APPROVED TOP RELEASE DATF.: 5
TOMKJIT
76
(31
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER JSrS-di
PROBABLE REACTIONSOSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Submrficd by
ACTING DIRECTOS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Connrted in by me
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At indko'od overleaf
6
DATE
NOTE: TniJ is tho estimate. No futhor version will bo published.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence cgoniio'icni of theof Stole, Defense, the NSA. ond AF.C
Concurring:
Or. R. J. Smith, for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney,or Ihe Director ol Intelligence and Research, Department o< State
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director. Defenie Intelligence Agency
De Louis W. lordello, for Director of the Notional Security Agency
Mr. Howardwn,Aitlitant General Manager. Atomic Energy Cocn/ninion
Abstaining:
Mr. Wilfiam O. Cregar. for Assistant Director, Federol Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his Jurisdiction.
WARNING
i lll'ilnlffecting the Nn'iiwnl Ptftflj nltliiimil IIthe meaning. 7QH, thenr1 lllllFiiiurn In any manner top'" ' |
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS SECRET WHEN USED SEPARATELY
7
CERTRAL
6
SUBJECT: : PROBABLE REACTIONSOSSIBLE COURSE OP
ACTION TS SOUTH VIETNAM
TEE PROBLSM
To estimate probable reactions to the possible deployment of Chinese Matlonallot troops to South Vietnam during the- It in assumed thatorce of one or two divisions with attached support troops, totalling0 troops, would be dispatched.
THE ESTIMATE
I. IONA
1. The GRC would almost certainly complyS request for combat troops. The GRC leaders would regardroposalignificantin US policy. They vould Interpret It as an expression of US willingness to disregard Peking's reaction and toilitary role for
1 t-iUS-
CSC forces outside Taiwan Itself. Most important, they vould alsorowing chancear between the US and Communist China which would advance their own chances of returning to the mainland.
?. nevertheless, the GRC would probably place sons limitations on its commitment. The GRC's first concern would be to maintain an adequate military posture both for defense of Taiwan and for any opporbunity to attack the mainland. Before undertaking larger deployments, it might also want to test the combat effectiveness of its contingents, particularly the Taiwanese soldiers. Initially, therefore, the GRC would probably prefer to send no more than one division.
3- The GRC would bargain not only on the extent of its commitment but on tho price the US might be willing to pay- inimum, tho GRC would expect the US to finance the entire deployment. It would alao expect substantial additional military assistance of all types, probably including support for an Increment In its armed forces equivalent to the troops sent to Vietnam. And it mightenewal of economic assiotunco. The GRC would probably try to obtain specific security guarantees for the Offshore Islands. It might pressoice in the councils of war and in any peace negotiations, and urge the US to undertake combined planning for military action against mainland China. In general, the GRC's bargaining price would rise if the Chinese Coranunlots responded by putting new pressures on the Offshore Islands and in the Taiwan Strait.
h. Outside the government, especially among the Taiwanese population, there would probably be some apprehension that the presence of GRC combat troops in South Vietnam would expose Taiwan to military retaliation by Peking. The prospect of Taiwanese* being killed far from home would be unpopular. It is unlikely that opposition on Taiwan would soon grow to major proportions, much less get out of control, but over the long run the Issue vould add still another reason for Taiwanese opposition to the Nationalist Government.
II. SOUTH VTBB9AM
5. There vould be little popular support in South Vietnam for the participation of the GRC, There are animosities toward Chinese and unpleasant memories of the Nationalist occupation of northern Vietnam at the end of World War II. There vould also be fear that tlie use of GRC troops would bring Communist China closer to outright intervention. The presence of the GRC troops vouldolitical issue for exploitation by elements opposed to the government. In particular, Buddhist and other political leaders might view the introduction of GRC troops not only as further veakening South Vietnam's national sovereignty, but also as
* In the GRC armed forces today Taiwanese account for almost one-half:ercent of the privates,ercent of the NCOs,ercent of the officers.
strengthening the position of the military leadership In government and reducing South Vietnam's flexibility on how best to end the fighting. Any such criticism would almost certainly be directed at least partly against the US.
6. Though concerned to some degree about popular reactions, the military leaders of South Vietnam would probably agree to the deployment of GRC troops. They would welcome the increase In combat strength and vould perhaps hope that GRC influence would be helpful inegotiated settlement of the war. ivilian government, particularly If dominated by Buddhists, would be less willing to accept GRC In determining whether to accept GRC troops any South Vietnamese government would be motivated more by the desire to remain in harmony with Washington and to commit the US more deeply than by any wish to see the GRCelligerent.
7- Over the longer term, the South Vietnamese reaction to the GRC presence would be conditioned in large part by the conduct and combat performance of the troops. There was some apprehension "when ROK troops were first deployed to South Vietnam, but this has been largely dispelled by their good record both in combat and in relations with the local populace. However, Vietnamese antipathy to ethnic Chinese ls considerably greater than to Koreans.
