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TITLE: MilitaryPart II)
AUTHOR: Edwin C. Pishel
VOLUME: 10
STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, ond theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
1
All staiemenis of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
ihe authors They do noi necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency oi any other US Govemmcnt entity, past or present. Nothingthe contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
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A study of the information that opposing commandeii acted on substantially modifies historical eutluations of the Cioil War.
mhjtary DvrrerxiGENCE isei-63
kshel Pabt IX OiANCJXixutsv-rjjjr. and Cetttoorc 1
The few historians who hive thought seriously about Civil War intelligence have generally concluded that it left much to be desired. They are near the truth, though not necessarily for the right reason. The belief held by some that mtelligeoce in that war was more than ordinarily laden with error is an examplerong reason. Another is the assumption that it was seldom of much influenceattlefield decisions. The valid reason for deprecating Civil War intelligence fa the limited scope of both the Northern and the Southern effort inteUigence was not pursuedcale that seems commensurate with the size and desperateness of the conflict. What was pursued was almost altogether military, and even the irulitary sector was not fully covered: strategic intelligence was severely subordinated to the tactical.
Family Affair
The reason for the neglect of political and economic tateUigeoce was simply the common ethos and ethnos of the dvilian leaders of the North and South. Having known each other for much of their political lives, they had little motivation for investigating what the other side was fighting for and bow far it would go. As they knew the enemy's geography and his language, they also knew the extent of his economic wherewithal.
This is not to say that export unities for political intelligencewith subversion were entirely ignored. The Confederates fn particular engaged in such attempts, their effort being directed toward
'Foree. p..
orririmr
turoidg tli- Copperhead coospintcy Into bo effective peace movement. Bui thisete forlorn hope, aod Us outcome was pathetic; wbeo the point of action was reached at the time of the. the Southern agents saw their collaborators melt
Tbe same Inbred knowledge of the enemy limited military leaden' fnquisitiveness. accounting in some measure for the Lack of interest in rtrategic and even in tactical intelligence. The generals and admirals knew each other even better than the polUtcsans did; they bad gone to school together, lived together, foughthis familiarity enabled many an officer to foresee bow his adversary would act under given conditions. Thus, for example, thecould predict that Mcdellan would try to "engineer" his way to Richmond, and they were right, for be jumped at the opportunity lo build siege lines when be encountered thinly held furtiCcations half way up the Peninsula.
And even tactical information was nut always felt to be afor planning an action. When Lee sent Jackson around Pope's flank to Manassas, he was without information as to where thefront might be vulnerable; so heoint where there could be do question aboutin their rear. When McOeUan landed on tbe Peninsula to begin tbe long-awaited campaign that was supposed to end the war, he bad woefully little knowledge of what particular obstacles be would face; it cameurprise to End in bis path tbe Warwicktream of no mean size. Burnside made so tittle effort to obtain information before Fredericksburg that be misplaced an enemy concentration that was directly across tbe Rappahannock,oue or so from has own pickets.
These cases, and others about to be seen, were manifestations of the Civil War commander's habit of thinking lhat possession of thegreatly reduced bis need for atdormarJon, that it was up to the threatened forces to find out what was going on.nly one of theseattack onthe fait la live an adequate substitute for information, and it was adequate then only because of the impotence of Pope's cavalry.
'The bfcarafwrst attain* basts that political fateEigene* sraa actaaDy practisedar peatet scab than this, throughhoa each ride fucceeded tn placing high in nwoiy ooumsal. While tl.iiossibility, thane references to high-level tptet omit the evidence, if indeedny; they are usually mere innuendo, the wishful figments of "popular" historians.
Secret Services
onsiderable eitent, however, tbe smsltness of Union and Confederate inteUigence activity is an optical illusion resulting from tbe tendency lo measure itodemonly tbe scope of tbe activity but more particularly tbe size of the bureaucracies associated with itandful of organized intelligence entities have surfaced, none of thorn giving any appearance of great size or authority. The Urgesteak strengthounting cooks and teamsters along with operatives. Several importantLee's army, for one- appear to have done without any separataorganization whatever.
Aa one of the chief misconceptions about Civil War intelligence touches this question of size and organiutkro. it wfl! be worth while" to pause and examine the matter. The literatureidespread belief that the UnionSecretaor army-wide organization. This bebef has existed side by tide with the ccertzadictory one that toteUigeoce bureaus were few inrtnaD in size, and of limited infiuenct
What tbe North hadower-case secret serviceodgepodge of uriintegrated, uncoordinated Intelligence,and military police activities. The service in tbe field was urincovised pretty much according to the taste of the individualIt was most often under the direction of the provost marshal, but It was sometimes assigned to tbe adjutant of the command or to tbe signal officer or the chief of staff. In some commands,those with the more sizable posiave-mtelligeocepecial stall position was created far the purpose. This was the case with Pinkertou's bureau, though rxrmusally it was under McClellan's provost rrsarshal Some commandersirect band themselves tntheir spies and detectives. Tbe variety was rendered complete by the not uncommon practice of assigning intelligence to one staff ofEoer and counterintelligence to another.
