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VP
Copy No.6
ORR CONTRIBUTION TO NIK
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK
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MP2 tORR Project No.
I
FOREWORD
the major new evidence and trends of the past year and their effect on an assessment of the future strength andof the Soviet strategic attack forces.
The judgments presented in this contribution represent the current views of ORR and have not been coordinated with other offices of CIA. It is expected that some of the views expressed will be modified as new evidence is acquired or as new insights develop during the deliberations which willpreparation of the final estimate. The specific numbers of ICBM launch sites, by type, identified as under construction almost surely will be modified f
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CONTENTS
Page
I- Trends in Doctrine and
.A- Criticism of the.Strategy of Deterrence
B. Outlinesew
C Trends in Policy . .
H. Strategic Rocket Forces .
A. JCBM
Status
a- -First- and Second-Generation Programs
b- Large Silo Program
c- SmaJJ'Silo
Force
Through
b- nd
B- MRBM/IRBM Forces
1 Current Status
2. Major Trends and Developments
a- Fixed Field Sites
Range
(i) Construction Activity
(2} Firing
c. Evidence on New
(1) Projected
1 : . .
Capabilities - . . .
Complex Control Centers . -
Communications Systems
and Prospects
Military Storage
III- Missile Submarine Systems
. .
. i ;(
andi Construction Programs
IV. Strategic Bomber Forces
A- Heavy Bomber
Current
Operations and
a- Aerial Refueling
c. Maritime Operations
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Capabilities .
Production Programs
Projected Forces
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Medium Bomber Forces
Composition and, Deployment 3.
a. Aerial Refueling
c. Maritime Operations
Capabilities
Major Developments . . .
a. Blinder- Badger ASM Associations
Production Programs
Projected Forces
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60
3
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Space Sysicms
i
Support Systems
Weapons Systems
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Page
VI. Command and Control
A. The Technical Apparatus
B- Operational
C.
Tables
USSR: Number of Launchers at Identified Complexes.
17
USSR: Estimated Number of Operation ICBM
Launchers.
USSR: Identified Soviet
Soviet Missile-Submarine Force,
I
LRA: Distribution of Heavy Bombers,
LRA Heavy Bomber Forces: Number
of Aircraft, by Model.
LRA: Distribution of Medium Bombers.
LRA: Distribution of Home Bases.
by Length of Runway.
LRA Medium Bomber Forcos: Number
of Aircrafi, by Model,
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK
Summa ry
The moil significant development in Sovietforces during the past yearharpinn the rate of constructionlaunchers of both ICBM systems currently being In the small single-silo program, constructionleastew launch groups (ultimatelyauncherea total ofew launchers were begun during5 and the firat quarter of
Those rates arethan tlioayatiainrd during any previousin the small-sito program.
The increase in the rate of starting new silos isalmost entirely to the expansion of the small silo program in5 from five to nine complexes. evidence of the beginning of six more new groups st both old and new complexes f ' '
together with the normalui launcner ITftrls w'thin groups, indicates that6 construction could beginotal of afnd possibly as manymall silo launchers. compared wither year in the previous two years.
With respect to the large single-silo program, in which launcher starts peaked sharply in the second quarters of4here waa an unusual increase in construction starts during the last quarter5 and the lirat Quarter
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These developments lead to an estimate that thereperational ICBM launchers in thebyf whichere firmly16 (including moren variousconstruction, virtually all of which shouldajor disruption of thetherefore, it appears that present forceforas reflected inillby moreaunchers althoughemains generally valid. It also seemsthe ICBM force win be substantially higher thanlaunchers estimated ins the low siderange fors. Fornoaunchers is estimated. In recognition ofchanges in pace and direction that havepast Soviet ICBM programs and the variousand strategic factors that may work to restrictsixe of the force, the low sideof this rangea minimum estimateorce no larger thanof launchers irnnlted by evidence alreadyof somewhat different composition. Although ilthat the high side of the range forxceeded, this is not considered to be likely.
* Very recent evidence, which is not reflected in this contribution, indicates that some of the apparently completed small Silos are being rc-excavated.
A key element of uncertainty in projections beyonds whether the recent increase in the rate at which construction of new launchers was begunajor change in Soviet policy and objectives and can be expected to be sustained in the future, or whether the increasea transitory fluctuation in tempo, similar to past
spurts in Soviet ICBM deployment activity. Thisbe reduced
determine whether new groups are stm oeing started atoriginal and new small silo complexes or at the newonly. In the lattereduction from therates would be indicated. It may require six monthshowever, toessation of starts ofgroups at the five original complexes because of theof groups started in the recent past and theweather and other '
It should be possible to judge the current pace of the large Silo program somewhat earlier, but because of its smaller size, the status of this program has much less effect on future quantitative projections.
* See'CIA/RRhe Military Issue in Soviet PolicyECRET.
Although it cannot be related directly to the future pace and magnitude of the ICBM program, there is some evidence that suggests the direction of current Soviet policy andthinking. During the spring and summeror example, statements by Soviet leaders increasingly referred to the necessary burdens of defense expendituresanner that implied some new or pending decisions with respect to the level of military; requirements.* In retrospect, these statements appear.To have foreshadowed the acceleration of the ICBM deployment program that began in5 and may have been occasioned at least in part by decisionsthe long-term course or objectives of that program. Moreover, the tone and character of current Soviet doctrinal discussionsrowing confidence in the availabilityore reliable Soviet deterrent and of the means toore flexible military strategy, presumably based oneterrent. These indications would be consistentoviet commitment to an ICBM force that wouldubstantially higher level of deterrence than past programs have suggested. If the recent pace of deployment isit would appear th,it the USSR is seeking within the next few years to achieve an ICBM force approaching
These developments may leadew round ofactivity, the first since the deployment offorce ofperational launchers As yet, it is not possible to judgedeployment will take the formobile system,SCAMP, or the retrofit of aat
existingrard sites, or both. In any case,increase in the total MRBM/1RBM force is
Developments during the past year havethe beliefew class of baUistic missilewill appear in the next year or so, but theinconclusive. Severodvinsk
suggestsew cL^ss of submarine may be underthere but provides no indication of the type.e-analysis of the probable utilization of thefacilities at Komsomolsk indicates that capacitybeen availableew submarine constructionby
ever, Soviet statements and the pattern olthe current ballistic missile submarine force continuea strategic attack role for the Navy, suggestingnew ballistic missile submarine will be forthcomingfuture. The deploymentorce of advancesubmarines ins would representSoviet step toward the attainment of some formwith US strategic attack forces.
Operations of the heavy and medium bomber forces of Long Range Aviation (LRA) continue torimary mission of Strategic attack and reconnaissance. There has beenno significant change in the heavy bomber forces during the past year, but it
is believed that major changes are in progress in theof the medium bomber forces. It now appears that, in place of extensive Blinderubstantial portion of the Badger forces may be in the process of acquiring air-to-surface missileshe ASM for the Blinder still is not operational and there are several indications that further deployment of this aircraft will be limited.
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Q
i. Trends in Doctrine and Policy
It has become apparent over the past yearew round ofdebate over military doctrine and strategy has begun in the Soviet Union. In contrast with tho Khrushchev period, whenof military matters centered largely on the practical issuesbyolicies of force reduction, the new discussions areroader, more theoretical character and are raising questions concerning the basic assumptions that have governed theof the armed forces since the's. it is notthat military officers should be reexamining the premises of Soviet military policy at this time, because thiseriod when important increments to the Soviet Union's strategic striking power are beginning to become operational. Seen in the light of this relationship, the new discussions assume more than routine intelligence interest, for they point to the directions in which military thinking is now exerting itsin the policy deliberations that are determining the size and character of the strategic forces which will exist some years from now. [
A. Criticism of the Strategy of Deterrence
Although Khrushchev has left the scene of Soviet policymaking, the heritage of his policies and ideas has continued to weigh heavily on Soviet doctrinal thinking. ense, military thinkers are as much preoccupied with Khrushchev today as they were before his political demise. Indeed.thc effort to find ways of escaping the limitations which his policies had imposed on Soviet strategy hasommonof much of the theoretical writing that has appeared in the Soviet press since he left the scene. |
The military establishment which Khrushchev left to his heirspecial-purpose organization whose value as an instrument of policy tended to vary with circumstances. By design and equipment, the armed forces were geared primarilyeterrent role, which rested on the tacit assumption that general war was an unlikely For the sake of economy, combat branches and weaponswere strengthened or reduced according to their effectiveness within the framework of Ihis deterrent posture. Partly lo reinforce
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the deterrentoctrine was publicized which denied thethat any warirect clash between the great powers could take place in any form short of an all-out nuclear exchange.
A few months after the removal of Khrushchev, while the new political leaders kept their counsel on defenseradual but unmistakable reaction to Khrushchev's policies began to bein the Soviet military press. The reaction condemned "subjective" methods of policy formulation and appealedtrengthened, more balanced defense posture basedore realistic strategy. Theof the new movement in military thinking was the argument that military policy should be based not on the assumption that war wasbut rather on the assumption that wareal possibility in the contemporary world. |
The first and most direct assertion of this argument wasby two well-known military personalities. Major General K. Bochkarev and Colonel I. Sideluikov, in an article in Redn They couched their argument in the form of an attack on nnnamed comrades who, they said, stressed the "possibility ofwar through the deterrent effect of nuclear-rocket weapons, rather than giving sufficient attention to the possibility that war might occur. " The purposes underlying this attack on the premises of Khrushchev's military policy were probably mixed. Considerationsto budgetary allocations may haveart. Indeed, this aspect of the argument was made explicit later in the year by the same Sidelnikov when he wrote in Red Star oneptember that the tendency to overemphasize the deterrent role of the armed forces could lead to questioning the "need to spend large resources on them. " Yet, It Is also clearain consideration underlying the attackenuine apprehension that the war-waging capabilities of the armed forces were being diminished by the doctrinal assumptions governing Soviet military policy. Q
This aspect of the new line is revealed most clearly in theattention that has been given in the Soviet military press to the question of whether war in the nuclear age can be contemplatedational instrument of policy. That this question is regardedr tical one by Soviet military theorists, and not merelyubject of theoreticals clear from the way in which il has been trea
Lt. Colonel Rybkin. whose article in Communist of the Armed Forces in5 first raised the subject, emphasized the practical implications of the question. "To maintain that victory in nuclear war ise wrote, "would not only be falsa on theoretical grounds, but dangerous alsoolitical point of view." The burden of the argument developed by Rybkin and others is that nuclear war is susceptible to rational control and that it can be uaed as an instrument of national policy. The implication, it ia clear, is thatorld in which nuclear war is possible the Soviet Union should put itselfosition to face this possibility with confidence, j j
The military writings of the past year have sketched only the broad outlines of the practical measures that are being proposed to translate these doctrinal injunctions into reality. One conclusion that military writers appear to have arrived at is that the Soviet Union should seek to broaden the range of options available to it in conflict situations. Accordingly, they have stressed the need for anof Soviet capabilities to engage in conventional warfare. This conclusion appears to have received broad endorsement at the Soviet leadership level, and there is good reason to believe that practical measures are being taken to implement it. j j
But the increasing Soviet emphasis on the development ofcapabilities does not give grounds for assuming that priority attention is no longer being given to the problems of nuclear warfare. While thore is now some tendency among mililary spokesmen to concede that localized clashes between Communist and Western forces might take placeimited basis and that even the introduction of tactical nuclear weaponsimited war would not necessarily mean an auto-malic escalation to general nuclear war, the dominant view appears to remain that waruropean scale could not be conductedon-nuclear basis. Hence the main problem for Soviot military theory continues to be that of preparing the armed forces for nuclear warfare. As Colonel General N.mov put it in an authoritative article in Communiat of the Armed Forces inthe mainin the development of the Soviet armed forcea is defined by "the requirements of world nuclear
B. Outlinesew Doctrine
There has been considerable effort over the past year to flesh out the bare bones of this doctrinal assertion with practicalas touclear war might actually be waged. Military writers have been at pains to reconcile the long-held tenet of Soviet doctrine that force superiorityrerequisite of victory with the manifest facte of the present strategic relationship with the United States. The articlesumber of theoretical solutions to the problems of achieving superiority, based on the exploitation of the special characteristics of nuclear-rocket war toavorable "correlation ofeveral aspects of modern war which are believed to offer potential advantage in this respect have received particular emphasis, j1 |
First it is recognized that the USSR must be capable ofWestern preparation for an attack. Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major General Cherednichenko, for example, writing in Communist of the Armed' Forces ofbserved that it is possible to detect in time not only the onset of an attack but also the "start of directfor an attack. In other words, they added, "thereossibility (of noturprise attack. " There is an implicit assumption
that Sovietl be able to rely on reconnaissance and de-
tection techniques to recognize the threat of an impending world war.
