IMPACT OF A THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ON SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS

Created: 5/25/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Tfnt'following Intelligence organizations participated in tha preparation of this esfimotti

TU Central Intelligence Agency and the MeUigenot orgonirotioni of theof State, Defense, the NSA. cod AEC

Conevrringi

.Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon* for Deputy Director of Central ^Intelligence

AV,ughes, The Director of Intelligent* and Research, Department of

Maj. Geo. Robert Taylor, 3d. forntelligence Agency Or. loch W. Tocdelto. for Director of the NoSorvol Security Agency Mr. Howard C. Srovm,iiitwnt General Manoger, Atomic Energy Ccmirduion

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Absfaining

IMS s" FSB:-iefift

. Cregar, forDirec'or, Federal Bureau of Invr>ligation,being outside of his "

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OF CONTENTS

THE PHOBLF.M

FOREWORD

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

URRENT SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Applicable to Programs Oilier Than ABM

ApplicableM Programs

OVIET HIGH ALTITUDE TESTS

MPACTHRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ONPROGRAMS

on Nuclear Testing

on Military Programs Other Than.

on ABM Programs

Ill- US DETECTION CAPABILITIES

A. Monitoring Capabilities of the AEDS

of Intelligence Sources

a Violation

Page

1

THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIEI1 COVERT VIOLATION

0

THE IMPACTHRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ON SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate tho impacthreshold Test Ban Treaty on Soviet military programs, with particular emphasis on its impact on Soviet ABM activities; to discuss the capabilities of US intelligence to monitoret ban; und to evaluate Soviet capabilities for covertlyit.

FOREWORD

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty considered in this estimate isin line with proposals under discussion in the US and abroad, bul it docs notpecific proposed treaty. Wc assumeof the terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty now in effect, which prohibits testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; underwater {including bothwaters and the highr in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. The Threshold Treaty considered in this estimate would add to the restrictions of the currentrohibition of anynuclear testeismic disturbance5 on the Cutenbcrg-Richter scale. It is assumed that treaty language willethod byean magnitude for any particular event will be established, thus avoiding mtemattonal disputes about tlie magnitude of reported events. It imposes no limitations on themedium in which the tests take place, or on the degree of decoupling employe*!. It provides no on-site inspection and no

lions. Had) participating nation will have to decide for itself whether any given seismic event of magnitude greater5 was causeduclear detonation andreaty violation.

CONCLUSIONS

believe that for most of the Soviet military developmentwhich we can foresee over the nest fewhresholdTreaty would impose no greater restrictions than those alreadyby tlie 1'urtial Test Ban. However, the relationship betweenof underground explosions and the resulting seismic readingsat best, anil can be greatly altered by decoupling.might therefore still testide range of yields,how far they were willing to risk violating tlte treaty and tocost and effort of decoupling. Practically speaking, wethey could develop weapons yielding

by scaling up from lower yield tests which wouldair chance of not producing seismic readings They mightdevelop TN weapons withy expensive decoupling methods. )

respect to ABM weapons, we think there is about anthat the Soviets have already

Icxoalmosplicric ABM warhead yielding |

ft they have not already donehreshold Treaty would not, in our view, makeevelopment impossible, as we believe existing Soviet weapon technology would support it either without further testing, or with lests that wouldeasonable chance of not exceeding the threshold.

C We believehreshold Treaty would impose prohibitive restrictions, beyond those of the Partial Test Ban. only for developing weapons which might need new warheadsIf the development of such weaponsufficiently high priority the Soviets might conduct tests virtually certain to violate die treaty, in the belief lhat the violation could not lie proved against them. As few as otic or two suchear could be of significant aid to their military programs. (Paras.)

D. The US Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) wouldcertainly detect all seismic events in the USSRagnitude

5 or greater. Perhaps with help from it could probably discriminate between explosions and occurring in most parts of the USSR, but there would stillearspecially in the Kumcbatka-Kuriles area, which could not lie so identified. Such events would representtreaty violations, but it would be extremely unlikely thatcould with certainty either confirm or denyuclear event had in fact occurred. )

K.eismic event5 was identified as an explosion, it would almost certainly be nuclear in origin. Thus this evidence,with wliatvailable from intelligence sources, would probably be sufficient, exceptew cases, to determine to theof the US government whether or not the explosion wasin origin. Evidence sufficient toorld forum that an explosion was nuclear could almost certainly be derived only from on-stte inspection, which Is not permitted by the Threshold Treaty under consideration.

