INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Politically Significant Groups in South Vietnam
Sumaary
South Vietnamultitude of religious, political, and regional factions. Some are large, loosely organized federations; others areandful of aen backing an influential leader. Only the various religions have anythingide popular base, but they are split internally, and their followers are concentrated for the most partew geographic areas. Of the religions, the Buddhist faction headed by Thich Tri Quang has by far the largest popular following. Only two of the political parties have national significance and these are also splintered internally.
At best no noreenuous guess can be made on the potential voting strength and voting strongholds of most of the politically influential groups. It appears, however, that Buddhist-backed candidates will garner the largest popular support, and that it willather strong allianceother factions and groups to offset potential Buddhist strength.
by the Office of Current Intelligence
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The Buddhists
adherents of Buddhism probablyaboutoercent of theouth Vietnamese. However, up toercentpopulation has been estimated to identifyloosely with the religion. Theational organizationSaigon, is presently the principal vehicle forpolitical influence. The UBA has at leasteffective provincial and grass-rootsextending down to individual pagodas. UBA is divided along regional lines into two
major factions, which have tended to act as theand moderate wings of the association.
Central Vietnamese Buddhist factionby Thich Tri Quang, whose power is centerednorthern city of Hue and extends roughly fromprovinces along the coast to theof the central lowlands. Quang's influencein urban areas and mirrors the somewhatmilitant attitudes of the centralwith its traditional antagonism toward Quang's chief lieutenant is Thichtbe UBA's youth commissioner; his key layinclude the Hue University Rector BuiProfessor Le Tuyen, and former cabinetQuang Thuan. It has been estimated that theof the central Vietnamese faction extendsmany as three million South Vietnamese. less than one million of these are The faction has been trying for some timea lay Buddhist political party, theForcesut the party is notin being.
3. The more moderate southern wing of the UBA is led by Thich Tarn Chau, chairman of the Buddhist Institute. Chau ispokesman for the refugee Buddhist clergy from North Vietnam, but he appears to control tbe bulk of southern-bornestimated to number from one to three The southern Buddhists, however, appear to be far less tightly knit than those under theof Tri Quang's faction. Chau is less politically effective than Tri Quang, and has at times allied
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himself with politicians whose actions have later cast discredit on him. His principal associates in the clergy are Thich Tan Giac, head of the Buddhist chaplain corps, and Thich Ho Giac, deputy chaplainiery orator.
A splinter group, the Southern Buddhist Studies Association, is headed by lay leader Mai Tho Truyen, who has been prominent in internationalcircles but has split with the UBA. Although seldom involved in domestic Buddhist "campaigns,'* Truyen has participated in various government-sponsored civilian councils. He may have several thousand close followers, most of them scattered among the southern provinces, as well as considerable appeal among UBA adherents generally.
The Theravada Buddhist sect numbers more. Members are largely of Khmer (ethnic Cambodian) stock, and live in the provincesthe Mekong River, primarily near Cambodia but also in Vinh Binh Province near the coast. They have been politically inert at the national level, but theirSon Thai Nguyen, brother of Khmer Serei leader Son Ngocexert considerable influence in the provinces where they are concentrated. Nguyen's faction is considered rather militant in its actions; the other majorof the Theravada Buddhists, the Nguyen Thuy Association, is an older, and more conservative group.
The Catholics
It is estimated that there areillionillion Catholics in South Vietnam. They have long been prominent among the country's educated and administrative circles, and areamong the military officer corps. The Catholics are concentrated chiefly in Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa provinces near Saigon where there arerefugee settlements. There are also pockets of Catholic influence in the delta, east of Saigon, and in the northern provinces.
illion of the Catholics are refugees from Communist North Vietnam. They are
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very active politically and very vocally Their acknowledged leader is Father Hoang Quynh, describedolitical activist. During the past year, however, Quynh hasather moderate tack in relations with the Buddhists and other sects, and his influence has been challenged by other refugee priests,Fathers Nguyen Quang Lam, Nguyen Van Luc, and Tran Van Kiera. Quynh often chooses to conduct his political operations through an organization headed by lay Catholic leader Nguyen Gia Hien.
Catholics native to South Vietnamwell organized and less aggressive thanrefugee counterparts. Theiris the archbishop of Saigon, Nguyen Vana voice for moderationidelyfigure. The most vocal of theirhowever, is probably Father Ho Van Vui,
a more militant figure who broke openly with the Diem regime.