Soviet strategy would further relyowerful strategicattack capability to exploit the advantages gained through early warning. The principle of preemptive attack, while not new to Soviet military doctrine, is politically sensitive and not appropriate for public discussion. Recent theoretical treatment of the importance of timely, surprise attack, however, has given implicit support to the desirability oftrategy. iscussion of "The Time Factor in Modernolonel I. Grudinin, writing in Communist of the Armed Forces ofbserved that the "first massive nuclear strikes" can possibly predetermine the entire outcome of the war. Thus, hecombat readiness has come to mean in part Ihe ability of the armed forces to "thwart any aggressive attempts totrike and achieve the decisive goals of war in the initial phase." Colonel P. Trifonenkov, writing earlier in Communist of the Armed Forces ofmputed even greater importance to this principle when he Stated that timely nuclear strikes against the enemy will be a
actor in the struggle for force superiority. Such strikes, he further contended, can "quickly and radically alter the correlation of forces." |
The possibility of achieving victory in nuclear war must be predicatedelief that damage sustained can be held to acceptable limits. Soviet military theorists apparently consider that the use of timely nuclear strikes will,onsiderable degree, result in the neutralization of the enemy's offensive capability. Two Soviet military theoreticians have stated this concept most succinctly. Lieutenant Colonel Yc. Rybkin in Communist of the Armed Forces of5 observed that the "more decisively and quickly" the imperialist aggressive actions arc stopped, "the less serious will be the unfavorable conacquences of the war. " And Colonel General N. Lomov, writing in the same journal intated that the abilityountry to resist an enemy nuclear strike depends first on how much his nuclear forces will beeutralized or weakened." j |
Despite the advantages accruing to the side which is ablethe first nuclear strike, the Soviet theorists recognize thatis unable throughtrike to eliminate completelyof the US to retaliate. Consequently, military theoriststhe USSR's strike capability must be accompanied by strongmeasures. "Colonel General Lomov, in addition toability of the USSR to neutralize the enemy's striking power,defense "in the broad meaning of the termhat is, air and Rybkm, too, cc: thai< tiOtl ' hi-nited bf cm si:
may be possible "to develop and produce instruments of war which can reliably parry an enemy's nuclear strikes. " It is apparently believedefensive capability, such as an ABM defense, combinedreemptive strategy, would go far to compensate for the present strategic superiority of the West.
These brief indications ofin Sovielovement toward certain concepts which have been present in US strategy for some time. Although the efforts up to now have been modest, it is likely that these concepts will continue to be explored, possibly with increasing explicitness. Central Committee endorsement of such an inquiry was given atarty Congress inhen Army General Yepishcv. chief of the Main Political
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Directorate, said: "We are obliged to strengthen the scientific and technical elaboration ofelating to the characterossible thermonuclear war. There are still some false and fumbling judgments and sometimes extremes are reached in the interpretation of the possible consequences of employing new means of armed struggle.
C. Trends in
The developments described above relate to one side of the policymaking processhat is, they describe certain of the-pressurcs that are being brought to bear on the Soviet leadershiperiod when critical decisions affecting the security position of the Soviet Union will have to be made. What effect these pressures will have infuture decisions on resource allocations and on the development and deployment of major weapons systems remains uncertain. Thus far the Soviet leaders appear to believe that they can find ways of avoiding the hard economic choices which would definitely foreclose the chance of chieving one or more of the objectives outlined in the five-year plan.
The new regime's hopes for avoiding these hard choices appear ,to lie in the expectation of an increase in the overall national product through better management and planning techniques which would improve the "factor productivity" of capital-labor inputs into the Soviet economy. The result wouldarger pay-off in terms of production for given levels of capital investment, which would meanarger pie to cut among the other claimants on national resources, such as the consumer sector and defense. ey factor in this prospectus, obviously, is whether the international environment remains sufficiently calm tothe Soviet leadership to postpone the satisfaction of some defense claims in the interests ofalanced growth of the economyhole. Q
The evidence of the leadership's views on this question is far from conclusive, but such indications as have been given pointeightening ratheroderation of concern over national security. Several times in recent months there have been echoes of thoseacknowledgements regarding the burdens of defense, which last year appeared tohift in the regime's policyreater satisfaction of military interests. In April alarty Congress, for example, Kosygin conceded that the relatively modest character
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of the plans that were being projected for the growth of the economy had been caused by the threatening world situation. "If matterssolely one added, "we would surely have madecuts in military spending. " Similarly, in his election speech in Brezhnev asserted that "expenditures for the army and armamentsreat burden for the budget, for our nationallaiming that the Party would like to drop "at least part of this load" from the people's shoulders, he went on to say that the "situation" did not permit this solution. In sum, judging by the tone of leadership statements at the present time, the recommendations of the military theorists appear to beavorable hearing in the policy councils of the regime. (S)
II- Strategic Rocket Forces A. ICBM Forces
1. Current Status
The principal new development in Soviet ICBMpublication ofas been the reversal of theobserved in the rate of construction starts on small singlethe first half This rate was accelerated in latethe new trend has continued However, the delaythe completion of these same small launchers appears to haveand,esult, fewer sites of this type havehan were previously estimated. * The large silomoved ahead about as estimated, although an increase in thenew starts in5 and6light
speed-up in the pace of construction These latter
sites also, andesult, the large silo sites are achieving an operational status one quarter sooner than previously estimated.
The duration of both the upward swing in the rate ofstarts and the stretching out of the construction cycle forsilos cannot be determined from available evidence. factors have some effect upon the operational force levelsnext two years, the main impact would fall on projections forbeyond In any case, the recent trends imply asubstantially in excess ofaunchers estimated on thein.
* Very recent evidence, received after the completion of thisindicates that some of the apparently completed small silos are being reexcavatcd- This evidence, which raises serious questions about the current status of the small silo program, is not reflected in the remainder of this contribution but its implications are currently being analyzed-
Other elements of the Soviet ICBM force, the earlier generationnd SS-8. remain essentially as estimated in- No new evidence has been acquired concerning the last group of ten triple-silo sites completed in the last halfhich may be equipped with either ther SS-9.
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The total number of ICBM complexes remains atsee During the past year) however, the composition of four older complexes changed. Construction ot small single silos began at three oldomplexes (Svobodnyy. Yedrovo, Kostroma) and, for the first time, at an oldomplex (Kozclak). etailed breakdown, by system and complex, of the currently identified Soviet ICBM force is shown in Table I.
and Second-Generation Programs
Construction of launch sites for the initial deployment of first-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) in the USSR began8 when rail-served launch pads for theissile were started at Plcsetsk. Construction ol this type of site0 when the three sitesotal of four launchers became operational at this complex. 9 and the endoft launch pads and hardened silos were constructed for the second-generationndCBM's. At tho endhen bothprograms were complete, thereperational launchers for Iheissileoft with two pads each andard with three silosndperational launchers for theissile atites (seven soft with two pads each and three hard with three silos wach). In addition,0 triple-silo sites that are equipped with either ther SS-9-
f the first- and second-generation ICBM launchers arc believed to be operational, except oneauncher at Plcsetsk probably now allocated to the space program. Limited amounts of "housekeeping" construction continues to occur at all old complexes. With the exception of possible changes underway at the otheraunchers at Plcsetsk, there is nooviet effort to change, modify, or phase out these older sites, |
Silo Program
Construction ol large single-silo sites began in4 with simultaneous construction occurring at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center (TTMTC) and at three new ICBM complexeszhur. Aleysk. and Zhangiz Tobe. Inork began at the Imem Gustello and Dumbarovskiy complexes, and in4 at Kartaly.
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abia 1
USSR: Jhmber of Launcheri at Identified ICBM Complexes a/ ^une-July iyccP
ci
9
and probable. These nunbers will change on the basis cf later evidence. Before the final estimate Is nade. Theae figures do not Include tbeaunchers operational or
under construction at the Tyuratare Missile Teat Center.
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The first large-silo site ol the TTMTC wasconstruction had been underwaya longer lime
was required to find the new complexes in the licld. however. The three complexes that were begun in January were not discovered until construction had been underway for some four to seven months. Two of the later complexes were discovered in about four months, and the Kartaly complex was discovered the month after it was started. There is high confidence frhat the re are no undetected large silo complexes in the Soviet Union.
Once started, the large-silo program proceeded at a deliberate pace for the firstonths- resents detailed information on the programming of Soviet large single-silo ICBMhe rate at which sites were begun during this period averaged aboutonth. During thiseasonal cycle in now starts became apparent. The second quarter of each yeareak rate threeites) that of tho remaining quarters of the year. In general cyclical pattern and pace during the firstonths, the construction program for large silos was reminiscent of thendrograms. During the last5 and the firstowever, starts for the large-silo program have remained high, compared with the corresponding previous quarters of the program. The rate at which sites were started during the six months in this later periodtarts per month,f the sites started in the last quarter5 andn the first quarter Thus it appears that the large-silo program either reached6 peak rate very early in the year or that the pace of the program was increased substantially at the turn of the year.
Observation of site starts during the second quarter will be criticalroper appraisal of this change, but coverage of large-silo complexes has been so sparse that there is no direct evidence on which toirm judgment at this time- [
the majority of these six complexes will be required to determine Wnether the large single-silo program has continued at
the new higher rate-
The average elapsed time from start of constructionarge single silo until it appears externally complete isonths. Allowing an additional three months for. fitting out, these silos will achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) sometime during the
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oonth period. Thishree-month reduction into IOC below that indicated in. This timenot affected the number of operational launchers estimatedrowever.
