SC No. 6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Peking Continues Efforts to Woo Afghanistan
Shao-chi's visit to AfghanistanApril was the latest of Peking's effortsinfluence in Kabul. It met with asas previous Chinese initiatives sincerelations were establishedutare undaunted and appear determined to keep
a foot in the Afghan doer.
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Peking almost certainly views the present government of Afghanistan as "feudalist, in nature. As such itroperfor Chinese-supported Communist subversion. Efforts at short-term cooperation with Kabul and even the provision of economic assistance areas Justifiable to. hamper efforts by the US and the USSR to increase their influence in In addition, by maintaining cordial relations Peking is seeking to demonstrate its "benevolentand to give substance to its claim that its dispute with India is due solely to Indian
Peking's effort' to keep relations with Afghanistan relatively cordial has been made easier by the absence of historical sources of friction. The common border is onlyiles long and runsemote, mountainous region. Although undemarcated, it had never been in dispute. When the Afghans proposed its formal delimitation in
the Chinese accepted. Negotiations were concluded inorder agreement was signed in November. The Chinese publicized this agreement as an example of China's reasonable and peace-loving attitude toward its neighbors.
first significant Chinese offerassistance to Afghanistan was madeuring the state visit of AfghanZahir Shah to China. Theillion long-term, Interest-freecredit, and indicated that their interestwould increase. Peking's offer "inut Kabul appearedgo as slowly as possible in implementing theaid program. InhineseChen Yi visited Afghanistan in an effortup the timetable and succeeded inacceptance of an'agreement on4inal version ofino-Ajghan cultural exchange.
5 thai; the
^ffiversave threat posed by the Chinese and said that they would turn down any aid projects which would require moreinimum number of Chinese "advisers." Despite these assurances, within three months two teams of Chinese technicians had arrived in Afghanistan and by December the number of Chinese in the country was apparently in excess.
potential aid projects investigatedChinese thus faruck farm and aat Kargha near Kabul, construction ofproject in the Panjshir Valley northassistance in silk production, aid fortextile plant in Kandahar, construction of
a caustic soda plant near Baghlan, aideramics factory in Kabul, and technical advice in theof lapis lazuli Jewelry and commodity.
of the projects are relatively for the Panjshir Valley irrigationwhich Chinese shown
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tho greatest interest. This is probably explained in part by its proximity to the closely guarded Bagram airajor center of Soviet milita assistance activities in Afghanistan. Moreover,
he proposed irrigpower outputam now being built with Soviet assistanco at Naghlu by- aboutercent.
Chlneso technical teams havebroad range of Information and statistics oneconomy, Including detailed data on tin-aid programs, past and present. "
Chinese technicians areTKana""Jague on promises, and the first dollar of the Chinese loan has yet to be spentpecific project. -Meanwhile, the Chinese have been able to collect information and have had an oxcellent chance to assess their position in Afghanistan.
factor curbing tho expansion ofin Afghanistan is the alreadySoviet presence. To date, Kabulillion dollars worth ofabove the level of aidPeking.
Chinese are obviously aware ofSoviet position and are doingcan to undercut it. One purpose of Liustate visit was probably to counter thethe Afghan premier to Moscow in February. the case with similar Chinese initiativespast, Liu does not appear to have hadin winning the confidence of the Afghans.
A Joint communique issuedpril, the day of Liu's departure, was conspicuously non-committal with respect to economiccontrast with explicit statements in tho Soviet-Afghanin February In which Moscow undertook to assist the Afghan third five-year plan.
bland nature of the Jointapparently reflected Afghan resistanceeconomic entanglement with Peking. Atof Lui's visit the Chmose mm^mmlBm^Bm^b" anned
to offer additional economic assistance but had been dissuaded by the Insistence of the Afghan premier that Afghanistan was already heavily overcommitted in capital investment and was unable to consider any more such aid.
12. Despite the disappointing results of Liu's visit, the Chinese probably believe their Afghan policy has reasonably good prospects; they havein opening Afghanistan up to Chineseand in somewhat Improving their capability to exert influence in Kabul. It seems likely thatpolicy toward Afghanistan will continue along present lines for some time to come. It willa careful mixture of limited economicand propaganda, backed up by the implicit threat of military force to keep the Afghans balancedpressures from the US, tbe USSR, and China. And all the while, Chinose engineers and otherwill be laying the groundwork for more virorous efforts to swijig the Afghans into Peking's camp.
Original document.
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