The Cao Dai
Cao Dai are an eclectic religiouselements of Buddhism, Christianity,and animism. The sect was Under the French, the Cao Daia measure of political autonomy,own army. Theyollowing of onemillion, although their real adherentscloseralf million. There areDai villages in the western provinces ofbut the principal base of Cao Daithe seat of the sect's "Holys inProvince, northwest of Saigon. The Caoin Tay Ninh appears to number athousand.
10. The sect suffers from serious internal splits and it is problematical whether it could become aelectoral bloc, although it certainly might elect some members to an assembly. Former chief of state Phan Khac Suuao Dai, but representative of the somewhat independent political Cao Dai elements in Saigon.
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principal faction of the sect, andthe most nationally minded, is led by former"general" Le Van Tat and his brother Le Trungare strongly anti-Buddhist. Tat was chief ofProvince from Diem's overthrow until late inregime. Close to them is Tran Quang Vinh,leader who servedember of theHigh National Council under the Quat ival of Tran Quang Vinh is Cao Hoaiousted Vinh from the "Holy See." Sang'sties, however, are not clear. Another offactions is led by former "general"Phuong, whomall Cao Daithe Vietnamese Restoration Party. Phuonga vice-presidential candidate against At least one Cao Dai faction, under
a Major Hung, is openly affiliated with the Viet Cong.
The Hoa Hao
The Hoa Haopiritualist Buddhist sect, with possibly closeillion followers, although they claim two million. Most of the members are concentrated in the westernmost area of SouthGiang and Chau Doc provinces borderingwhere they are the dominant political and religious influence. The Hoa Hao still retainof their former private army, but they have suffered from internal divisions and are stillsignificant national influence. They are,ource of recruitment for government paramilitary troops in several delta provinces outside their own domain, and thus may be in process of spreading their local influence.
Among the most important Hoa Hao leaders at present are Colonel Tran Van Tuoi, until recently chief of An Giang Province, and Colonel Nguyen Van Hue, the chairman of the An Giang provincial council. Hueollowernce-powerful but unsavory Hoa Haoran Van Soai.
Other key Hoa Hao figures at present are Colonel Ly Ba Pham, the new An Giang Province chief, and Pham Baaigon politician who probably has little influence at the local level. One of the many factions in the sect is led by Truong Kim Cu, another former "general" and erstwhile troublemaker.
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The Dai Viet Party
The Dai Viets are one of the two nationally significant political parties in South Vietnam. They are also splintered into several factions, only two of which are of importance.
The northern branch of the Dai Viet Party is composed chiefly of refugees from North Vietnam, and has little in the way of formal mass organization to support its nationally prominent politicians. The faction is led by Dang Vanublisher, andformer premier Phan Huy Quat. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Bui Diem, an adviser to Premier Ky, has also been associated with this faction. As national figures, some of these men probably couldubstantial vote, particularly in Saigon, but they have no local strongholds.
The southern faction of the Dai Viet Party has been weakened by events of the past two years, and is partly splintered between southern and central wings. Its nominal leader, Nguyen Ton Hoan, is once again in exile after having been ousted as deputy premier to General Khanh; he calls his party the Dai Viet Nationalist Party. Hoan appears to have had ties among several top military officers including Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu. whose brother, Nguyen Van Kieu,rominent Dai Viet Party member. Leadership of the faction by default now is claimed
by Ha Thuc Ky, whose actual base of power is in Quang Tri Province in central Vietnam. Ky calls thisthe Revolutionary Dai Viet Party. Its popular strength is unknown. The southern faction has been estimated to have0 active followers.
The VNQDD (Nationalist) Party
Like the Dai Viets, the VNQDD Party has been badly splintered. Ita strength and organisation are greatest in the various provinces of northern South Vietnam, known to the Vietnamese as "central Vietnam."
The southern branch of the VNQDD, based largely in Saigon, does not appear to have extensive grass-roots support. Among its leaders is Nguyen Hoa Hiep, minister of interior under Quatomewhat
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ineffective administrator who used his government post to build up the faction. Another old-time VNQDD leader, also in Saigon, is Vo Hongusinessman and one-time minister In the Bao Dai era. It was recently reported that Khanh will be recognized by local VNQDD factions as the party's national leader in an effort to unify the VNQDDounterforce to the Buddhists. Also prominent in the southern branch, although born in Northis former deputy premier in the QuatTran Kim Tuyen.
primary base of VNQDD strength isVietnam where the party appears to haveorganizationrassrootsVNQDD could probablyollowing ofhundred thousand throughout centralparty has been particularly active in Quang
Ngal and Quang Nam provinces, where it has entrenched itself to some extent in the provincial It has nevertheless experienced internal provincial factionalism, chiefly between younger and older elements. The party has strength in Quang Tin, and slso has some following in Quang Tri and Thua Thlen provinces, but substantially less than Tri Quang's central Vietnamese Buddhist faction. Some VNQDD leaders in central Vietnam have cooperated with Tri Quang in the past, but are now in the process of allying themselves against him. The secretary general of the central Vietnam branch of the VNQDD is Nguyen Dinh Luong. enuine regional leader for this faction has not yet emerged.