Some implications for the future of the large single-silo program may be derived from the deployment patterns at the six complexes. The immediately obvious implication that the ultimate number of sites willultiple of sixrises from the apparent arrangement of the larger silos in groups of six, with each group havinghapcd electronics facility co-locatedentral silo. the number of such groups to be constructed in each complex is not obvious. The largest number of groups started has been four, at both ; nbarovskiy in the west and at Uzhur in the east. Moreover, both of these complexeseparate site, not associated with any group, that has tentatively been identifiedomplex control site. If all six complexes are slated for four groups plus one complex control site, the ultimate number of sites would be an. To date,three of the six complexes have only three groups-
The sixth complex, Aleysk, maypecial problem to the Soviet planners because of the earthquake damage that probably took place there in At the time of the quake there was only one group of silos under construction, liyt was apparent that one of xhese silos had been abandoned and that awas under construction nearby. At about the sameecond group of six silos was also started. |
it has not been possible lo determinehird or lourUi group has been started at Aleysk, but if so they are somewhat behind the schedule of starts at the other five complexes. Moreover,the existing silos have been seen at Aleysk, construction seems to be moving aheadlower pace than was anticipated- If the quake damage has been severe at Aleysk, the complex may not be enlarged beyond two groups-
c. Small Silo Program
The construction program for small single-silos differs from any previous Soviet ICBM program in severalhe silos are being constructed in greater numbers than in any otherhe silos arc smaller and less complex than those
in any otherhere have been no seasonal peaks in the start rate similar to those of the sccond-gene ration triple-silo and the large single-siloonstruction of deployed sites began very
Construction of small single-silo ICBM sites was begun in4 and has continuedomewhat irregular pace to the present time. ites were started at five complexes.Four of the five complexesrovyanaya, Gladkaya. Perm, and Olovyannayaere previously known ICBM launchfor theissile. The fifth complex, Tatishchevo, was new but used the support facilities of an abandoned IRBM complex.
5 andour additional complexes were brought into the small-silo program. Construction of small single-silo sites probably began at Svobodny and Kozelsk in5 and at Kostroma and Yedrovo in Each of the four additionalwas an existing ICBM launch complex, three having theissile and one having theissile. The use of Kozelsk (the SS-8is the only departure from the exclusive use of existingomplexes for additional deployment of the small single-silo sites.
At the nine complexes now in the program,small silos have been identified since Aboutthese sites are estimated to have been startedites are believed to have been started the rate of construction of the small single silos-is notfrom month to month, the construction pace for the firstas reconstructed,ate ofilo starts resents detailed information on the programmingof small single silos. ) 5 rate wasa definite and as yet unexplained slackening in the pacefirst half5 that was noted in. The pace ofstarts regained momentum in the last halfignificantly higher rate of starts has beenthe fourth quarter5 and the first quarter6
niu suns vuuixeua Tare ot ii per mown.
Moreover, there were at leastroup starts at this time, aboutmany as in any previous six-month period- These increasesalmostcntirely by the introduction of the lour additionalto the program, for the rates of site and group starts wereat about5 level at the old complexes as the newbrought into the program. There is no way of knowing howhigher stan rates will continue, but there are reasons toto apply through at First, five group starts6 at two of the original small-silo complexes. is only reasonable to expect additional new groups to be started atnew complexes. Third, even if no more new groups areyear, almostore silos would be required merely to fillgroups started since These sites in addition to thesites already identified6 assure the start of atcalendar If additional new groups are started atold and new small silo complexes, the total number of startscould-
The presence or absence of additional group starts aftert the original small-silo complexes will be the best indication of whether the higher start rates are being sustained. because of the recent appearance of group starts at some of these complexes and the anticipated time-phasing of group starts at individual complexes, it may not be possible to determine for another six months or more whether groups will continue to be added at these small-silo complexes.
2. Projected Force Levels
a. hrough
The estimated number of Soviet ICBM launchers for the periodhroughs shown in Table 2. In general, the current estimates67 compare favorably with those of However, forhe estimated force0) is considerably above the projection for that year provided in4 In fact,8 the number of estimated operational ICBM launchers will exceed the low side of the estimate forrovided in0 This change for the period7 has been necessitated by the substantialsince5 in the rate of construction starts at both the large-silo and small-silo complexes. Because of lack of evidence
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Tabic 2
USSR: Estimated Number of Operational ICBM Launchers- -.
Operational Systems
5/
' :
to hkO
to 1m5
to iu5
to 3
to 3
(triple silo)
(single silo)
(SS-9)
to lllO
addition to these launchers there areaunchers atcompleted or under construction. While under certainany or all of these launchers could serve aslaunchers of the Strategic Rocket Force, this is notbe their normal
additional four soft launchers will be operationalut their purpose is not yet clear. possible that they are for deployment of theehicle,tested at the TTMTC during5 and
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supporting the projected deployment of an SS- Very Large ICBM, this system is no longer included in estimates of future forcet"
Second-generationndontinue to constitute the bulk of the operational ICBM force at the present time. However, during the next year significant numbers of single-silo sites will become operational, rapidly changing the number of hardened targets for US strike forces. Single silos already compose more than two-thirds of the hardened Soviet sites, and7 the change in the Soviet force structure will haveighly dispersed targeting environment.
Because of the lengthy construction cycle for bot large and small silos and
it is unlikely that the
number of launchers forill fall outside ranges. At the pace of currentorge silos started aftereneral rule should not become operational until after The low side of the estimate forherefore is based on the assumption that those large-silo sites firmly Identified to date will be brought to operational status inonths andumber of sites on which construction ia estimated to have starred during the first halfased on the average start rate during the first two years of the2ilos per month)- The high side uf thos based on the assumption that sites will be brought to operational status inonths and that the higher start rate observed in5 and6 at large-silo complexes (six per month) will continue beyond. | ,1
The estimate for8 for the small-silo program is based on the number of group starts and the estimated period of time required toroup of ten sites to operational status. This period is now estimated atoonths. on the low side, all groups started by the close of the first quarter) should be operational by The high side is based on the number of groups known to have started by) While it is to be expected that there would be some additional group starts in the second quarterhey prob.iMy would be few because of the relatively high number of group starts
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/
already identified this year. For this reason, no allowance was made for additional undetected groups on the high side of theange.
It is anticipatedirm number for the starts of individual sites and groups for both the large-silo and small-silo programs during the first six months6 will be available by the end of the summer, at which time the high side of the projections may be adjusted.
b. nd
It is now estimated that the ICBM force levels willaunchers1aunchersn bothhe range of previous estimates byaunchers. In view of the uncertainties beyond the current deployment program, no attempt was made to provide low and high extremes in the estimated ranges. In general, it is expected that the Soviet ICBM force level may fall somewhat to the higher side of these ranges. If this materializes,1 the USSR will have reached approximate numerical parity with the currently scheduled US force of ground-based ICBM launchers. |
It is believed that1 the Soviet force to stabilize and that tlie major efforts during thestoward greater mobility, increased accuracy, improvedand system replacements. In this context,guided re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and suborbitallong-range ICBM's may attain operationaladdition, it is estimated that the USSR willolidwill be deployed initiallyobile configuration andto replace theystem. It is likely that none ofwill change appreciably the numbers of launchers inICBM force, but each could considerably affect theof the Soviet forces by
The evidence is quite clear that the rate of ICBM Site constructionignificant step forward at5 and that this change affected both the small-silo and large-silo programs. When taken in the light of only limited evidence that new ICBM systems arc scheduled for developmental testing at the
-
TTMTC in the next year or so, this seems to indicate that the USSR intends to go with the systems it now has, perhaps for some time. Other factors suggest the possibilityoncentrated Soviet effort in the near future that could resultigh level of site construction. The introduction of small silos at four additional ICBM complexes makes it unlikely that the rate of the small-silo program will fall below that oferiod, while the continuation of group starts at the original small-silo complexesotal rate higher than that oferiod for at least another year. On the basis of these factorscontinuing starts and the possibilityight appears that the USSR will havemall-silos operational or underby the closey which time it is expected that the new site-initiation phase of the program would be terminated.
Similarly, in the case of the large silo program there is momentum thatontinuation of the program during the next year or moreevel ofilos. This number would fill out each complex tohe highest number of silosingle site indicated by the evidence to date. While it appears thatiteseasonable minimum estimate, it is not certain that it is the ultimate Soviet goal for this system. However, because the demonstrated rate of construction starts is onlyoer year, it unlikely that the total number of silo sites will
;
For several reasons, it is not likely that the number of launchers in thendrograms will exceed significantly the high side of the estimate. Even at the recent relatively high rates of deployment, for example, obsolescence will begin to apply as the force levels approach thendicated above. Partly for this reason, neither Soviet nor US ICBM deployment starts for any one system have in the past extended beyond four years (the period used for this estimate). This time seems to define the general limits that these programs can attain, and it seems likely that both thendeployment programs, whatever their size, will be completed byith few, if any, new starts occurring | |
Furthermore, the attainment of the high side of the estimated range willajor sustained Soviet effort that, at its peak, would result in moreaunchers under construction at onehird again as high as the present level of activity and substantially higher than the combined ICBM/IRBM/MRBM construction
peak Finally, on the basis of the Soviet experience init would be unusualeployment program touninterruptedlyigh level for an-extended period While there have probablyariety of causes foror even abrupt terminations of previous Soviet regularity has been the exception rather than the rulepast. . ;
Although there is some basis in current evidencoof the extent of thendrograms, theforce levels arc unknown for. missiles with heavy and light These intended force levels .might bring about continuingof follow-on systems at the close of the current programs- Itfrom the general level of construction on currentthe desired force leveloderate one and that the USSRfor approximate parity with the US in numbers oflaunchers. Provided that all hard and softaunchers were Operationalhe construction of launchers nowthendrograms could raise the Soviettforce0 toaunchers. This number would fall short ofof deployment for the Minuleman and Titanotal ofbut the USSR may reason that its larger number ofmissiles will then provide qualitative parity between themissile forces- Alternatively, the USSR may choose tonumber to some extent while continuing efforts
It is anticipated that,iquid-fueled follow-on system will be operational andmall solid missile will be nearing operational status- While one or both of these programs could effect an increase in the total number of ICBM launchers, it is believed to be unlikely that they will be used to supplement the systems in the Soviet force at that time. Because of-the possible phase-out of theystem, the Soviet force level1 mayttainaunchers .discussed above. On the low side of1ood portion of theoft sites probably will be deactivated without replacement. On the high side, it is estimated that the follow-on liquid-fueled system will be deployed in new single silos and that this program will be phased initially to the deactivation of softites, and later to the deactivation of multi-launcher hard sites- Sinceaunchers are involved in the
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i
ne-for-one replacement program would be aundertaking by itself, and it is unlikely that this new system wouldizable net increment to the Soviet ICBM forces. On balance, it seems more likely that theill not be deactivatedeplacement, and it would probably be prudent to plan for the Soviet attainment toward the middle of the rangeoaunchers by |
hase-out of allaunchersassured, and deployment of at least one solid-fueledshould be completed by thes. This programthe formeplacement for ther could bring aboutaddition to the ICBM force, deployedew singlea mobile mode. Unless the USSR is able to develop unusuallyon its initial solid-fueled ICBM, early deployment ofwill beobile mode. ubstantial increasewarhead missiles above the level attained1 does notunless there are improvements in warhead andpermit the missile to be targeted on Minuteman silos. the particular advantageolid-fueled missile is itsand adaptabilityobile environment. It is estimatedthat the solid missile will be deployed initially in abut that, toward thes, ther its follow-on could be deployed in singlea replacement for thehich will then be approachingshelf life. Because of the possibility of asystem, and because the advantages ofwith relatively small numbers of launchers, it isthe mobjleforcc will be on the orderaunchers
t is estimated lhat the total number of ICBM launchers will fallo. This force will be composed principally of large and small single, dispersed silos, using thendissiles or their follow-ons andodest number of mobile solid-fueled missile launchers. As part of the qualitative upgrading of the force durings, considerable improvement is anticipated in re-entry technology. By the close of the estimating period, some of the larger missiles will probably be equipped with MIRV or be adapted for suborbital
missile systems with rangesautical-miles (nm) or with considerably suppressed trajectories. Such systems would supply an additional flexibility for Soviet targeting but they need not( of-require additional numbers of launchers.
am'H.BM/IRBM Forces
Current Status
Although no new construction of permanent MRBM/IRBM sites or other major changes in the force have been detected since the publication of, the estimate of the number of launchers operational inas been modified somewhat to reflectregarding the statuspecial group of six soft sites (Type V) that are deployed singly instead of in the customary pairs. The decline ofaunchers projected in,perational innas based on the judgment that these sites would be abandoned as other sites of the same variety had been.
