NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
.. ms
OF CENTRAL' INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
vAiindtca'tffd Ovcrloal
' *
North Vietnamese Military Potential it Fighting in South Vietnam
rrT
The following intelligence organization participated in the preparation of this estimate! .
The Control Intelligence Agency ond tht Intelligance orgoniratfons ol lhaof State, Defense, and Ihe
Mr. Sherman Kent, Acting CIA Member ol USlB
Mr. George C. Denney,or fl* Director of Intelligence ond Research, Depart-mentof State
lievsenonl Genera! Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, Defense Intel]Agency IJevteoonf General Manhollonor, USA, Director of tbe National Security
Abifa/nrng:
Dr. Charles H. Reichordt, .for Assistant Goneral Moragor, Atonic. Energy Com-nshaioo, and Mr, William O, Cregor. fc AssistantFederal Bureau of
Investigation*'tha subject being ouHhfa of their
"ttjp
table of contents
THE PROBLEM
ASSUMPTION
DISCUSSION
I. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
A. Manpower and Mobilization
Population and
Mnlulization
IJ. Tbe Armed Forces
CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT FORCES IN SOUTH
VIETNAM
A. The Current Situation
lln: Command
Logistics
D. Factors Affecting Capabilities
Military Training and Infiltration
Capacities ofCs
Tmcks
Sat
Cambodia
Fond Supply
Combat
VC Recruitment and Conscription
VO/NVA
Monk
Effect of IfS Actions in the-
PROBABLE BUIUDL'P OF COMMUNIST FORCES
Page
TABLE I IVILIAN LABOR FORCE OF NOR11I
VIETNAM WITH SEX 5
TABLKSTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE AHMED
TABLESTIMATED MILITARY STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM 7
TABLEONTHLY INFILTRATION 10
TABLESTIMATED COMMUNIST MU.ITARY
TABLE C: ESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCEnHs) 17
TABLESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(Numerical Slteiiglli)
"TOT-SfcCEET
NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY POTENTIAL FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate: (a) the present strength of the North Vietnamese military establishment; (b) its capability to expand; (c) its capability7 to send troops lo the Soulh ami support them there; and (d) tlie probable buildup of forces in the South.
ASSUMPTION
For the purposes of thise assume that North Vietnam will generally continue to pursue ils current strategy in lhe war over the next IS months,
CONCLUSIONS
estimate lhe present strength of the NorthForces to be slightlyiihfthe army. North Vietnam bas sufficient manpower to providemilitary force ofen without serious strain.
total Communist force in South Vietnam is estimated. The major combatorth Vietnamese troops,0 VCmain and local forces, anduerrillas.
Vietnam is estimated tourrent0ndividual replacements foraximum effort, this total might be doubled. FromVietnam could organize someonfantry regiments
' Tin*ll-i* *sliiiii(t" xri (uncut a* ul
5ECBEL.
3
JjLLItU.
There is considerable margin for error iu estimating total Com-iiiimisl losses Nevertheless, we believe these losses are mounting rapidly. The loss rate has already begun to strain the replacement capability ol the VC in South Vietnam, but it appears lhat current total Communist losseseplaced, il mvessary. from within
SoUlll Vl.ilUHI.
V..estinute that the VC could recruit and0 men per mouth. The replacement of cadre, however, isroblem and is almost certain to become more difficult in the future. By the endhe loss rate may exceed the estimated capability of the VC to recruit replacements Irom within South Vietnam,if the rate of cimniut increases. In such case, tbe Communists might be lorced cither to scale down their plans for exjiflosion or to step up tlie rale of infiltration from North Vietnam.
F. Present evidcitcc suggests that the total infiltration6 will prolwbly Ih-00 men These wouldinclude one or two infantry regiments per month, additional units and combat support battalions, and individual replacements.
C. Wc have no reliable evidence of Communist force goals. By Ihc endowever, the Communist regular force may0 regiments and other units and number0 VC0 NVAnot gain of0 lor the year. By the endhis force may grow to, provided attrition remains substantially6 proportions.
II. We believe that current and estimated future capacities of tlie Laotian nwd network are efficient to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Even if this capacity could be reduced, say by one-third, and combat activities were to double, we would slill estimate that the capacities would be sufficient on an annual basis to support lhe requirements for the Communist forces at current and future levels. However, nt these higher levels of forces and com-Iiut. the excess ol road capacities over requirements would be reduced during the rainy season.
