this
he r
in the preparalion'.of} jiittell^enc* organiiolions'ot' Ihe '
'
mr. williamecjor, lot assistant director, federol bureou of investigotion,being outside of his
1 Oi' GCCBCT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
SCOPE NOTE
1
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATEItlALS PROGRAMS
II. SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST PROG
A. Te* S
II Weapons Development
C Peaceful Usei
NUCI-EAR POWER AND PROPULSION PROGRAMS' .7
A. Nucleai-Fawerrxl... 7
uclear Applications to Acrospnoe 7
C. Nuclear Electric Power 8
CONTROLS ON FISSIONABLE MATERIALS AND
*
ANNEX; SOVIET PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES .,
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To review significant recent developments in the Soviet atomic energy program and to estimate the probable course of that program over the next five to ten years.
SCOPE NOTE
The Soviet Atomic Energy9emains the comprehensive estimate of Soviet capabilities andwith regard to their atomic energy programs, and should be retained. This memorandum updates information on those subjects about which significant new information has become available during the past year and whichestatement. It also assesses the significance of new developments of importance not covered in
CONCLUSIONS
A. We estimate that during the past year production of fissionable materials in the USSR has continued at the rates estimated innd that as ofi the total amounts of plutonium equivalent and weaponsn stockpiled weapons will reach approximatelyetric tons,he USSR continues to complete and place in operation production facilitiesunder construction, but has not. wc believe, started any major new facilities in the past few years. (Paras. IS)
B.[
]We
do not believe that Soviet requirements will become so pressing as
'Kot Oi* vk-wi ol llir AnuiJM Llticl ofepartment ot trie*ev hlilo ptingrophF"
2
cccficr
cause (he Soviets to resume atmospheric testing in ihe near (uture. Wc believe, however, that they will continue occasionally, as they did in the past year, to test in ways which involve considerable risk that debris will escape outside Soviet Iwrders in violation of the treaty.
)
C. We estimate that the Soviets have continued lo improve their fission weapons and low-yield thermonuclear weapons. We nowthere is about an even chance ^hat the Soviets have already
ff they have not already done so. they could developeapon on the basis of existing technology without violation of the Test Ban
Treaty.
believe thathe Soviets conducted atnuclear explosions fni peaceful purposo, indicating anin their program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.their weapons test programs may have contributedWe believe the Soviets will continue to exploreof using nuclear explosives for peaceful uses.
the past year, the Soviets have continued to progressnuclear power and propulsion program, but wc foresee noIn fact, Soviet nuclear power continues to be plaguedand cost problems.ive Year Plan, into previous plans, makes no mention of nuclear powergoals )
have no evidence of. and do not anticipate. Sovietnuclear weapons or significant quantities of fissionableother countries. In the event the US enters into afor sharing nuclear arms, the Soviets have impliedwould do likewise. Whatever multilateral machinery theythe Soviets would almost certainly reserve to themselves alone
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PROGRAMS
he Soviet program (or production o( fissionable materials luo procueded during lhe past year generally along Ihe lines estimated inS.under comfruction when that estimalc was published arc now coining into operation. The estimate* ol production made in5 included(ram these new facilities and still represent our best judgment.revents these estimates, extended one yeai. During the pas! year wc Iiavc detected no statu on new production facilities. We believe that. with the completion ol facilities now under construction, tbe Soviets will have sufficient
TABLK I
ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION AND AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALS IN METRIC TONS
Puno.viuM EnurvAiajft'
"IUWlU
rnxtpiir *
200
M
..
250
30
350
. ,
410
460
St
im
640
.
78
.
Mnurliv H. nindikop'. USN, lhe AuiiUnl Chief of Nivjl OperationsciMftioen* ol lhe Navy, beUevn tintsee footnote to paragraphor (he amount5 andjU* for wripoai uie foror eumpleaseetric toni aod apply theuiceut (nctor (or non-weapom use, thereby arrivingiguu'etric torn.
toon of uranium enriched toontent.
Includes both plutonium and tritium. Oik kilogiam cf phi tonquivdent to IS grams of tritium.
There ettioiates involw wide margin) ol error of lalrutet tent and phuercent al present, widening to nanusercent and (Anercent in the future.