The current estimateperational MRBM/
IRBM launchers (sec 'Tableas, been ranged to rcflect,on the highthe possibility that these sites are still available for use by units of the Strategic Roclcgt Forces (SRF).'
2. Major Trends and Developments
Significant features were the continued absence ational siteecline in the rate of
of additional operational construction of fixed field sites, and the continued lack of firm evidence on field deploymentobile missile system such as the SCAMP. It is believed that the major Soviet effort in the MRBM/ IRBM field is and will be directed toward greater survivability and shortened reaction time rather than toward an increase in force size. The obvious interest in mobile systems as well as in solid propellant missiles is an indication of this trend, and it is believed that efforts will continue in this direction.
Tabic 3
ussr: Identified Soviet mrbm/irbm Launchers a/
Under
Type
(SS-U)
0
(SS-5)
to 56
These figures do not include launch sites at the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center or' launch positions at fixed field sites.
a. Fixed Field Sites
Ninety-eight fixed field sites have been identified at or near existing MRBM complexes This number reflects an increase of aboutore than were identified at the time of. Ofowever, only eight were constructed during the past year (the remainder being older sites newly identified) This is less than half the number constructed in the previousonths. This decrease in the rate of fixed field site construction implies that this program is nearing completion- To date, fixed field sites have been identified atf theeployed MRBM (
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Most of the sites have four launch positions andfew permanent facilities. Tents, equipment, and wheel chocksrings have been observed at some sites, but there issign of activity,
b. Test Range Activity
the USSR At least one
is now developing new missile systems at the KYMTColid-fueled missile, appears designed to augment or replace existing MRBM/IRBM's ineriod. Other systems of MRBM/IRBM range may be under development, |
8 unllkelv' therefore,.,
other systems could cntcr'thc Soviet arsenal before
Construction Activity
Three major areas of construction at KYMTC have been noted during this past year: H,ew area under construction south of Area 5C.
The most significant activity is.thought to be that at That site, the prototype for the hardened MRBM sites, has been undergoing modification Three of the four silos have been or are currently being modified, with work on thesilo apparently complete. The southwest silo has been under going modification since at least This work was possibly complete inail line was finished up to the silo, although some construction work is still visible. oop road around this silo has also been built, and the silo diameter appears to have been reduced from about
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Areaoft site under construction sinces still not complete; pad surfacing there began only in The pad spacing of this site suggests design for an MRBM-sizc system, but there is no evidence, as yet, to allowof the system. Completion of this site is expected in the next few months-
A new area of activity south of Areaas noted in ew road was observed under construction running south from the road serving launch areand terminating just south of the abandoned launch site 5C2 and in line with all other sites in Launch Complex C- Construction activity is under way at this terminus. This activity may resultew launch area, but as yet no identifiable features as to type or size are present.
(2) Firing Programs
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Theas been flownm
Although it has been fired only, tom
impact area. |' ' ' that the
missile could have a. range capability oi atm- I
it probably
could not achieve an initial operational capability before
If theas-an operational range of overm, it could be identical to the SCAMP missile displayed in5 Moscow Victory parade. The USSR claims the SCAMP to be solid fueled,ange ofm. This equation suggests that the SCAMP could enter the Soviet operational inventory some time after It should be noted, however* that no SCAMP-likc vehicle has been firmly identified at the KYMTC, and thes believed tohree -stage vehicle, whereas the SCAMP in allhas.no more than two stages.
c Evidence On New Deployment
_. ' <
Since the publication of, no additional MRBM/IRBM sites have been detected, either under construction or 'operational. Changes observed at the existing sites appear to beeneral housekeeping nrfture. and all sites appear to be essentially unchanged. No mobile missile.systems such as SCAMP have been
identified at any of the deployed sites or complexes.
[strengthens our confidence in the ability tt laentny blAMP-lypc systems if and when they arc deployed atSRF bases in the field.
(1) Projected Forces
There has been no additional evidence that will significantly change the projections of force level as estimated in NIE. It is expected that the obsolescence of thendystems will require the USSR toajor portion of its MRBM/IRBM force during the next decade. Because of theof soft, multilauncher sites, follow-on systems probably will emphasize dispersion, mobility, and hardness. | |
Although tlie exact nature of the eventualby the USSR cannot be determined, there is continuingto the expectatiopombination of mobile and fixed
j The continued emphasis on mooiiity in soviet statements and the possible correlation of the SCAMP to theystem currently under test imply that the USSR considers mobility as an essential feature of future programs. Accordingly, it seems likely that the existing MRBM/IRBM soft sites will eventually be abandoned and that their mission will be filled both by additional hard launchers constructedetrofit silo program and byubstantial force of mobile launchers. It now appears that both objectives might be accomplished by one missile system, the KY-6.
In general, it is expected that the total number of aiming points for Soviet MRBM/IRBM systems in Western Europe and the Far East will remain relatively stablelthough
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the structure of the target system may change. It is therefore estimated that the USSR willontinuing and stable level ofissile launchers in the MRBM/IRBM class throughout this period.
It appears quite certain that no significant changes will be made in the existing level of Soviet MRBM/IRBM force through However,8 the missileow undergoing testing at KYMTC could be operational. It is estimated that this missile will begin to replacendissiles at existing hardened sites byy whichobile version should also be operational in small numbers. The initial phase-out ofndoft sites is expected to be concurrent with the introductionobile system, and the total force level should not rise significantly. |^
1 the USSR should be well on its way towardobile missile program while phasing out mostorall of the soft sites from the operational force. Because many difficult and complicated problems, especially in command and conlrol, are inhcr nt inobiles/deployment program, the degree of success or failure that the USSR may experience cannot be predicted with confidence. The retrofit program at the existingndard sites should be completed by this time, and additional deployment of new fixed sitesingle-silo mode could be well under way. It is estimated that6 the entire present force ofnd SS-5will be phased out. At that time the MRBM/IRBM force would consist solely of multi-silo sites, hardened single-silo launchers,obile missile system. As stated earlier, the total force, regardless of mix, will probably remain atissile launchers.
Capabilities
has been little new evidence uncovered during the past year on which toeassessment of the operational capabilities of the SRF. Current estimates on method of launch and silo hardness remain valid. Limited new information on complex control centers, command and control facilities, and communications, as well as some data on SRF supply depots is presented below. [
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omplex Control Centers
fCBM complexes
during the past year reveals that at six of these installations there isthat stands alone and does not conform to existing groupsites consistaunch silouried control bunkerlarger but similar to that at the group control sites, butbe logically associated with any one group of sites in aappearance of one isolated site at each complex suggestssites serve as complex control centers. While there is no to prove this hypothesis, it appears
toeasonable assumption and it is now anticipated that eachwill haveardened control'
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D. Evaluation and Prospects
Owing to the emphasis on preplanned action that hasthe SRF command communications system, there is little question that some form of this syctom. if only the local command option to be used in extremes, would survive an attack of almost any intenaity. Assessment of the degrae to which the system would permit sustained, effective control of missile operations from Moscow, however, is less certainI
it is very
uamyuclear attack On Ihe UbSK would leave SRF Headquarters capable of issuing its commands but largely uninformed as to the effectiveness or even the reception of these commands in the field. This isolation and command uncertainty would result from the probable early destruction of key segments of the common carrier systems used as primary media and the doubtful performance of HFa nuclear environment.
suggests that at least sortie me pi nave oeen taren to Till this gap in the command system. The hardened communications antennas at SRF command posts in European USSR are all buried in the earth, or perhaps even in concrete, and appear to be designed to provide information, or command feedback, toeadquarte rs. The capability to act on this command feedback, moreover, will be
3?
considerably enhanced by the addition of VLF stations distributed throughout the USSR, inasmuch as the more reliable signal emitted by these stations would give added assurance to SRF Headquarters that its commands were being received; ore definitive assessment of these new aspects of SRF command communications must await not only further technical analysisjof the hardened antennas but alsoindications of the role which thenstallations will play in the plans of the SRF. Tentatively, however, photographic intelligence suggests that the prospects for surviyable SRF command communications are considerably better than indicated
Through t is expected that there will berather than structural changes in the SRF commandstructure. The small balance of work required to complete the MRBM/IRBM contingency communications system of HF radio circuits probably will be soon completed. .It is likely that at some time beforehe communications construction teams will move to the ICBM complexes, where thus far there has been relat vely little activity in deploying backup radio facilities.
onger period extending into thes, it is likely that SRF command communications will benefit more from systems installed primarily as common carrier facilities or for uses by other military forces rather than from systems controlledby the SRF- Ifis likely that the SRF will make extensive use of the buried mulliconductor cable of the Ministry ofthat reaches from Moscow to Vladivostok. Basic construction on this mainline communications route apparently has now beenand it is likely that largef not allf the cable will be passing operational traffic within the next few years. In addition, the Soviet Union has within the last year or so placed into orbit an experimental communications satellite system that has the potential to add further diversity to the SRF communications system. The most significant input into SRF command communications capability, however, probably will come from the completion of the tropospheric scatter network now under construction in the Soviet Arctic and Far East. Although the prime consumer of this costly, but much needed, network is expected to be the Air Defense Forceshe increased timeliness and quality of missile defense information will undoubtedlyignificant impact on theof the SRF command system to react efficiently to attack situations. |
Regional Military Storage Depots
is -
of the eight in the USSR some time
During the past year, quantities of strategic missile equipment stored at six
pcrscd storage installations whichgo. Although these installations have been designated as regionalstorage depots, their association with strategic missiles was established as early Their exact function in support of the SRF remains unclear, however. It seems likely that theyariety of storage, maintenance, or repair responsibilities for general military equipment.