I. Maintcnantw and iipcration of the North Victiuunese truck fleet in North Vietnam and Laoserious problem, and the regime is dependent on the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe for trucks, spare parls, and POL. However, despite truck losses from air
. am! retirement, we 'vi these losses could Ik* offset by imports. The POI. requirement for trucks involved in the iiifiltralion movement has nut been large enough to present significant supply problems, But local shortages have occurred from lime to time and may become significantesult of attacks on the I'OI. distribution system.
J. Olhcr channels of supply complement llie Laotian corridor. Cambodia has become an Increasingly important source of supplies, particularly food. Although sea infiltration lias been curtailed, the Communists will probably continue to attempt to resupply (heir forces by this means, particularly in llie delta area.
K. We believe that morale problems for the Coniuiunisls will |h> votne aggravated in the future. Hanoi's problems iu implementing its military strategy have increased, and the record of combat must raise questions, at leasl aiming some leaders in North Vietnam, as to lhe wisdom of their long tenn military strategy.
DISCUSSION
I. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
A. Manpower and Mobilization
1ndI" u'< and structure ul Northarc more than adequate to ropi-Jri tlie war al illclneedtough estimates vary, the total population.limitillion. Iu the 1W9 ago group, mere areomales, and olittle overillion are believed to be mi vice. Moru'vi-F 1 Ii.
reach the age ol IS each year. Thus, thereonsiderable pool of militarymanpower available for tin- North Vietnamese armed force*.
A ImInw intensive society such as tltat of Northould not mobilize niMjipovier resources fur military or war rvtattd tasks lo the extent iharactrristic olndustrial societies. But miiipuwtr could be taken from the North Vfetiwnwse eeoiiorrry in tliree generalse of the younger men wlm would normally inter the lahur force each year coutd have provided as manyudes since the beginningind Hanoi has probably already lapped this pool heavily. Transferring men out of various ttowissentlalsuch a* nun-state trade and consumer services, and education, could provideales, but no widespread effortso have Ik.ii nwde yet in this area, 'lhe largest source, awl the one which has Irneu most extensively tapped, is aghi'iltuie. where the regime hasflort since5 to replace men with women, children and old pfoplc.
Agriculture accounts for moreillionotal labor force of someilgh proportion of tin* Lilior force hasi. been women, exceedingercent in agriculture. North Vietnamese press and other sources have indicated this ligure may hawo GO orercent. While welieiv is insullicient evidence lo argue for the higher figure, we ute confident that women now constitute at leastercent of the agricultural labor force. An incrouM- ofhe pjoportimi rd women in tlie agricultural labor Ions1 could have released as manyales for other duties.
Stolnllzalkm. Some preliminary- steps to expand the armed forces were probably takenome former servicermn. particularly NCOi, wereo duty4umber of military unit* were expanded and some new units were funned. Inischarges were halted, at least temporarily. Inartial mobilization was officially proclaimed. The ilruli age limits, which had hernool of
TS
_
"Tl tidlHI_
I" iiicrciisi Hn' number ol tliuie engaged In const ruction, tr.mv porta lionoiimmmicalion tn- -an increase nfn Hit- pits) twolii-M1n llieofinjnnvri. we lirlieve North Vietnam lias llie capability lo cipund IH aimed forces Inithoutirol Jim*.
B. The Armed Forces
e arc tiaiftdiiil llul thr North Vietnamese Aniwd Forces have expanded Mgnificaiitlylv I'Klimanpower availability estimates noion iiMiliUi/.illoii. however, olfeis the basis lor exact estlmntes. Among thensliiMis are tlief the infantry and air defense units ami uf (In- forces in ui on ihwto Smith Vietnam.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
ARMY
AIR FORCE
NAVY
ARMED PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES
TOTAL ARMED FORCES
MILITIA POTENTIAL'
North Victuatttcw Army Breakdown Out-of'Country
South Vietnam
Laos
TOTAL
Infantry .
Air Defense **
Olhcr
TOTAL
oo,oon
nl rlrinrott nl tin' civilian jH>|iili>tiihi hrtwreun.JikIiiij; iIkhiI Kir million (kronen. u ilntractVinFnH-tiroi farm, inm. and mil Mmnut pjanbtr fioair evtitnirr.
*Th* nwWSr. AAA. SAM uarts. ladW, aadh ikfebw adsinisln-ban andTaliotvnhrs laadrc aa Ak Fmr/Ali IXrmr Hrabraartroa. Ituot. Anm BMohvd ka ak dVftrasr am ini> tfa* aafaatry ifaanona .mind ur aarbsoed Ds the Infantryfitful'.
