
Strategic Balance
Developments
k
The Resource Allocation
Military Claims on
Econoaic
Demands for Skilled Manpower
II. Current Trends in the
Offensive Forces
Defensive Forces
III* Probable Future Developments
in Military Doetrine
in Personnel Appointments
in Defense
General Considerations
Total Expenditures
Cofcpoaltion of Expenditures,
by Military
k. Composition of Expenditures,
5- Dollar Valuations of Soviet Military
Prograos
6. Future Trends
by
Statistical Appendix
Tables
Soviet Defense Expenditures, by
Percentage Distribution of Soviet
Expenditures, by
3- Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Attack Forces,
by
Expenditures for Strategic Defense Forces,
by
Expenditures for General- Purpose Forces,
by
Defense Expenditures, by Category
of
Distribution of Soviet Defense Expenditures,
by Category of
Valuation of Soviet Defense Expenditures,
by Mission,
Expenditures for Strategic Attack Forces,
by
Expenditures for Strategic Defense Forces,
by
Expenditures for General Purpose Forces,
by
Defense Expenditures, by Category
of
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Follow! pp. Papo
Figure 1- Soviet Military Expenditures, by
Figure 2. US and USSR: Percentage DistributionDefense Expenditures,
Figure 3- US and USSR: Comparison of Defense
Expenditures, by5
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MAIM TRENDS JN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
I- Factors Affecting Soviet Policy5
The Soviet leaders are likely to have found little to encourage then as they viewed thoir strategic situation In the world at the beginning Developments affecting the balance of military forces between the USSR and the US over the preceding year had clearly worked to their disadvantage. The war in Vietnam had stimulated the USapid buildup of its forces to the point where US personnel levels began to rival in size those of the Soviet Union. Thus, to the disparity that the USSR had long suffered in strategic attack forcee, it now faces the added prospect of falling behind also in theater warfare capabilitiesthe dimension of military power that the USSR had long regarded as its favored domain Furthermore, however negligibleilitary power, China threatened to aggravate the Soviet Union's border security problems and to add to the tensions of international relations.
A. The Strategic Balance
The military balances was unfavorable for the USSR According to figures publicly available at the beginning of the year the US missile strike capability5 consisted ofinuteman and someitan II sites as well asubmarine-based Polaris missile launchers. The Soviet ICBM force was nor. only much smaller but also more vulnerable, consisting ofaunchers, most of them soft and clustered at someiming points. Although the USSR appeared to be more active In the development of new ICBM systems at its test ranges, , V? wasnew launch positionsaster rate, thusth* imbalance. Still further tipping the scales of intercontinental strike capabilities against the USSR was the US advantage in mannedhe USomber strike capability consisting ofsfl's, to which the capabilities of its allies added some significant weight.
Confronted by this formidable strategic attack capability, the USSR had made sustained and vigorous efforts for several years toits defenses. To this end, heavy outlays had been made on surface-to-air missilcsnterceptor aircraft, and warning and control systems. Despite impressive achievements, Soviet strategic defense measures have not yettage where they could offer an adequateto the threat posed by the forces arrayed against them.
The relationship between the USSR and the US in conventional warfare strength was more evenly balanced, but even in this sphere there were significant disparities in mission capabilities. The forcesto the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and in the Western border districts were fully capable of effective defensive actions against attack from Europe; hort period of preparation they were also
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capable of mounting strong offensive actions,ull-scale invasion of Europe. Nevertheless, the overwhelming edge in active roan-power which the Soviet Union had once enjoyed in this theater washing of the past. ignificant weakness in Soviet general warfare capabilities was its lack of an adequate ability to mount and sustain military actions in areas beyond the ocean borders of its own territory. The naval strength of the US and its allies was far superior to that available to the Soviet Union- With its large surface forces, includingowerful attack carriers, the US Navy was able not only to support offensive actions in many parts of the world but also to deny the Soviet Union the same capability.
B- International Developments
Seen from Moscow's point of view, international developments5 added new dimensions of insecurity to the Soviet Union's military position. The rapid US military buildup occasioned by the war in Vietnam was the most ominous feature ln this respect. Not only had it brought theeasurable increment in general warfare capabilities, but it also had contributed intangible*benefits of battle experience. Apart from what the war had already brought ln terms of the military relationship between the USSR and the US, it had also added an alarming clement of uncertainty to the international situation.
The war in Vietnam has affected the Soviet Union in several ways. On the military level, it generated sharp anxieties within the regime concerning the adequacy of current military programs, lending support to internal pressures which were always present within the regimeuildup of Soviet forces. Although the US buildup could notlear and present threat requiring the Soviet Union to make matching increases, it could be preoented as an argument for greater efforts tourther widening of the gap between US and Soviet power.
With respect to international policy, lt raised the spectreeepening involvementynamic and dangerous situation whose course and outcome could not be controlled. The possibilityirectconfrontation with the US was clearly presentmost, clearly, perhaps, ir.uestion of whether or not the USSR takes the risk of shipping important military equipment to Korth Vietnam by sea. 5 the USSR declined to take this risk despite Chinese goading.
Finally, in relations with the Communist countries, the Soviet Union was faoed with delicate and difficult choices. The position that the Soviet Union occupied in the dispute with China as uell as Soviet national interestsautious policy with respect to as-ni sting the North Vietnamese. Yet, to sustain its Claim to be the leader Of the Communist camp, the Soviet Union was under strong pressure to deironstrate vigorous support for an embattled ally. Most difficult of all for the Soviet leaders was the question of what to do in the eventino-US conflicta prospect which undoubtedly became increasingly pressing and topical for Soviet contingency planners during the year.
All of these problems promised to remain vith the Soviot Union for some time to come. One of the features of Soviet press comment on the Vietnam war5 van the preoccupation it displayed with the danger that the war might become enlarged. US writings on the concept of "escalation" In war were described and dissected in the Soviet press for the first time. Tbe Chinese vere charged directly with seeking to enlarge the war. The Soviet press also implied that Peiping wished to embroil the Soviet Union in war with tbe US and explicitly reiterated this charge in an official Party letter that was widely disseminated both inside and outside the Soviet Union. The fact that the USSR haa do -vigorously pressed this point strongly suggests that it is seeking to prepare advance justificationefusal to act in the event of Sino-us hostilities.
Row to handle the Chinese challenge la clearly one of the moat vexatious items on the Soviet agenda of unsettled problems. eriod of ambivalence, in which the new Soviet leaders appeared to be working under the assumption that some chance remained for checking the deterioration of relations between the twoore consistent policy aimed at isolating the Chinese in the Communist world emerged. From the ideological and political standpoint, the policy appeared to be paying dividends. Chinese standing in the world Communist movementserious damagend China's influence deteriorated in the less developed countries. Yet to reap benefits from this situation, the Soviet Union has been placed in the position of accommodating radical Communist leadersested interest in hostility toward the US. Thus the gains that the USSR has made in the Communist movement at the expense or China have been accompanied by some loss of flexibility in Soviet policy toward the US.
Adding to all the other Soviet concerns with respect to China is the possibility of renewed Chinese provocations along the Soviet borders-Indications continued to accumulate duringyear that the Soviet Union was adjusting its military posture in the east to strengthen its capability to dealilitary threat from that direction. The gradual reinforcement of army and security units in the Far East Military District, which had been underway for several years, continued Newlso taken in the Turkestan Military District opposite Slnklang, including the possible relocation of some units to bring them closer to the border region. In addition, there were unconfirmed reports of troop movements to the east. Beyond the immediate problem of possible Chinese border Incursions, the forproblemrowing nuclear capability ln China faced the Soviet Union with the, possibility that sterner measures to assure its security ln the east would be required in the future.
In contrast with the generally gloony picture presented by the trend ol' developments in Asia, some hopeful signs were discernible in the course of developmento In the West. Tne divisive tendencies in
SS.
NATO, exaccrbuled by President DeGaulle's nationalistic policies, were threatening to bring about changes in the Western military alliance. In this situation, opportunities for Soviet political action aimed at impairing the effectiveness of the military coalition ranged against the USSR appeared to be brightening. Nevertheless, the possibility that West Germany might gain access to the control of nuclear weapons, or even decide touclear capability in its own right,ource of apprehension for the Soviet Union. Indeed, the tendencies toward nationalism vhich worked to weaken the Western alliance also worked to bring this possibility closer.