It goes almost without saying that under these conditions theof reformation between neighboring commands was usually haphazard, and that nothing but good luck or geographic separation could prevent duplication of effort oo the one hand or working at cross purposes oo the other.
This unsystematic system seems inevitable when it Is realized that there was no superior Intelligence and counterintelligence agency at
Washington. Two bureaus operated there at Overlapping periods, but with authority that was more local than central. And even their local operation! were so ill coordinated that rnembers of one were occasionally shadowed or arrested by the other.
One of the two was PinVerton's bureau, attached not to the Warbut to the Army of the Potomac- Its podbve-mteDigence element was at the capital for the eight monthshen the army was headquartered there When McClcllan took tbe fieldlie springrnkerton's spies went along, leavingmall counterespionage element that remained until Pinkertoo resigned at tbe end of the year.
The other bureau, the counterespionage and policeeaded by the notorious Lafayette C. Baker, was initially under the State Department, but from2 until it passed from view five or six years later it operated under the War Department Baker's position as Department provost marshal did not, however, give him wide authority. Although his activities often ranged afield (for example, he sent detectives oo the trail of Confederate agents in Canada, andime hemall office in New York City for liaison with the localpecial orders were required for him to lavadc the realms of the Bcld armies or geographic commands, whose provost marshals operated independently (andashington and environs regained his main field of operations.
It was Pinkcrton and Baker themselves who fathered the "Secret Service" myth, not unwittingly. They published memoirs in which each named himself chief of the "United States Secreteach case an ex post facto title self-conferred Then historians whose purpose it served to accept tbe existenceecret Service during tbe war took it from there, each solving the problem of the chiefship by naming whicliever of the two men lie happened to be writing about
'Generally thought. motakenly. to have beenajor positive until.genco oigin nation Baker did make on* Or two trust to rWwioodhe war. aod later on mm oi tu* men ocouHnaD* engaged io minor espionage prefects. Although Baker', account of hs* Rkt^mondard to (wajtow,artulhr tupoorted by eipense accountsredential mad* out In the name be daani to have used there and ragiMd by the Confederate Secretary of Wan this latter paper bt in the Walter riwjheliMi CoDoctJoo on Intelhgano* Service, Waihuigton. D. C
The.ntelligence system was both mute and lestthan theso in that thereepartment-level bureau in Richmond, less so tn that Geld armies tended to doistinct and recognizable intelligence organisation. (This apparent lack, however, may be partly due to tbe comparative scarcity of Confederate intelligencet least there wu somein the Confederateractice of makinga routine part of the mission of subordinate generals and letting it go at that. Tbe high competence of Southern cavalry, attained early in the war. probably bad something to do with this. Jeb Stuart, for example, was an intelligence collector and evaluate* par(though he preferred to employ his cavalry tn roore bellicose pursuits whenever he could).
The intelligence bureau in Richmond, though highly placed, wasomplete intelligence service. An alter ego of the Confederate Signal Corps headquarters. It was concerned more withintelligence than with any other aspect of the job. It wasknown as the Signal Bureau, and its overt activities consisted of issuing army and State Departrnent ciphers and enciphering andthe correspondence of the Richmond authorities. But it also operated courier lines to the Potomac and beyond, and it wasat least incidentally tn obtaining and directing agents at the far end of these lines. In this capacity, and In various projectswith sabotage, ship captures, development of infernal machines, and collaboration with the Copperhead secret societies in the North, it was known as the Secret Serviceith these activities itar broader mission than any or all of the Northern bureaus, but it would have served the Confederacy better if it badess ambitious set of functions and hadigger and better jobtraight forward mformation service. Tbe bureau wasosition to develop an army-wide Secret Service; it does not appear thaton that scale was even attempted, if indeed conceived.
* Information on the bureau's tide and on Its iwo-intelllfeoee set ret-service func-lions is from an impubllibed mamisoipt by David W. Csd.ly of Carrolllon, Md.
The revelation that the Confederacy did not go all-out to obtainwill not disrupt popular belief ha the mtrepedity. cunning, and invariable success of the Southern secret agent. But as we are
UOEQHIT
about to tee, the scenario theme that Feb ran rings around Yank in scouting, spying, and all related matters it another myth. Had it not been (or Joe Hooker, that might not haveyth.
Sew Sharps Look
Hooker succeeded Burriside in command ol the Army of the Potomac (headquartered still at Falmotjth, Virgjriia) inmong improvements wrought by'Figbtin' Joe (whose forte was ae-adrnirustration) was the founding of an organization called the Bureau of Militaryhis bureau was an improvement over its predecessors because any real effort to get and report the facts would have been an improvement; but happily there is more to the story than that.
Two principal factors In making theuccess wereooker was as strongly committed to the idea that Rebels were only about sir feet tall as McCleUan had been to the vastness aad in-vulnerability of the enemy legions. With Hooker in command, the Confederates* strength ceased to be an aD-absorbing quest loo. Their positions (especially of fortifications and batteries) and movements became tbe main truest ion to beit should have been allooker supplied the bureau with real talent, especially at the top. Its chief was George H_year-old colonel of volunteers, an upstate New Yorkawyer, linguist, and former diplomat Sharpe. having refused brigade command in order to stay with bis regiment, naturally took on tbe staff assignment witheturn to line duty was always in his mind, but be was too effective an intelligence officer to be spared.