' Thn. includr* urlillriy. jimor. high oumrnand, i. *iixino>'ts anduniti
TSOfcUEJ^
7.I* no way ol resolving tliis wide, range til estimates witli certainty. In our view, the lower rstimalr. whichofalfvit llie fan! year or ao. is probably somewhat conservativeome fiueatkai about llir exactof tbe infantry brigades, and lln- larger figure fornfantryial four ofave (mm to divisione arc notowrvrr, that thtr evideoce is suffi-eirntdmw lh.il ill lour of tltese brigades have been uperddid. and we doubt libit all mult are eonlkiuousry at full strength. Wr do think thai the strength of infantry und airrimarily AAA) units, and ihr number of troops in or runo South Viet nam aie probably larger than the Iowct figure* given In Tableherefore, we estimate lhe strength nf the tinny to bend the tntol turned forces slightlyIhese estimate* are wellun', ctip.it Ity. and well above llieinliuiiiuin reipiireinents foi in-ecu in try forces,
II. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. The Current Situation
organization
2 division-type bead'juartCis *
headquarters"egiments
attalions (regimental and
eparateeparate platoons
6 regiments
attalion* (regimental mid
S. llir estimated VCVNVA military strength in South Vietnam i*. as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
VC Main and liOeal Korea*' 0
Ninth
Combat Support Personnel Political
' Man form ira utUailnuir lo At Ctnual OCo* roc Sturh Virtual lo it*n Ihr.
* TVA JnMcn hjx Ir-ntatHs ia SmBi VMwa.ii. ,n, bsNtrrastfi to ia mkuwI WAdmaai Ijr* I.r.-.
Irah(hk>li lobutnl cr wmd. Marnrnv. tVama]VA nYvWot, t* nM promt lapn (nouOu in Soldi Vk-Uwhiunili uiirj with aiorUn and mudkal TllV*trr tirpratrt.illor, Hi Huma-ajMijil. iiBBpoOri; tha-a.ord titsw and ^wmlLi.ix'iiiiK auiciird Id lhan (or thr imulMiilii-ti
fi
I* room lor nror in these estimates. Tin: combat strength ol the various urnisu. iltin last reported lolalany given iTiiniieiil, spieitii unitsell under or overtrength lx*causeuMiultins. dcscrlinns, or re[>Lte.uieiitv Totals tiirnliHi.il caoVo, und enmhjit support jmi-mhuk'1 iinlirateough order ol magnitudeou available uiformatiou.
lx- NVA lom- In Soulh Vietnami built up primarily Ity the inlro (Imf complete units wn* Jaiiuary lUfS,miiuiy Iruiioiig and sonic infilli iii- r, inuL'.'cvidentr indicates that someVA troops entered South Vietnamndn the first live mouthscceptance of the presence of NVA units andin South Vietnam often lags several months Inland tlicir actual time of entiy, and thi- figures on infiltration are subject to continual revisionlieol |ust ctprrience, it i* alinoat certain thatotal iufilnation both in units jihI ripberrneiits so far6 actually
Tht tUirowml Structure. Tohi* expanding force, the CmiimuioV. structure in South Vietnam bis grown systematically.oons and isnii|Mnies were fnrntid0attalions and the fiist indications of iTgimcul.il Ni/Ji VC headquarter were notednd the first NVA regimentreel South Viciiuun In4 'lhe first division-type and frontwire also detected iu IflOi. lor many years, the two major military tsmtrol points hi Scmth Vk-toam have liceti thecadc|uartersin VC Militarynd the Militarv Aflans Section ol the Central Office forV-WainOSVN appears lo be tbr tup militiuy-political lieadenaartcrs in South Vufnam. Both COSVN> areilute to tin; High Coinrrian'l In Hanoi. The overallthe war lies in Ibuioi, but we are unable lo determinelent of tactical controlby Hanoi or the military relationship between COSVN and MR-5.
VC and WA unitsIntegrated into larger, more cohesive bodies with thr funiijlion of division-type and frontimilaratnmd wahiti lla- Viet Minh during the Indochina war. Thear In lie associated with apMaaV geographic areas, while the di vis Ion-typequarters do not. Itoth have the capability for conducting tuiilli-lMttaliim and imdti regimental operations. Three NVA division type. Ih'.kIijii.uIi is have been confirmed inwo composed uf Itoth NVA and VC units and one with NVA unit* only. There are also two Iron! headquarter* with mufti piuvlnciulirectly subiwdinate tourtluT waulh two proliable VC division type lieadquartcas have liecn identified The reinaindor ol the cmunianc!ornposed of pteninculith tlicir own laganic and attached noils, and ol separate units, both directly sulxwdmatr to the respective VC military regions.