C- Internal Developments
Soviet military policy is affected not only by the requirements posed by developments in the external environment but also by pressures generated within the Soviet system itself. The requirements posed by defense needs come into conflict in the Soviet leadership with theposed by other needs. In the processes by which this conflict is resolved, differing points of view are brought to bear on Soviet decisions. The ways in which this conflict is res6*lvedthe shifts in the balance of influence enjoyed by competing interest groups in theital factor in shaping Soviet military policy. The indications ore strong that forcesigorous effort in defense policy gained an advantage in this internal conflict
1. The Resource Allocation Issue
The new leadership, having criticized Khrushchev for poor management of economic affairs, was under strong pressure to improve the performance of the economy, which was faltering on the eveew five-year plan. Improvement of performance was to be effected on three fronts: managerial reform, administrative reorganization, and economic programs designed to improve the flow of output Of agricultural and industrial products. The managerial reforms and reorganizations, while politically significant and potentially somewhat disruptive, were not directly relevant to the immediate problem of resourcehis particular problem cameesult of economic programs that threatened to cut into the limited supply of nationalvailable to support existing programs.
Whatever the specific programs that vere belrig planned by the leadership, the military issue was certain to be involved. For whether the question was viewedhoice between civilian andproductionurrent basis or between investing for economic growth' rather than for current consumption, it came downatter Of assessing the urgency of the military's claims on national reS0urccs. Thus the principal issue facing the Soviet leadership at the beginnings was whether military requirements could be Keptevel commensurate with other goals and commitments.
Judging by-Koeygin's speech to the Supreme Soviet inhe Soviet leadership5 vith optimisticon this matter. In words reminiscent of Khrushchev's lost speech before his downfall, Kosygin asserted that the development of heavy industry in the Soviet Onion hadtage at vhlch it was capableonsiderably greater exteot thanof supporting agriculture, light industry, and the other branches of the economy cervine the con-sumer's welfare. He also calledpeedup in the growth rate of the light industry side of the economy so that it could be brought closer to the traditionally favored heavy industry sector. Although there vas nothing radically new in these proposals, they were politically bold,illingness on the part of the leadership to undertake necessary measures in the economy even at the risk of violating shibboleth dear to the military heart.
A more concrete expression of the approach the leadership was taking to its economic problems was contained in the agricultural program which Brezhnev unveiled at the March Plenum. The significant features of the program in respect to matters of resource allocation were the size of the investment Involved and tbe ldfg-term nature of the commitment. The investmentoubling of state capital expenditures, compared with the average of recent years, and the underwriting of additionalexpenditures in the form of state subsidies for higherpriceB. The timespan of five years over which the program was scheduled to run Implied that the regime had arrivedairly firm determination thot the needs of defense were not likely to growand that long-term commitments could be made on behalf of economic expansion. That the program would Involve some sacrifices for other claimants on national resources was Implied by Brezhnev's statementredistribution" of budgetary means would be required to support it.
There was no explicit indication that the leadership expected to find the necessary funds for agriculture at the expense of the armed forces. Indeed, Brezhnev completely ignored the subject of defense tn his long speech outlining the agricultural program, as did Kosygin in his speech to the planners some days earlier. Yet the prospect of additional expenditures fcr agriculture may have forced the issue of defense requirements to the forefront. In any event, lt soon became evident that strong pressures on behalf or defense Interests were being brought to bear on the leadership. These pressures were no doubt also related to the darkening of the international outlook associated with the Soviet Union's involvement in the Vietnam war. By late spring, it was apparent that the regime's optimistic expectations for future economic programs had begun to din.
For the first time since the beginning of the new regime, Soviet leaders began to speu* of the burdens imposed on the economy by defense. These statements attract attention, if for no other rtUM than that the subject of defense expenditures had rarely been presented
in thie way before in Soviet public statements. All of themefensive attitude regarding the size of defense expenditures. Some of them Implieddirectly or indirectly that the size of these expenditures required some sacrifice of other goals.
Brezhnev vas the first to raise the subject with his acknowledgement ln his Victory Day speechonsiderable part of tbe Soviet national budget vent for defense expenditures. "We do not conceal thee asserted, "and the Soviet people understand veil the need for such expenditures." Mikoyan followedpeech onay in which he stated, "Our state spares nothing to produce new kinds of weapons ln large quantities to replace those which becomedmitting that this was expensive, he added, "It would be oven more expensive If we failed to do this."
Suslov came nextpeech in Sofiaune In which he pointedirect relationship between defense expenditures and welfare goals. "Of course we would like the life of the Soviet people toe said, "but we are compelled to take into account objective reality which forces us to allocate considerable funds for the defense of our country." Kosygin carried thistep further In his speech in Volgograd onuly. Be pointed out that the maintenance of up-to-date armed forces demanded "very large sums which we would gladly direct to other branches of the national economy." This could not be done,he said, because "to economize on defense would mean acting against the interests of the Soviet state and against the interests of the Soviet people." Finally, as if to add the credentials of collective authority to this official apologia, the theoretical journal of the Party, Kcmmunlst, came out in thr following month with an editorial which reiterated the substance of the above remarks.
These events marked the turning point in Soviet policy on the military issues. It ls still uncertaininal resolution of the issue was achieved at the time or whether fundamental controversies continued throughout the subsequent plan and budget But it now seems apparent that the change in the disposition Of Soviet leadersanifested by these shifts in emphasis on the military issueid prevail and resulted in decisions that are now embodied in the plan for the coming year. It also appears that the changes in resource allocations that were adopted lo accommodate militarydid not reduce tbe commitments to agriculture undertaken at the March Plenum.
Thu*year after the Soviet leaders had started out with the evident intention ofev Impetus to the growth of the economy, they have found themselves frustrated by the requirements of defense. Judging by the evidence cited above, this dilemma was one which had been unanticipated hy the leadership at Uie beginning of the year. Hence the cause of the problems must be sought in some new
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development during the year which increased pressures for military spending beyond tbe limits that could be accommodated within theframework of expectationsiana commitments.
2. Military Claims on Rcnourccs
There were many indications in the public commentary at the time that one source of these pressures was the military establishment. Hot only was there the indirect evidence provided by the renewedof the need for "strengthening" the armed forces that punctuated public statements during the spring and early Bummer, but also there woo both direct and indirect evidence that demands were being put forward regarding some special issues concerned with military industry andmanpower.
That the subject of military industry bad acquired some new lnportance In the regime's policy considerations was indicated ir. several ways. Some of the speeches mentioned above, as well as other speeches and articles, contained phraseology^ which seemed to imply some particular solicitude for military "industry"pecification which attracts attention because of its relative infrequency in general statements on military policy- Mikoyan, for example, peech delivered to the Tank Academyune described the development of military industry as "extremely" necessary. In his speech onay he'had also referred to military requirements in terms of the needteady flow of armaments production. Shelepin, in his speech in Severomorok on 2'i July, also took pains to mention military industry In two placesn his otherwise standard assertion that the government intended to devote untiring attention to the strengthening of the armed forces.
More specific inalcatlons concerning the nature of the issue were provided by the military preas. For example, an articleolonel Miftiycv, which appeared in Red Starune, put the issue In terms of the proper allocation of manpower between civilian andproduction. Be argued that ln the conditions of the nuclear age the need for manpower ln military Industry was higher than ever before. Whereas states could previously count on transferring industry toproduction after the startar, this Right no longer be feasible. Hence the1"stocks of materiel, in particular, of armanent androduced before the outbreak of hostilities have acquired "greater if not primary importance" among the factors which will determine the outcomeuture war. He argued that the problem of insuring adequate labor resources for military industry would not be cased appreciably bybecause production of advanced weapons did not lend itself to mUl-productlon techniques. High-quality lubor was particularly necessary for the production of modern military equipment, he asserted.
A different argument was advanced by General Kurochkin ln Uk- name newspaperuly. Addressing the question of the nature of the imperialist threat at the present stage ln history, Kurochk'.n
sought to make the point that the theoretical possibility of averting uar did not lessen the possibility that war might nevertheless be thrust upon the Soviet Union. In developing this argument, he adduced figures to show that military expenditures in the NATO countries had risen continously in the postwar period and that, in the United States atavored component of this rising investment was research and development. The implied lesson was that the Soviet Union should match the efforts of its potential adversaries.
These indications taken together suggest tbat one of the issues brought to focus in Soviet policy during the period in question was the level of effort to be devoted to tbe development and production of military hardware. Whether this was brought about by the necessity of deciding on one or another weapons program.or whether it reflected merely the insatiable appetite of the military establishmentonstant flow of economic resources into military production cannot be determined. Some new light on this question may be shed as evidence on the course of Soviet weapons programs io accumulated.