Than estimates mr subject lo marr.iru of eiior it leait as grejl ai tbotc utucuted with production.
robjeel to margin, ofwhich grow from iI5 percent5 topercenttopercent
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capacity to meet tlicirnd wc continue to project no new additional facilities.
fnlonnimf. Tlie question of whether an underground facility at Dodonovo houses pluioniinn production reactors is under re examination. However, our estimate of current Soviet plutonium production remainsWu believe Ihc cumulative estimate forfetric tons to be accurate to withinercent. We estimate tint byheproduction of plutonium equivalent will luvc readied someetric tons, of which overetric tons will comey-product from reactors other thanreactur margins of error become greater in estimates of future production, and reachercent by
Tlte new plant at Zaozerniy if probably based on improvedtechnology, but our information is insufficient lo determine the natureimprovements. We have no evidence tliat the Soviets have made theadvances necessary toas centrifuge process competitiveguMUS diffusion process.
estimate that the cumulative Soviet productionnin terms of uranium enriched to, is not moremetric tons nor lew than ISO medic tons. This wide range continueshugely out uncertainty with regard to the efficiency of the Sovietprocess. Our best estimate foietric tons. Ourof future production assumes the operation at full power of allcascade buildingsi On this basis we estimate thatill reachetric tons. We believe,airconfidence, that cumulative production will not be lessetricmoreetric tons by
faieiiel in Weapons Stockpile. In calculating lusionable materials avail able in the weapons stockpile, we continue tomalltlun fivenon-weapons useeduction of tenfromnd plutonium equivalent to take account of pipeline requirements and weapons withdrawn for reworking and quality control checks.
'CtptalnI. Birvl.topl. USN, the AiMtiant ChiM ol Naval Operation)e^irtmeni of the Navy, believe) with respect totolucQJn thatu MWafteirnt evidence to nipnorl the pfoducKon rtaekacy which would be required fey the ftpnes in ih' ritiniair Moreover, in order to aurvc at such production figures, b" would have tn postulate, without supporting evidence, Sovart employment ol aiialfluw eorapirsson aod new Improved bonier in gavreut difhtsaoo plana. Hb Spires are therefor*Hothe total cumuUuvc Soviet pioductions ofo liend 2t0 metric torn, wilh (he most probable valueetric tons. Even tho valor ailumn tncBfpor*uoa by the So*ieU of all pOMible amptrwemeMi within the gaseous dafuum mh nologtnown to have beenbm deludes (he cmjiloyiuenl of aaial-Bviv compressors and new improved barrier*.
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II. SOVIET NUCIEAR TEST PROGRAMS
A. Test Activity
the year slnorpublication of NIE|
j2 underground Soviet nuclear tests. These testsHirc listed in Table II Tbey raise Iobe number detected since the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Eleven of theere conducted at tlie Semipalalinsk Nuclear Test Area. Small amounts of fission products were collected outside the USSltf
jfromT shot onnd probably fromT shot on
scale and pace o( Soviet underground testing hasut the maximum yield of devices tested hasbelieve that the pressures on the Soviet leadershiporewill grow. However, we do not believe that research,military rrxjuircmeiits will become so prcumg as to cause the Soviets(romPartial Test Ban Treaty or to resume atmospheric testingnear future. We believe, however, that they will continue occasionally,did during the past year, to test in ways that involve considerabledebris will escape outside Soviet borders in violation of the treaty.
B. Woopons Development
S. Thermonuclear Devices. Since the Test Ban Treaty, the Soviets havethree tests with yields Urge enough to be either thermonuclear mockups or full scale submrgaton tests. Of theests imce the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, several yieldedT. assuming thai they were fully tamped in granite
TABLb II
SOVIET UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED DURING THE TEAR JUNE6
mi.
ruobak
(ct)
5
Ufa
5
201
hh IMS
ept 1
203
5
5
1
200
5
ii.il
0
.
0
. .
pr
G
ission Dcoices. Most of tlio Soviet unclear (cats since (he signing of tho Test Han Treaty Have been in0 KT rnngc, assuming Hut (hey have been fully tamped in granite. f_
i
AII of these tests could have helped Ir fission as well as fliermoratdcar weapons tedmology. in the direction of rcdudug diameters and developing ipccial effects weapons.
tniNMu ChmocteriUicsT
have recently concluded that there is about an even chance thathave developed an ABM warhead,ieldmain considerations leading ushis conclusion are?he past year of some of the nuclear tests inoviel(b) inference from the apparent Soviet Intent to employ theas an exoalmosphcric interceptor. Wc have further concluded that,Soviets have not already developed an ABM warhead, they could do sobasis of ousting technology, either without further nuclear tests or withwould not violate tlte Test Ban Treaty.