1 TrrfoiDuOco" was at that tans* the fuO-nedgrd eerutValeot ofhichcull about three decades abort of acQuarlae Its present place la the BBlhUry WnasB. Alone, 'IsisdlierBor" carried do aawplirarion that rt was faatoreaa-boo about ao enemy or foreign power.
' Spy duty was beneaui the dirnltyers hi the plebeian North bait,not in the aristocratic South-
abcock. the young dvilian who had been Burnsides one-man secret service, readilytepdowo to theosition in the bureau. Sharpe broughtcDow townsman. Captain John McEntee, asndozen or to spies from among Unionist citizens of the locality and from the enlisted ranks of the army.'
U1HLT
Like Puikexlon, Sbarpe was placed under tbe army's provost marshal,bicenominally. He sent bis reportsto, and obtained most of bis guidance from. Hooker's chief of staff. Major Ceneral Daniel Butterficld, heir of tbe American Express empire.
ureau was not only the most highly developed mteUigence activity on either side; itodernity about it that parallels the war's numerous other military innovations. Itompleteoperation. Sbarpe established detachments fa neighboringHe had his own scouting facilities independent ot butwith, the cavalry. When thereavalry expedition to distant country his men went along whether or not the main purpose of the raid was to probe for information. Interrogation ofeserters, aod refugees became routine and thorough, tbe commander who forwarded prisoners to Washington instead of to Headquarters heard about bis error In short order.
he ring In which the chief figures were Elizabeth Vanealthy spinster, aod Samuel Both, manager of the Richmond. Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad. There is every reason to bebevc that it was far moreleast rncee continuouslytbe more highly publicized Confederate espionage to Washington. The Richmond ring'smitted here because Dearly all of its known actjVities belongeriod later than the campaignshis article.
Sharpe was the army's spymastcrtatus Pinkcrton had never fullyhough independent operations did not entirelytbey were few and limited in scope. An example of his authority is the fact that when tlie army invested Richmond4 be took over directioning of resident spies in the city who had previously been controlled, well enough it appears,ocalcommander long in theinally, bis bureau in one way or another managed to get Its bands on Information reachingfrom all(besides those under bis direct control) consisted of newspapers, scouts working for corpsew spies in similar status, tbe cavalry, tbe bollooos. tbe Signal Corps observers and oryptanalysts, and dispatches from distant commands and from Washington. Though the armyand bis chief of staff and adjutant had tbe first look at much of this material, Sbarpe gathered It all, added it up with bis own information, and produced digested, serai-evaluative reports.
Sharpc's reputation soon spread west; from the Mississippia request for bis cooperation. Finally be becamefor Crant as commander of all Ihe Union armies, butelected to take the field in Virginia,ctivitieswhat they had been with the Army of tbe Potomacbased himself in Washington with Sbarpe at bis side, tbehave acquired some semblance of an army-wide
ChaaceOcmttTe: the Intelligence! Bene
Sharpe quickly got results. One of hisIndiana cavalry sergeant like Pope's savior on the Rapidanso tt-eH received by the Rebeb that he was permitted toile guided tour of their front and rearnd then to get away across the Rappahannock unchallenged- Back at the Falmouthhe gave Sharpe the locations of troop corscetrtrationt.and artillery positions, in many cases with pinpointorthern-born farmer living in Lee's lines west of Fredericksburg sent information that corroborated the sergeant's picture of low enemy strength in that locality and added the compelling point that around Chancellcusv-ille thereis-mile vacuum between the positions on the river and the nearest troops to the rear.
xpert, derived after several sveeks' work an organization chart that was considerably better than Pinker-ton's chart of tbe previous year. Devoting particular effort to getting brigade and regimental averages, be added up Lee's strengthSO0
' Name* of Onioaat. IndUnant. Hunon-ina. andabound is the recordsbureau and other Federal IntelligeoeepcscBttaNyaot excluded because of the dialect problem. On the Confederate ride,the tradingre from the border rrgson but no sharpcMOcnt. Apparently Ita deep Southerner to drop hitlhaa
ew EoeUnCwi or New Yorker to airume one.
' He was bi Confederate uniform, but If Ike had represented himself as belonging to some regiment or battery of the Southern army he would In ad probability have been sent promptly to that unit.easonable, conjecture that he claimed membership In one of tha partisan organizations operating in northern and western Virginia, and that bis tup under escortretended effort to make contact with his company.
plus artillerytotal that was as close as the Confederate returns could have givenlthough Hooker could not have known howiece of work this was, be could not have failed to see that Babcock's service under Pinkerton had oot afflicted him with any liallucinatory disease,"
While this reformation was going on, the Confederates' chronically haphazard intelligence did not improve. Lee's dispatches at this 'periodurprisingly poor understanding of Army of tic Potomac organlratiooi when well-informed prisoners were taken theoften could not fit the mostata into place. An effort topy into Washington failed Lee complained that his scouts could not get past Hooker's pickets.ull and correct statement of Hooker's strength reached Richmondedical return printedashingtonts relay to Lee was so poorly handled that be did not appreciate fts authoritative character and instead relied oo his own estimate, which wasercent below the mark.