'Die daily logistical irepiiiemrnt for IIk1 Communist.steadily increased. It is estimated tliat as of Julyequired aboutons ofch day. fl. an estimated
C/NVA troops probably ic-piiied0 Ions daily al present levels of activity.
dk ol thispiirtrrn-nl is not drawn from outside sources. Indeed, wc Ixlicve there is no external requireincut for POL, mid food is ob-luiiied primarily in South Vietnam and to some extent from Ciuulx'din. Ihcorei'. are noligmutaiit eternal logistical require-nieiil. Tims lhe main requirement levied on external sources, is for some types ol Class IIV (quartermaster, engineer, andndre estimated that this external requirement was only almulo J5 tons.his has risen, and we nowaily Requirement ol aboutoons of Class V. The daily rcqnijvmenl may Increase substantially depending on lhe rale at which the Connn list forces are built up and the rate at which ihey are engaged in combat. Moitover, the nature of the external logistic requirement could changeit. for example, lhe frequency and level of comlial should deprive llie Communist forces of access to local food supplies in South Vietnam.
B. Factors Affecting Capabilities
MUiluiy Training and Infiltration. Prior to US bombing, infiltrationin North Vietnam was conducted in several Induing eetilcrs. Army-ttii"inn 'i. hi-ti'I and specialized (laiuing up to one year. Alter thr US bombing begin, unit Iraiulug and training lor infiltration was decentralized and transferred tomilitary units, which then fonoed new units, trained them, flushed (hem oul, and dispatched ihcm to the South. Inhis type ol training lasted threeyhen: were several instances where some individual prisoiici' repotted iheir training lasted only lour to six weeks, andew cases even less.
lt i- estimatedVA division has lhe eapahilily ofombat ready men every three- months or possiblym year. ItepOils indicate thatt least six divisions have conducted training of units for South Vietnam. It is doubtlul thai all elements of the six divisions would be used coucorreolly lor infiltiation training, because ol (he requirements id normal duties phis the scheduling of the training cycle.we <stiniale lhat North Vietnam has ibe capability of0.ear for inon. by broadening the number oi nuils in the training base nr shoi lening the training cycle. North Vietnam might,mixiiiiinr. elfort, train double tlie above number of individual personnel in one-year. Actual training performance prim6 has apparently been short of these, proj'xliiMis ol capabilities.
While wc iisliinale lhat individual replacements could be trained al the rates projected above, we do not believe that all of lliemrganized into iiilaiitrv regimental units and provided with the requisite leadership at. llivi-ion. t'. v. mi ir
iraiiHtldispatehcd six regiments inlo Southtlie fall of
ihI lhe springc consider it possible to aitelrralc such unit-type training vo th.it North Vu*twm couki pr'alucc infantry regimentsate ofomi ywu. fl* would mDOWtt fur00 men |xt
uhtfolloH. For Ihrhi.ere infillrulid into South Vietnam.lie rate uncased oou-.'Khi.dily .mil vatiad hrtwtsun June tuor thinner.te of itdilti.ition appears tn liavc ihmlml further. No clear pattern lor infilliatlou is npji.iieiit, hut witli the buildup of Free World cumliut force* In tin' siunnierhe complexion of the war in South Vietnam changed, and the Communists evidently daddoil lo incieo.se. significantly their effort, Almost all ol Ihe personnel Infiltrated into South Vietnam traveled hy foot, and the Irip iiMiidly look up to ten weeks. Infiltration is nol gcoied to the dry season, as those who arrived in September and October wouldcii enruute during the severest pail of the rainy season, perhaps fo take advantage of factors which would limit mtflM
e tVlx-vr wc have not yetmanrrum rate of uifiltration.1thi- rale of infiltration to some exteut are tlie wrathcr. time ere route, .mil tlie lof-btu-al problems of feeding thr troops enroute. Recaru ofdcss-ftWits. and hostileheseattrttfon among the troops during liillttialioM However, sse believe the North Vietnamese have thebihty loogMical support for tlx- infiltration system and thai more
table 4
MONTHLY INFILTRATION:
January .
.
..