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large number of independentof them living in Saigon and headingsmall political parties, are nationallyand might well be elected if they wereonstituent or nationalof these men wield influence in thescene, but probably have no real powersupport outside of the political andcircles in which they lobby. Many areofficials and ministers; others areregional factions; some are former army officers.
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Aeons these men are Pham Quangia Dlnh council member. Tran Vanouthern leader; Hoang Co Thuy and his brother Boang Coaigon councilor; former premier Tran Van Huong, and such figures as retired Generals Tran Van Don, "Big" Minh, etc. In very few cases is it possible to estimate the extent and locale of support such men might draw from the electorate, unless they were endorsed by organized parties, religious groups, or the military. Among them, however, are probably some of thebest political and administrative talent, as well as some of its most overrated politicians.
Of the numerous groups with which many of the individually prominent politicians are associated, the Southern Old Students' (or Dong Nal) Association Is one which could develop considerable strength, at least in the southern part of South Vietnam. The Association, founded5 and beaded by retired General Tran Van Don, reportedly hasembers, morere in the Saigon area. it is ostensibly an apolitical association
of alumni and teachers from four well-known lycees in South Vietnam, the Association isover for political activity by southern intellectuals and politicians, many of whom wish to see asouthern voice in the government. Among other members of the Association, which reportedly meets regularly each month, are former chief of state Phan Khac Suu and Tran Van Van, prominent in the nowHigh National Council and its secretary general, Nguyen Van Loc.
Labor
24. Although there are several competing trade unions, the only labor organization in South Vietnam with any substantial following is the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor, or CVT, headed by Tran Quoc Buu The unionembership ofrom its affiliates, but actual strength may be less. Host of the CVT support is in the Saigon area, but it has some relatively important affiliates in Da Nang and other citiesorps and in the delta. The CVT gains some rural following from itsworkers' affiliate, but most of the plantation areas are now Vietnfested and residents there may not be permitted to vote.
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the rivals of the CVT is theof Free Syndicatesnled by Buiomewhat unsavorywho has sought to draw strength away from The Confederation of Vietnamese Tradeunder Vui Van Thienplinter group ofunder Le Van Thot and Le Dinh Cu are also rivals
of the CVT. The Thot-Cu group draws its present strength from the textile workers, whose ranks have reportedly been infiltrated by the Viet Cong.
Military
Withen under arms, the military couldotentially powerful voting bloc, although there has never been any evidence that the military would vote as orderedecretast practice of allowing army troops to vote in areas where they are currently based or operating gives the army the potential of swinging the outcomeiven electoral district. Host of the rank and file of the military, however, would probably vote their own political and religious persuasions, although they might support popular military candidates. The influence of the Buddhists among the officers and ranks of both the army and policeorps has recently been demonstrated; certain troops in the delta are known to be strongly Catholic.
Veterans of the armed services alsoa potential political force, possibly allied with the military. There are presently estimated
to be as manyeterans in the country, but they are less likely to voteloc than inwith their individual political and religious loyalties. The only significant voterans'the Veterans' Legion Associations des Anclens Combattants Vietnamlens reportedly has0 members; only, however, arc said to ba interested enough in the organization to pay dues. Under the Diem regime the Legion was of little significance, but it gained prestige from the election of General Ph.am Xuan Chieu, secretary general of the Directorate, as its president innd from the creation in6ew cabinet post for war veterans.
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Youth and Students
Aboutercent of South Vietnam'sis estimated to be below the age esult of past electoral lavs which have lowered the voting ageouths in their teens andouldignificant political Rural and urban youths have differentand outlooks, as do working youths and students, with the latter exercising the most vocal impact.