The Actum
Hooker, appointed In midwinter, had three months to ready aThe farmer-spy's report gave him the opening be wasfor: weakness oo tbe enemy left,ap that opened directly on tire rear of their main force. The gap could be reached, however, only If the Federals could evade discoveryong march through country that Stuart's cavalrymen were watching
wif the Effuse now roort feorraJJy accepted, though use last few percentage points of accuracy MMaboock was deeidadly sow on two of the lasaaCry eVtaioas and too Ugh en Use cavalry, aad tha (sroaa csmcesad cast
Babcoefc had served under Pintstoo on the Feearssula and aeons So haveand Inork of that period, which (as noted ka Part I) produced adequate banc data. But be deplored the ponderous lacordireplng enforced by Pmlurrtrro. be also deplored, it would aeon from his own lata work, tberactice of makmf ns-anrth estimates that had btrle or no reUtac* to his nut-by-naait findings on the cssaspcautioo of the Southern army.
-SeeIX i. p., "Tcldhf-ew* Story ia Turoa Parts.-
Hooker's march did evade effective discovery. Part of this success was due to security measures far more stringent than any the army
USb UNtY
had evero these Hooker added signal deception. Hishis cavalry occasioned this piece of trickery. Intending tohorsemen to raid toward Richmond when the Infantryplaced themiles upriver. poised to Jump off southward.planted, with whatingular lack of subtlety,that tbe cavalry was headed for the Shenandoah Valley.flagmen copied and deciphered this message (and tbeinterceptors ascertained that they bad doneee alertedin the Valley and kept Stuart upriver, ready to follow tbe
Thismile stretch of front so lightly patrolled that Hooker marched his main striking force0 men upcountry, across the Rappafurrriock and the Rapidan, and back downriver toaverage distanceee realized what was happening. By that tune Hooker had within hisosition only throe or four miles in the rear of Lee's center. Once this position was taken, the Confederates could save themselves from wholesale loss only by retreating, and even in retreat they would be punished severely.
"ecurity action*ay tnoom here fore oot only tightened picketing bo! oo use eve of his march placed within earshot of all picket* to prevent leaks through tcrost-tbe-etve* fraternization, to which the armies on tin: Rappahannock front svero mucharly in hb command he (topped civilian visits to the army, so that thb telltale action would not coincide with bisbo early In hb command, ho earscelcd newspaper exchange* with the- enemy and sharply curtailed flags ofe punished newspaper conjectures about army movements without regard to their truth or falsity, and beprobably without muchcrack down on tbeabit of potting military secrets in their lettersn the eve of bit march he Stopped all outgoing loldier mad at tbe Washington postehipment of pontoons brought bycircuitous back route to avoid Coofedoril* observation on theyn-chronlnDd with the upriver march of his main bodyirabl* *ocondaiy actionhe heights below Fredericksburg. He took pain* to see that ordinary security measure* protected thb latter movement; anything less risked eiposlng its diversionarye protected tho main movement by an unusually thorough sealing-off of the countryside, wbich included stationing guards atto prevent local residents from (preadlng word of their observations. Although most of these measures seem obvious, they were nose the lets departure* from previous piacttce.
"Possibly not to foeipbeaMy:eavy ebinker, he forced himself to go through that campaign without chemical lupport-
mniv
But Hooker held back the coup deew mucs short of the target position be incrplicably assumed tbend lo a
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poorClianeeUctsvule, In dense wilderness relieved only by an occasional farm.
Lee was quick lo accept tbe inroad ve thus tendered him.nert found the enemy right flank unguarded, facing south; Lee scot Jackson on another end run to the west of that point. Jackson'slast, for he was fatally woundedarge part of one Federal corps. It was enough to spreadthrough Hooker'sorce, or at least as far as hU
This batilelassic in several ways; one of them was themisconstructioo of Jackson's march, which they could sec at several points. Thinking tbe underbrush much too thick to let even foot soldiers get through, they did not believe that what was happening could really happen. Commanders oo the Federal right, receiving many reports from their own scouts, pickets, and signal potts that showed an attack to be imminent, rejected them because ofconfidence that the movementetreat Headquarters was thus denied Information from the front that might have changed Its'mind.
A sufficiency of cavalry could have caused the true character of the march to be reported to Hooker in time, but be bad held only three cavalry regiments back from tbe raid to the south. He was almost as empty-handed oo the field as Pope had been at Manassas, thoughesult of his own deUberate choice.
- Babeock's rejections were telegraphed to Sharpe at Charxdlcervule; tha oppc-nte mswtmenu of the easier* of staff reached Hooker directly by the same route.
