LBJ
Mandatory .f?
Case#NLjJlHSL
CENTBAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CPPICS OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Ph6
SPECIAL MEWHANEUM6 SUBJECT: Castro,6
SUMMARY
Thing" hare not been going veil for Fidel or for the "revolutionary camp" vith vhlch be identiflea ln vorld affairIn particular, be baa been shaken by tbe overthrow of eeveral heads of reroLutlocary go Vermont elsewhere and by the recently-uncovered aaaaaalnatlon plot agalaat hla ln Cuba. Ve think that hia attitude in tfce face of theae develop-menta, together vith hia frustration over Cuba's continuing economic difficultly, le causing him toeasure of his rapport vith the Cuban populace. This does not meen that hla hold on pover la imminently threatened, but lt probably does mean tmat he vill become gradually more vulnerable over aperiod. There vill, at the same tine,omewhat greater chance that he might undertake risky or belligerent actiona abroad.
In seven yeare of powerasood deal. He has tended more and iRore to exaggerate hie ownend that of tbe Cohan revolutionary example in vorld affairs. He baa, at the same time, been losing part of his charista within Cuha, for the revolution he commands has aged but not prospered. Ee cloarly finds hi-rself under unimaal preooureo at tbo preaont time; his reactions to these are likely to move aim further out of rapport vith tbe Cuban populace.
Frustrations are not new for Fidel; bis flamboyant career has been full of them. But the talentsbroughtin his revolt against Batista have not proved voll-euited to the day-to-day buxinoss of political administration anddeciaion-maklng. Hia regime has, for instance, teen set hock by lbs tendency to apply ell aorta of theoretical principles in dogmatic. Impractical fashion. As ve pointed out some time ago, the lenders of tbe regime have failed all along to put enough Latin flavor into their "Marxian This
haaarticularly strong limiting effect en Cuban economic rrogxeEs aa the regiine has initiated, and then failed with, one
fine-sounding scheme after another. Cases in point are the original crash program of Industrie Lizatlon, the expropriation of land froa many of the country's most productive farmera, an ineffectual schedule of vorh norms, and tbe relianceear ego on moral, rather than material incentives to stimulate worker productivity.
3. Of course many other thingsa large proportion of them outside his controlhave combined to hold Fidel'sat relatively low ebb. The US economic denial program continues to exacerbate the regime's internal economiclow sugar prices hurt Cuba badly last year; bad weather has reduced the size of this year's crop. Communist China's refusal to supply promised quantities of rice this yearurther major irritant. Perhaps most serious of all as anto Cuba 'a progress has been the continuing exodus or defection of many of the country's moat talented and beat trained psople.
k. Prospecte for parallel revolution elsewhere in Latin America are din, at leant for the short-run; Castroismolitical force in the area is virtually moribund. Try aa Caatro will to breathe fire and spirit Into prospective
revolutionaries of other Latin American countries, he finds that the manner actually willing to go to the barricadesdisappointingly snail. And even while he declares bis determination to aid end abet those vho dare to tike up arms, the Soviets warn him to beep risks low and the Chinese callhicken for notnough
5. To an increasing extent, Castro haa come to picture tbe world as divided into two important parts. One is thecamp led by Cuba, the USSR and the other Common! at countrloa; it also includes moat nowly-independent end in-between nations. Tbe other is tbe counter-revolutionary camp led by tihe united States and including the other "imparlallot" countries. Long and sincerely distressed by tbe Chinese-Soviet split, Fidel baa felt that thio hampers the progreas of tbe
Chinese turned their wrath on him too, be badumber of clumsy and unsuccessful offere to try to bring the tvo big Ccmmunist powers bock into harmony.
6. While he continues to expound about the inevitable forward movement of tbe revolutionary camp, Fidel is obviously avare of ths beatings taken recentlyumber of hie fellow
about tbeof Ita leaders displaced bythere willcewvhat greater chance thet Caetro might resortieky or belligerent more. ore could take tbe formampaign to atcp DS overfli^tta of Cubaenewal of pressurea on the DS navel baea at Ouantanamo; it might, on the other hand, involve direct pro-vision of weapons or man from Cuba to assist an activeperhaps in Vietnam, perhaps closer to home.
8. The recent aasaealnatlon plot against Castro baa obvioualy added to his woaiee. Thia conspiracy ahowed atodicum of sophistication and apparently stood an appreciable chance of success* Moreover, Investigation by Castro's security officials has indicated that certain of Fidel's old military eomradas, if not directly involved in the plot, appeared at least to be susceptible to the same kind of The regime's reaction has not, however, stoppedhorough roll-up of tba plotters and of suspect individuals on tbe fringes; it has gone on to set new standards of behavior, applicable to all Cuban officials. Unfortunately for Castro, bowevar, purging Cubans for conspiring with Imperialists, tor lack of revolutionary militancy, or for flagrant corruption is
one thing; purging then for telling dirty stories or for cirilired intercouree with pretty girls is quite another.
9. This moralistic attitude on Fidel's pert la notnew, though lt clearly la becoming more extreme. From the beginning hla rerolutlonary credo hasertain note out of tune with the general Cuban habit and temperament. Until now, however, xoat Cubans were able to forgive him his moral preachings because they knev Fidel vaa willing to rise above those occasionally in hla personalew moral rearmament approach, especially if long sustained, might antagonize considerable numbera of people vho have so fax remained backers of the regime. Indeed, Fidel oould become eo upright as to cause hia eventual downfall.
SHERMAN KE Chairman
FCR THE BCARD C? KATTCHAL
Original document.
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