..
ii ml ier
367
ipiiet iiuliidi' Allireitini by two or irat pntwi oi ictnrimu. iff on astutmiuiit. tlie iiHJorf wlilih It mafiuirtid hy uuWs luted on PW inletrugiitioiit wlikh mi- judu'il to hr pinluibly true, hut tlio major portiiwi which has not hirrn cnnlUviieil by odi'i* Winn's. Ctlejjoiy 4 derivedtnfrnvt'nts nat ninsioitt.itim anmvt.
ts
important deli miming factors working on infiltration nil' the number ofil<>yiti nl Illinois >Iimated it'tjuirmiHtnl foi them in Southnd finally, Hanoi's dct ision to send ihem there.
('apatilu* of lhehe capacity of Ihe muds in North Vietnamaos io delivei supplies lo South Vietnam t*lie capacity of tlie ntiul* in laaoa rallies than hy those in North Vietnam.be total unmtcrdktcd capacity of Im infiltration road* for truck nioventent isajb per day in the dry musonon day In tliehi* capacity is av.uLilJe to pointsew uf the Southborder. Tlie inoveinenl of uipplirs into South Vietnam is dependent on (he trail system and on the numbers of ptiiti-rs, bicycles, and anluuib used.
Aerial interdiction has incrcasetl the cast und dlllicully ol keeping traffic movlng. has slowed Iruck movement, and has reduced road capacity to some extent. Neverl lie less, dining the pas! year tbe Noilh Vietnamese haveto mahilaiii the overall capadly of the roads IxjUi in Mililary Region IV (Mlt-IV) and in Laint sufficient to meet IIm-it military needs. They liave at lhe same litne siriiific.uitly ertendVd llie road network, increased Hi araibility. and nude il kas surorrahh- to inttidktioa liy construction ofi-.aiies. short mis. .nH| ti. passes, apparently aimed at |mniding an akernate lor each majoi supply route. Tlie new rood from North Vietnam into Iaios alleviates lhe pressure onia pass road and adds lo the totalwhich can Im delivered into Laos. The new "Sllianoukfrom Camlmdid into southern loio* also permits llie .icipiisitkiu of some additional supplies which can lx- delivered all tbe way to Ihe Iri border area.
Ix>gistiral piobhius. caused by aerial interdiction, hiton wditable cost in terms of iuan]>owcr. transport andequipment. Several hundreiJ ihnusarxl workers are being employ id tidl trim to maintain transport routes in North Vietnam. In laos, pooiltly four engineering groups arc anploytsl hi maintaining, constructing, and improving routes iu the torrt-dut ana. and fur rathspecialist up lo five civilian laborers are believed to he ruerulled at Icait for part lime work, because of the seopr- ol Ibis effort, we anticipate tint, despite tbe cost ami difficulty turned by aerialiction and slower truck inovcmenl. the Ninth Vietnamese will continue lo improve lhe motor routes into the Laotian Panhandle and will concentrate their construction eflort* in Uios on increasing lhe exlsling road capacity,for the ruiny season.
vipncilyi" expitssed in *hoit tons pernpuclty fit" ire* nu* very ruiifttvsitivr.on lilinulct fix siutaiiivdw us'cr atillt isthat tin- ic.iils could cany ntthi"'hi* iiijssrity figaut. bul thewould llicii rnniiie waik*oik. Further,i|lacily li,;uio islw natrirtin- pmnlliukc pi>inl) un llm nWiv, capacity fui OlliCi* niay be iwiwoVialily
"Hits expansion oload net indicates increasingIrnck transport lor liigislic support. North Vi.lnain is estimated lo haveloHK) cargo trucks. Imports totaledo taratiOO trucks havo been imported. The POL mpiiremeiil Iminnfd(ration movement has not been largeh lo presi nlsupply problems, llul localhave occurred from time tomat become significant as result uf attack; on tbe POL disti ilnmuii system.
ot tin: truck licet which consists ol overillerenta serious problem,cause ol lack of adequately skilled mechanics
its Si-cun -i'i. .il. easier U< get new trucks lhan to gel the spare parts needed to put vehicles biirk into service. Vehicles damagedi strikes have been removed rapidly and i';uiiiib.ili/iil to salvage usable parts. However, despite truck losses from air a'tack. breakdown, and retirement, we believe these losses could he oflset liy in purl s
n1 Irueks .ue believed to have been operating on llie inlillra-linn mutes within Laos during the past dry season delivering al leastoet Ions of supplies per day lo the South Vietnam lxndei urea. Waterways and primitive means of transport are used to deliver additional supplies, lhe amOittil ol which cannot be quantified. Transport aircraft, including helicopters, are hi the North Vietnamese inventory. However, we do not believe: lhat these aircraft will be used lo any significant degree in transporting supplies into the Laotian corridor and South Vietnam.