Another issue on which military pressures were brought to bear on Soviet policy during the year was the question of the ground forces' shore of money, manpower, and hardware. Although much of the evidence on this subject is indirect, it adds uponvincing case that changes were adopted in Soviet policy during the year aimed atthe Soviet Union's capabilities to engage in conventional The implications of such changes for the problem of resource allocation would He not only in the direct costs involved in maintaining and equipping higher manpower levels but also in the indirect costs to the economy involved in the diversion of additional resources of manpower and materials from other programs.
The evidencehange in Soviet policy on this Issue is derived both from the trends in doctrinal literature and from private disclosures by Soviet military officers. On the doctrinal side, there were scattered indications during the early part of the year that the question of the role snd size of the ground forces had againubject of controversy. olemical exchange between General Shtemenko and Marshal Rotroistrov over the question of whether the infantry still warranted the title "queen-Of the battle field" was one manifestation of this development. Another was an article by Marshal Rctisistrov in Kommunlst, In March, which indirectly arguedtrong ground force by disparaging the opposite policy which had been espoused byolicy which Roljnistrov described as setting off one branch of the armed forces against another one the basis of "subjectivenother was an article by Marshal Malinovskiy in the restrictedjournal. Military Thought, in May, which included the assertion, "We consider it premature to 'bury' the infantry as some people do."
More direct evidence was providederies of statements by high Soviet military officers. The first was by Marshal Rotmistrov in June. Commenting on the balance of strength between the United States
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and the Soviet Union, Rotmistrov emphasized that the Soviet Unionontinental power and that it would maintain the capability to overrun Europe even without the employment of nuclear weapone. It would be foolish, he averred, to think that in this situation the Soviet ground forces would be reduced. On the contrary, he said, they have been strengthened, for both nuclear and nonnuclear war. The second was by Marshal Chuykov in August. Commenting that he had been reinstated as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, he added: "Some people thought they could do away with the ground forces but found out they couldn't do this." The third was by Marshal Sokolovskiy in October. Commenting like Rotmistrov earlier on the "nuclear stalemate" between the United States and the Soviet Union, he assertedonstant updating of views was necessary on the relative role of missiles and ground forces. The views on this question expressed in the book Military Strategy, he said, were being refined to include the possibility of nonnuclear war.
As with the question of military industry, it Is difficult to translate this evidence into terms of the specific resource-consuming programs which may have been involved. It seems probable that theof status of the ground forces reflects some decision to increase military manpower beyond the levels anticipated by Soviet planners at the beginning of the year. It seems probable, also,orresponding increase in planned procurement of ground forces equipment has accompanied this development.
Many small pieces of evidence con be assembled to show that pressures for military spending were intensifying at approximately the time the Soviet leadership was indicatingurn in economic policy had occurred. These developments provide the grounds for certain broad conclusions concerning the trends in Soviet policy The Soviet leadership began the year with the evident expectation thatexpenditures could be kept at levels which would permit anOf the growth of the economyhole. For reasons which arc not entirely clear, but partly, at least, because of pressures from th* military quarter, this expectation was disappointed. These developments suggestenerally conservative tendency muy now be gaining dominance in the leadership and that leaders disposed to stress military consideration in the formulation of policy are enjoying greater influence. More particularly, they point to an enhancement in the influence ofmilitary leaders in the formulation of policy. The broader economic implications arc less clear because it is uncertain whether the decisions taken over the past year involve short-term or long-term commitments.
I>. The Economy
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the reevajuation of Soviet military policy had to interact with major decisions about economic objectives and policies. To set the context, it is useful, to review trends during the last few years and theof the published goals of the new five-year plan.
1. Economic Bequirements
The burden on the Soviet economy of defence expenditures cannot be specified in detail, because of uncertainties ln current estimates and the importance of qualitative factors such as theimposed by military programs upon scarce resources. Yet lt ic apparent that economic growth has slowed in recent years, whereasprograms have claimed resources that would be useful to revitalize Soviet industry and agriculture. During the,ational product (GHP) increased about one-third (only one-half the rate of increase of the preceding eightotal militaryincreased about one-fifth, and expenditures for military research and development nnd space more than doubled. The use of extra scarce high-quality men, machinery, and materials in the military programs deprived the civilian economy of these much-needed resources andimportantly to the decline in the growth of CUP. Other factors in the poor performance were (l) the increasing Inefficiency of Soviet Institutions for planning and management ln on economy that won growing both in aize and in the diversity of demands by the military, industry, and households,he low rate of growth in agricultural output.
The initial announcement of the Soviet five-year planonceded that the resources token for defense purposes hamper general economic growth and that further growth of the defense might of the Soviet Union is required in the new plan period. At the same time, the leadership isetermined effort to regain the economic momentum ofs by planning an annual rate of growth in CMP estimatedercent. To achieve this acceleration In economic growth, Soviet planners are counting on rapid increases in factor productivityhe increase in output per unit of labor and capital combined. Ihe average annual rate of growth ofittle moreercent per yearhen defense expenditures grew relatively slowly, and then fellate ofercent per year, when defense expenditures (particularly for research and space) were accelerated. The prooable military and space programs0ontinued increase in the requirement for highly skilled personnel and complex machinery, the very inputs that are needed to raise factor productivity in the civilian sectors. Furthermore, the emphasis in the new plan is on agriculture, where gain? in productivity are less likely to be forthcoming. It seems probable, therefore, that the military programs and the needs of agriculture will hold Soviet economic growth to on averageercent per year during this plan period.
It is conceivable thatH may be able to meet Its growing requirements for the military over the next decade without increasing the share of resources going to defense. However, even this would create strain within the economy, especially If it is accompaniedapid annual growth cl fixed capital Investment.
If both GNP and defense expenditures grow atercent perhe level of defense expenditures would rise nearlyercent,2 billion rubles59 billion rubles This absolute increaseillion rubles for defense in the next ten years would be substantially more than the absolute increase In defense5 Alternatively, If defense expendituresatercent per year, the absolute level of defense spending5 would be about one-third higher thannthat is still considerably larger than during the past decade."
* 2. Demands for Skilled Manpower
Over the next decade, the labor supply for the economyhole should be sufficient to provide annual increments to the labor force in line with those of the past few yearsercent per year The chronic shortage of skilled manpower will persist despitenrollment in professional and technicalavailable" secondary schooling,ontinuing investments In on-the-job training. The low educational attainment of the Soviet labor forceeart, compared withears in the United States)ajor constraint on the effective use of modern technology on an economy-wide basis.
AS in the past, military programs can be expected isproportionate share of the nation's skilled manpower. Thisis accomplished directly through the government's power to aesig graduates of professional and technical schools to specific jobp for three-year periods, including service in the armed forces. Its accomplished indirectly by central control over the incentive system. Material incentivesncluding fringe benefits as well as premium wages and salariesre established to favor the military ir-vto: of the economy. Under such circumstances, ther.-for*. thr- civilian sector is powerless to "bid away" skilled manpower from theilitary sector.
* If the share of defense in GNF were to drop, as implied in this alternative, the rate of increase in GH? ^Ould probably be lar^fir,2ercent.
II. Current Trends in the Forces
There was relatively little change in the levels and composition of the USSR's operational military forceslthough activities were under way which promised substantial changes over the next few years. New strategic attack systems will begin to become operational this spring, and the phasing in of new launchers over the next two years will add substantially to tbe survivability andof the strategic attack forces. Meanwhile, intensive research and development on still newer systems is continuing. imilar situation characterized Soviet activities in the air anddefense fields. While there is little evidence that the older deployment programs arc being phased out, some have come toajor deploymentew long-range SAM system is under way, and research and development activities looking toward the eventual deployment of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system are apparently being given priority attention. Trends in the general-purpose forces appear to reflect tbe same general pattern. Although it appears to bc unlikely that these forces were altered significantly, there ore strong indlmations that they are being augmented and improved and that their capabilities will be substantiallyover the next Jew.-years.
A. Strategic Offensive Forces
No new systems for strategic attack were introduced, although the construction for tvo new single-silo ICBMk continues. The first sites under construction in these programs should become operational this spring with others phasing in over the next two years. When completed, these sites will add greatly to the power of the Soviet striking capability and increase the number of hardened aiming points tenfold. arget complex of this magnitude Is beyond the capabilities of any existing force to attackigh probability of destruction, lt uppears touarantee that slgniiicant numbers of Soviet missiles will survive in the eventurprise attack. In the Soviet view, this may be the first time thatR has enjoyedosition. On the other hand, the additional launchers will still leave the Soviet ICbtt forces numerically inferior to the US force.
