3ECRKT"
MEMORANDUM
US AND SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: COMPARATIVE SIZE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports
SfXRKY
i
L-iiitt
The material presented in this memorandum is the result of aeffort by CIA to estimate the costs of the Soviet space program-It is believed that in the aggregate the estimates in this memorandumseful approximation of tho magnitude of the fundingof the Soviet space program and its major elements. Implicit in this Judgment is the idea that in the aggregate the various economies and diseconomies In the Soviet program balance, making tlie estimate of the total level of resources necessary toigorous spaceetter approximation than the assessment of the level of technology and costs incorporated in an individual program. The estimates of dollar costs are based on current estimates of the nature of the Soviet space programs now under way and of future Soviet space objectives. As various Soviet space programs unfold and as mission objectives andof hardware become more clearly defined, the estimates and the cost factors used in their derivation will be reevaluated and periodlcolly
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COtfi'i'lfTS
Introduction
Annual Funding Requirements .
Implicationsanned Lunar Landing
Funding Requirements
Appendix
Methodology
Chart i:
Figure 1. US and Estimated Soviet Civil andPrograms: ollowing page
Figure 2. US and Estimated Soviet Civil SpaceRequirements, FYpage
Figure 3- US and Estimated Soviet Space Programs:
Funding Requirements, Cumulative Through
5 fo:lowing page
Figure V. US and Estimated Soviet Unmanned Launches and5 following wc
Figure 5- Analog Approach to Estinnting Soviet Space
Programs foi lowing; pang
v blank}
US AND SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: COMPARATIVE SIZE*
Sumrnar'
The space programs of both the United States and the Soviet Union haveery large commitment ofduring the past few years. Tho US civil and military funding requirement reached aboutillion in Fiscal4hereas the estimated Soviet requirement exceededillion tn Fiscal Although the US requirement probably has reached its peak at least for the next few years, the Soviet requirement appears to beits rise.
The largest commitments have been to civil spacewith the US allocation now runningillion annually and the Soviet allocation estimated atillion. Of these amounts, manned spaceflight and launch vehicle development (which is principally in support of manned programs) have absorbed by far the largest shareboulercent in the United States and overercent in the USSR.
* The estimates and conclusions in thia memorandumthe best judgment of this Office ashe US and estimated Soviet dala presented in thisarc in term* of funding requirements (budgetedfor space programs. Despite the fact that lhe budgut expenditures and actual expenditures mayear-to-year basis, the hudgol planbeen used rather than expenditures because it is the only available series with sufficient detail to permit cost estimates by mission and program. In the period covered by this memorandum, total annual expenditures are below the funding requirementsin the budget plan and to some extent lag behind these requirement*. The terms funding requirement^ and budgeted expenditures are used interchangeably in this memorandum.
The judgment that the USSR isarge commitmentajor manned space program is based on the latest National Intelligence Estimate.. Although the costarc basedoviet program toan on the moonompetitive with Project Apollo, the magnitude of the cost estimates is generally consistentanned lunar landing program aimedomewhat later date, as well as with other major manned space missions sucharge space station.
The one area in which Soviet allocations appear to have outstripped those of the United Slates is in unmanned lunar/ planetary exploration. This difference reflects the heavy Soviet commitment to the planetaryhile the US program, however spectacular it may have been, omparatively modest effort.
1. Introduction
An attempt ie made in this memorandum to gauge tho pace andof the Soviet space effort. The gauge being UBed is economic and the unit of measure is the cost of the Soviet effort expressed in US dollar equivalents. Although there is no direct information on the ruble costs of the Soviet space program, it is possible to estimate the cost of this program as if it were undertaken in the Unitedhis approach makes it possible to reduce tbe heterogeneous hardware and activities that compose tbe US and Soviet space programs to adenominatorthat of dollar cost. One objective of this approach, obviously, is tolose approximation or the actual cost of carrying out the Soviet program in the United States,till more important purpose is touantitative index of the Soviet effort, thuseasure of the overall magnitude andof this effort.
