opy of 9
MEMORANDUM FOR: Diroctor oi Central Intelligence
bonring on OXCART use
over Cuba
PROS:
would establish and validate theof tho OXCART system toefended aren, in which weather
ontinuing factor.
It would confirm the reliability of the basic aircraft system.
Should they elect to exerclee theefenses, it would provide an opportunity to try the first generation electronic jammers.
It wouldnique opportunity to test the response (detection range, handling capacity,oviet-type air deienee systemow cross section Mach Three reconniassancc plane. This dynamic response is unknown ateven to tho Soviets. In our estimates of Communist defensive capabilities, we havo always assumed them to be perfect so as to be delense consorvativo. However, they are probably far from perfect and such experience wouldore confident Judgment of survivability In time of real need.
5. The initial reaction would he that of the Cuban manned defenses. We would expect the Soviets to move in and uxploit this opportunity to calibrate their own capability. This would giveefore and-after" look at the defensive capability which could be followed both through COMINT and through the warn ink-intercept systons carried on OXCART itself.
APPROVED FOf RELEASE DATE:7
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6. Utilization of OXCART over Cuba couldow-key introduction of OXCART into our ordinary reconnaissance operations, thereby signalling an upgrading of equipment used In ouch activities. OXCART use inituation would tend to accustom both the Communist and Free World nations to the concept of its normal use in the same role as the.
CONS:
It wouldeasurement of the OXCART radar cross section to the Cubans and Soviets, which Is probably unknown to then.
Unless we flew the missions off nominal, it would allow the Cubans and 3ovlets to pin down the operational speed, altitude, and turning radius of OXCART, which they now know only generally.
Since we must be prepared to turn on the electronic jammers even against exercises of theystems in Cuba, it would give them an opportunity to establish the basic philosophy of the first generation ecu. Tbe noise jammer (BIO BLAST) which works against the (FAN SONG) tracking radar is old hat, and would reveal nothing of Interest. Tbe guidance link jammer (BLUE DOG) would reveal our insight Into the Soviet command coding and our ability to override and mislead the mlfaLle guidance system. However, it should be noted that the second and third generation jammers would not normally be flown, and therefore neither tested nor exposed to compromise.
If our estimates of the OXCART invulnerability are drastically wrong and the OXCART were brought down
in Cuba, the Soviets wouldreat deal technologically, since much of tbe airplane would survive its crash. However, ve consider this totally unlikely.
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C0KMENT3:
6. Oi the likely losses, tbe cross section and guidance link Jammer would be the only cignifleant ones. We could conntraln the mictions so as not to reveal theao features; however, this would detracttbe value of the operational validation.
6. Political considerations are covered in Board of National Estimates MemorandumSeptember IDO'O.
a inert
Deputy Director lor
Science and Technology
cc: ExDlr
ecce.
Original document.
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