0

DISCUSSION

I. CURRENT SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

past decade ol Increasingly sophisticated Soviet testing of nuclearand weapons has includederies, Iwo series of intensivt lest* in

nd two youi of testing underground urn. the Partial Testwas signed In1 An evaluation of tbc effects of aBan Treaty on Soviet military programs must starteview ofnuclear technology developed through these tests anil Its relation loprograms.

A. Technology Applicable to Programs Omar Than ABM

Development. The Sovietsamily of thermonuclearresponsive to the present needs of their strategic attack amifortes.ng Itange Aviation and the Kocket Forces havenumber of older TN weapons in the low megaton range baaed on tliethe tests conducted8 and car her Weapons based onrst series probably began to enternd arc nowin significant quantities, and will continue to be produced In orderolder weapons slill in the strategic attacktockpile. The*'generally represent significant imprusemeuts over tlie entireand probably include some high yield (over ten MT1 TN weapons

for delivery bv both aircraft and missiles. arhead |

suitable for thes estimated to be now available as ii usult of

3 Tbe Soviets had6ariety of relatively largeweapons Inwhich arc ptobalJy still in stock-

pile in large numbers lor tactical missile and rocket forces, for tactical aviation, fur general pnrposo uses by tho Soviet navy, and for SAM forces.esult _ofest* llie Soviets were able to develop fission weapons in the

Most ol the nearer

liision wejipons entering trie Soviet stockpile in the last tew' years are probality

these improved biw-yicid weapons.

rior to the Partial Test Ban Treaty die Soviets bad largely fulfilled their bark requirements for multimegaton TN WAinon* and for fbaiuu weapon* They may stillequirement for TN warheads in the iiibmegsion and low megatonor thehe requirement can lx> fulfilled under the Partial Test Ban, and probably would be fulfilled before tho Soviets accededliresbold Treaty. Under tbe Partial Test Ban, the Soviets have conducted teats yielding upT. Some of the tests yielding aroundT and higher

wok* probably directed toward development of TNT or less Imvn been detected, especially during the past year;liave been oriented toward development of either fission or TNweapons based on die underground tests of tbe last two years willcntermg stockpile next year, and will be available for

ployed over the next several years.

Effects Testing. Our arsarysis of Soviet tests provides ser) little Intonna-tion on Soviet programs to enhance the kill potential of nuclear we.ip.ms. or on the state of Soviot knowledge of the various kill effects of nuclearost of the thermonuclear tests1t Novaya Zemlya, wliere the Soviets were probably able to Instrument only forsic diagnostic Informationfor development of TN weapons. Most of the Soviet fission devices were tested at Srmlpalatinsk; we know little about the methods of testing there or the kinds of effects InstrurneriUtion employed.

Tbe Soviets have conducted extensive tests of the effects of nuclear bursts on military equipment and structures. Although we cannot say how much tbe Soviets may have learned aliout kill effects from their tests, Ihey have clearly had ample opportunity to discover tho same Important nudear effects which wc have discovered.

Analysis of Soviet publications and classified manuals shows ihut tin- Soviets have acquired effects data of sufficient scope and quality on air. surface,and under pound bursts to be adequate for planning and executiug most militarychusafled articles show that they arc aware of therachatiou effects on electronic equipmentlthough we have no knowledge of the extent tn which they may Live explored these effects, we do have evidence tliat they are aware of tlie vulnerabilityissile guidance systems to them. The Soviets have also shown that they understand thepulse (HMP) phenomena produced by nuclear explosions, and they may haveumber of low-yield surface tests to measure the EMP effect on mililary systems anduipmenl. Although ll* Soviets are probably aware of the EMP vvbieridalily of ICBMs and silos, it nr. doubtful tliat they have conducted tests of the surface EMP effects of high yield weapons.

Cansidering tho foregoing, we think the primary effect ofsent Partial Test Bun on Soviet weapons programs has been to prevent complete systems testing and effects tutting in the atmosphere or space. Nevertheless, the Soviets can obtain some significant data mi those effects by simulating atmospheric and space environments In underground tests.

B. Technology Applicable to ABM Programs

9 High-Altitudermgeries, the Sovietsumber of high altitude nuclear tests, near Sary Shagan. (Sec

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tests-oviet interest in assessing the capability of an ABM system to discriminate and track two or moreppruachlng successively ondentical Uajrctoriea. bothadai blackout environment andormal atmosphere.2 events appear to have been conducted for the primary purpose of studying tbc effects on radar systems of blackouts created by high yfcld precursor burst* or by detonation of tho Interceptor's own ABM warheads. Data relating to certain long range effects, sttch as EMP and TREE, may also have been collected. It is unlikely, however, that the tests involved devices which hid rnhamul radiation outputr that the Soviet* were testing far thu vulnerability of re-entryVs; to shock produced by surfacoof loways.'