After two more days of fighting and shifting. Hooker worked the armyosition where the attacking Confederates would have beenisadvantage. But then he retired across the Rappahannock to bis old camps, apparently in tbe belief that Lee had been heavily reinforced. This story, entirely false, cameair of deserters who reached the Federal rear headquarters at Falmouth. Hooker's chief of staff beUeved they were teDing the truth, but Babcock, wbo also questioned tbe men, insisted for several days that they werehen he too accepted the story, though only overnight. It was during that night that Hooker decided to retreat Hooker's state of mind, however, was such that it is difficult to assign any strong influence in his decision to the enemy's supposed reirJorcements, which would still have left themonsiderable numeric disadvantage in any case.
lITT
Port Mortem
C*hancelkirrvillearrrpai'go based oo flawless uUeUigence but lostefender who was caught flat-footed and who. even at tbe moment of striking the decisive blow, had only begun to recover from that oIf it had been Hooker who attacked that day, be would have known what corps, what divisions, and probably what brigades be was Unking. Lee had not identified in advance even the corps that became bis victim, and tf be bad, the information would haveew entry on hishart (presumably be kept no other
As usual, the role of mtelligence in these events bas beenonly dimly. Hooker's plan Is repeatedly characterized as the most brilliant of theone searches tbe literature in vainrace of suspicion that intelligence might have bad something to do with ft. Tbe possibilityeport of ersemy reinfeecements was of some influence in Hooker'i decision to retreat also goes unnoticed. That Lee based Jackson's attack on knowledge of the vulnerability of the Federal right flank Is well known, but his otherwise uninformed and misinformed state Is not recoguiied. even though it makes the result be extracted from that one perceived fact all the more
The usual impression of Confederate superiority In intelligence Is largely owed to this faculty of Lee's forictorious stroke out of such fragments ofout of noat all; in other words, out of imagination and prescience. Had be possessed less of this kind of genius, he would have been forced to provide himselfetter, more organized information service-He understood the art of war much better than the art of military irXelligence.
" Tbe corps bs qoestaou, was mat of. Howard, woo Lee thoughtWiiiou. Howard! advancement had taken place throe mouths before.
The reverse was true of Hooker. He Is remembered as thewho, bidding strongly to end the Army of tbe Potomac's history of frustration, led it to its most unnecessary defeat But if the ln-teuigeoce side of the ChanceUorsville story makes his defeat seem all the more tragic, it at least reveals bim as the creatorard-hitting, effective information service that persisted after lie was gone,substantially to die victories of the army he left behind.
Potomac Pat de Deux
The Battle of Gettysburg, together wilb the maneuvers thai led to it, has an mteuigeoce story that baa suEnedegligence aod fantasy proportional to Its prominence In the national heritage.
Early inonth after bis battle with Hooker, Lee began drawing westward from Fredericksburg,hird of his army temporarily^ behind as cover. Hit plan was to march rscathwird through theause at Culpeper to receive reinforcements and supplies lengthened Sharpe's opportunity for discovering what was going on.
Though he hadeneral movement of this kind, Sharpe soon afterward felltory that tbe stirrings across tbewere connected with an impending raid by Stuart. The story may not have been spread by the Confederate command, but If it was not it was the most successful noo plant of the war. Hooker ordered Pleasooton, his cavalry chief, to break up the raid.
Pteasonton caught Stuart by surprise andigantic cavalry battle with him. but drew offictory. After the Ccttysburg campaign was over Pieasontoo covered this failure by explaining that his attack was reallyeconnaissance In force and that it had succeeded in unmasking Lee's rnovernesjt toward the Valley andThe historians have tnistfully repeated Pieasontoo'son the facts. Actually his reports after the cavalry battle, and papers captured during it. strengthened the Federals' Inclination to behoveig raid by Stuart, ratherassive infantry move, was in the naaking.
It was another four days before Hooker began an all out pursuit of Lee, and what sent him on his wayoutine interrogation. The Interrogator was Captain McEntee of Sharpe's bureau, wlto had been up:ith Pieasontoo for two weeks, trying without success to get some of the bureau's spies over to Culpeper. He chancedegro boy. one Charley Wright, who bad 'redugeed* frombe wake of the cavalry tight. The boy badervant to Confederate officersear. He said be bad seen two infantry corps pass through Culpeper en route to the Valley, and when his knowledge of Confederate organization turned out to be about as good as McEntee's own, the captain got off two cruick telegrams to Sharpe.
These set the army into motion ooespite Lee's partially successful effort to confuse Hooker and so delay pursuit, the Federals'
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inf fi^iY
discovery ofovement came soon enough to put them on the Potomac in good lime. When Hooker tet up headquarters atooh. hisoot of him. the CorrfedWate advance was about Hageritown and had raided intoutwas another week in assembling the rest of bis army near Winchester.
His crossing into Maryland took placeooker crossed, east of the Blue Ridge, onhh. By now Hooker was marching almost abreast of Law, and oo an Inside track. .
Because Hooker bad had to take care not to crossnly utelligencc or prescience could have made bis move Intoand so timely, and no ooe has ever accused Hooker of prescience Tbe lntelhgence that put hb army Over the river bas been in published records for many decades, but its obvious effect on bis actionstha whole outcome of thenot been seen. So the fact that it was substantially erroneous tatelhgence has of course also escaped notice.