High school age youth apparently have long been the major target of various pressure groups, including the Viet Cong. Because theyess sophisticated and more malleable age group,
the high schools have often provided the hard core for political demonstration. Many of them reportedlyCommunist cells. The Viet Cong regard the high schoolseans of infiltrating confirmed followers into the universities andource of military and agent recruitment. The proportion of students overs unknown, but somewhat greater than in OS high schools.
students, often fromfamilies, remained largelypolitics until the Buddhist campaignnlisted their energies andislethora of political organizations
in the country's four universities: Saigon0 students; Hue with; Dalat with; and Vannew Buddhist university ina few hundred students. Both atand Van Hanh universities, the students have tended to be restrained in their political actions over the past year. The Saigon Students' Union,f Saigon University's student body under Tran Quang Tri as president and To Lai Chanh as executive committee chairman, has beenresistant to recent political agitation. In general, religious organizations in the Saigonsuch as the Catholic Students' Federation and the Buddhist Students' Association, have exhibited less religious and political fervor than other student groups.
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students at Hue University,ess privileged class andstrong Buddhist influence, have been more The Hue Students' Union, under Tuan Xuanbeen periodically in ferment during the pastand has been involved in recent "struggleactivity. Thereilitant, leftistthe Hue faculty, including the rector, andbody has also been reported asto Viet Cong propaganda. The university
of Dalat is under Catholic administration, butilitant pro-Buddhist element.
Overseas Chinese
The Chinese community in South Vietnam is estimated atillion, most of whom live in Choi on, the Chinese city adjacent to Saigon. They are Vietnamese nationals by decree of the Diembut have managed to retain their own schools which teach Chinese and their internal societies which have begun to operate more openly since Diem's downfall. The Chinese are strongly entrenched in South Vietnam's commercial life, but few have taken an interest in politics.
The increasingly disturbed economichowever, together with increased government efforts to bring Chinese youths into the armed services, may draw the Chinese more openly into the pictureolitical pressure group. Although most of them appear to be oriented to Taipei rather than Peking, there is some Viet Cong influence among them. ew Chinese firms, apparently motivated by profits, supply the Viet Cong, and some Chinese laborers, particularly in the textile industry, are reported to be Communist agents.
The Montagnards
ethnic tribes in Southnd are scattered throughouthighlands, primarily close to the If allowed to vote, they wouldtribal candidates, but as thereifferent tribes, any real cohesionmontagnards is questionable. One of the most
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prominent tribal leaders now active in theis Paul Nur, newly appointed to the commissariat for montagnard affairs, but it is by no means clear that he speaks for all tbe sontagnards.
Popular Voting Strength
At the present time, there is insufficient information to support any assessment of thevoting strength and voting strongholds of any or all of tbe politically influential groups and factions in South Vietnam. Elections held under the Diem regime were controlled or Influenced by the government inanner as to providetudy of voting attitudes or habits. provincial and municipal council elections held under the Quat regime in5 appear to have been generally free of government domination,data on them provideough gauge of political and religious influence among the electorate. Moreover, the issues and candidates were local, and5 results may not necessarilyalid bearingational election.
It is not yet known whether the comingwill be organized to run provincial candidates locally, either as individuals or as party slates,
or to run all the national candidates on the same ballot. Such arrangements will be very important as they will help determine the vote-drawing power of candidates with either local, provincial, or national reputations. 5 local elections brought outillion voters, or perhaps half the estimated potential as measured by voter turnout claimed by the Diem regime.
to plot the areas ofor control by the various powerCatholics, the sects, the Dai Viets,be done only roughly. There arethe political and religiousindividual provincial council members, andof the vote won by each member, but nois at hand concerning the total vote orof losing candidates. Moreover,rovide almost no clue to politicalat the district level.
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the suppression of genuineactivity by the Diem regime, and to somethe power of the military since that time,the development of political parties,to their Internal splits, and forced orthem to operate clandestinely. Most ofare reluctant to reveal theirstrength claims, when made, tend to becandidates in the past elections ran asor with government endorsement, butpolitical party or religious labels. There
is no accurate census of the populationhole, or of popular religious affiliations.
the accompanying map, an effort hasto pinpoint known strongholds or pockets ofor religious influence. Zt has beenestimate group strengths by cities on the map,for Hue where Buddhist domination la evident.was made to estimate possible party orstrength. Attempts to pinpoint araas ofby religious or political affiliationnecessarily limited to the populatedin the northern part of the country, andtowns and cities in the delta. Most of thearea of central Vietnam is sparsely populated,
and relatively little information is available on rural political allegiances in the delta outside of the known strongholds of the sects and the Khmers. (Map)
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Original document.
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