harudetiMics tif Certain Nuclear W'eajxmi. Aiiotbnr portion ofest scries involved the detonationroup uf TN weapons In5 MT range. These weapons showed certain characteristics suggesting that dicyew Soviet weapons design. One recent attempt toheoretical model exhibiting these characteristics ledesign that could produce anay output. We think it likely that tlie Soviets would realize thr importance ofay effects for eioatntosplieric ABM weapons and could adaptesign accordingly. If %uch is lite case, the Soviets then couldeapon that wouldays

fiM DrfliH/mi nl. For several years the Soviets have been constructing what we believe arc AIIM deft-rues.* The missile most likely to be used in an

ow merryilotWrai voluaj corrgr cao be ailaWaWsli at theof athw rforts. by apftaprUlr iJeMga oly rurtryev fc> iiMaadttrd (anlaan nrtfy.igh rv>(t.ay enrrgyev hi olkm caledX-ray.

'So-trategic Air ind Maaahtovember,ond foMnotn 11

i'VXilnwiijtlifdi- role in such defenses is lhc Calculialosh-typo. Givendifficulties ol Hleiitirynig lethal wurlieadsloud ofoutside tin- atmosphere, it is desirable tliat an cxoatmospherlcemploy weapons with asill radius as leasable. This in turna nmir.ir wjrhe.id with improved kut capabilities, one way ofmighttluuughne of tbe group of weapons describedpreceding paragraph appears highly suitable lor use with tbe Gaknhhave do evidmiv whatsoever tbat this or anyof llie group ofnuclear weapons is the Galosh warhead, nor indeed can we be suregroup of now nuclear weapons 1

less, the apparent deployment of an cipehsiV* ADM tyrTc'm employing exo-atinosphiTie Infr Repines argues lhat tlie Sovietsarhcudarge kill radius, whatever sure danism may be used to achieve it.

ii.-

IJconsiderations in the preceding paragraphs lead ns to beliese thatJi.bat the Soviet* have developed an esoatinosplseiukui tcehmqucs, es-eti though we dunk that

war lie ads

totMpMt System.f course desirable to warlieads in their actual environment, but it is possible bynd undergrwuid test data to calculate tbe effect* of specific in various objects at various altitudes.

II. IMPACTHRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ON SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS

A. Limitations on Nuclear Testing

IA Degree of Risk Accepted. Because of variations hi geological structure and in the propagation paths uf seismic signals, nuclear explosions of tbe same yield may produce quite different seismic readings. Experimental evidence based on US tests and measurements indicates that the seismic magnitudeuclear lest of known yield andiven medium may vary by upnits on thecale. Asercent of the cases fall alsove andercent below the averagehot intended toeading5 on lhat scale would0 percent chance of oxeeeding tliatountry desiringercent assurance of nol exceeding5 limit would be limited tu tests of about oiie-balf the yield il might lest with onlyercent assurance.

earing Medium. Most detected Soviet underground tests have taken place iu granite, [

1 would be possible, without violating the Threshold Treaty, to test In dry alluvium devices of larger yield tlian those which could be tested in granite.

JWe believe that the Soviets liave

had little experience In tasting underground in dry alluvium at yields alxtvc tbc low kiloton range. Tlie USSIt pmhahly lias alluvial deposits of sufficient depth, but we do not know whether the deposits arc dry toepth as would permit testing]

It is pofctiblr tb.it the Soviets would resort toin which the nuclear explosion takes placearge cavern,tbc Decoupling at lower yields appears

but to decouple larger yields so tliat they can be tested within5 Illumes Increasing!)and difficult. It has been estimated thativen seismic threshold one might test witheviceield up to as much asimes greater than on Id be tested withoutBut thisighly thcnretical and obviously very uncertain estimate.ractical nutter, it seenu to us likely on the basis of present knowledge tliat seismic effects from an explosion on the order of most of the time, be degraded through decoupling to reading,ery Urge and costly cavity

sveapoDs wilh yieldsutilizing expensive decoupling

methods.

Soviets could probably scale up from the devices they testedwith reasonable confidence, weapons having yields four or five timesas the test devices.Wf think that, providing theyhance of exceeding Ihe thresltold, the. Soviets couldyieldingConceivably they might develop

B. Impact on Military Programs Other Than ABM

IS. ll follows from what has been said abovehreshold Treaty would not seriously hamper Soviet development of small yield tactical weapons, low yield testing for special effects (enlianced Or suppressed radiation for tacticalr acquisition of data on the vulnerability of components. Underreaty, though with some risk of violating it the Soviets could also probably develop now or follow-on TN warheads with yields

for their small-silo missile systems, as well as for now naval missile systems,believe that for the tests needed to develop an entirely new warhead withSoviets would be forced either to resort to expen-

sive decoupling, or. more likely, ioreater thanercent chanceest would5 seismic reading. Full-scale tests of high yieldor of silo hardness against nuclear weapons cannot be conducted under either the Threshold Treaty or the Partial Test Ban.