However, the major responsibility of the main installa-tion appears to be missile oriented because of the presence of large numbers of MRBM/IRBM transporters, erector-launchers, fueloxidizer trailers, and other missile support equipment. As yet, no missiles and no ICBM equipment have been identified at these
It has not been determined whether these eight storage depots, all near major Soviet rail lines, are responsible for supplying missiles and ground support equipment to the missile launch complexes as required or handle reckling and maintenance of this material, or both. It is difficult to comprehend the need for such quantities of material, as have been observed at these depots, so late in the deployment program. It is possible that some of this material could be utilized to provide missile equipment for the fixed field sites which to date appear to be devoid of permanent equipment.
Deployment concepts, equipment, and logistic requirements for the MRBM and IRBM systems appear to be similar. Because of the limited ability to store, maintain, and repair missiles and missile equipment at the launch complexes, the SRF apparently may be relying upon the eight regional military storage areas to fulfill these functions. Four of the depotsalta, Bcrdichev, Novaya Mezinovka, andrc so geographically situated as torimary role in supporting the bulk of the SRF MRBM sites in Western.USSR. Abundant strategic as well as tactical missile support equipment has been observed at these four locations. Similarly,ndupport equipment has been identified at Tambov and Surovatikha. whose geographical locations indicate primary IRBM or ICBM roles.
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III. Missile Submarine Systems
There has been little change over the past year in Soviet capability for strategic attack by means of missile-launching submarine systems. Construction oflasses of ballistic-missile submarines was discontinued2etrofit of earlier units oflass with theubmerged-launch ballistic-missile system is proceeding slowly with no direct evidence ofrogram forlass. Cruise-missile submarines,rimary role against surface forcesecondary role against coastal targets, have been in production With the phasing out of ballistic-missile submarines, the construction of cruise-missile submarines expanded considerably. Current emphasis still is focused on construction of thend thelasses that are equipped to launch cruise missiles. There is only tenuous evidence thatI class could be used to augment the ballistic-missile submarine force under certain circumstances. It is believed that the Navyand continues totrategic strike mission. Although there is no direct evidenceew class of ballistic-missile submarine is under construction orew missile is being developed for its use. it is believedew class will appear during the next two years. Changes in shipyard facilities at Severodvinsk and Komsomol'sk and the extensive addition oTnew facilities at Gor'kiy may presage the appearance ofew class ew class of ballistic-missile submarine is under construction, it is expected that the con-struction of cruise-missile submarines will be phased out.
A. Mission
Since, Soviet statements continue to strengthen the view that the Navytrategic strike role. In the most recent pronouncement inarshal Malinovskiy indicated that special attention has been paid to the development of the Strategic Rocket Troops and atomic, rocket-carrying submarines as the chief means of conducting strategic warfare. The pattern of deployment of missile-configured submarines appears to further support public statements as to the strategic missile role of the Navy. Beginning at least5 the USSR has deployed ballistic-missile submarines,lasses, to patrol stations in the North Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans. 6 there hasignificant increase in the number
of submarines on patrol station in the North Atlantic. Patrol activity has been continuous, with at least one submarine on station at all times, and on two occasions there have been as many as threedeployed simultaneously. Both public statements and recent deployment patterns are compatible with earlier evidence whichthat the Soviet Navy hadesponsibility for striking targets deep in enemy territory. These developments also strengthen the viewew class of ballistic-missile submarine will appear in the near future.
Soviet statements
umdvu 1submarines Is that of tactical strike against enemy surface ships. These submarines probablyecondary mission for strikes against coastal targets.
me iiucieur-powefcd i, class havp ecn engaged in out-of-area operations but with only tenuous evidence that any of these deployments are associated with the patrol stations used by ballistic-missile submarines.
Evidence of Soviet views on requirements for missile submarines is acquired from fragmentary intelligence derived from statements, analysis of construction programs, shipyard improvement, and. in some instances, from reports on the development of new missiles. For example, the loss of the strategic strike function0 wasby statements indicating the loss of this role, and by analysis of construction programs which indicated the cessation of construction of the ballistic-missile submarines and an increased emphasis on the construction of cruise-missile submarines. The earliest indication of such requirements is expected to come from public statements, whereas the more positive indicators arc acquired from the identification of new classes of submarines. | |
B. Current Status
The present Soviet missile submarine force is composed ofubmarines and is about equally divided between ballistic-missile and cruise-missile types. Of thia force,nits are nuclear-powered, includingallistic-missile submarines andruise-missile Of theiesel-powered submarines.nits are ballistic-missile types andruise-missile submarines. About
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one-half oflasB and all except one unit oflass ballistic-misaile submarines arc equipped with theissile system. This missile, which became operational ins firedurfaced submarineistance ofautical miles.
Theollow -on missile system which became operational This missileange ofautical miles and is firedubmerged submarine. Theystem is installed inlass test bed and in thelass submarines. I
C. Operations and Training
Soviet submarine operational activity56 hasarked increase in the deployment of nuclear-powered submarines beyond local waters. The level of such deployments5 and the first half6 was double the level observedoviet missile submarines, which now operate without benefit ofsupport units previously observed, arc deploying to patrol stations in tho Atlantic and Pacificegularity approaching continuous on-i station patrol. In thelass submarines have been employed ' frequently, but it is posjjftble that at leastlass cruise-missile submarine has also occupied this station. In the Pacificlass submarines have usually been employed. There were two unusual deployment operations by Soviet nuclear sub-mannea In oneorthernlaas submarine carriedive-week deployment to the Mediterranean the first substantiated deployment ofnit to this area. Theortie of another Northern Fleet nuclear-poweredinto Atlantic waters off Bermuda, probably for the purpose of testing US antisubmarine warfare capabilities along the East Coast. Two surface units accompanied the submarine, probably in order to provide support and to gather information. The most impressive operation by Soviet submarines during the past year, however, was the covert transfer of at least two nuclear submarines from the Northern Fleet to Pacific Fleet waters via Cape Horn. This operation, which lastedays, also involved four surface support ships. Although out-of-area operations appear to have involved only aboutercent of the Soviet nuclear submarine force, it is apparent that the increasing tempo of operations is atartial realization of the Soviet objective for
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more frequent and sustained naval operations and training on the high seas. The USSR now appears to have gained considerable confidence in tho reliability of its nuclear submarines, as evidenced by theer of long-distance patrols undertaken.
D. Construction Programs
Although information available during the first halfontinued construction of cruise-missile submarineshelass at Severodvinsk and Komsomol'sk and thelass at Gor'kiyhereumber of indications, including construction of new facilities, which, taken together, suggestajor change may be under way in the programs at all three yards. None of these indications is conclusive, however, with respect to either the timing or the nature of possible new programs, and the first firm evidence is not likely to be received until new unite are launched i
-"in iTuviei !fi;iTOri
for Soviet nuclear-powered submarines was probably regained3 led to the conclusion inhat the first unitew class of ballistic-missile submarine could appear as early7 andoperational Since last year's estimate, further evidence lias been acquired which strengthens this belief somewhat. At the Severodvinsk Shipyard, which was the lead yard for theof the N, H.l classes of nuclear-powered submarines and would be expected to continue as the lead yardew class of ballistic-missile submarine, thereossible indicationew class of nuclear-powered submarine is under construction.
A hull diameter ofnto account the range of error, is not inconsistent with thediameters of submarines oflasses currentlyat Severodvinsk.
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This hull section will be part of athat is unlikely to be completed until some time duringif it is the estimated new class of ballistic-missiledoes nctt necessarily represent the lead unit, which could be inadvanced stage of construction within the coveredwithout being observed.
A new ballistic-missile submarine construction program may involve Komsomol* sk in addition to the lead yard, Severodvinsk, and there is now reason to believe that building capacityewclass could have been available at Komsomol'sk since about the beginning If this capacity was allocatedew ballistic-missilearine, the first unit could be launched by7 oreanalysis of the delivery of ships from Komsomol'sk Shipyardt is concluded that Komsomol'sk used one hull assembly facility for nuclear-submarine constructioneparate facilitylass ballistic-missile submarines, in much the same manner as Severodvinsk Shipyard. Construction of guided-missile destroyers appears to have taken place on one of the building ways in the nuclear-submarine facility. With the removal of an uncompleted Krupnyy hull I to the launching basin about4 orhis space would have been available for ji new class of submarine In light of theconsiderations, it is believed that the constructionlass cruise-missile submarines may be phasing out at Severodvinsk and Komsomol'sk in favor of ballistic-missile submarines, and the projee-tions of the submarine forces are based on this judgment.
New shipyard facilities have been built or are still underthat will improve procedures for material handling and assembly at Severodvinsk, Komsomol'sk. and especially Gor'kiy. Although construction of facilities at Severodvinsk and Komsomol'sk is not necessarily related to new programs at those yards, theof large new ship assembly/fabrication shops at Gor'kiy Shipyardoncurrently with the construction there of large transporter docks and nuclear support ships, suggests that the Gor'kiy yard is about to begin constructing nuclear submarines. If so, it will become the third such facility in the USSR, and its participation in the nuclear program would indicate that the limitations imposed on the construction ol iim:lear submarines in the past by the availability of reactors have been overcome. The new facilities at Gor'kiy imply
:
- y.
increase in annual Soviet output of nuclear-poweredins well as the possibilityew class ew ballistic-missile submarine programSeverodvinsk and Komsomol'sk as projected, the most likelybe constructed at Gor'kiy wouldew class of
A conversion program onlass submarine for thesystem probably was begun3 at the Severodvinskr.f|
| in the Northern Fleet Missile Teat
this conversion program,
a conversion rate of probably one unit per year, rather than theof two units per yearotalnits byapparent slow pace of retrofitting theystem maydissatisfaction with the system and raises the question asall submarines oflass will be retrofitted.
No direct evidence of conversion of additional units ofC class exists other lhan the original test bed. Extensive modification worklass submarines, however, is under way at Severodvinsk and Vladivostok, involving at least four submarines. This work involves extensive changes io the area of the missile tubes. There is as yet no evidence that this modification is related lo theissile syatem.
Missile SystcmB
Inoviet Admiral indicated that the USSR hasa solid-fuel submerged-launch submarine missile within excessautical miles. There is no directsupport this claim. It is believed, however,ew missiledevelopedew class of ballistic-missile submarine anda missile is likely toubmerged-launch solid-fueleda rangeautical miles. With the estimatedIhe appearance of the submarine, the missile should benow.
ew submarine
w lllUissile development, there
may be little or no advance indication prior to the appearance of suchon tho Northern Fleet Missile Test Range.
J OP SECRET
Most cruise-missile submarines now carryautical-mile, low-altitude version of theissile, which entered ser-yice
il iB pussiuie
aigu-dHHwe, longer range version ol themissile finally will enter service in the next year or two.
