THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT'S MOVE AGAINST DANANG

Created: 5/1/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

C<* 1

- jfcrTbe Saigon "Jewnsatnt'enet Ik-Liang

infurvatton available Inon precisely what

has ippened In therea during th* past twenty four hoursand it La no* happening there, In Boa snd ina too fragmentary to pejwilt evenwellpeculation, let alone Inlexprotatlone. hat -oaa Be offered with any deems of confidence. Weknow tAnttk total of three goverrewinfcro-Saigon) battalions (two earlne and dh* airborne)rad into the Danang area and that after some it- but apparently win err -aklmiahln; they toon at leaat tenporary oontrolairs Headquarters and ottiar atrntoKlc locations lnoluding Danang radio* Ve defl noLknow what pronptad Uie operation, what Its overall objectives are, Ihather It la bat the first steparger Dir.-ctory plan, and what the rftaeUoii of other Interested pertleehe Struggle forces,ddhttts, tho First and Second ^Ivielone,ill bo.

In none waye, th* Jir*ctory opectually lame bed onletnae" Una) strongly resonbles th* plan discussed In harch whenUtion sparked by Uen, Thi'e ouster fiaiet began builtllng up and Dnnang first cane under efreotlv* oontrol of the Struggle rbrcsa. At that Use the Directory Indicated it -a* thinking of baring pro-ova loyaUstspecially among tha Central Viatrept vrXJDU, stir up activity which would serveeri for largo seal* intervention by Saigon foroeeorcible re-es iMlahnwnt of Saigon oontrol. THe earlier plan Was shelved but wayt have been for rot tan, since recant events any have been guidedlfled reloesmaUon. Catholle and vwyQD groups in Central 'litan hav*mt nellve in reoont weeks and the temperature Inorps area has rlsonoeult of their activity.

7,

. Not inovlnc axactly -hat thoplan* and intooUw are, only speculAt* on trio causes of their reoanteit.Dlnh had lhurface eaJaTvSI Corps, but the area obviously B*e have been xaaudBp effective .ooatrol. -Unh'a own notlvaa and ambitions vera also auapectaatx nir.ee ef hie oatonelbl* Directory colleague*, "he Struggle 'ore* co-Id itly or acourataly becowuniet movement, but left wing, it and pro-VC element* vera obviously penetrating th* etrvggle fore* tor* and gaining soma measur* of infiuena* within it. utput ofog radio* tonne*waa increasingly incorporating of obvicu* *iet Cong inepiraUvO. The aetlvltta* of tha BundhiBla, -

weremorale and diaoiplinaand war* beginning to bo felt Inrpe. Th* Directory may felt that under its surfnne oslm the situstlonfva* deUrinating rapidly

rot had to be surgically arrestad in the imtlonal Interest. Ky, and other unler Directory leadera such a* Co nay have foundncreasing pressure from activists like Col.srlne general" Land fi*: [rede officer* known a* Urn "Paby Th* Irectory certainly recognised tlwt had they surfaced their intention* to. the taoricanaf tU hareo dinar* Oa Uee free, acting.eewt/ils la probably i* principal reason* why they kept their hand so carefully concealed

for Xytf ooJeetiveB,an only speculate Invery

Ounne operation nay bo only the first phaeearger plnn Hue

la onvlaionaed that whny will bo occupied of tor is

and (ho can ba ^nyerso

In which

will serv tliroughou reeponelv oxorolpod

herit than forcibly extended throughout ICorpi, the. "irectcry layl that an affeetlv* ohow of force In Central 'iotram to sober, and hence curb, Its more vocal and active opponent* the" rest dr thoho buddhlsts to tho dlctatos of -the ^iddhirt Institute) dver which Trlnow

(da facto control. _ Even If thee* art indeed the Iftrectory'sot clear whether th* Directory intends toie the. elnotiteiB and transfer to civilian rule or is only tryingtronght* Ita hand during the cnBuins weeks and mon^ of political nanouvor,

eaotlons areto entlwto'a't the*Wwui tattoos .Intention or objectives. -Huohwlll depend on hownova agai at Danang proves to be and how effective the struggle organisation

proves to be whan put to the test* Ifan uecure Densnp

ith minimal effective opposition, ltB polltloal hand will beeast tot-Warily BtwngUienod. Goo, Miuan. lam^KLll then have to

new balance of strength and detornlna what course their personal tg diotaU. *hls Could ba the treaccepianoe

control through some faee-savinethad,1f

the dange

Itenan operation itself proves sticky orwith aarlous

of fratarialdol civil/war iny real

iTJ the ftuavig operation iteelf is succeosful, the speotre of such olvil strife Islstill very much present.

>r

V.

all that can ha Mid with oonflrlanoa abort th* it* la4Um profoundly ufoet by th* OovarnnenVa aova,

la.vaakQaaa, IrreaoluUuoactical opportunity thay will

(Inly aova to protest strongly, however, If they should dataralna that

rrayed age .net thaa are oessona trably too strong to trifle with,

theyjjaay hold tnelr fire and bid* their tin*. Again, nuch trill depend on

tha fllay of the"hand in ieinang. In Hue, and in Saigon over tho next few hours

and

In naidng It* nova anainat Manang,Ky goveriintnt hasreat deal on on* play* If the operation prove* uneaceeeaful oranarchy and civil warr?s, Cca>Jttxmer^uatodao are oonslderahly bettaV than even that th* Directory itself will not b* obi* to survive,

|lf th* operationoliUea will b* even stickler than tftvyftiave Won during th* period where varloue interested parties aanasess

and Urn balance of forces they have created. At thee cau do la keep the closest posaibla watch over the situation and endeavorlgn meardng and value to feats as they mere*.

Original document.

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