C. Peocoful Uses1
underground seismicprobably experiments in Use prjccful uses of nuclear captives.On5 near the SemipaUtu.sk test area andfrom this event was collected outside the (enitorial limits of theother occurred on5 near Ufa. and was probably nudearand conducted as an experiment for increasing gas or oil production.to these tests, some Soviet peaceful uses developments could beby means of contained underground detonations. Over the past threeUSSltumber of tests in alluvium and rock, using bothhigh explosives and nuclear explosive* in ranges of yield upwe bdieve (ha( most of (hese lest* were primarily devoted toof nuclear weapons, (hey could also have provided data ofinvestigating peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, particularly forwork.
Annca lot ftihW HfT'iiiiei-
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As (Itctand* to gain muc-lirogram lor tin- iH-.ict-Iul uses ol nucleaiin terms ol scientific knowledge, ot international prestige, and of potential savings io money and time on large construction projects, wc believe lire Soviets will continue to increase their activity in this program. Wc believe tliey will further explore tlie techniques of using peaceful nuclearindependently ol whether any inlernational arrangements are madesuch uvc.
III. SOVIET NUCIEAR POWER AND PROPUISION PROGRAMS
Powered Submarines
It We believe that during the past year the Soviets have been overhauling tlieirlass cruise missile submarines, probably to refuel lhe reactors and modify lhe propulsion systems to improve theu reliability as they did earlier wilhlass and ll-dass submarines. The Soviets appear to have gained considerable confidence in the reliability of their nuclear-powered submarines, and now send them on frequent long patrols and on undcr-icehe construction oflassclass submarines has continuedate approximatingear. The construction of ll-class ballistic missile submarines has apparently been terminated, the last unit was delivered3 We believe the Soviets willew class of improved nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, but we have as yet no firm evidence of it.
Applications to Aerospace
nhe Soviets laiuiched two satellites0 watt power source using lite decay heatadioactive isotope which probably operated on (he thermoelectricore efficient method olmuch larger amounts ol eleclric power in space is thermionicoviet research on thermionic conversion, using nuclear reactorsource of heat, has interallied during the past year. Soviet scientists presented aanalysisompact thermionic reactor at an internalionalin5 and also alludedlassified program on thermionic conversion On Ihe basis of Soviel research described at the coherence,wc estimate that the USSR will probably not have an operational ihermkmk icadoi power system in space before (lie.
' Titer modci triesed to ptoduce directly small amounts ol clectrirtty from tlie decay heat ol radioisotopes, using two materials in the llvcrmocouplc in which application ot heatlow ol electricity.
' Therm ionic conversion produces electricity directly fiom ln-at by thermal cmitiiun of elec-trtim, wlWli in streamingatlvode tu nil anodeacuum pioducc nn eleitiie current.
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e still lave no direct evidence of any Soviet nuclear rocket or aircraft nuclear propulsion programs, but there is continuing Soviet materials research which could be applicable to such programs.
C. Nucleor Electric Power
During the past year there lias been nohe Soviet midear powcr progiams. Wc now accept, on tttc basis of lurther analysis, the Soviet claim of moreegawatt. (MW) of nuclear electric power generating capacity inf all current expansion plans are executed on schedule, the total generating capacity would beWe
The new Soviet Five Year, in contrast to previous plans, makes no mention of nuclear power construction oruclear power plant that appeared in the draft plan for Armenia was removed in the final plan. We believe that this reluctance lo claim progress, together with the slow pace of the nudear power program, continues to support our estimate that engineering problems and unexpectedly high costs have caused the program to be stretched out far beyond original goals.
he chairman of tlte Stale Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy discussed two new designs for transportable nuclear power sta-tiom suitable for use at remote military, consxrucrion, or mining bases Tbe firstwater-cooled, water-moderatedtoteam generator contained within the reactor vessel and has an outputW. The second typeater-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor2 MW output,to be used in multiple units totaling as much asW. We bdieve that these types of transportable power stations are within Soviet capabilities in the next ten years.