! is difficult even under (lie Partial Teal Ban to conduct the teststo develop new warheads yieldingThe Threshold

Treaiy would udd to these difficulties.

/may oe mat ttie Soviets will wish to develop

new warheads ol such yields which are hardened against US ABM weapons, or which can be used in their own ABM programs, or both, Apart fromthese possible requirements, we believe that tbe Sovicls do noi need to conduct sueh tests as would carry high risk of violating the Threshold Treaty.2 tests enabled them to develop niuttimegalon weapons with acceptable yicld-to-wcight ratios lor Long Range Air Forces and Strategic Rocket Forces, and to test effects of these weaponsegree compatible with mililary requirements.

C. Impact on ABM Programs

s stated above, we believe there is about an even chance that thealready developedwarhead.

If Ihey have not already tlOTPeaty w<, in our view, makeevelopment impossible, as we believe existing Soviet weapon technology would support it. either without further testing or with tests tliat wouldeasonable chance of not exceeding the threshold. The Soviets coulday lethality data applying toarhead from underground testing without violatiug the Treaty. We believe also that inests the Soviets acquired enough data on radar blackout effects lo pennit them to develop and deploy this weapon system. Although the Soviets would almost certainlyequirementull-yield exoatmospheric test of the System and for tests to acquire additional blackout data, this is already prohibited under tbe Partial Test Ban.

e believe the Soviets liave not developed an ABM warhead with

[ritcy roi&bteed lor

such warheads

In this'event. Wi> ufellfcl'e.hrcsUOkl licaty would notimit-

ing factor as long as the prospective warheads were In tbe submcgaton range. For the developmentew ABM warhead of ibis type In the multimegaton range the Threshold Treaty wouldignificant limitation over Ibe present treaty.

III. US DETECTION CAPABILITIES

he ability of the I'S tohreshold Treaiy and lo detectnivolve* establishmenteismic eventcn place-agnitude. idinliOeation ol sueh an event as naturalplosive in origin, and identification of an underground erosion as nuclear or conventional high explosive. lfleieiil, but related, problem is that nlorld forum

ol the validilyS kleritificatioueismic event5 inuclear explosion.

Monitoring CopobilitJBs of m# AEDS

23J

event

SSH otr above can be delecTcd

ercent certainty.

e believe that in nearly all eases itossible to distinguish be tweiTi explosions and earthquakes in tin- USSR wlnn the seismic reading5 or above. |

ll'racHctllly speaking,eismic event registering oveil identified as an explosion, would almost certainly lx- nuclear raj her than chemical in origin.

B. Capabilities ol Intelligence- Sources

ntelligence resources ed the USUI commuiiily could sometimes lie useful in supplementing the AKDS analysis

2S. It is also possible that changes in Soviet test location* or methods could degrade US intelligence capabilities. Although we would expect the Soviets

esort to such activity so far as practicable ifttempted clandestine testing, we do not believe, they would be completely successful in eliminating intelligence indicators-

C.iolation

o criteria foriolation are specified in any of thea Threshold

| We believe that in

general sueh proof could be demonstratedorld forum only by on-site inspection, which is not permitted under any form of the contemplated Threshold

IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET COVERT VIOLATION

We have estimated above that the Soviets can meet most of theirrequirements for weapons development withouthreshold Treaty. If they foresaw testing requirements for military programs tliat would require consistent violation, they proliably would not sign the treaty in the first place. We also believe they would not accede to the treaty unless they thought il would be relatively advantageous to them, or at least not disadvantageous. Once they had enteredreaty, the Soviets probably would feci that the advantago to be gained from frequent violation would not be worth the political damage to Iheir International position, providing these violations were proved against them.

It is clear, however, that the Soviets could gain significant advantages in weapons development from one or twoear which exceeded the threshold.

The Sovieti might therefore testaimer which they knew would violate the treaty, believing that the violation would not be proved agaioat them. In any event, they have shown considerable willingness to riskon of tbe Partial Test Ban on several occasions, andlievn that they would lie equally willing to riskhreshold Treaty, We believe, hi fact, tliatould bo IUmiy toouple ofear |

f the Soviets should desire to test5 with the least chance of being caught, tbey could move the tests awaynown test areaeavily seismic area, such as the Kamchatka-Kuriles area,|

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