ANNEX - A SURVEY OF THE SITUATION IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

Created: 8/1/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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rf operations and ir.tailicer.eeir.clici.tc? that there ha*arge buildupCoi^ru-ist forces lo th*tajMSenorth and sotiiK Of- PyOutcna in thenorth of themile-wide Demi litAti zedseparating the two Vletnams.

response to reconnaissance reports oiVietr.ET.esa Ar*ry (WVA) concentration justthe dm, us Marine and Southse

(ARTO) forces initiated Operation HUSTINGS inrr.ri Provinceuly. Subsequentlyonded to include seven US and five ARVN battalions, OperationIstablished sporadic and often heavy contact with major elements cf theB Infantry Division in this area during most of July and in early August- By 3when thaended, the allies hadoldiers.

(bodyndeaoens.

.Che'allies lost M7 killedS)8 US). Most of the ftghtina in Operationtook placehe thickly forested ridges and ravines of the central Part of the province, away from the flatfa/lds on the coast where nost of the population resides.

nd reconnaissanceindicate thet units of6 Divisioninfiltration across the MZ in .lay'.-- Thisfirst known itujar NVA fcratfp move-ant viaaccessouth Vietnam. rd,a-headquartersa few This wa* the shortest caricda unit oi thisas taken ta enter" The prasir.ee of most of the divisionTri Province WAS officially confirmedonuly.

or UseKI

There arcpassiblehy Hanoi decided to use the BKZajorroute.. First, it was quieter. efector fromth Regiment staled -that his unit'sthe coastal plains, of North Vietnam and through foothills in thento Quang Tri's noun-tainouaonlyays; the trip through the Laotian corridor takesecond, it was safer. Until recently, the DM2 was not horded, while the fcro.il complex through Laos has been under constant air attack. Third, theof the tri? felflrough tne DM2 meant less B Division haa fever man stricken with malaria at the end of its trip than units which have traveled through. Laos. Finally, the use of tha DK2 meant the Northetaamese could utilize forward supply dumps north of the 2one.

In this connection, exploitation of North Vietnamese documents captured during Ooeraticnreveals that all -food forth Division is being procured in North Vietnam. ends toUS pilot report* of rice, stores scattered along Route 1C2rfcri of the rjrU. and captivethat their units were responsible forrice across -the 6en Ma> River ir. the dxz. The extensive supply facilities detected in this area suggest that Hanoi has made detailed plans to resupply Communist troops in the South via the DM2 and may have been usi'iv) this shorter route for some time. Ir. the past, ComMWiist units ooerating in South Vietnam are believed bo have relied almostor. locally gathered food.

Since early July, shortly afterS Division had moved into South Vietnam, acomplex was formedsquare-mile area

.which extends across the Demi HWSzad Zone into both North and Soukh Vietnamese territory. Some ten NVA radioof whichbeer, firmly located/

"HESCflVArWilCOPT

Objectives of the Buildup

short-tern objectives of theepps.rer.tW were lo Secure the major cc:>routes reaching into Quang Tri's central .}

end western mountains There axe two such routes: aoute 9 wr.ich connects UoS withn theietnamese coast, and the Ba Long Vallev,ear ago by AftVAi. Accordingecond lieutenant from theh NVA captureduly, troops ofE Division Were to capture the towns of Cam Lo and Oonaastride Routethe town of Ba Long, just inside the er.rar.ee to theorvj VaLUy. of tha alleged oo^ectives, Dong Ha appears to be the mostu5;it is in the center of Qoanq Tri's thicfclv mhab-itea plains at the juncture ofnd 9.

ifittfroaations indicateCommunist forces in guana Tri and Thuawere to attack allied reinforcements.

An unidentified division in Laos was scheduled to attack alongo ensure aflow of food and weapons into South Vietnam erom Laos. th Division was reportedly in reserve in North Vietnam just above the dmz.

5. Ultimately, the Morth Vietnamese aooarer.tlv hops to "liberate- fluane Tri. The enemvate tr.at hisfor success in at largeare now betterorps than inther area of South Vietnam- The two northern orovirr.es

. "

tory to many NVN units, and their tcnowlsdge of the terrain is considerable.. Jo addition, as noted, tne area is readily accessible to Wcrth Vietnamese supply dumps north of the Wearhvir. ootr. Laos and North Vietnam lhay alsoactor c= major importance in the ComewnuSt stratecv.se military considerations, together with the rragiie political situation in revident tr.isto the probability" that thehope toajor offensive in theorps area..

6

soYth .PnVfc regiments- the 6th.

Tha Government Situatel_qj__tl

ressand tha near-

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provinces is reportedly low, and manvk&ti"?nare in fact from ^ocfchtte

tne provinceear anda hallthat ideology* plavfa mintr people's allegiance/ ktoshrl Evan the Buddhistflared haaviiy in nearbypeopleQuang ?ri

emonstrations in Quanq Trirey lacked zest. Many of th?-rem tne countryside were reported to haveo because they liked the bus ride.

Soma cause* of trie civic iodifforer.ee areiirov inci*^ administration, long beset by factional disputes, is Inefficient ever, by south Vietnamese standards. The distribution cf t'SAID commodities, Suck as cestfnb.has beer,almost nonexistent to district villages outside of Quang Tri city, Paclfacab.or. ofhamlets is gcinqossibly becauseembers of tha local pacification teams in the area joined simply in order to avoid tha draft.

Dacpita theof government, the Viet Conn and theietnamese mayard tilts expanding their influer.ee .in Quang Tri by tteans othar than maSeive introduction of NVA regular*. Refugees, although feW inwith other provinces, are reportedgainst tha Communist*, and trt* collection ofir. the area has greatly iavproved over the last year. eport in rtarchSto tha ARVN 1stch operates

in Quang Tri and Thua "Thien provinces) stated the opinion that tha local papulation did not identify with Vietain force battalions in the region, probably because the battalions were composed mostly of Worth Vietnamese draftees. Presumably tha people would be even more prone to inform or. units clearly labeled as northern, such as3 Division.

oBESEaVAfiON OOP!

Original document.

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