2. Annual Kimdinj; H'-quirements
Estimates of Soviet funding requirementshe estimated budgeted expenditures of the Soviet space programre compared with the US space budget plan for Fiscal9s shown in1- Budgeted expenditures have been used for the purpose of this comparison because the requisite details are not reflected in actual US expenditure accounts. Budgeted expenditures represent proposed claims against available resources as contrasted with actualwhich represent resource utilization. Estimates for the Soviet programs are based on the US data and, therefore, are expressed in the same terms; there is no evidence that the USSBpace budget plan similar to that of the United States.
Space funding requirements, as shown in Figureave been high for both countries, with those of the United States running fairly far ahead of those estimated for the USSR. The US space budget plan grew rapidlyh| but since that time bao leveled off at aboutillion annually. Of this amount,5 billion are allocated to civil space activities, und5 billion go to military pro-grans. Although the oun ual funding requirements for Soviet space progress are estimated to be running below those of the united States, they have been growingigh rate and are approaching the current levels of the United States. There has been no indication as yet that Soviet requirements for space have leveled off.
Tbe estimates for the USSR represent only those programs that are currently identifiable through actual flights. No allowance has been made for military space programs that may be under way but have not yet been identified. Because it is probable that some unidentified
See the Appendix.
military space programs arc now under way, estimate! of the funding requirements of Soviet military space programs are ulmost certainly understated.
Because of thisomparison of civil space pro-gramu may be more meaningfulomparison of the total programs. Estimates of funding requirements for civil space for the USSR and the actual budget plan for the United States are shown In Figure 2. US budgeted expenditures are still ahead of those estimated*for the USSR, the levels for the civil space programs of the two countries are much closer to each other than those for all space programs taken together. The funding requirements for civil space programs of both countries have experienced rapid growth in the past, with the USSR generally lagging behind tbe United States by about one year. As with the total space requirement, the planned allocation for the US civil space program leveled offhereas that for the USSR continued to climb
Although there are several reasons for the difference ln therequirements for civil space programs of the tworincipal reason is believed to be economies effected by the USSR through the adaptation and use of facilities originally used tothe military missile program. This Is ln keeping with the Soviet practice of using facilitiesual purpose. The cost of those facilities which support Soviet missile programs has been attributed to the military and does nott of the space estimates.
Another reason for the difference is the estimated lower Soviet funding requirement for manned space flight which otcma largely from the fact that tbe Voskhod program makes considerable use of hardware developed in the Vostok program, unlike the US Gemini program whicharked departure from Project Mercury. The Voskhod spacecraft in most important reopcctB Is no moreostok,modified to accommodate three men or two men end an airlock. In addition, the launch vehicle used to boost the spacecraft into orbit has the same first stage, thes that used in the Vostok program. Moreover, the USSR man-rated the upper stage (the Venik third stage) during the Cosmos photo-reconnaissance program, and In all likelihood the aoft-landing system employed on the Voskhod also was developed os part of thla same program.
Finally, although tbe USSR has stressed unmanned lunar andexploration, other programs related to space science andwith the possible exception of biomedical programs, apparently have not received the same enphasis in the USSR that they have in lhe United States. Soviet scientific satellites in general carry fewer, simpler experiments than those or the United States having equivalent missions, and the Soviet applied satellite programscommunications, meteorology, and navigationappear to be considerably behind similar US efforts.