Its chief author was John Bibcock. Sharpe bad sent him toonh toe local espionage. Crippled by the presence of Confederate soldiery and busy secessionist citizens who knew bisibcock bad to hide out and operateurvival level The result was that when two men he had sent beyond Hagers-town returned onh, their report was his first real news in four days. He fumped at it so eagerfy that he oversoldt put all of Lee'a army at or over the Potomac; this was correct as to the leading half of the Confederate mam body, but It placed the rear half two days' march ahead of where it actuallyabout Winchester.
By the time Babeocks emphatic telegram arrived oo theoren other bits and pieces of Information pointing to the samebad Eltered in. Some of these appear to have derived from the Confederate habit of sowing false leads; if that was their origin, the trick served not to confuse the enemy but to hasten him on his way.
En route, thisthe Federal gairttoo at Win-cbentf. capttarsng WOO. It bad marched tbeaaea bo- Fredericksburg wtthout bene; disceveeed. Hooter Isad nejjectedull da; to report to Wadtfngtoe. Hut thewas moving north. It seas during that day thai Winchester was Invested.
. Orders rnruired him to protect Watbmglon at weD as to find and Eghl Lee. After(token naarehea of the peeviiut year, the Federal* coeatruvtly feared an attack ou Waifatagtoa from the Vargaaia rvie of the Poeoma*.
He was tees. La company of ooe of hi*esfrdeeit of the locality who wa. known to havefor tho Fodemh during Uft 1SC2 vi.il.
gtfWWt UPCf
lo any event, once Babcoclt said ili.it no Confederates were lingering in Virginia, Hooker lost no time in issuing marching orders.
It was this action, foundedisplacement of the enemy, that more than any other single factor caused the Federals lo arrive first at the place of eventual collision and lake possessjoo of the famous fishhook-shaped ridge that gave them an insuperable advantage
Bui thus told, Babcock's erroretter story than it deserves. If one set about to list mstancea In which wrong Intelligence pointed to the correct action more forcibly than correct mteuigcnce would have, this one would surely stand near the bead of the list But the story is robbed of some of Its beauty by the fact that Bibcock was only half wrong, and the correct half of nil fmdings wasompeAing indication that this wasaideint. Tbe storyit more whenealized thataction was such as toood margin for error. Washington, after all. Is on the Maryland side of the Potomac If after Hooker crossed. Lee's rear elements had struck for Washington on the Virginia side. Hooker could haveenough force to deal with them, in front of tbe city if not sooner.
Wefl Met ef Cetvuibvrg
The most general distortion in the standard version of Cctfysburg is the theme that the battle was an accidental collision of two great armies groping about almost as if blindfolded. That is correct enough for the Confederates; it is false for the Federals.
The reason Lee was in the dark was that he had failed to appreciate the object lesson Hooker had presented for him on the Rappahannock: he had voluntarily parted with the bulk of his cavalry. Beforethe Potomac be allowed Stuart, who was smarting undercriticism of his surprise by Pieasontoo, to ride off to tbe east and march on ihe Federals' right There is an entire sub-Iitetature on this march and its wisdom or unwisdom; It may be summarized here by saying that Stuart had an (mage-restoring trip, full of raids, captures, and skirmishes, but the country was so full of enemy soldiers that he did not find Lee's army again for tenGettysburg, fighting for its life.
Not until the night of the Zotb did Lee learn that the Federals were in Maryland. The discovery camepy sent out weeks before, not by Lee but by Longstrect ThisHssrrison, athe story goes, been sojourning In Washington. More prob-
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ably he had been following Hooker's irroy. at least for joroe clays. On his way to rejoin Longitreet he passed through or near severalcorps- They were about Frederick, and comparativelyJuneas th* day Lincoln replaced Hooker with Georgend the Army of the Potomac was catching its breath while the new chief got his bearings.
Tbe Confederates were strung out for sixty miles, from McCoiincJhv burg to the Susquehanna, to an excellent position 'to be whipped one clementime. Lee, after first doubting Harrison, sent outwith ordersurried concentration aboutoint all bis Inf arrtry forces could reachay or two.
Harrison had saved anhe manner of Pope's spy oo the Rapidan. His story haslace In the literature, but its numerous retellings neverull sense of the absolute vitalneas of his service; they do not depict an escape creditable to one man. Yet the Confederacy conceivably owed the last yearalf of itsto Harrison, fnu.
While the Confederates were getting their key intelligenceingle spy, the Federals were reaping the benefits of team espionage. Most of the citizens of th* invaded region remained behind shuttered windows,ew dozen self-appointed patriots were out spying, scouting, and making courier runs to Harrisburg. From there their news war telegraphed lo Washington and forwarded to thethusircuit ofegrees.
From these dispatches end from his own sources, Meade correctly placed the bulk of the enemy force on bis left, about (Chambersburg But hb marching orders sent the army fanning out from Frederickide angle, with scarcely any more strength on the left than on Ihe center and right. Onh, though be had comparatively Utile evidence, he predicted with phenomenal accuracy the movement of the main enemy force eastward toward Gettysburg, but be still did not reinforce hb left wing, which was moving on that place. Thus hb actions have given the impressioo that he did not know where to expect thetbe Federal half of the collisior>of two-blind-armies myth.