- If
in. OTW9JKIST REACTIONS
Horth Vietnam. Hanoi would be moro concerned over the political implicationo of the CRC deployment than over its immediate military Hanoi would seek to exploit tho presence of this force to show that the Saigon regimeool of foreigners and lacking in nationalist 6pirit and support. In some circumstances, Hanoi vould probably see the use of GRC forces as evidence of US difficulties in continuing to support the war. However, thero would alsoeneral concern in Hanoi that the US, recognizing tho nosslbllltyharp Chinese Ccmaunlst reaction, was nevertheless willing to accept greater risks of escalation.
Fearing that the US might be building toward an invasion of North Vietnam, Hanoi would feel it desirable tourther buildup of GRC forces. To this end, it vould probably call on Peking for further demonstrations of support. Thus far, Hanoi has made no effort to exploit the presence of Chinese military forces in north Vietnam. Indeed, this presence hao not been admitted by either Peking or Hanoi. But theof GRC forces might persuade Hanoi that the time had come to publicizo the presence of Ccunmunlat Chinese forces within Horth Vietnam, probably under the guise of volunteers. However, Hanoi would probably not want any large influx of new Chinese Communist contingents, lest this add to tho very escalation it hoped to deter.
- 5
China. Peking vould interpret the GRC deployment aa
a significant change in OS policy, vith tvo potentially seriousossible buildup for an invasion of Worth Victnan, and beyond this, an attack on the nainland by GRC forces in alliance vith the US. Accordingly, the Chinese Communists would believe it essential to respond with more than propaganda. This feeling vould be reinforced by their desire to appear rcaoluto in the eyes of other Communist countries and of the world at largo.
Communist reactions vould be those which heldurther buildup of GRC troops in South Vietnam andplansRC attack on the nainland. Such actions, however, would
be those the Chinese Cccnunlsts bellorod carried the least risk ofa direct confrontation vith the US. Among the possible reactions might bo overt troop and aircraft deployments to coastal areas opposite Taiwan, stepped-up harassment of GRC air and sea units in the Taiwan Strait area, heavier shelling of the Offshoro Islands, and perhaps seizure of ono or more of the smaller islands. Tlie Chinese Communists might also reinforce their forces on the North Vietnamese and Laotian borders. If requested by Hanoi, they vould probably publicly cctaovledgo the presence of Chinese Ccoaunist allltary forces in Horth Vietnam and agree to add to thea. With Taipei directly involved, Peking vould also increase its pressure on Hanoi to hold out for total victory in the South and resist negotiations.
" "V
IUI l)
Wo think lt unlikely that Peking would move "volunteers" into South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese vould be reluctant to change the nature of the war in this manner. And Peking Itself vould probably prefer to wait to Judge the effects of its own moves on the further course of U3 and GRC policy.
We also think it unlikely that Peking wouldarge-scale attack against Taiwan. The Chinese Communist loaders almost certainly recognise that their capabilities for an attack are limited and that such
a move vould resultirect confrontation with tho US.
lb. The timing of this course of action could be an Important factor in the Chinese Ccomrunlst reaction. It is likely that deploymentRC force in the near future vould not trigger any greater Peking reaction than indicated. However, Chinese Communist reactions might be sharper if the deployment occurred after some further escalation of tho var, especially If such escalation had brought Peking closer to direct involvement.
15. Soviet Union. The primary Soviet concern would beino-US var had moved one step closer, and that the Soviet Union could be dravn into an increasingly dangerous situation over which it exercised decreasing influence. The Soviets vould also be disturbed lest the effect of the grc move serve to increase Chinese Comnrunist influence In Hanoi atxpense. Wc do not believe that they vould take any positive counteraction to the GRC deployment, but it would contribute to the deterioration of US-Soviet relations.
IV. FREE WORLD IffirVCTIOW
16. Tlie initial popular reaction throughout the world would be one of alarm that the GRC deployment increased theventual var between tho US and Communist China,isk of further expansion. This attitude might cause some difficulties forvbich have given political support to the US position In South Vietnam. Most of these countries would expect to be consulted in advance and many vould express misgivings. In Japan, the Sato government vould probably feel compelled to protest the US/GRC move. At the UB, the issue mightactor in the voting on the question of Chinese representation. Among the states actively involved in the war, Australia and Hew Zealand vould probably have mixed feelings: while pleased to see additional military strength in South Vietnam, they would be disturbed by what they would deem an unnecessary political complication to the war and its resolution. Laos and Thailand would be concernedroadening of the var vould sooner or later bring Chinese Communist troops across their borders. Only South Korea vould wholeheartedly support the move.
Original document.
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