F. Projected Forcei 1.
The Soviet missile submarine force is expected to beduring the next two years by the addition of aboutI-class nuclear-powered submarines and possibly four additional dicsel-powered cruise-missile submarines oflass. There will probably be little change in the ballistic-missile submarine forces, although the first unitew class could be in service by Estimated strengths for the missile Submarine force are shown in |
2.
t/is believed that the production of both Eclasses of cruise-missile submarines will have been1 production'of the new class of ballistic-missilehave reached aboutnits. t is expected that thewilluclear-powered ballistic-missile submarineaboutnits, including aboutf the new class,
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Table U
Estimated Soviet Mieslie-Submarine Force
Ballistic cissllc
Nuclear
l
New class
- * * *
Diesel
I
Z-conversion
Cruise missile
Nuclear
I
Diesel
J
W-conversion Total
hi
10
33
*z
22
5
17
2
5 5
7
& 10
3 7
35
7 5
7
13
22
o 12
1 9
0 to 2
35
25
30
5 25
3
IV. Strategic Bomber Forces
The manned bomber forces of Long Range Aviation (LRA) continue toignificant contribution to Soviet capabilities for strategic attack. Both the heavy bomber forces and the medium bomber forces of LRA have primary missions of strategic attack and reconnaissance, and it is believed that most LRA aircraft would be employed in these roles. Secondary missions, such as support of the Soviet Naval Air Forces (SNAF) probably would not involve any substantial number of aircraft. It is believed that LRA will continue torimary mission of strategic attack and reconnaissance throughout the period of this estimate. |
The heavy bomber forces of LRA are believed to be directed almost exclusively toward intercontinental operations, primarily against the continental United States, whereas medium bomber forces are believed to be directed mainly toward operations in Eurasia, withmall number of medium bombers programmed for operations against NorthAmerica. Because of this basic difference in targeting, the heavy bomber forces and medium bomber forces are discussed separately in this estimate. | |
A. Heavy Bomber^Forccs
The primary wartime missions of the LRA heavy bomber forces are believed to be the delivery of nuclear strikes and theof strategic reconnaissance againsthe continental United States. The secondary missions are believed to include support of the SNAF in the reconnaissance role and by the provision of tankers for SNAF long-range reconnaissance aircraft-^
Status
Tlie heavy bomber forces currently consist ofearour-turboprop heavy bombers and ahout) four-jet heavy bombers. Aboutf the Bear aircraft arc equipped with the Kangarooir-to-surface missile (ASM),
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a few arc specialized reconnaissance variants with no weapons-delivery capability, and the remainder are free-fall bombers. All of the Bison aircraft are capable of free-fall bombing, but no ASM has been provided for this aircraft.
About two-thirda of the Bear ASM carriers, the Bear reconnaissance variants, and all of the Bison bombers are believed to be equipped for aerial refueling. Bison aircraft are used as tankers for the refuelable Bear and Bison, and abouthere is no firm evidence of the actual numberre believed to be equipped for this role. It is estimated that Bison serving in the tanker role can be converted to the bomber configuration in the field, but these aircraft are not believed toombing capability while equipped for the lanker mission.
Heavy bombers arc assigned to all three of the Long-Range Air Armies (LRAA). Table 5 shows the current distribution of these forces.
Table 5
Soviet LRA: Distribution of Heavy
USSR
Central Siberia Soviet Far East
LRAA . Bison regiments
squadron
2nd LRAA ear bomber regiment
ASM regiments
3rd LRAA ear bomberear ASM regiment
3rd LRAA ison regiments
Heavy bombers are based on six airfields, four in European USSR and one each in Central Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Five of these airfields have runways0 feet, and the sixth, in Central Siberia,oot runway.
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c. Maritime Operations
Dear aircraft of LRA and,esser extent. Bison aircraft continue to engage in maritime operations, but this activity still constitutesmall portion of overall heavy bomber operations. Most of this activity has been directed against US surface forces,in some cases thCjl/nain mission possibly has been ELINTof land targets. It is anticipated that the extent of LRA
involvement in overflight operations gradually will decrease as the
Bear aircraft assigned lo tlie SNAF become fully operational-
SNAF Bear aircraft have been identified in flights involving US forces onew occasions during the past year- This general lack of overflight activity by SNAF Bear is not surprising. Delivery of the Bear to the SNAF proceeded slowly, and only fivew. re deployed by It is unlikely, therefore, thatBear units would naveignificant operational capability before the end5 or Furthermore, during the first three months6 the principal SNAF Bear unit appears to have ceased operations for about seven weeks, suggesting some difficulty with the aircraftore probably, its reconnaissance systems. Byhe SNAF had acquired more thajiear aircraft, and it is believed that these aircraft soon will assume the_ primary responsibility for long-range maritime reconnaissance.
4. Capabilities
It is believed that the major part of the LRA heavy bomber forces remains committed to intercontinental operations, although it is possibleew aircraft might be diverted to maritime missions in support of the SNAF. LRA capabilities for attack on the continental United States are limited, however, by the range characteristics of current heavy bomber aircraft. The refuelable Bear ASM carrie rs have the greatest capability for intercontinental attack and could reach most targets in the United States directly from their home basesingle inflight refueling. The nonrefuelable Bear ASM carriers and bombers also could strike some US targets directly from their home bases, but would-have to use Arctic bases to achieve coverage of most of the United States. Bison aircraft require both Arctic staging and refueling to reach most US'targets, but could attack the western United States from Arctic bases without refueling.
5. Production Programs
ontinued increasenumber bi sear- aircratt assigned to the SNAF, and it now isthat reconnaissance variants of the Bear are being producedlow rate at Kuybyshev-Airframe Plant No. Previously itthat the aircraft assigned to the SNAF were originallyas Bear "A" bombershe basic bomber versionndfor use in the maritime reconnaissance role. The numberdeployed with the SNAF now exceeds the number that couldbe accounted for by earlier production, however,
The number of Bear assigned to LRA is estimatedremained unchanged for the past two years, but it isa number of LRA Bear have been modified at Kuybyshevperiod. of Kuybyshev continues to reflect
modificationfor example,
two of the five Bear at tne lactory were identified as probable "A" models. Il is highly unlikely lhat the Bear "A" would be in production at this time, and it is probable that these two aircraft were returned to the factory for modification to one of the later configurations. This
activity could include the conversion of "A" models to the ASM-carrior configurations, as well as the addition of an aerial refueling capability to Bear "B" ASM carriers and the modification of some aircraft for
missions. LRA bases in
udu neon modified for aerial refueling.
"Irevcaled that more than one-half of tho Bear "B" already
-nnnnfii
The presence of this modification activity at Kuybyshevirect correlation between the number of aircraft at the factory and the buildup in the number of Bear assigned to the SNAF. The present estimate of resumed production assumes that all of the SNAF Bear, with the exception of one or two prototypes, represent new production. It is possible that the SNAF Bear force consists partly of new aircraft and partly of older aircraft, or. if Bear aircraft have been .withdrawn from LRA during the past year, that all SNAF Bear are modified aircraft as previously estimated. In either case the estimate of total productionircraft by- is
considerable
essentially correct, althougl to the production schedule.
there is
ear aircraft naa Men produced by the end Thistotal provides ene/ugh aircraft to cover the estimated Bear , strength in LRA, and it is believed that production of Bear bombers and ASM carriers for LRA ended In addition, it is estimated that production of reconnaissance variants for the SNAF began in the last halfith aboutf these aircraft having been produced as of The current rate of production is estimated to be slightly less than one aircraft per month. | ]
6. Projected Forces
The following projections of force levels forA heavy bomber forces are basod on the belief that the USSR willmanned bomber forces capable of operating against theUnited States throughout the period of this estimate. | |
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LRA heavy bomber forces appear to have stabilized at their present level, and it is estimated that there will be no major
change in these forces during the next two years. Estimated force levels throughre given in Table 6.
Table 6
Soviet LRA Heavy Bomber Forces: Number of Aircraft, by Model Midyear
Unit;
Bear
to kO o 35 o 35
ASMtototo 80
toto
toto 55
toto 95 o 95
Grand total 0
b.
It is estimated that the LRA heavy bomber forces will decline graduallytrength ofircraftt is believed that the number of Dear ASM carriers and Bison tankers will remain essentially unchanged during this period, with the reduction in the total force resulting from the phasing-out of the older Bear and Bison free-fall bombers. | |
During thes it is believed that Bear ASM carriers will be gradually phased out of the force, with Bison being retained only for the tanker role. Byormal.
attrition of the Hear and Bison aircraft would reduce the total force .to only someircraft. orce of this size would be at or below the minimum practical level, and continued attritionnless offset by new programs, would result in the complete elimination of LRA heavy bomber forces within another two years or so.
It is believed, however, that the USSR will maintain manned bomber forces capable of operating against the continental United States throughouts. The manned bomber is the only strategic weapons system capable of performing simultaneousand strike missions, enabling it to search out and attack mobile targets and targets of uncertain location. Strategic missile forces, in contrast, arc dependent on other systems for reconnaissance information; in the absence of manned bomber forces, Soviet operations against the United States would be wholly dependent on satellitesystems for damage assessment and retargeting data. Other advantages of the manned bomber include its ability to deliver very large weapons and its ability to deliver weaponsigh degree of accuracy. It is believed that the USSR would plan for the heavy bomber forces to reach the United States after the initial missile strikes, enabling these aircraft to operateegraded defense environment. This is no reason to believe that such operations would be any less ffective or any more vulnerable durings than ins. [_
For these reasons it is believedew heavy bomber may be introduced into the LRA inventory duringeriod in order toorceignificant capability for intercontinental operations. It ia believedew heavy bomber program would be detected some three or four years before thebecame operational. If, therefore, the USSR intends toits heavy bomber forces by the deploymentew aircraft. the development of this aircraft should become apparent ineriod. The introduction of this new aircraft, which also would be available for use by the SNAF in the maritimerole, could be expected to resultotal LRA heavy bomber force ofircraftith about equal numbers of the new bomber and Bear ASM carriersmall number of Bison continuing in service as tankers for the Bear. |
J.
The primary wartime missions of the LRA medium bomber forces are believed to be the delivery of nuclear strikes and theof strategic reconnaissance against targets in areas peripheral to the USSR, especially the European NATO countries. mall portion of the force is believed to be programmed for similar missions against targets in Alaska, Northern Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. Secondary missions are believed to include support of the SNAF and the Tactical Air Forces (TAF). LRA medium.bomber support of SNAF and TAF operations probably would be mainly in the reconnaissance and possibly electronic warfare roles, but might also include strike missions.
2-Composition and Deployment
The LRA medium bomber forces currently consist ofadgerwin-jet medium bombers andlinderwin-jet supersonic-dash medium bombers- At the present, neither of these aircraft is helieved to have an operational ASM An ASM is known to have been under development for the Blinder, however, and Inhereood possibilityubstantial portion of the LRA Badger force may be in the process of acquiring ASM's. mall number of the Badger probably arc configuredfor reconnaissance missions, with no weapons delivery capability- The great majority of the Badger aircraft are believed toombing capability, although in some cases onlyecondary mission. All of the Blinder aircraft are creditedree-fall bombing capability, although most of the Blinder currently deployed arc assigned to units thatrimary mission of |
All Badger aircraft are estimated lo be capable of refueling inflight from other Badger that have been equipped to serve as tanker aircraft. There is no reliable evidence as to the number of Badger tankers, but it is believed that the ratio of tankers of bombers isnd it is estimated that the present force includesadger tankers. The Blinder aircraft currently deployed are not believed to be equipped for aerial refueling.