Luckily Meade's generals on the left were even better informed than their chief, by virtue of the advance of Union cavalry beyond Cettysburg. Federal horsemen detected enemy approaches from
- Hooker had been-fth Washuipoo and despite his eswarnt man*not ousted to fight another battleLeo.
west, north, and emit, laid captured sornc revealing dispatches. The wing commander onurried bis infantry on lo the town, where by now the cavalry. dismoiinted, was fighting against heavy odds. The Infantry seized the ridge and adjacent bills and managed to bold on for tbe rest of the day.
Not until news of this battle reached Meade did be order upof bis army, scene of wbich was stall to Maryland, more thanmarcb '
Although the Confederates were surprised by this collirioo, believing all the Federal infantry to be well down k> Maryland, theyig numeric advantage at the outset because tbey arrived from all direc-tions at about the same time. While they had been cooeerrrrating the Federals bad been dispersing. Again Lee bad seized the upper band while being less well mfecmed than his adversary! but this time the blow be struck did not quite turn the battle.
He attached again on the 2nd and again inflicted heavy punishment That night Meadeouncil of war, asking whether the army should retreat. The vote was negative and be accepted it as his decision.
Eoery One But Pickett's
Though the dernoralizmg effect ofetreat bad weighed heavily in the council, some writers givehare of tbe credit for this decision. These, however, repeat an error alieady seen in tho case of Pope's escape on the Rapidin. The decisive intelligence at Gettysburg, they say,apturedone from President Davis addressed to Lee, which Union cavalry scouts tookourier party on thatver near Hagerstown. Itthe urrportant information that the Government could not send the Army of Northern Virginia any more reinforcements, and inof the shortage Davisrerncndc'usry revealingof military conditions throughout tbe Confederacy.
That Lee was getting no new troops was good news to Meade, but the chief value of the captured docurneatt was strategic It was of more significance In Washington dun in lhe Geld. It does not look like the kind of information that would haveoomful of generals who bad beenesperate figbt for two days; their concern was with the forces Lee then bad In hand If Davis bad said he was0 men on the road for Pennsylvania the neat day, Meade and hit generals might only have shrugged their shoulders, knowing
it would be two or three weeks before the reinforcement could arrive. Almostoreover, this dispatch, like the one supposed to have saved Pope, arrived after the decision it pointed to had been made.
To the extent that iotcQigciKe influenced the derision, it was Inteui-genco obtained on the field, butanner that wul neverV script. This toteuigenceimple Ubulataoo, compiled from psisooer. hstqiogatiorts, of sjGorsfaderate regiments and brigades that had been in the battle. Sharpe and Babcock had set to work on this as soon as they reached the field, of course; by afternoon oftost revealing compilation. It shewed that the entire Army of Northern Virginia infantry was present except one division, and that every brigade present had been in the fight By everrmg, when Sharpe reported to Meade just before the council of war opened, he was able to add that this one division, Pickett's, was now on the field and could be expected to be used heavily on the morrow. As Meade's rear elements bad arrivedew hours before and be could count on having an advantage ofn fresh troops, the decision to stand fast cannot have been asne as has been supposed.
Hare in all probability was the war's biggest payoff for the bookish side of mtclhgenoe, the headquarters staff work that was thenovelty.rastic reorganization Lee bad carried out fust before marching north,hart that accompanied Babcock everywhere (except, presumably, to Frederick) was tn souoditsoo that the enemy situation could be reconstructedatter ofy the jigsaw method. Thisrecise kind ofintelligence that the Confederates could not have produced even If their chief intelligence arm, Stuart's excellent brigades, had been put to proper use.
Not only was Pickett's Charge forraeen, but tbe sector at which it was to be delivered was divined by Meade. It came against the center of bis line. Two otherere withhe three werebacktate of completeby0 Federals, two-thirds tbe number of the attacking force.
The Army of Northern Virrnxua, badly spent, fell back to homo sol Vicksburg surrendered to Grant Julyhe day after tbe battle
-Tha Federals id seeal aaea ractao- of prfaooenthe hattk ofas wdl advanced. IVsbooca roar have been on the ffctd the first day. hut Sharpe probably did not arrive imol the oijht of. McEoWi acJM-ties at this stage of the campaign are ankarwo.
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ended in Pennsylvania; (he Federals new held the Mississippi to its mouth. Ftom then on the most the Confederates could hope for was to keep armies in the field until the North should tire of the war.
Some GeneralOationt
Though the events covered here represent onlyuarter of tbe ma Jar campaigns of tbe war. several instructive points can be drawn froe?*rhem: *
The importance of the contingentnd of having tberesources to deal with ftn unsurprising discovery, the more so when one is aware of the Civil War commander'sfor tactical over strategic intelligence Yettriking to see the principle at work. TwoBull Bun anddecided, so far as totcQigersce decided them, by informa-tiOQ obtained during tbe action, and arising out of it Tbe principle was also at work at Gettysburg (though the inteUigence obtained on tbeeld was of less profound influence than tho advancethat put the Federals oo Cemetery Ridge ahead of the enemy).