Wc believe that the Soviets are improving the capabilities of the strategic missile forces by providing redundant ccearrunicntion Moreover, the greateror" ICSM launchings fromsites may also reflect increasing sophistication lnRF exercises. Redundancy of communications and proficiency of operations are two vital prerequisites if political restraint is to be an option in the face of possible hostilities. For these reasons, currentwill probably Increase the Soviet leadership's confidence in its deterrent force.
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The level and structure of MRBM/IRBM forces remained static The existing MRBM/IRBM force of more than 7O0 launchers stillery serious threat to areas on the Eurasian periphery. The force is concentrated primarily in the Western USSR and basedon soft sites. Although vulnerable, the very numbers of sites would probably assure some degree of survivability.
Intensive developmental activity has continued at both major missile test'ranges: the Tyuratam Missile Test Range (TTMTR),where the ICBM programs are conductod, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Rangehere the MRBM and IRBM programs are conducted. At theigh level of testing has been maintained. The policy of .the past seems to be continuing: new developments will be pursued with sufficient vigor that planners can be assured of future options for the qualitative and quantitative upgrading of the ICBM forces. olicy may be aimed at maintaining the quality of the Soviet deterrent as well as at avoiding the dangerserious lag in weapons In the meantime, the USSR isriority effort to the development of space capabilitiesan effort which is undoubtedly motivated in part by military considerations.
One of the more recent and perhaps more serious turns in Soviet weapons design and doctrine has been the emphasis on "mobileodels of what were purported to be mobile ICBM and MRBM/IRBM systems have been displayed in recent Moscow parades. If the claims made for the capabilities of these systems are true, they could add substantially to the survivability of the Soviet strike forces. However, we believe that the Soviets are only now beginning toolid propellant missile to strategic rangein this caseautical miles. This leads us to discount to some extent their availability and tothe claims as referring to prototypes rather than to fully proven missiles. The timing of the new test program appears toeplacementarec number of obsolescing MRBM's and IRBM's. Ho similar program in connection with the ICBM systems has been detected.
The importance of new mobile systems is derived primarily from the fact that they are-susceptible to neither enumeration nor Consequently, the range of uncertainty associated withestimates of operational force levels is greatly increased, and the difficulty of targeting against these forces grows enormously.
The5 brought no alteration of the trends in Soviet policy affecting the future role of the Long Range Air Forcehile the LRAF retains the capability of putting somewhat moreeavy bombers over target areas in the United States, Its relative importance among the means of strategic attack available to the Soviet Union is decreasing. The medium bomber force of the LRAF had as its orimary mission attack in peripheral areas. In addition, lt has longecondary mission of supporting naval operations. Arctic.training over the past year continued on about tho same level'i; however,
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Greater participation of Bison aircraft was observed. Bear aircraft have been assigned to the Soviet naval air forces for reconnaissance, apparently to aid in target acquisition. The Kitchen air-to-surface missile (ASM) for the Blinder.is still not operational, and the sole ASM in service vith the LRAF remains the Kangaroo, carried on the Bear. Since no follow-on heavy bomber has yet been observed and normalion will continue tbireduce the numbers of the present force, it is estimated that the total force will be reduced by about one-third This reduction in strength will notomparable reduction in capability, however,arger portion of the remaining force will be equipped for aerial refueling and ASM's.
No new significant development in the ballistic-missile or cruise-missile submarine fleet took place Construction oflasses of cruise-missile submarines has continued. There is at present no direct evidenceollow-on ballisticsubmarine to supplement or replace thelasses of ballistic-missile submarines. The Soviet fleet contains aboutallistic-missile submarines, most of which are in the Northern Fleet area. The role of the cruise-missile submarine remains that of strikes against enemy fleet units and coastal targets.
B. Strategic Defensive Forces
Soviet military policy continues to stress ana commitresources to the air and missile defense forces. The primary responsibilities for the development and operation of the defenses lie with the fighter aircraft, missile troops, and radio-technical troops assigned to the PVO Strany (Air Defense of the Country). The magnitude and variety of attacking forces,with which these forces might conceivably have to cope, render the task given them extremely difficult andunattainable within the constraints of current technology. Thus it is not surprising that huge expenditures are poured into developing and deploying advanced air defense systems, most of which have been quickly rendered obsolescent by the advances in offensive systems. The expenditures on operations and expansion of the air defense system have roughly equaled those of the strategic attack forcesaboutillion rubles (in this case the equivalent for both forces of These estimates do not include the intensive androgram at the Sary Shagan Missile Test. Centerhere Soviet weapons designers continue to strive unsuccessfully toissile defense system which satisfies the criteria for national
Progress has apparently been registered, however, in an area which is of almost equal importancedefense against high-performance aircraft. Tne most recent improvement in this critical area has been the deploymentrobable high-performance SAM which promises toajor element in the defensive network. Although not yetwidespread to confirm the total deployment pattern, it appears
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toystem which can be deployed in barrier defenses and in point defenses for certain key strategic areas. ystem, now being deployed in the Urals and the Western USSR, could add significantly to the capabilities of the widespreadystem, currently the backbone of tbe air defense network. One incentive for this deployment might be Soviet concern over the possibility of renewed manned reconnaissance. Tbe new SAM system will be complemented by improving air intercept capabilities provided by thewin-jet interceptor which began entering the PVOnd by the Fiddler, which will probably become operational before
Soviet concern with US reconnaissance capabilities and the development of military space systems has been manifested by theof some Ben House radars to detect and track earth satellite vehicles. It is believedissile system using Ken House radar inputs could be deployed at an early date against reconnaissance satellites.
The probable ABM defenses at Moscow, which have been underfor almost three years, prebably are still several years away from providing comprehensive coverage of the ballistic missile threat to that vital area. The long construction time of the Moscow facilities together with the concurrency of this effort with aprogram which is apparently still incomplete indicates both the urgency that the USSR attached to'this:*deployment and the difficulties it is encountering in carrying out the program.
Improvements continue ln the integration of air defenseautomation is growing, and the sophistication of the unitsas they acquire improved equipment and streamline their But an air defense network is itself vulnerable to missile attack unless protected by an effective anti-missile defense. in the field of ABM defense hold the key to the future trends in the defensive forces, and, although the USSR will striveolution to this problem, it is difficult to predict when significantwill reward such effortsystem for widespread
C. General- Purpose Forces
Having borne the brunt of Khrushchev's economizing policies over the past few years, the Soviet generaj purpose forces stand to profit the most by the new policies that are being developed by the post-Khrushchev regime. Thus far the evidence bearing on trends in the general-purpose forces lies mostly on the political and doctrinal level. This evidence suggestsundamental reappraisal of the role of the general-purpose forces has been under way and that this has ledequirement for larger, more versatile forces capable of adaptingariety of contingenciesoth nuclear and nonnuclear, European find non-European. This requirement Implies the need for
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augmentation, reorganization, reequipment, and redispositionforces. There is some firm evidence that practical measurestaken to implement the policies implied by these politicalindicators.' Such evidence is not readily available,and in any event tends' to lag behind actual developments bymargin. V
The changes in the theater forces include the Warsaw Pactas the Soviet military establishment. Tbe Warsaworlittle moreaper organization, served more as aof Soviet diplomacyractical instrument ofthes, however, the Warsaw Pact has become anin which command and control arrangements have beentightened, plans for common action in war have been developedin large-scale exercises, and modernization of theweapons of the Eastern European* armed forces has been steppedas well as Soviet and Eastern European doctrinalattests to the fact that the Warsaw Pact is now regarded aselement in Soviet offensive ond defensive strategy for
Within the Soviet theater forces, modifications have become apparent that seem calculated to enhance striking power and to provide greater mobility in botb nuclear and nonnuclcar conflicts. Someof field armies has taken place, and new rocket,nd artillery weapons are being issued along with the continuedof new models of armored vehicles.
Crowing conventional capabilities have been accompanied by shifts in the disposition of forces, the most noteworthy of which haveedeployment of some units along the Sjnkiang border region and an apparent buildup in the Far East. Though these shifts affectinor portion of the Soviet ground forces thus far, they maya further buildup in the eastern military districts.
In the Navy these trends have taken the forr, of expandedin the construction of surface and support ships, somewhatthe imbalance caused by the previous concentration onconstruction. Most Soviet naval construction, however, continues to be of submarines. This is more ir. line with the broader tasks eneral- purpose"y, which include the defense against attacks by enemy carrierubmarine strike forces, the interdiction of enemy sea-lines of comunication, and support for the ground forces." The current construction program appears to be better designed toleet of larger, more heavily armed ships, thus increasing the Soviet capability to operate at great distances from the Soviet littoral. The principal inhibitions toolicy in the past lay in the limitations of available ships and the luck of air cover. To some degree, this latter need may be met In the future by shipboard SAM armaments.
" Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
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3 there hasajor effort to improve thecapability of the Soviet Navy, particularly for operationslocal sea theaters. This effort is believed to stem from ato undertake aore aggressive operations against the enemy on tbe open seas through the use of submarines, surface strike groups, and aircraft in botb theater and strategic situations. The most notable developments in out-of-area exercises have been (l) the almostmaintenancemall force of submarines (includinguclear-powered submarine) and surface ships iu theeginninghe long-range deployment of surface missile ship and submarine groups into the westernhe monitoring of US Polaris submarine bases at Holy Loch, Rota, and Guam byand trawlers;) long-range patrols of nuclear-powered submarines in the north-central Atlantic and is tbe north-central Pacific.
Although most of the Soviet Tactical Air Force (TAP) ofombat aircraft is still composed of older day fighters,has been continuing as new-generation fighter bombers and all-weather fighters are being brought Into service. The tactical air elements provide the USSRersatile force capable of both air defense and ground attack missions. ignificant development over the past year has been the assignment of new fighter units to the Far East Military Districta development which may signal the beginningrogram which could substantially improve the fighting effectiveness of theater forces In tbat area. Soviet capabilities for long-range sea reconnaissance were also improved during the past year by the assignmentumber of Bear heavy bombers to the Soviet Naval Air Force (SNAP) to augment the primary force of medium-range bombers.
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Ill- Probable Future .
Developments in Soviet military policy over the next few years-win depend not only on the technical, political, and strateeic.factors discussed above but also on the men and ideas now coming to the fore in Soviet military thinking. The changes in weapons programs and force structure now under way in. the Soviet Union have gone hand in handeadjustment in Soviet military doctrine. Beginningeaction to the over-simplifications of Khrushchev's military policy, this readjustment has now developedhoroughgoing critique bf the theoretical premises and practical implications of the Soviet Union's strategic position. The central thrust of the thinking now evident in the military pressearch for ways to broaden the '. options available to the Soviet Union in the uses of its military power. Judging by the trends in doctrine over the past year, the men who are carrying out this readjustment, and the ideas they are generating, an impetus is being imparted to Soviet military policy that is likely to carry it along present lines for some years to come.
A. Trends in -Military Doctrine
In discussing trends in Soviet military doctrine, it isto bear in mind certain facts about the nature of the subject. Soviet military doctrine isixed body of ideas. Itet of general principles intended to provide guidelines for policy-makers in deciding the practical questions of force structure and the allocation of military resources among various end uses. It is susceptible to change and development in accordance with the changing requirementsynamic strategic situation and with the changing views of Soviet military theorists. The impact of these factors for change isregistered in the writings on doctrine which appear in the Soviet military press and journals. It is from this point of view that the trends in doctrine discussed in the following paragraphs should be viewed. They are significant as clues to the directions in which Soviet military policy is moving. They do notomprehensive account of the current contents of Soviet military doctrine, which still retains many of the features of the Khrushchev period, including an undiminished convictioneliable missile deterrent remains an essential requirement of Soviet military policy.
Recent Soviet military writings, however, haveearch for ways to loosen the rigidities imposed on Soviet military strategy by the assumption that airy war involving the great powers will inevitablyrocket-nuclear" war. Underlying this search is the recognition that the present strategy of the USS3 has deprived it of the flexibility necessary to deal with war situations in which its nuclear deterrent cannot be brought into play. Attention has turned to the two areas of potential development which appear to hold the greatest promise of restoring flexibility to Soviet stratepy: capabilities lor conventional warfare and strateeie defense. In
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advancing their recommendations for an Improvement of capabilities in these areas, Soviet military theorists have criticized not only the practical implications of Khrushchev's military policies but also the basic concepts which governed them.
A leader of the new military thinking has been Marshal Rotmistrov, who in an article in Kommuniat in5 launched the attack which is now being carried out on the doctrines that until recentlySoviet military policy. Condemning with the label ofthe fundamental concept of Khrushchev's military policyhe view that any military engagement between the great powersajor nuclear warotmistrov implied that the Soviet Union's nuclear deterrent representedartial answer to the country's defense needs. Although he did not spell out theof bis critique, it followed from his argument that the capability to bring Soviet military power to bear ln situations in which the stakes did not warrant the risk of nuclear war was equally important.
There have been many indications in the doctrinal literature over the past year that the views adwnced by Rotmistrov have gained broad acceptance in Soviet military circles. Soviet theorists now recognize that between the poles of localizedmperialist colonial" and "nationalnd full-scale nuclear warthe majorpectrum of war situations is possible.
With increasing explicitness, Soviet theorists speak of the possibility of prolonged conventional war and of war limited to tactical nuclear
weapons. Inarshal Sokolovskiy disclosed that even his
book. Military Strategy, was being revised to include tbe new views on
the possibility of nonnuclear war.
A corollary of this theoretical development hasendency to emphasize the practical implications of the standard Soviet view that victory in war depends on the combined action of all arms and services. No Soviet military man has publicly'questioned the preeminent role assigned to the strategic missile forces in the Soviet Union's defense posture, but some hove implied that the paston these forces to the neglect of other branches has resulted ln on-unbalanced force structure. Others have Implied that abuildup of other forces is now ln order.
comments along this line have appeared to reflect ate measures axe*-taken to assure the maintenance of _es. This purpose is manifest ln the efforts that have beento publicize the fact that the Western powers were maintaining strong ground forces and were preparing themselves to wage conventional as well as nuclear war. The object lesson implied by these accounts was sometimes drawn explicitly; th* doctrine that victory in war requires tlie combined action of all arms of services has been reiterated frequently, as has also the view that modern war will require "massive" armies. ew note ln this theme was struck by
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General Shtcmenko in an article in Soviet Husala incknowledging that the SRF remained as fonnerly the "main and decisive" branch of the Soviet armed forces, he went on to point out that under certain conditions in wars not involving the use of nuclear weapons or involving their limited use onlyhe Cround Forces would become the "main andranch.
The other "older" branches of the armed forcos have also gained support in this public reevaluation of the country's force structure. olonel Prusanov, writing in Communist of the Arned Forces in an early issueor example, specifically mentioned the Air Forces and the Navy as the branches which should profit from what he called the Party's current rejection of the distortions that had previously characterized Soviet military policy. The Air and Missile Defense Forces came in for special attentionheoretical discussion of strategic mission concepts which was sponsored by the General Staff Journal Military Thoughtubtle controversy over the relative rolesand the relative Importanceof the Strategic Rocket Forces and the PVO seemed to be concealed behind the theoretical formulas in which the discussion was carried qji. In any event, the discussiona forumowerful argument in favor of air and missileby Colonel General Tsyganov, the chief of staff of thy PVO. Citing the danger of surprise attack and the invulnerability of enemy missile-carrying submarines, Tsyganov argued that the security of the country could not bc assuredowerful aerospace defense.
As the logic of these views would suggest, Soviet military theorists have come to recognize tbat the character and durationuture war cannot be predicted with any certainty. In contrast with Khrushchev's assertionsuture general war would be decidedatter of days, Soviet writers now give greater stress to the viewuture war may be prolonged even if nuclear weapons are employed. In the current literature, increasing attention is given to thisand to the further need for ready armies of great strength, backed by reserves of trained personnel plus odequat* stockpiles of materielapability to convert industryar footing rapidly.
The question of economic mobilization for war has been one of the central issues in Soviet military writings since the change of regime. The terms of the issue were set by two articles which appeared in Coiwiuniat of the Armed Forces in Whereas one article argued that the long-term economic development Of the country was compatible with military interests, the other stressed theof giving immediate priority to military preparedness. Denying that general economic development automatically insured the defense needs of the country, the second article argued that it was essential to prepare for war during peacetime. Although both sides of this issue have been argued In other articles throughout the year. It appears nowemporary truce may have been reached. ote by one of the participants in the argument which appeared in Military Thought in
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5 indicated that the issue was no longer whether there should be more preparedness, but rather what kind. It is the specifics of this question which will undoubtedly occupy Soviet economic and military planners over the next few years.