Medium bombers are assigned to all three of the Long Range Air Armiesut aboutercent of the forcencluding all of the Blinderre based in European USSR. Table 7 shows the present distribution of LRA medium bomber forces.
, Table 7
Soviet LRA: Distribution of Medium
USSR
Central Siberia Soviet Far East
LRAA. linderadgerraining division
equivalent to about two regiments; mostlyew Blinder)
2nd LRAA linder regiment
7 Badger regiments (one possibly converting to Blinder)
3rd LRAA adger regiments
3rd LRAA adger regiments
LRA medium bomber regiments are based on 21 n European USSR, one in Central Siberia, and threeSoviet Far East. Inmall Badger detachmentan airfield in the Eastern Arctic. These airfields, withof the Arctic base and one that is shared with thebe grouped into two classes according to the lengtheel oreet. This distinction isBlinder aircraft have been based only on the airfieldsfeet runways, and the majority of LRA mediumeet runways- Table 8 shows the distribution ofbases, including heavy bomber airfields which fall into awith runwayseet and longer-
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Table 8
eet orOO Feet
t'it
European USSR 1st LRAA 7
2nd LRAA 5
Central Slboria 3rd
Soviet Far East 3rd LRAA
All of ihe airfields with runwayseet andcurrently occupied by LRA heavy bomber units, with theone of the airfields in the Soviet Far East. The latter isLRA and the SNAF. and supports two Badger regimentseach service)NAF Bear reconnaissance unit. Thiswas extended to its>resent lengthrior toof SNAF Bear.
In the European USSR, all of Ihe airfieldsin the 1st LRAA support Blinder regiments, as does onetwo airfields of this class in the 2nd LRAA. those five airfields hadeet runways, and in two casesa close correlation between the extension of the runwuys anddeployment of Blinder. The other base where the runwaylengthened4 has been usedeploymentBtindor aircraft, and it is possible that the Badgerthere is in the process of converting to Blinder. units are stationed on theirfields in theoot runways,
Al present the only medium bomber base in Central Siberiaunwayeet and supports two Badgeradger squadron also was based in this area, at an
Soviet LRA: Distribution of Home Bases by Length of Runway
airfieldoot runway- This unit has been deactivated, how-ever, and LRA aircraft are no longer based at this'field.
In the Soviet Far East, LRA medium bomber regiments are based at two airfields withoot runways and at one baseunway of more thaneet. The latter base is shared with the SNAF, as noted above, and the extension of the runway to its present length is clearly associated with the deployment of SNAF Bear. The two bases with runways ofeet each support one LRA Badger One of these bases was extended from Us former length ofeet during the past year. I
3. Operations and Training
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4. Capabililie
The LRA medium bomber forces have a' capability for operations against probable target areas in Eurasia, buteTy limited Capability for operations against the United States.
LRA Badger and Blinder bombers on two-way unrefuelcd missions from home bases in European USSR could reach all major targets in the United Kingdom, Western Europe. North Africa, the Near East, and the Middle East. Badger bombers based in the Soviet 1'ar East would be capable of two-way unrefueled missions against Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, and Formosa, and,ingle inflight refueling, could fly two-way missions against Guam, the Philippines. South Vietnam, and Thailand. Badger bombers from the Soviet Far East and Central Siberia also could operate throughout Communist China.
By deploying to Arctic bases or refueling, Badger bombers from European USSR could conduct two-way missions against Iceland. Greenland, and Northern Canada. It is believed thai one or possibly two Badger regiments might be employed for such missions. It is
unlikely that the Blinder whichhorter combat radius than the Badger, no aerial refueling capability, and no record ofto the would.be-used against these target areas. Badger bombers from the Soviet Far East could conduct two-way un-refueled missions against Alaska and Northwestern Canada, and, with inflight refueling, could reach the extreme northwestern corner of the continental United States from bases in the eastern Arctic. It is unlike that more than one Badger, regiment would .be used in this area. [
Events during the past year suggest that there has been major change in Soviet programs for the modernisation ol LRA medium bomber forces, and it. is unlikely that these forces will develop in the manner previously estimated- It had been expected that the Blinder would become the main strike aircraft over the next few years, with the Badger shiftingupport role. The Blinder program has developed alowly, however, and recent intelligence indicates that this aircraft may be phased out of production much sooner than anticipated-In addition, it appears that LRA may be preparing to equip aportion of its Badger forces wilh an unidentified ASM. This could significantly improve the strike capability of LRA Badgerextending their usjcful life into thes. It is possible, therefore, that the USSR has,decided to limit the deployment of the Blinder and to provide the Badger with an ASM delivery capability so as to maintain the striking power of their mediumorces.
Deployment
that only some Zlee.uu iu mA Jits during the past year -
duug urn yasi year
about the same number introduced during each of the three preceding years. To some extent, this slow rate of deployment has reflected difficulties wilh the aircraft itself or example, Blinder aircraft in operationalwere grounded for about six months because of engine troubles. It is believed thai another reason for the relatively slow pace of Blinder deployment* fhr-lackuitable ASM-
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There has
been no evidence" of "ASM activitype rational Blinder units,Blinder bases -'- both LRA and
SNAT*id not reveal any indication of the construction of ASM facilities. It is unlikelv.hat deolovmentlinder ASM
System is imminent, e.
f eases, nave nan theiT mnw-vi
fact thatew medium
! PVfBnrfoH In thi*olVinr ialaH
Blinder also suggests that further deployment of this aircraft will be limited.
ASM Associations
n suusiaiiiiai ponRn uiforces with an unidentified ASM system. Indications ofprogram include the construction of possible ASM facilities atbases, |the sighting of
ew Badger modification
ASM-equipped Badger at'LKA
torage /handling
acilitieS are under cons tr uc tion
possible ASM it nine LRA Badger
in European USSR. The construction of this type of facility
inai several sues proDaoiy are neanng completion, mere-ierable variation in the arrangement of the facilities at the
is consu
different bases, but each site obviously is intended for the same function. ypical site contains two large drive-through buildings and is locatedecured area near the aircraft parking aprons or hardstands. Each of the drive-through buildings is approximatelyeet wideeet long, although one has four drive-through bays and the other only three. The four-bay building alsowo-story office-type building attached to one side, givingistinctive "T" shape. Roadways within the site link the drive-through buildingsarking ramp and two large concrete pads- Access from the site of aircraft parking areas is providedingle road, I
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The drive-through buildings appear to be suitable for the storage, assembly, and checkoutedium-size ASM, and there is no other apparent functionacility of this natureomber base. Sites of this type have been seen only at LRA Badger bases, and the nine bases involved supportadger regimentsircraft, or about one-half of the total LRA Badger force- These bases all have runways ofeet and are not considered as candidates for Blinder deployment.
The
ram Known .to oce Badger arc the Kennel (AS-ij and the Kipper (AS-2J. The Kennel has about the same cruising speed as the unidentified ASM,ange of onlyautical miles. The Kipperange comparable to the unidentified ASM- but an average cruising speed ofnots.
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Kemci or rvennei-type miSBireB aryeT another L.
or three probable Kennel missiles
j ono Badgerrobable Kennel
>ne probable Kennel being towedaxiway, and two
One of the possible ASM facilities is under construction at
this base, and the Badger with the probable Kennel was parked near this site.I
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Production of the Blinder is estimated to continue at Kazan' Airframe Plantt is believed, however, that the Blinder will be phased out of production within the next year-or Bo.
d(jcti<
Recent intelligence in dicates that thepassenger transport is entering productiohat Plant No.-be possible for the Blinder and theiClassic"toJbeat Kazan', but this is consideredorplant facilities were divided equally between the two programsbe possible for production ofrthe-jBlinder to continueatefour aircraft per month, but production of the Classic wouldto little more than one aircraft per month. If the USSRuse the Classic extensively, as reports indieatev-it is unlikejva low rale of production would be considered-acceptable.
Betweenndnly aboutlinder were delivered to the LRA and few, if any, to the SNAF. The current estimate thatlinder had been produced bys basedeak rate of three aircraft per month. Thislight reduction from earlier estimates basedeak rate of fourper month.
relativebombersproauced, but |
that the Blinder "B" ASM carriers
being produced at any substantial rate.
suggests thatf the Blinder at Kazan' were "A" models (bombers) and only four were probable "B" models
(ASM carriers'
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also indicates that Kazan' is engageduw uauger moflilicalion program. Throughlant No.odified. Badger bombers to the Badger "C" (Kipper ASM-carrier configuration) for the SNAF. More recently the plant is believed to havemall number-of Badger for special missions, such as the Badgereconnaissance variant. These later programs involved relatively small
ai-pre vtoueiy modification of Badger bombers to Badoer "C" ASM
Forces
The current status of LRA medium bomber .programs is uncertain. The following projections are based on the belief that Blinder will be phased oj^ of production within the next year or so andumber of Badger units are in.the process of acquiring an ASM-delivery capability. Because of these factors, the composition of the projected forces is considerably different from previous estimates. Overall inxce levels, however, arc similar to those previously
It is believed that the composition of LRA medium bomber forces will undergo major changes during this period. deployment of the Blinder probably will be limited, and the rate of delivery is unlikely to exceed the average ofircraft per year achieved during the past three years. It is possible that some Blinder may eventually be equipped with the Kitchen ASM- There are no indications that the deployment of this system is imminent, however, and it is probable that most Blinder will be employed in the bomber/reconnaissance role. | |
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The most significant development projected for this period is the modification of LRA Badger for the delivery of ASM's.
i
a missile metype, aitnougn it is possioieompletely newishe rate at which it is estimated that this system will be deployed is relatively high, but is comparable toJthe rate at which modified^Badger ASM carriers were introduced into the SNAP. ,It ia,possibleew.Badger ASM carriers already are assigned to LRA units, but it is..unlikelyignificant operational capability exists at.present. Estimated force levels throughre given in
Table
Soviet LRA Medium Bomber Forces: Number of Aircraft, by Model
Units
J
ASM carrier
5
te5 to 5P5
b-
It is estimated that the principal change in theof the medium bomber forces during the first part of this period will be the phasing out of most Badger bombers and some of the Badger tankers. The number of Badger ASM carriers and of
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Blinder probably .will remain relatively stable at theevels, resultingotal'medium bomber force ofircraft in thes=.
It in believed that the limited deployment of the Blinder-will-lead'to >the introductionew medium bomber ineriod. By this time the phasing out of the Badger ASMcould be expected to begin, and the deploymentew system would be necessary to maintain an acceptable force level. It is believed that thedevelopment of such an aircraft would be detected ineriod, several years before it became operational- Byeriod, Blinder aircraft also would begin to phase out. resultingotal force ofircraftew mediumlinder, andadger ASM carriers and tankers.