ea HouUx.0sea routes appear to haveajor means ul iiililliaiing supplies, particularly In tbe southern pari of South Vietnam. These have declined Inince the inception of the US Market Time Operation tuevertheless, there ate0 cumnivrcial and private craft registered in South Vietnam,f whhh are at sea on any given dayoastline roughly comparable in overall length lo that Irom Maim tn Florida. Olhips detected between5 andere inspected ami an0 boarded and searched. While this large operation continues to expand, there is still room lor iuliltialioii Hecent reports indicate that larger steel-hulled craft are attempting lo icsnpply the VC in soulhern South Vietnam from time-to time. Even ifew craft reach the coast of South Vietnamew ton* of supplies each, they would stillaluable means of supply, particularly fin tho delta area.
ambadki. In the past. Cambodia served moreanctuary for the VC rather than as an infiltration channel for men and supplies iulo SouthDuring the past year, however, Cambodia lias become an increasingly important source of supplies other than armaments. For example, io recent months Camliodia has appaieully rescind some sort of agreement for the sale ol substantial quantities ol food to lhe Communists Sihanouk has also offered to permit bovpilallyjitioti of wounded Communists in Cambodia and even their
TS
id urn to South Vietnam after recovery. Sihanouk stated that this offer wasn ;ul attempt to deter the VC/NVA fioill establishing their Own hospitals in Cambodian territory, and there is Mime evidence that tile odor is being implemented. Thertion of the so-called "Sihanouk Head has apparently beni constructed, ir nut by or with the cooperation of the Cambodinu Aimy. at least with its knowledge. Hue is he ing purchased in I'hnom Penh and delivered to Oiiuuuuvist military units via (his road. Other .supplies ob fjuned in (Cambodia either clandestinely or privately are primarily goods such sin pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and some radios. Armaments would probably be moved through Cambodia only clandestinely.
UiiicNlricted use of Cambodiaransit zone; for .supplier would provide the t'nmumnistsogistic route capacity far in excess ol tin i: maximum projected needs. Any physical limits on this potential would lie set hy the capacity of the ports rather than hy that of the roadnet- Slhi.noukvillc Ls the only port of significant size on the Gulf of Siam and at presenta capacity ofMX) tons per day above and beyond the normal Cambodian liaffic Ihrough the pint. The roadnet from the ports to fhe South Vietnamese liordercapable of handling more than this. Tlie degree to which tlie Cambodian government will ilself become huthcr involved in traffic with the Communists or accede? to unrestricted use of its ports will depend on Sihanouks fluctuating views of the course of the war and of where Cambodia's best interests lie. Al Ihe roomcril. Sihanouk appears lo be making efforts toore neutral posture. Nevertheless. Cambodia will probably continue to condone the transit and sale through well-cMablished private channelsnpplits to the Communists in South Vietnam but will probably not officially permit armaments traffic.
Food Supply. Hice is the main food essential for the Communist forces, although salt is the scarcest item. The total Communist force would require atetric tons of rice per year; current XVA/VC main force units probably do neit consume much0 tons annually. These totals are far below the1 amount of rice available lo the Communists- in South Vietnam, lint their problem is moving supplies to lhe ricc-dcficient areas in the highlands where most <if the NVAA'C main force tmits are located. This problem lias been aggravated by (he increased level of combat which has- disrupted distribu tion and limited VC harvesting operations; in the highland.'. And in recent months US operations into Communist-controlled areas have seized au average olons of lies; per month.
The Communists- have resortedariety of measures to overcome their food problems. 'Ihe couutry is studded with food caches. The- VC have raised food taxes in most regions and have increasingly resorted to coercion into meet their quotas. To meet their needshe VC have- moved closer to the fond-producing areas. They have also increased their pincurcmcnt ol lie in Cambodia. The Communists are not likely to solve completely tlielr food problems by theseut ne'ither are they likely to suffer serious food shortages on any large scale; iu the near future.