FIGURE
US AND ESTIMATED SOVIET CIVIL AND MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS: FUNDING REQUIREMENTS,*
(BILLION US DOLLARS)
'OSi-include 'National Amc<sv<ici ond Spaceof A'a- <ffc* Naf.onalVmiKmloroSoviet proare*
MMlW
W FT
tpl icationsanned Lur.ar landing
The estimates shown ineflect the initial installment of funds assignedoviet manned lunar landing program that would be competitive with the US Project Apollo. The bads for including this program in the estimates is Khrushchev's acknowledgement in3 and again inhoviet effort toan on the moon, as well as the spate of statements by Soviet scientists and cosmonautsanned lunar landing. Another consideration in this Judgment is the urgency with which Soviet scientists have sought information on the lunar surface with the aid of soft landers since at least
If the Soviet program is competitive, numerous activities not yet visible to the intelligence community must now be under way. In order to have flight hardware ready for testingV, the USSR should now be developing the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and other mission hardware required in the program. Thus the commitment of resources to the program should already be substantial. It is estimated that,inimum, the USSR could be planning expenditures on the order ofillion toillion for the developmentaunch vehicle suitable for the mission. Beyond thisanned program of the magnitudeunar landing or large space station could require on the order of an additionalillion toillion, bringing the total program estimate to about $lk billion.*
Although almost all other Soviet space programs hu>ve experienced steady growth in the past few years, the estimated manned lunar landing program ls largely responsible for the high level and rapid growth in the estimate of the Soviet civil, space budget plan. Almostercent of total budgeted expenditures for Soviet civil space programs5 are estimated to have been absorbed directly or indirectly by this single undertaking. In the United States, Project Apollo and other activities related to this project accounted for more thanercent of5 budget plan-
if the Soviet manned lunar landing is not competitive with Apollo but is scheduledote ins, the annual budget pians would be somewhat lower than those estimated- nevertheless, studies based on the US Apollo program show that the overall program budget plan increases as the duration of the programengthened, and annual funding requirements remain substantial throughout the life of the program-
Bvon if no Soviet manned lunsr landing is in progress, the rapid pace of other portions Of the space program coupled with the tenor Cf
* Although the lotal Project Apolio funding requirement lsillion, the Apollo requirement Cor categories comparable to thoseln the estimate for the USSR would be on the orderillion-
Soviet statements suggests that some other major space program of equivalent scale must he under way. The most likely alternativerogram toery large manned space station* Estimates forrogram are of the same magnitude as thoseanned lunar landing. Thus, whatever ultimate Soviet intentions may be, there are indications that substantial commitments probably have already been made and that the Soviet civil space funding requirement is likely to remain high in the next few years.
k. Cumulative run-irj Requirements
Some concept of the relative importance of different classes of missions in the United States and the USSR is provided by Figurehich shows cumulative funding requirements by mission. Through Fiscalhe United States has allocatedercent of the total space budget plan to civil projects andercent toimilar comparison for the USSR is not meaningful, because, as noted above, there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the Soviet military space effort. Thus far, US civil programs have accounted forillion, whereas Soviet civil programs are estimated to havewellillion, about two-thirds as much as the US
Within the civil space accounts of both countries, the man-in-space program clearly has received top priority. Aboutercent Of the total Soviet civil space effort has been devoted to this program, compared withercent of US civil funding requirements. TheSoviet manned effort includes Vostok, Voskhod,unar landing programarge space station) as well as the leading edgeircumlunar missionmall space station. The USrepresents budgeted expenditures for the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo projects. The reason for the relatively low figure in this category is that the budget plan Tor the development of the Saturn family Of launch vehicles is not carried as part Of the Apolloas is done by NASA, but has been puteparate Category for more direct comparability with what Is observable on thede.
The account covering development of the launch vehicleexpenditures only for those Launch vehicles, upperengines intended specifically for use in accomplishing civil Thie -: - j :
developing military missiles adapted for use as space launchxample, the development of neilher the US Atlas nor the SovietCBM is included in this account. The cost of these launch vehicles when used ir. accomplishing missions that tarn partpecific space program is, of course, included ir. the budget plan for that program.
