CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RATIONAL ESTIMATES
SUBJECT: The Dangerilitary Coup in Guatemala*
The National Intelligence Estimate on prospecta for the Mendez government in Guatemala,oted that the first order of business for the new president vould be to solidify Mb working relationship with the military and toodus vivendl with tbe country's right-of-center groups. Ve pointed out that to accomplish this hs would have to demonetrete convincingly hia determination to proceed vigorously againat Communist terrorism. And we Judged that be would probably me he enough progress on these matters to maintain himself In power at least for the balance of this year. In fact, however, during nearly three months in office he has not made each progress; suspicion of Ms intentions has grown within the military establishment; and the dangeroup baa increased.
Prepared in ONE, coordinated, which isonger paper on the Guatemalan situation,arget datectober.
1. President Julio Cesar Mecdez Montenegro von election as tbe candidate of tlie leftist Revolutionary Party (PR) with a
APPROVED FORRELEASE DATE:1
plurality Incontent In which the right!at verba was divided between two retired military officers. Hia inaugurationuly vas possible only because outgoing President Perelta (alto Minister of Defense) insisted that the election results be honored and forced tbe anti-Msndet rightists and military officers to acquiesce.
endea had agreed to select his nomineeist of three oases provided by the military. Arriaga was on that list.
he military budget had been depleted by use ofillion dollars for additional security forces ln the tense pre-inaugural period.
2. Tbe election caused dissension ln the militaryvhich has not been repaired. The naminguccessor to Par alto as Defense Minister vas delayed when the military leader ship had difficulty in agreeing on Msndez1 choice. Col. Rafael Arriaga.^ Thus Arriaga, one of the more effective sad enlightened leadersilitary establishment that does not boast many, began his new Job without the cooperation of some of bis subordinates. Bis efforts to restore military unity under his control have not been successful. Indeed, militarywith Arriaga has Increased due to his efforts to stay within the railltery budget by slashing allowances of officers and certain offices and units, including their operational funds.
3. At tho nana tine, th- capabilities of too country's police force* for preventing violence or apprehending ertreedatanever very Impressiveave sharply deteriorated. Inhen their incompetence vas highlighted by tbe ease with vblch the Caoauniflt Insurgent bands kidnapped prominent Ouste-malan citizens, the teak of coordinating tbe operations of tbe various police forces vas given to Col. Arriaga. Tbe limited progress tbat be made has largely been lootuly. The police forces have bien disrupted by Inveatlgaticcs dealing with charges of murdering Communists; police officials have beenand replaced by even less competent, if more humane.and the method* used by the police under the military dictatorship have bean publicised and oondemned by tbe Mender administration.
k. In the threeis inauguration Nendaz has visited tbe principal military bases in an effort to improve bis relation* with the alii tary leaders vbo are still the final arbiters of Guatemalan politics. Those efforts, however, have not overcome their basic concern that Mendex wouldommunist iofiltratioo of tbe governmentesurgence of Conmunlst influence to tbe levels reached under Arbena In* period. That concern baa been heightened by Mendez'
offer of amity to the Communiit Insurgents and byrominent Cansunlat writer to tbe pluah assignment of Ambassador to rranee. An even more serious source of concern has been Mendei1 refusal totrong new campaign against the Communist insurgent groups and bis emphasis on condemning rightist extremists. Thisarticularly touchy point because the military and the rkaitemalan right areallies aod the insurgent* are continuing to assassinate rightists and former military officers.
Consequently, we think that many of the Guatemalan military leaders are approaching the point of no return with tbe Mendez sdmlnlatraticn. Plotting between them and civilian rightists seems to be reaching an advanced stage, tblesc Mendez takes steps to reassure these elementsby ordering anagainst the Contunist insurgents, for instancethey are likely to move soon to displace him.
The development of this situation depends importantly on the attitude of the Minister of Defense. Rone of the military leaders would willingly precipitate an armed conflict between elements of the military establishment. If Colonel Arriagafirm in his support of the civil government, the plotters
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