B- Trends in Personnel Appointments
Soviet policyroductecision-making process thatremium on the ability of men to advocate the interests they represent with vigor and skill. The caliber of the men who represent military interests in the policy forum is thus an important factor in deciding what the military will get in terms of official favor and material support. There is little evidence as yet to forecast the type of men who will be administering military affairs in the years ahead as the present aging high command gradually leaves the scene. However, in the opinion of knowledgeable Westerners, the new generation of military leaders is likely to be more responsive to the changing realities of military affairs and less fettered by the experience of the past. In the meantime, the influence of these younger men is making itself felt in the inner cirei.es of the General Staff, where doctrine and policy are studied and debated. In the changes ofwhich have taken place in the General Staff over the past year, it is already possible to see some indirect connection with theof this younger generation.
The period following the fall of-Khrushchev has been onestability for the top levels of the Soviet high command. new important appointment among the deputy ministers ofthat of Marshal Zakharov, who replaced the late Marshal Biryuzovof the General Staff in latethe letter's
death in an air crash, tore important for current trends in military policy are the subsequent personnel changes that have taken place within the General Staff. These changes, involving most of the key positions on the staff, are notably consistent with evidencehift has occurred in Soviet policy toward stressing the role of the generaJ.-purpose forces.
Marshal Zakharovighly respected professional soldier who has shown appreciation of both the old and new in military affairsan experienced man whose views were apparently acceptable tolboth the new- leaders and the military. Under0 substantial restaff-mg of the General Staff has taken place- S, two first deputy enters of the General Staff, one of tho deputy chiefs, and chiefs of several of the main directorates were replaced. The new appointments include: Generals Batitskiyasukov as first deputy chiefs of the General Staff (Kazakov was also appointed chief of staff ol- the Warsaw Pacteneral Gorbatov as deputy chief of the General Staff, General Kraynyukov as chief of the Military Science Administration, and Colonel Crylev as chief of the Military History Section of this Administration. In addition, General Shtcmenko,
deputy chief of the General Staff since the summeras named chief of the Main Operational Directorate.
A number of these new staff members can be identified vith views which appear to be compatible with the hew policy stress on theof conventional warfare capabilities. Of the new staff members. General Gorbatov has the strongest credentials in this regard. Writing in the classified military debatese rejected the modernist argument of General Gastilovich which had opened the debates. Gorbatov was adamant in denying categorically the concepthort war and the view that missiles had replaced artillery and aviation. Shtemcnko and Kazakov also appear to be disposed favorably to conventional forcesombined-arms doctrine. The views of Batitskiy and Kraynyukov on this subject have not been expresseds some reason to believe that they may be linked with the general policy orientation manifested by the others mentioned above. Kraynyukov, for example, is reportednowledgeable Westerner torealist"esignation which was not further clarified but which would presumably include the notion of differentiation from the Khrushchev school of thought. Colonel Grylev is also described by the same individualrealist." rylev was reported as having opposed the principal speakersilitary doctrine conference which had registered approvalumber of points of the then official military doctrineincluding, inter alia, the principle of the primacy ofin modern war. More recently,5 conference onhistory, Grylev pointed out past errors resulting from subjectivism in military affairsincluding an underestimation of the role of aviation and tanks in modern war.
The role of. Chuykov in the high command has been ambiguous since the change of regime. Chuykov, who in the past has expressed strong views on the need for massive ground armies, was believed to have been removed from his post as commander-in-chief of ground groops in't, although the fact of his removal, was not disclosed by the Soviet Foreign Liaison Office until December. At thiseorganization affecting the high command was reported to have taken place in which administrative control of the ground trooos was to be assumed by General Staff components with Marshalirst Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander of Warsaw Pact forces, assuming the functions of overall commander. The transferhtemcnko from the post of chief of the Main Staff of ground troops to thateputy chief of the General Staff tended to lend credence to these reports. In addition, the new post of Deputy Minister of Defense for Combat Training was established, presumably reflecting increased attention to combined-arris operations andurther detraction from the responsibilities which had traditionally been assigned to the ground troops commander.
owever, it appeared that Chuykov, who had continued to serve as chief of Civil Defense, had been reappointed
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Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops. onversationSattache he said tbat he had been reinstated as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Troops and that Ground Troops headquarters had beenwithin the past month. He then commented, "Some people thought they could do away with the ground troops but found out they couldn't do this." ew daysoviet liaison officer appeared to confirm Chuykov's statements when he acknowledged that Chuykov vas commander-in-chief of unidentified forces in addition to being chief of Civil Defense. He would not say that Chuykov was commander-in-chief of ground troops, however. Chuykov's apparent reinstatement seemed consistent with the resurgence of conventional militaryand, in view of his past statements in defense of powerful ground forces, appeared to present strong evidence in confirmation of this trend.
However, it now appears that this explanation is not tenable. The press has only rarely reported Chuykov's attendance at official military functions since that time, and his signature has continued to be missing from the obituaries of former ground troops commanders. Finally, accounts of Armed Forces Day functions in late6 listed Chuykov with other Marshals of the Soviet Union but not with the deputy ministers of defense, which would have been the proper place for his name if he were indeed the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
In light of the above, it must be concluded that themade to the US attache last summer either did not accurately reflect the situation at the time or that the situation has since changed. Chuykov may, for example, have been restored to ground troops commandrief period and then removed eitheresult of some subsequent decision or for health reasons. It is also possible that the statements referred to some unrevealed organizational changethe combination of civil defense responsibilities with the command of certain categories of ground troops, in any event, the ambiguities surrounding Chuykov's career do not appear to have been caused by fluctuations in ground troops policies during the past year, because indicators that the latter are enjoying support and increased status have continued to accumulate.
C. Trends in Defense Expenditures*
1. General Considerations
The estimates of Soviet defense expendituresresented below are the resultontinuing effort by this Office to
- The data on expenditures presented in this contributionall outlays for personnel and other operating costs,of all hardware used by the militaryonstructioncontinued on
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construct and maintain an expenditure serios that reflects estimates of current force structure and incorporates Improvements, based on accumulated information, ln current understanding of historical trends in forces, programs, and activities. Evidence for the periodas systematically reviewed in order to restate, from the vantage point of, the historical pattern of Soviet defense programsprocurement, deployment, and so on. For theovered by National Intelligence Projections for Planning6n attempt was made to select the set of "moat probable" programs from within the ranges of uncertainty presented there, taking into account the latest evidence. Certain projections6 were mode in on effort to preclude an unrealistic sagging -the "tired-arm" effectin the expenditure seriesy taking into account the effects of longer lead times of futureprograms.
It should be noted that the ruble values discussed below and presented ln detail ln tbe statistical tables have been computed In5 price terms. The major advantage of constant price coating is that changes over time ln any given expenditures seriesfor example, total expenditures, procurement of ICBM systems, and the likemay be viewed as real changes in the magnitude of programs rather than the result of changing prices- The major disadvantage of constant price costing is that it does not take into accountor deflationary price changes over time.** For instance, if there0 percent increase in the priceiven model of weapon, the estimates of expend!turc is constant prices understate actual Soviet outlays. The result is that it is incorrect in principle to compare the scries in this contributioneries dealing with Soviet defense expenditures based on "current ruble prices." The ideal solution would be to present the estimates in both constant and current price terms, but the available evidence on the price behavior of Soviet military goods aod services is at present inadequate to permit the direct conversion to current prices.
facilities, military and nucloar research and develo]>ment activities, and all space programs. Many of the funds required to cover these expenditures come from sources other than the budget account labeled "Defense" by the USSR.
* The expenditure data prepared for HIEovered theperiod tack The extension of the duta in this contribution bock0 represents the completion of ORR efforts toonsistent time series for the period beginning with tac military buildup of the Korean period.
ruly inflationary or deflationary price change is one for which there iiorresponding and proportional change in quality of the good or service-
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It is believed, however, that estimates ln constant ruble prices doeasonable approximation of not only how the total expenditures for the estimated force structures would appear to Soviet military planners, but also, and perhaps more important, how thefor given programs would appear relative to other programs military or non-military*
The dollar valuations of Soviet military programs which are also presented below have been constructed to show what the estimated Soviet military programs would cost If purchased ln the US& dollar prices- As such they can provide US planners with anof the physical magnitude of given Soviet programs and alsoseful basis for comparison with US programs. Because of significant differences in the price structures of the two countries, however, the dollar valuations of Soviet programs do not necessarily provide the most accurate indication of the relative costs of given programs from the Soviet point of view. For example, when calculatedollarbasis, Soviet expenditures for personnelreercent of total expenditures, but on the ruble basis, the personnel share is onlyercent. It is, of course, ttyercent figure that would be of concern to the Soviet planner. On the other hand, programbased on dollar valuations aimed at showing proportions or relative sizes are appropriate if the resource inputs lo the programs being compared are weighted approximately the same. In these cuues the comparison based on dollar valuations would give proportions similor to the ruble comparison. Because the Input structures to various programs are not always obvious, however, lt Is probably safer ln general to base such comparisons on the ruble expenditure data.