FIGURE 3
US AND ESTIMATED SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: FUNDING REQUIREMENTS,
CUMULATIVE THROUGH5 (Billion US Dollars)
TOTAL PROGRAM
CIVIl
hiutaby
MHB
MCBUH*
LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
CONSTRUCTION SPACE SCIENCE &
iPpiiCAnons"
CIVIL PROGRAM
UNMANNED LUNAR/ PUNEim
dwvlopfiten* o> Scrum family oi launchwhich it mcludad in LaunchDevelopment catpgo-y
' Let* Unmanned Lunof/Plone'oty.
In addition to the Saturn oerloe. of launch vehicles, the USIncludes such hardware as the Scout launch vehicle and thestage. The Soviet account includes the Proton booster andsuch as the Lunik, the Venik third and fourth stages, and Based on apparent Soviet intent toajor mannedduring this decade, the estimates of Soviet fundingalso include the developmentarge launch vehicle inV class, which would be necessary toannedand which would have no military role as un
Despite the Urge payload capability provided by theCBM, the USSR has found it necessary toubstantial co-ad taent to development of launch vehicles. The estimated Soviet fundingtotals5 billion and almost equals that of the United States. For the USSR, this sum represents about 2'j percent of the estimated civil space requirements, as compared with aboutercent for the United States.
Construction of facilitiesajor Item In the US space budget, with aboutillion budgeted thus far for this purpose. As noted above, lt Is believed that the USSR has been able to effect economies in this area through the use of existing militaryIn the space program. Comparatively little construction is believed to be related directly to the Soviet space program, and this ia reflected in the relatively low estimate of Soviet fundingfor this purpose shown in Figure 3-
Spaee science and applications haveelatively small share or the total civil space funding requirements of both countries, with that of the United States accounting forercent and that estimated for the USSR,ercent. One reason for thisseems to be tliat the United States has err.pliasi7.ed appliedprogramsreater extent than has the USSR- It should be noted that this category excludes budgeted expenditures for unmanned lunar/planetary exploration, which is showneparate account.
The uxMsanned lunar/planetary exploration programs shovn In Figureare the only programs for which estimated Soviet funding requirements appear to exceed those of the United States. Ironically, this le one field of space exploration in which the United States had up until the soft landing ofcored Its most spectacular successes over the USSR. The primary reason for the difference Is the large commitment made by the USSR to the planetary program. The USSR Initiated this program In thes and has availed itself of every favorable opportunity to launch one or more probes either to Venus or Mars. Tbe program has been in such difficulty that5 the USSRan engineering test of planetary probe hardware {Zonduring an unfovorable period. Nevertheless, this probe and the three attempts in5trung indication that the USSR Intends to
continue toigorous unmanned planetary exploration program in this decade. Dy contrast the US plana only one Mariner probenownd the sophisticated Voyager vehicles will not be launched
rlGURE 4
US AND ESTIMATED SOVIET UNMANNED LUNAR/PLANETARY PROGRAMS: LAUNCHES AND FUNDING REQUIREMENTS THROUGH5 (MILLION US DOLLARS)
illion Total planetary SISSMillion
t 11
LUNARLAHITARY PROSES O
US LUNAR PROBES US PLANETARY PROBES
funding requirements prior lo9
IIIII
nnT
APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY
The cost of the Soviet space progran ls estimated in terms of budgeted expenditures expressed ln dollar equivalents, as if thewere being undertaken in the United States. This approach has been adopted because there Is no direct information on tbe actual ruble costs of the Soviet program. Tbe estimated funding requirement of the Soviet apace program can thus be compared directly with that of the US apace program.