IV. SOVIET CONTROLS ON FISSIONABLE MAKRIALS ANDoviet policy with regard to safeguards on nuclear materials andprovided to otherndear. Tlse USSR as well as most East European countries are active members of the IAEA and approve tbe principle of safeguards, but no reactors have been placed under IAEA safeguards by any of these countries. Wo do nol know what bilateral safeguards. If any, arc Inower reactor has recently been completed in East (Germany with Soviet assistance, and another is under constiuction in Czechoslovakia, both of which will be capable of producing plutonium for development ol weapons. We know of no processing plants for fuel elements in these countries. We believe that the USSR will probably insist that irradiated fuel elements from these (eaclors be relumed to ihe USSR for processing. In any event the East European countries will almost certainly not undertake independent nuclear weapons pio grains. To date the USSR lias not provided any non-Conununist countryeactor capable of prndudng enough plutonium toignificant weapons program.
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IL Wc believe ihal Ibc USSR has not furnisltcd nodear weapons Co any other country, and lhat any nuclear weapons which may be in Warsaw Pact countries are under strict Soviet control Under present circumstances, we do not eapect the Soviets to enter into any multilateral arrangements lor sharing nuclear weapons. They have implied. Iwwever. that il the US were to enter into such an arrangcrnenr, they would do likewise. We would expect, under these circumstances, Ihnt tho Soviets would publicize such an anangementounter lo US actions. Whatever the natureultilateral maehinery, they would almost certainly reserve to themselves alone ihe final decision on use oi nuclear wcaonnv
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ANNEX
SOVIET PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
he USSK has had extensive experience fn (he use of missive chemical explosions for industrial purposes, such as mining and the construction of canals and dams. As early as thehe Soviets hid conducted some tests which cratcred. Prior4 Soviet spokesmen claimed that the US Plowshare programisguise for military tests However, byhe Soviets had apparentlyrogram lor Ihe peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. At the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, in. (he Deputy Cliairman of Ihe State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, USSK, discussedS scientist three programs for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions in mining, water resource development, and in production of natural gas, and inquired about US cooperation. Another scientist discussed the possibility of using nuclear explosions for excavation Inn official of the Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow stated that his institute and (he Siberian Institute bold had programs for Investigating pcaeelul nuclear explosions.
25 the USSR appearsave stepped up its program for developing peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Two underground seismic events^
5 were probably exr*rirnenls in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. One occurred on5 nearomipalatinsk tes( area and radioactive debris from this event was collected outside the lerri-loria! limits of ihe USSR. The other occurred on5 near Ufa. and was probably nuclear in origin and conducted a* an ex|>erunen( for increasing gas or oil production. Thus, il appeals (he Soviets have already conduc(ed experiments in some of the applications which USSR scientists discussed with US scientists in Geneva
ver (Ih* past three years the USSRumber of tests in alluvium and rock, using both conventional high explosives and nuclear explosives in ranges of yield upT. On several occasions since Ihc limited Test Han Treaty radioactive debris was delected outside the territorial limits of the USSR. Except in the case of the5 test, it has not been possible lo attribute debris lo any specific event, but we believe (hat all debris came from Soviet nuclear explosions which cratcred.
4 Although wc believe most of these testa were primarily (leveled to lhe development of nuclear weapons, they could also have provided data of value lo nuclear excavation purposes. An underground nuclear lest, in any medium, whichrater, presents an opportunity lo the tester lo acquireof value to nuclear excavation technology, regardless of the primary puipose for which the lest was conducted and regardless of whether the lest was expected lorater. The technology for producing craters in lutrd lock would be importantrogram investigating the feasibility of nuclear
In any peaceful use of nuclear explosives, lliereumber of factors which must be taken into consideration. These include lhe cost of tbe nuclear device compared with the cost of conventional methods of earth moving and Ihe dangers of radiation and shock. Tlie USSR will probably seek to develop dean thermonuclear devices to minimize radioactive fallout which might drift across national boundaries in violation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
6 We believe the Soviets will continue to increase their activity in thissince lite USSR stands to gain muchrogram (or the pcaceJul uses of nuclear explosives in terms of scientific knowledge, of Internationaland of potential savings in money and trine oo large engineering proffers. We believe thai ihey will further explore che techniques of using peaceful nuclear explosives, independently of whether any international arrangements arc made concerninghe success of the program, for example, would greatly increase the feasibility of large programs such as tlte development of the Kara kum irrigation system tn lhe Turkmen SSR and the now dormant Davydov plan to divert water from the Ob and Ycnisey Rivers to the arid regions of Central Aim
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