Total Expenditures
The currently estimated levels and trends in totalfor there shown In the chart, Figure 1. The estimates of total expendituresear ago ln support of the Memorandum to Holders ofre also shown ln the chart for purposes of comparison-
Ihc first major difference noted between the two series is the inclusion of data for' period in the more recent series. The very rupid increasen expenditures and then the decline that occurs ineriod reflect the impact of the Korean conflict on Soviet military programs- The increaseprimarily the result of the rapid buildup in nuclear deliveryln the form or bomber aircraft for the LRAF.
Foreriod, the trends in the two series nre almost identical, but the present estimate is consistently higher than the seriesear ago by between about one-third and ooe-half billion rubles annually. This difference is explained almost entirelyignificant upward revision In estimated expenditures
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JOB WET
by the Soviet Ministry of Defense for wages of civilian personnel. This revision was based on analysis conducted in support of thedata contained in
The most significant difference between the two series is the trend shown foreriod by the present estimate and that suggested by the series prepared last year. Last year's seriesecline ofillion rubles3hereas this year's estimate indicates an increase of about the same amount.Furthermore, the estimated expenditure levels56 in the new seriesignificant upturn in total expenditures. since this rapid increase in expenditures is made up primarily of the leading edge of expenditures for ABM and advanced ICBM systems which will not be deployed until, these expenditures must be considered as being more uncertain than those for the earlier years, which are based on observed deployment.
The estimated increase in expenditures for the entire period is8 billion rubles01 billion rubless shown in Table 1. This equals an overall increase of aboutercent, or an average annual rateercent.
3- Composition of Expenditures, by Military Mission*
The US and Soviet percentage shares of estimated total expenditure for each of the major military missions, RDTE&S,eneral command and support residual, labeled "Other" are shown in the chart, Figure 2. The trends in Soviet mission expenditures over time are shown in the chart.* Details on the behavior ofshares are contained in the statistical appendix,ough appreciation of the relative emphasis on the major missions for the USSR can be gained directly from Figure 1.
The very pronounced decline of expenditures for the General Purpose Missionigh of aboutillion rublesow ofillion rubles is immediately obvious. This declineecrease in the share of total expendituresto General Purpose Forces from about two-thirds2 to about one-third1 and thereafter. Even so, lt is not6 that the combined total shares Ur Strategic Attack and Strategic Defense surpass the share allocated to the General Purpose Forces. for command and support programs remain essentially constant throughout the period so that the growth shown for the item labeled "Other" may be attributed entirely to RDTE&S.
The major point to be noted about the decline Inin General Purpose Forces is that loreriod; it made possible very appreciable increases in expenditures for Strategic
Seehrough 5.
** as been combined with "Other" expenditures inor purposes of graphic presentation.
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T
Attack and Strategic Defense programs and forithout giving rise to proportional increases in total expenditures.
The most impressiveside, is in the expenditures for the Strategic Defense Forces which increase from about three-fourthsillion rubles0 to almost fourrubles More significantly, these expenditures almost double ineriod. The reasons for this growthontinued large program for deployment of control and warningprocurement of fighter aircraft in the earlyery large SAM program; and the leading edge of ABM ln the last few years. The behavior of expenditures for Strategic Attack has been somewhat more erratic with the peaks and troughs that represent buildup and completion of major weapon systems programs being more discernible. The peaks representing procurement of bomber aircraft5 and expenditures for MRBM/IRBM and ICBM systems grow steadily, with the former peaking2 and the latter ecline, the ICBM expenditures then increase and reach their highest level
Theission* shows <he steadiest, and by far the largest, increase. Its share of the total grows fromercent0 to almostercent Expenditures for6 are estimated to be moreimes thosen average annual rate of growth of aboutercent, compared with an average annual rate of growthercent In total defense expenditures. The rising expenditures for this mission reflect the dynamic technical changes in the Soviet military establishment which began ins. The complexity, sophistication, and quantitative requirements foradvanced weapons systems, together with space programs, have rapidly multiplied expenditures for RDTF&S. Development costs alone, in some cases, may outweigh those of subsequent deployment. Indeed, the cumulative amount estimated to have been spent for Sovieturing thes slightly greater than the cumulativefor either the Strategic Attack Mission or the Strategic Defense Mission.
The method used for deriving the estimated Sovietfors basically different from that used for deriving the expenditures for the other missions. The latter are derived fron: explicit assumptions as to the size of ihe forces and other underlying physical quantities, whereas the expenditures forre derived
* Expenditures shown for this mission are broader in their coverage than the expenditures for research and development reported by the US Department of Defense. To obtain comparable coverage on the US side, the expenditures for research and development of the Atomic Energy Commission and all expenditures of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration were added to the expenditures for research andof the Department of Defense.
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igure 2
US and USSR: Percentage Distribution of Total Defense Expenditures by Major
"
I %
j V
1
S
AIT-LI
luiriGif di'Ihm
'*[|
*. ALL IKI'lNIJITUneS FO" NUCLL'HVONS UIt "oTIIEI)1'OCOiLIO OAT* ON EHMENOITUHESUS OfOG*AMS, sr Million. OO , THC US ii or THII. i OH Till DASIV O* ) TOTALT io-
AUfHOaiT*. "UO. IK IMI - SSISTANCE AMO CIVI Ol -
'CUM '..
li i'-Mt ro* IMSv<-. . I CAil--
Oaa vtAH iH5.
"CTALlATOnY" I* IMSIGHATIO" uSEO IH TMl US.
IS HOI POSSiflLE AI THI* Tl Mt TOES7IUATID SOVIEt HDTEftSN THT II* ftlDC.O T i. row tmf BESPFcrivk phoghams mavi seen ihcluuid ih rtoTcas. fu"tmC"mohc .
DICAIinr THC SOVIETOt AL AMII Wtl.l PHOOHAMS -HIBvATE . ESTIMATItlMPENOITUHCS BY HASAO*SO SILLIOhiC acc <SIhave ihClUOI OH THE US SIDE . "Ci-ll. .
ANO IMf MUCLEAM thUL- C "OT At IHCIUMO. OH SOV II T
SlOt. COMMAND SuBrO"; .i "
IEO PAY. AMD THEHIBOCfAMCLUOtNG H> QTAT IMCLUOCO
' . i'Hi-.tro ih isa* chices.
r.. OAO OH nr* RUBLESIH5 PBlCES .
aee cia
igure 3
US and USSR: Comparison of Defense Expaufitoros by
JS
wHANGL
X
ATTACK7
CFOP USE PROGRAM*, BY uiSSlQN. OO
C OT THI*O*A*HtO TOTAL OffltCATlOMAL
ai.tm ALIO. IN THC INTEREST OT. MILITARY AUlSTAMCC AND CIVIL Ot-
rCMftf HAVE fetEN tXCUUOtD OH BOTH .
ti,op fikal tca* i and wkt expenditures arc re* calcmuak
TEAR
C, RETALIATORY"HE DCSIOhATIOH UMD IN THC US.
Q. IT It NOTSSI^LE AT THIS TIME TOCS1IMATCD SOVIET ROTERS EKRENOl TUR*MISSION. THCRtrOftE, ON THE US SVIDC, AtU. RESEARCH. DEVELOPMENT. andfNtlTAt) FOR THE RESPECTIVE PROGRAMS MAVl OlLN INCLUDED IN RDTEAS. fUfl THE RMORE THE SOVIET NUCLEAR ENERGY MOTAE ANO SPACE CrKKiHAM* ARC COVERED ESTIMATE. ESTIMATED EXPCNOITUR* *NASAON* ANOM ATKt*CHTIITURES FOR ROT AC PROGRAMS RV TMt ACLHAVE UEEN INCLUDED MERC ,
H THE USXPENDITURESOEHlPALCTlNLO PAY.ATIONAL GUARD. ANO THE NUCLEAR EHEHGY PROGRAM (EXCLUDING WOTAC, ARE INCLUOEO,THE BOUCT SiOC. CmRENOITuRCS FOR Command AND GrnrRAL SUPPORT, RESERVE. MlLiTARUtO SCCiRMT*
RTTtRCO PAT. AMD THE* HuClCAP PHOGPAA4 tt-Ct_UO*NG HOT Af 1 AMf iKlvlHD
S1*IS OA
ore general wayonetary aggregate and are based on published Soviet data pertaining to expenditures for "Science." The estimated costs of military manpower for those personnel in the armed forces who areinrojects are added to the resulting base series.
h. Composition ofy Category*
As in the discussion above of the distribution ofby mission, outlays forrograms are the primarygrowth in total defense expenditures. Fluctuations in thefor investmentthat is, procurement of equipment andof facilitiesare, on the other hand, the principalthe fluctuations in total expenditures, whereas the estimatedfor operating costspersonnel and operation and maintenance
tend totabilizing influence. The large and consistent growth inxpenditures coupledodest but consistent rise in theand maintenance portion of operating expenditures account for the general upward trend in total expenditures0 expenditures run counter to the trends for all other categories in thathen theyeak ofillion rubles, theyownward trend which^continues through thes, after which they level off atillion rubles.