-
(Itnnlxtt Lotsci. Communist military losses in South Vietnam havu mounted rapidly.ho Communists were reported lo haveoss of0 men killediltie. Ihis figure is subject to considerable errorisc of duplications, omissions, and inability lo identify nonmihtary eiisliullics. We me unable to estimate with any degree ol confidence the number ol Communists wounded in action, bul tlie total mighl0 Willi as many asXMI to IIO.IKIO laving seriously wimsidcd.roops weir captured ami anallied to lhe CVN. The number ol deserters' who jusl melttd into lhe countryside and cities is unknownlhc Comtnunists also permanently lose personnel throughut* there, is no reliable information from which toigure for sueb losses. Not counting those who might Ik- seriously wounded or who desert, llie Communists may have lostsl SOllOO men of their total fighting force. If losses caused by wounds ami desertions were, include d, the total loss might be as high'
upward trend iu Communist miliuny losses hashrough May.ommunists wen reported killed, slightlyHO captured andad rallied to the CVN. If these figures were projected tohe total low might0 men. The overall loss mighteosonnel pOssil)ly lost Iwcause of wounds ,md desertions were included.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATKIJ COMMUNISTSSlsS
Killed
Captured
ines
:
Seriously )
Deaerten
0
1 Iktinliiiiaiyy <liti .md nsiuiiiiui> th.it llv current k'vel: ',.-
i derived Iromet NodehichC/NVAnnd wlixh litis Wtwven onr-timd .iml nnc-luli iJ tin- 1'ititl munlvrining siM-iiindvut ol actionarrlt <il mwlot |iioii:itii':itly.
"I'lmi- Is ikiusehis tot.il,nuxl on thi .tisiinipliOii that their ii at leasttii(iiiiiuiiisl ilrM-itrr for tach returnee ti> the S'tuiIi Virliiiimew Ci.vi'iiiniS'ijI.
Cniflmcnl and ConitcvtytUm. No precise figures are available for Ihe population under VC control, hut it is probably in the vicinity of from three to five milarm. primarily in Ihe delta legion. Of Ihis total,ould be physically til young males; in addition, thereumber
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i: soft
Ml&il fr*.0 CIA
ol youths each year wIki become old enough lu fight, perhaps. Some VC recruitment is undoubtedly conducted In cnntesled areai and In GVN-contioUod areas us well. Tln-re Ls no way to determine exactly how far the VC have drawn ooanpower pooh but the growth in Communist furies phuncreasing casually kisses probably have begun to lav the VC reaiut-snenl ami tiaiuhig apparatus in South Vietnam.inimum, tlie VC have bad to rvlaimnulmg standards and rely inorrroiisxriptioti.
V* vpHtVc on VC manpower has become more apparintn-(rc.io.ug numlars nf prisoners mention lhe lack of personnel .iml ibr poor ijuality of tlie new i-iwnls. many of whom are very young andi-with only two or three Watfa of training Moreover, tlie use of combat units, evenor training appears to lx- increasing. Wc estimate tlut the VC could)0 men per month. In addition, the VC probably recruit ami (oiiscript Urge numbers of personnel who receive Utile or no formal training. Thus tl appears that current iii-coiuilry training eapahlllty couldcunent Communis! operational losses'. But over tin* nextonths or su. Ihc loss rate will possibly exceed lhe estimated capability of llie VC to recruit and train replacement* fiom within South Vietnam, cspecinlly if the rate of combat increase*
ie lots of VC cadre, riowrver. is probablyroblem and is almost certain to become worse In the future. Tbeof cadreengthy process, and lusty, *top-gap measures to provide new cadre create almost as many problem* as theyhe Comiouni.ls also have raptdl) adv-arxrd personnel to serve as cadre; lodging from prboocr statements and captured docurrieriti. tins 1msoticeable drop in quality among the cadre.
VC.'iWA licrlMlrhWiip. ihcrc is little evidence of significant friction between NVA ami VC troops, although personality clashes, food shortages, and misuse of guerrilla forces have created isolated incidents. The Integration of North Vuiiiauiesc personnel into the VC organization as both high and low level cadreas aided in controlling problems arising between the two regional groups. Ihe use ofNVA and VCsoimel in the same unitthat the Communists consider the two groups compatible. Nrvrrtliele-rs. tlien*ossibilily that as tire war takts on even moreorth Vietrorncse diaiacter, antipathicthe Southerners and Northerners inav increase.