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Soviet reaction to announcements that the United States is proceeding with the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) programndicates that the leadership is very much concerncdjWjth-US military space developments and will.act to maintain parityvin,thisvarea.i; Much of the activity in the Voskhod programhirtsleeve,environment and extravehicular activityas provided neccssary.hackground for. developments in this directionn, and the development of the largeboosterapability to place in orbit .relatively large, man-rated capsules in the near future. Whether by--theirnwniniti-ative or in reaction to the MOL program, it is expected that the USSR will orbit manned vehicles capable of carrying out military missions over some extended period of time. Such missions.might well include space reconnaissance, real-time damage assessment, surveillance of mobile weapons of various types, and inspection, and destruction of artificial satellites as well as-the general and myriad activitiesssary to advancing space technology and exploitation.-
C. Space Weapons< , .
The official policy of the USSR on space, like that of the United States, is that space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and kept free of military weapons. umber of years, however, Soviet officials, expressing deep concern over US.military Space activities, have rfssertcd the willingness and ability of the jUSSR to use space for military purposes should the need arise.
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Aside from the paradingglobal rocket', 'j the SCRAG, Ihe most direct public statement of intent to produce space weapons was contained in the Soviet rejoinderS accusation that the possession of "orbital rockets" contradicted' the spirit of the UNagainst neclear wcapons'inhe "Soviet reply stated that the resolution did not banproduction, and acceptance of such weapons as equipment of the arrried'forces. Although this statement ignored the issue of operational deployment, "it did suggest the likelihood of Soviet interest "in developing orbital*weapons during the years to come. For the foreseeable future, however, it appears that offensive multiple orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBM's in terms of effectiveness, reaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positiven view of these factors, plus the far greater cost of such Weapons, it is unlikely that the USSR will deploy an offensive multiple orbital weapon system within the next five to ten;"years, although it almost certainly will carry out expermintal test flights of space vehicles/convertible to weapon Systems. It is not definite that theaunches aretep in this direction, although this is considered to be unlikely on the basis of available information, f
apability lb launch theehicle. For this reason. ;>
On the other hand, theay be either the long-touted Soviet "global rocket"ractional-orbital weapon with ranges up00 nmuborbital system for precursor weapons of shorter range. Because of the accuracy limitationractional-orbital system, it is believed that the weapon under development is more likely to be of the suborbital type. Lacking other evidence on the system to bo deployed at the four new soft launchers at Plcsetskt would be prudent to plan on thethat theystem may be deployed there by The Plesetsk complex is the only close-range launch area that now appear
ppears
tiiia reason, it is
estimated that any deployment of this system in the near future will be quite limited. 1
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VI. Command and Control Systems
Command and control is an amorphous concept which embraces all the factors that affect the ways inational leadership copes with problems involving the use or potential use of military force. It includes, but is not identical with, the functional performance of thehe technical mechanisms and the organizational procedurci which constitute the nervous systemilitary organization. More than this, command and control includes the capabilities of the forces themselves, since the ways ineadership can respond to crises depend upon the means at its disposal. In brjef, command and control refers to the potentialities for actionwhich govern the management of military forces in war situations.
ope at the cxne.
Soviet.preparations for the contingency of war arc still affected by the particular view of general nuclear war which prevailed in the Soviet military establishment during thes- Variously labeled in the West the "one-actthe shortr the "nuclearhis view held that the initial nuclear exchange would largely determine the outcome of war and that theater operations would be of secondary importance. Although this view has since been modified substantially, the Soviet Union has optimized its preparationseneral nuclear war in Europe at the expense of preparations for conflicts of lesser intensity.
The decisions regarding force structure and doctrine which were made under the influence of these views of thes affect the range of options available to the Soviet command and control system today- The technical apparatus of the Soviet command and control system and the capabilities of the Soviet leadership to cope with various wartime situations arc analyzed in the following paragraphs. [
A. The Technical Apparatus
General nuclear war would obviously introduce factorsommand and control system has never faced. Modern weapons are capable of placing all rear areas under attack from the outsetar. The widespread destruction would be of unprecedented magnitude. Such disruption of the traditional sanctuaries could forestalljeopardize central government control over the country, and
make civil defense an acute national problem. In contrast to situations of the past, where breakdowns of command channels have affected mainly" field commands'rather than central headquarters, nuclear war couldliring about a'complete collapse of the whole national commandThis prospect poses the most perplexing problem to confront the national leadership: how to maintain central controlyriad of separately'developing actions, any one of which might carry broad strategichile adequately insuring the ability of field comm'ando'rs "to operate'in conditions of temporary isolation from the center. 'At the heart of; this politico-strategic problemechnical one' -'- the'question of the adequacy of the communications and data-handling" capabilities to cope with the problems of nuclear war-
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A critical factor affecting the adequacy of Soviet command and control capabilities is the extent to which the system is equipped with automatic data-handling facilities. We know that Soviet proficiency in the technology of automation is high, but there is reason to doubt that the military application of data processing has been developed as rapidly as might have been possible. It is clear, at least, that Soviet military spokesmen themselves are dissatisfied wilh the rate at which these advanced techniques arc being assimilated by the forces. Acomplaint in the military press over the past year or two has been that commanders and staffs have been slow to take advantage of the possibilities afforded by the new computer techniques. In. view of these complaints, we believe that the introduction of data-processing facilities in the Soviet armed forces has been proceeding unevenly, with priority undoubtedly assigned to the Air Defense and Strategic Rocket Forces.
In general, the limited evidence on the technical capabilities of the Soviet command and control system is consistent with what we would expect in the light of the general level of Soviet technical The operational capabilities of the system, however, depend not only on technology but on the ways in which the Soviet leaders are prepared to use their forces. From this standpoint, certain weaknesse in the Soviet command and control system become apparent. Having predicated their preparations on the assumption that the next war would be nuclear,find themselves less than well prepared for other contingencies. I
B. Operational Capabilities
The USSR has been improving its forces to maximize its chances for survivaluclear environment. Military leaders have placed increasing stress on mobility, dispersion, hardened facilities, and the pre-posilioning of stocks and equipment, while insisting, at the same time, on the maintenance of high standards of combat readiness and an ability to react rapidly. Both the direct evidence available lo us and our general knowledge of Soviet capabilities and planninggive reason to believe that the command and conlrol procedure^ associated with these forces arc tailored lo the same requirements.
J Moreover, we believe that command facilities are TrrraDic una tnst alternate facilities are available in the event that
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regular channels are disabled. Classified documents mention thepreplanned instructions for force commandersysteminsure the maximum economy of time in getting forces intothe event that hostilitiee were to commence according to thein Soviet doctrinea full-scale nuclearhecontrol procedures would probably operate much in the waybeen planned. That is. they would be directed at assuringUnion the initiativeuclear exchange.
However, there are other possible scenarios for the beginningeneral nuclear war for which the USSR may be less well prepared. Forar might beginonventional conflict "and-then only much later, or unevenly, escalate to the nuclear stage. Inextremely complex problems of war management-might arise. Theater forces would have to be set new tasks in accordance with the changed situation. War plans would have to be adjusted to take account of the gains and losses registered in the conventional phase; IR/MRBM forces might have to be retargeted depending on the results of prior ground operations; planned employment of tacticalfor nuclear strikes might have to be discarded because of losses in conventional operations. Such contingencies as these wouldimpose extraordinary burdens on Soviet data-processing and data-dissemination capabilitici
The USSR also appears to be poorly prepared to deal withof tactical nuclear war. Tactical nuclear weapons canby the artillery rockets and tactical aircraft of theforces. Judging by statements made by Soviet officers indoctrinal debates of theuthority overof weapons and the timing of strikes would devolve ononce the order to employ nuclear weapons isappears toegree of decentralization of commanduse of nuclear weapons that is not paralleled in US practice- of these procedures for close political control insituation are apparent.
the confidencein us auinty to evert discrete gradations of military pressure must be very low in circumstances where the command options are simply either to commit or to withhold nuclear
weapons. I I
Large-scale conventional war would also face.Sovietcontrol with problems which it might find difficult to handle- theater forces which exist today were structured, in theunder the influence.of Khrushchev's view that;the nextshort and would involve mainly strategiceapons. The-iforces were motorized and reorganized to improve theirand their capabilities for independent actionuclear Integral supporting elements werendand materialsapid advance against light oppositionThe role of reserves from the western militarythe USSR was greatly reduced. These changes were accompaniedrevamping of the Warsaw Pact command arrangements aoforces were more closely integrated intoith the reduced emphasis on Sovietorefor the discharge of their own specific tasks.them better for this new partnership. Easternreequipped andv
The principal effect of these structural changes was-to greatly increase the speed and maneuverability of Soviet theaterhile these qualities were intended mainly to improve the capabilities, of the theater forces to operateuclear environment, they contributed also to Soviet conventional warfare capabilities particularlyonflicts which might develop rapidly, and quicklyighly dynamic character. For more sustained action, however, Sovietwarfare capabilities were reduced by tho structural changes of thes. rincipal reason for.this is that many of the support elements that would be needed for protracted theater force operations were removed in the interests of streamlining the forces for rapid advance with nuclear support. Moreover, many of theelements that were retained have been kept at reduced strength.
Soviet capabilities to cope with the problems of conventional warfare, consequently, would probably vary greatly depending on the magnitude and nature of the conflict. If ihc conflict were relatively limiteds, forield army operationSovietwould probably be excellent. If the conflict were to become more widespread and protracted, relative Soviet capabilities would diminish
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Finally, Soviet capabilities lo manage crisis Situations or to engage in strategic maneuvering with the West are also limited. the depth and variety of strategic capabilities available to the United States, the Soviet Union is correspondingly lacking in the range of policy options which these capabilities afford. The negativewhich the Soviet Union has thus far displayed toward efforts toialogue on the concepts of nuclear restraint and selective targeting is one notable symptom of this limitation. I I
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Many of the potential weaknesses in the Soviet commandsystem noted above may be corrected as Soviet forcescapabilities and as Soviet doctrine adjusts to take account ofinherent in these improvements. It is possible,that the increasing strength of the Soviet ICBM forcethe Soviet leadership greater confidence in the efficacy ofand lead them toider array ofia the eventonflict with the United Stales.
The USSR has given increasing evidence of an awareness that capabilities for conventional warfare could play an important role in its confrontation with the United States in the future. Soviet military leaders have indicated in their doctrinal writings and in private conversations lhat they no longer categorically reject the possibility of non-nuclear warfare in Europe. Moreover, they have taken practical measures to improve their capabilities to meet this
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kind of contingency. umber of exercises over the past two years have appeared to be based on tlie assumption that military operations could take place in Europe without immediate, automatic escalation to nuclear war. Over the next five years, we expect toradual improvement in Soviet capabilities to deal with limited war situations,onsequent broadening of the options available lo the Soviet command and control system.
Increasing evidence has accumulated over the past year, as discussed in section I, above, that the problems of Sovielncluding the limitations on command and control options imposed by the existing force structure and doctrinal conceptsre beingew and extensive scrutiny by Soviet military thinkers- Il is already apparent from the published writings that have emerged from this scrutiny that the major issue that is being posed is whether the USSR can successfully extricate itself from Ihe "all orilemma imposed by Khrushchev's view of the natureuture nuclear war- The message conveyed by these waitings is that thereay out, that nuclear war need not be thought oferelo disaster, that it can be contemplated as an instrument of policy, and that it is susceptible to rational control- How thesethinkers propose to translate these assertions into practical measures is nol yet apparent. But it is clear that there is new movement in Soviet military thinking, and that the objective of this military thinking is to broaden the options thai are now available to the Soviet policymaker in confronting the issue of war- I 1
Original document.
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