Basic changes in the composition of procurement over the past decade are more marked than the movement of the total suggests because of offsetting trends. For example, although total expenditures forincrease by lessercent5he combined expenditures for missile systems, ground-based electronics, and nuclear weapons were four timc3 those In terms of their share of total procurement, these systems represent aboutercent5 and almostercent Procurement of all other types of equipment in the aggregate fall6 to about one-half5 level.
The growth of expenditures forogether with that for the procurement of missile systems, ground-based electronics, ami nuclear weapons are indicative of the economic impact of advanced weapon systems because these programs makf the greatest demands onscarce supply of high-quality resources. Total expenditures for these purposes6 are nearly twelve and one-half tinvs0 level, almost five times5 level, and almst twice9 level. Another indication of the increased complexity of equipment within the Soviet military structure is provided by the trend in expenditures for operation and maintenance. Even though personnel, costs and the Overall level of manpower continue to decline, the Cost of maintaining the new systems grows steudily andarger share of total operating expenditures. The breakdown of total expendituresurther evidence that the Soviet military establishment
* Seend 7.
" v : ,
difference in coverage between theission and theategory In the case of theission, expenditures related to militaryon active duty who are engaged inork are addedstimated value of allork carried out directly for the military establishments as well aa to all space programs.
has grown more hardware intensive over time. Expenditures for the development, procurement, 'and deployment of weapons systemsthat is, RDTE&S, procurement, and construction of facilitieshave grown fromercent of the total defense expenditures0 to almostercent
5* Dollar Valuations of Soviet Military Programs*
Soviet defense programsave also been valuedIJ US dollarsthat is, the dollar amounts it Jrould have taken in the USU to purchase the goods and services required to support the Soviet military programs which have been discussed above in terms5 rubles.
The results ofomparison made5 on aare shown in the chart.he data'used forto calendar5 for the USSR and to fiscal Adjustments to the accounts as presented in other sectionscontribution were necessary to provide as much comparability
If the Soviet military package5 were to be purchased in the US, the resulting expenditures, after adjusting both sides to attain comparability, would equal nearlyercent of the expenditures planned by the US for fiscal The ratio for Strategic Attackxpenditures is nearly the same as that for the total. In the ease of General-Purpose Forces, Soviet expenditures are nearlyercent of those for the US. The largest difference occurs inDefense, where the Soviet figure is more than three and one-half times as large as the US figure. The estimated Soviet expendituresKZAS, amount to almostercent of those of the US, and in the cat-gory Other the relationship is the same as that for total expenditure*.
Tne shares of total expenditures allocated to eachthe country's own currency are shown in the chart. Figure 2. indicates similarities in the share of the total on: to Strategicesser extent to
General Purpose Forces. The major differences are in the sharesto Strategic Defense, where the Soviet share is nearly fivewhere tnehareigher than that of the
6. Future Trends
The range of uncertainty about the trend in militaryfor tbe next few years has narrowed somewhat since last year's estimate. Additional information has become available about
See
The comparable US designation is "Strategic Retaliatory."
-
Attachment 3
Replace third and fourth paragraph of sectionageith the following:
If the Soviet military package5 were to be purchased in the US, the resulting expenditures, after adjusting both sides to attain comparability, would equal aboutercent of theplanned by the US for fiscal The ratio forAttackxpenditures is slightly greater than that for the total. In tho case of General Purpose Force, Soviet expenditures are nearlyercent of those for the US. The largest difference occurs in Strategic Defense, where the Soviet figure is more than three and one-half tines as large as the US figure. The estimated Soviet expenditures fornd the category "Other" amount to almost three-fourths those of the US.
The shares of total expenditures allocated to each mission in each country's own currency are shown in the chart. Figurehis chart indicates similarities in the share of the total on both sides allocated totrategic Attack, and General Purpose Forces, lhe major differences are in the shares devoted toDefense, where the Soviet share is nearly five times as large, andhere the US share is more thanercent greater.
deployment programs for ballistic missile defense, long-range SAM's, and ICBM's- esult, as noted above, the estimates3 have been reversed in trend, and it now appears likely that they will grow significantly so that the projectionsre more likely to move in the higher ranges of the HIPP In addition, as discussed in the policy section of this contribution, there is likely to be greater emphasis on theof the ground forces than has been demonstrated ln recent years.
It has been noted earlier in the contribution {Section I, d) that an average annual growth of military expenditures on the orderercent vould be compatible with Soviet capabilities. The higher number vould lead to appreciably less growth In GUP and hence to less growth in modern industrial capacity and In consumer welfare. of trends in Soviet military policy and in the views of Soviet leaders leads to the conclusion, however, that the present regime vould
accept the costsercent rate of growth of expenditurec for Soviet
military preparedness.
HIPP,nd VI. oft o'".
-
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
The detailed data on which the foregoing discussion on expenditures is based are presented here in tabular form. The data are expressed in billions to two decimal places to make it possible for the reader to ect some perception of smaller movements in the underlying physical data, but not to suggest that the accuracy of the data is such thatcan be attached to the second decimal place.
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Table 3
Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Attack Forces, by Element a/
Billion
Attack
Heavy Bombers
Miaalla
Hediun BoMers
IRBH's
Support
.""
86
fsr s'.rs'-cs-.trir:eii; ITor personnel, procurraent. construction, and nuclear weapons for leag*renge attack weapon tystena. Thla alaelon enconpaaaea surfleiar.eeautical Biles and nore; bellisubmarine systeas; aad all heavy andand tanKera assigned tor.je AvimUoa, including supporting peraonnel and equipment. All expenditure*davtlopreent. test. iM evaluation (SITAE) axe Included ln the BBOU Klaalon. Because of rounding, componentsadd to tHe totals shovn.
5 pricea.
H
Id d
IfJ H
SI*
5
3l
to
d d
o d d
g
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all.
nm
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3
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as
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: i
Sis?*?
-
Table 5
Soviet Expenditure* for General Purpose Forces, by Element */
Billion jww mMmX
|
69
Tranaport Ar-.atlon
96
tj
Snip*
Aviation
Mat fcippcrt
mammma
OJ
Expenditure* for Ceneral Purpoaa 'oreea conprlee all expenditure* for peraonnel, procurement, operation ana maintenance, con-etruetlon, and nuclear veapona for conducting land warfare and oppoiloneuy naval foreaa and chipping. Thli nlaalon enooa-paeatt tha following: (l) theater foreaa, which lnoluda .round coabat foreaa, tactical rocxtta and nlaallea, and tactical air foreaa plua their eaaociated contend, aupport, and nrviceilitary air tranaportaval foreaa, utiles include thataurfaea fleet, tha naval air fcrcee, and Um eubaarlne fleet except tha eeJUateelle eutMrlaa fcreca. All expenditure* for RXU ara included in the MTfclS Weelon. Beeauee of rounding, coemoaaate my tot add te tha totale. bpraaiaa5 price*.
e. teUllatic-clsalla awbwarl-^a, which ara laelrfU vith Strategic Foreaa.
Table 6
Soviet Dtfvmty Category of trpenditur* a/
21
u
ce
I!
3*
V
(-1
11
g*
55
II
12
kl
33
=-
CT
2 1 las'* 5 6 7 iffi 9 0 a 1
la*f
Mir* ana)
yi'.ea*
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aaat ajaiacananc* 6
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Table 9
Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Attack Forces, by Element a/
ft US 1
lew*
Peripheral Attack
KRBX'i and IRBM' Joint Support Total
Sii 6
1
1 1
? 81 75
28175
Xagl.
6 587
l.8e $ * 86 3
For the scope of expenditure* n cf mission, zee fee*tMt J. Because of rounding,nay
not add to the totals shown.
Trtlt 11
Soviet Expenditures for Oenersl Purpose Forces, by Element a/
* Vi
Hi mill
AvlatiCft
61
J3
a n>F*
37
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Original document.
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