Id 'c.'< Also Important in the long run, tlioogh difficult to measure, is tlie impaet on Communist morale of the adverse factors in the war. Captured documeuls and prisoners indicate thatmradriess among tlie Ciit-imr.nist ranis, and tli.it many of the troops are having doubts as to thevictory of the Communists. For example, VC documents have candidly discussed tlie adverse effect of the GVN's "Open Aims" (defector) program, and many documents have gone to great length lo counter 'icssimism within the Communist forces Hut there have been no mass defections and the Communists eonliiiuc to ftglit well. Ufo for the Communist soldier has become even grimmer
IF bin III |_
than previously, and morale problems lor the Coinmunbls will probably become aggravated in the future.
fjtrt of US Actions in the South. Tim stcppcd-up activity of US forces lias almost certainlyiiunuiiLsl plans for tbe conduct of tbe war. The Communists have been increasingly unable to pick and choose combat al time* and place* to iheir liking. Tliis has forced them tu rely increasingly Oilmeasures and improvisation rather than on their preferitd tactic* of well-planned battles. Finally, the US forces have pushed deeper into Communistreas ant) liave hired tht! Communists to place more emphasis tn .self-defense and pioteetion of iheir main hose ureas lhan ever before. They have retained, nonetheless, considerable strategic initiative and arc capable ofwith sizable forces in many areas.
3S. Thus, Hanoi's leaders have not been forced to change their strategy for tin; war. bul their problems in implementing it have been increased. While Hanoi's leaders believe iu the conceptrotracted conflict, they must,sen the warar longer and more costly affair than it appeared to them two years ago. And they must now recognize Die high risks inlarge numbers of their troops and have serious doubts of everanother Dien ltien Phu Tlie Communists haveonsiderable price in both North and South Vietnam to increase their forces and continue the battle, "llicy are probably willing to continue doing so for some time to come. But the record of combat must raise questions, at least among some leaders in Hanoi, as to the wisdom of Iheir long term military strategy,
III, THE PROBABLE BUILDUP OF COMMUNIST FORCES
lthough the VC/NVA are apparently developing higher level command ami control headquarters and are including more units under control of these h'-jidquarters (division-type andt is not anticipated that ihey willlarge scale conventional operations, at least uol within the time frame under consideration, it is more likely that these headquarters will be used tn centralize contra) over multiple, widespread, and possibly simultaneous opera-lions in their respective areas ofouth Vietnam.
Atf. Present evidence suggests thai the North Vietnamese regime will probably send00 troops into Soulh Vietnamhese forces would probablyumber of units and combat support battalions (artillery, mortar, ami AAA) ami replacementseet combat losses. The Imildup in infantry regiments will probably continue at about one Or two per nion Ih.
-II. We have no reliable evidence of what force goals the Communists hope ultimately to achieve. They are likely. In any event, to reassess tlieir tactics and strategy jxiiodieally. especially after6 summer campaign. Present trends indicate thai the Communists are probably movingorcethis year of seven to nine division-type headquarters and two front head-
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6
ESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCE DEVELOPMENT (Units)
7
Division tyix> Headquarters
Front
itegimenis
battalions {Regiuieiital .ind Separate)
TABLE 7
ESI (MATED COMMUNIST FOKCK DEVELOPMENT (Numerical strength}
I ki 6 n7
VC Main and Local0
NVA Troops0
jiporl
Political Cmlre 0
C.icrrillas
quartersegiments. By the endhe Communist regular force strength may total, thuset gain nf0 for the year. By the endhis force may grow to total, provided attrition remains substantially0 proportions.
We calculate that Ihe force structure outlined almve for tbe end0 wouldons of external logistics daily if current levels ul activity were sustained.he level of activity were doubled, the external need wouldons per day. Similarly, by the end ofhe force postulated wouldons ol external supplies daily at present levels of activity,ons if the level of activity doubled. Though we cannot be confident of what the requirement would be, we believe the lowerore nearlylhe actual requirement.
Wc Iwlievc thai current and estimated future capacities of the Laotian mid network arc sufficient to meet the requirements of tho Communist forces iu South Vietnam. Even if Ihis capacityeduced, suy bv one-third, and eombut activities were to double, we would still estimate that the capacities would be suificlent on an mumal basis to support Ihe requirements for lheforces at current and future levels. However, at these higher levels ofnd cornbat, tht: excess of road capacities over nxpiiremcnts would be rorh iced during the raiuy season.
The projected force structure for the end6 would require heavy recruiting within South Vietnam, 'llie total NV'A/VC manpower requirement may lie as muchnd could perhaps go even higher if the rate of combat forced on the Communists increased .substantially.
| lire sent from lha* North tnd allowances madei for combat lows. VC rrqiiarcinctiU muld lie0uch ui effortwithiny the endthe (Mntiblc uiuum ui lore*amiiih.it luuca will possibly exceed VC retruitim-nt capa-liUitiea. caixxiallt if the rate ol eombal Increases. In thi*he <ajniinuimtsorced cither to scale down their plans feir cipamieai or to itep upifiltr.tliem Iioin North ViHtiam.
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Original document.
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