Because there are no direct cost data, the funding requirement of the Soviet program was estimated by approximating that of itselements. In effect, the total requirement of the Soviet program was reconstructed from its identified and estimated porta. Identified programs ore those in which launches have already occurred, such as Cosmos, Blelctron, andstimated programs aro those In the pre-launch phase, sucheteorological satellite program, which is believed to exist because of US-Soviet agreements signed as earlyanned lunar landing program, which Khrushchev acknowledged in-
Scient itself, ha the nature
and technical analysts, and to some extent the USSK en relied on toission or program. Once mission has been established, its funding requirement the basis of US budgetary information provided by NASA, ler government These data were adjusted to loviet hardware known to be used as well as differences Lgn and fabrication.
xsed to approximate individual Soviet space programs In Figure 5. This example shows how the Soviet Vostok program was estimated on the basin of Project Mercury. Both ore first-generation manned apace programs that took place in about the same time frame, and for that reason, the Mercury program seems well suited as an analog for the Vostok program.
For tho purpooe of cost estimation, the program was divided into three categories: spacecraft, launch, and support. The cost of the spacecraft represents the planned coat of developing the spacecraft as well aa the actual mission hardware. Because in most instances relatively few details are known about the Soviet hardware, uie was node of some characteristic of the hardware which can be readily estimated and which bears some functional relationship to coats. In this example the total orbited weight of the Soviet and US hardware was used, which necessitates someadjustments for more direct comparability. Tn the example shown, Mercuryounds and
Vostok well0 pounds. It would be misleading to estimate the cost of the Vostok program using an unadjusted cost factor derived from Mercury, particularlyarge share of the Vostok weightounds) is attributable to batteries. Therefore, useful payload was used as the unit of weight to determine the estimated funding requirement for the Vostok spacecraft. Useful payload is an arbitrarily defined unit intended to take account of major differences in spacecraft design and subsystem weight. Applying the Mercury cost) to the adjusted Vostok weight yields the estimated -program requirement for the Vostok spacecraft.
Launch costs include the booster and launch services and are estimatedost factor for placing one pound of payloadautical mile orbit. These cost factors are consistent with estimates of the costs of Soviet hardware known to be used inthe space mission, adjusted to reflect the use of the boosterpace launch vehicle and to include launch operation costs.
Spacecraft, launch, and mission support make up the total funding requirement for the program. Estimates of mission support costs are taken from the closest US analog. Once the funding requirement for the total program had been established this total was distributed over time in general accordance with the pattern observed in the closest US analog. Adjustments were made in the distribution to take account of differences in the scale of the programs and in thefor accomplishing mission objectives.
there are other costs incurred because of specific programs but not directly related to them. These are nonprogram costs for such activities as administration, research and technology, and tracking and data acquisition, 'ihc costs for these activities were estimated on the basis of identified programs and were put into separatecategories.
Uncertainties arising from poorly defined or unknown hardware characteristics and mission profiles surely result in inaccuracies in the estimates for individual Soviet programs, in addition, individual Soviet programs may enjoy economies or incur penalties which are not present in the corresponding US program. However, despite uncertainties in the estimates for an individual program, It Is believed that in the aggregate the estimates presented in this memorandumseful approximation of the magnitude of the funding requirements of the Soviet space program and its major components- Implicit in this judgment is the idea that in the aggregate the various economics and diseconomies in the Soviet program balance, making the estimate of the total level of resources necessary toigorous spaceetter approximation than the assessment of the level of technology and costs incorporatedingle program.
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ANALOG APPROACH TO ESTIMATING SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS
SPACECRAFT
Total poylood per ccpiulcoylood per cop*,I* Number of capsulei Average cost per ccptule Cost per pound of ujefu: poylood Tofol cost
LAUNCH
.ouneh cost Avciope coil pei lounch Del ivory cost per0 nm orbit)
TOTAL PROJECT COST
(including mission lupporl)
HIMt C
ounds 14
9 million
illionillion
illion
SPACECRAFT
Total poylood per capsule Useful poylood per capiule Number of eopsulei Average cost per eapiule Assumed cost per pourd Total coil
LAUNCH
Tofol launch cost Average cost per launch Estimated delivery0 nm orbil)
TOTAL PROJECT COST
(including mission support)
ounds
13
8 million
illionillion
S8M
lllon
Original document.
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