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DATE: ?
OXCART
66
MEHORAHDUM FOB TKX DIRECTOR
SUBJECT; Probable Cencunlat Reactions to Om of to* OXCART for Reconnaissance wr Cute
Aosuajptions! (a) Four flights: two per month for two months (b) The vehicle would be detected mad identified
We taluk It moat Likely that there would be do attempt to shoot down the aircraft, and that tht Conwualsts would either make do public Ibsim of the matter, or would keep public controversyory low kay. if they did make an Is sue at all. It would mow llfcely take the form of private warning to the US against uae of OXCART overR. But there are other possibilities mala* are included la the discussion below.
1. The Soviets know of the existenceS aircraft such ae the OXCART: we believe that they do not know the details of Its capabilities. One virtually certain reaction to the flights would be for the Soviets to use then to gain more information about the vehicle.
The Soviets might be puzzled as to why we were using this vehicle at this tine, for returns whleh would probably not seem to them worth the cost of revealing more of the aircraft's capabilities. They would wonder why ve chose to intemmMce this new factor Into the Cuban situation whleh is quiet, and In which
they probably eoBslder that v* -re getting all the intelligence We need fromndlight*. Me think their aoet likely Interpretations vould be that thoreieated eithertage in the routinenpnbility Alett was obsolescent, or (b) final trials before uae of tha aircraft over Worth Vietnam, over China, orover tha lean.
3. We think It unlikely that the florleta (or Cubans) would attaapt to ahoot the OXCABT down with anissile. Ue aa* no reason vhy the OXCART abould be attacked whanot.*
h. Aa real eyaalluu Is whether tht Soviets would decide to raaxe an leave of tha natterublicly or privately. Thoy might do ao out of concern that the us vaa preparing to us* the vehicle over the UeVB, and outesire to aat USublic or private renouncing any such use. It is also possible that they might ue* it as an oeoaaion for raising: tha whole question of overhead rooonnaiasonce (including that byr aore generally forarder line toaarda the US with respect to Vletaaa.
5. On the whole, we think it unlikely that the Sovleta vould want to heat up the International situation over this issueIf only because it vould involveabout
are advised' that' any auch attaapt against the OXCAhT would almost certainly be unsuccessful.
OXCAHT
ox
nights OTtr Cuba, art uncertainties about how to daal with oxcart Id Um future. Heace Wa doubt that they wouldublic furor, or reopen tbe whole quest loo of overhead reootmalseance. There le about an even chance that they would make private representation* to the UB, warning against use of tbe vehicle over the USSR.
ubetever the desires of the US and Soviet govt roam ot a, something about aae of this vehicle over Cuba sight beooae public, either by Cuban declaration or by leaka to the press. Ia euoh aaae the Soviets would surely dec* re their ability to deal with the aircraft over the USSR, If there were substantial publicity, the Soviets might feel constrained toreater Issue of it; we think they would prefer not to do se.
If the vehicle oaae down In Cuba (vhlch ve are informed la extremely unllkoly) and especially If the pilot were alive, there would certainlyreat deal of propaganda and publicity. The ohanees of Soviet actions alone; the lines mentioned above would substantially increase; ve still do not think tbe Soviets would create an international crisis, if the aircraft came down at sea aad mas not recovered by Cubans, Ccanunist reactions would probably be the seam aa If It had returned to Its base.
flifiT _
8. There Is one other alight possibility worth caavmaalng. The Cubans nay be sufficiently annoyedeccomtaaance, aad sufficiently eager to do aoaethlng about it, to seise upon use of the OXCART as evidence that the US Itself badtatic situation. They night than consider that it gave the* license to useissilesircraft subsequently overflying their country. We believe that they would not think the risk worth taking; it does not oaks auch sense from their point of view; moreover they would almost certainly be restrained by the Soviets.
9- Chinese Conminlst and Worth Vietnamese reactions would be limited at most to propaganda if the affair became public. Both countries would doubtless expect tbe vehicle to be used over them, but the North Vietnamese at least expect direct USin any case. We do not believe that either country would take the event as evidence of US Intentions to escalate war In the Far East, though both might issue propaganda to this effect.
FOR TUB BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT aCTH Acting Chairman
Original document.
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