Equally stilling is what happened when the principle was nothole series ofvailable, for oot unbl tbe Pennsylvania campaign did the Federals consistently keep theirabreast of the action- Lee often divided hisoften as to make Itabit: at the beginning of tbe Seven Days, before Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Cettysburg, and during tbe fight at ChancelVsssville. He took these risky actions, and won battles by them, in tbe knowledge that Union generals would probably lack either the faculties or the aggressiveness to discover his dispersion in good time, or would be unbkely to call him fully to account if they didimely discovery. Even when dispersion led himosing battle at AntJetaro, the loss was not due to tactical lecoooaissance by tbe enemy. Not until Cettysburg did tbe Northern army display enoughiscovering bis positions to inspire any great fear of the consequences of dispersion.
taket eU kinde" Each type ofInter rogation,produced about as expected and sometimes fell short. Each also producedand
Otasfcgast factor ta three tunc* as peesrSerable in doe* action a* the preeoooeJvodS.lesl War Uiaonj,,
ncsulu ol great impact, tadind not ordinarily expected. In espionage, tbe shortfall is exemplified by Pmkertoes evidently barren penetration of Richmond, noimal good performance by the fanner-spy who told Hooker the way to tbe enemy rear, and surpriseby Harrison and by rope's spy, neither of whom could have been expected to move with enough speed and tuck to save an army in the way they did. Signal interceptioo,loweaped to an extraordinarily fruitful performance In tbe deception that opened the way for Hooker's march to theor all that the^plTot seems to have been thrust at Lee win tooenerosity)
The bread-and-buttercavalry,the same pattern- Interrogation, at leastourcecertainly fell short under Lee. It achieved good standard results, not only for Babcock but even for Pinkerton. Two of its greatest successes, however, were la much moreiled crates' movement to Pennsylvania and showing, atwhat the result would almost certainly be if Lee continued attacking, as be did. Cavalry, ordinarily the main reliance oo the march aod in close action, often did produce according toat for Lee at Cbancellorsville aod for Pope until be wore out his mounts; but it performed over Its head In numerous captures of important dispatches, most notably Stuart's theft of Pope's entire files; the frequency and Importance of these captures was abnortrsal And newspaper intelligence, thoughawn-producingon account of the masses of error, bluster, and plantedthat it had to deal with, had its day In that one authoritative disclosure about Hooker's stiength, though the validity of this was not apparent to Lee until their main encounter was over.
Each different type of mteUigence thus enjoyed at least one fine hour, all were indispensable Coisdusioo. it took all kinds, and tbe greater the total effort, the greater the scope forwas tbe most bcnehcicjit supplier of all
Flag sipudiog made It possible lor enemy correspondence to be in Inceptedar neater quantities and with much more ease than over before ia the history of warfare. (It was overwhehnlogly the main asedliua of Qui War intercept, though to use funeral btx-raturc of Use Warited incidents of mtertaptioa and erypUubdysd involve IrJerraph or courierattle capital appears to have horn nude of these oppcattucJnes to the carter eatnpsipa. not because ciphers were unusually secure but precisely because they were insecure, oosn-maoden wereboot putting valuable secrets oo the air.
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But to say (hat all types were important is not to say that their importance was huh/ appreciated. Had these commanders been asked to name the one iniormation source they could least afford to do without, the cavalry would have been their choice. Their willingncss to employ it on other tasks even at critical times is perhaps the best single indication of the Civil War general's lack of passion for intelligence.
Iig built-in adoantagc tn intelligence can be ooercome^'. In tbe contest for tactical information the Confederates held the upper band by virtue of fighting on home groundercent of the time. It seems to have been habitual with Federal comuutnders, wben operating in tbe Confederacy, to concede the enemy thisope resisted this tendency and by force of effort succeeded in getting an even break or better as long as his cavalry held out Like Pope, Hooker was too stubborn to be resigned to coming in second in the information contest. Other Union commanders were libera! in regard to newspaper and flag-of-truce exchanges, probably because those were situations in which the Northerners for once stood touid pro quo. Hooker clamped down bard on both. By these and other strong security measures, and by bis insistence on vigorous and competent Intelligence work, he marched to ChaoaUcn-sville with well nigh perfect information while Lee, surroundedriendly population, suffered from information that was as bad as Hooker's was good until the armies had been at close grips for two days. And tbe advantage Hooker seized early in his command did not prove transient; Sbarpe maintained it, apparently, all the way to Appomattox.
A chancterization of commandert as getters and users ofThree rather sharp classifications emerge from theof Hooker, Meade, and Lee respectively.
* In the Mississippi theater, at least. Federal spies were Untrue*ed to teD tbe Confederates the troth about Federaln tbe assumption that tbe Rebels would have correct Information anyway and that tbe spy who made misstalemeot* would only betray himself. At least one spy who ventured to interpret this rule to suit himself wound up by bavins; to be reassigned east
Hooker, administrator par excellence, saw the value of intelligence and knew bow to get the job done right He also did an excellent job of translating bis intelligenceampaign plan. And an excellent job of security. But in tbe pinch he did not trust the pbut that be must have admired as much as history does. It is hard to put one's finger exactly on his flaw, but this much is clear: be could
nrpr-iflinil i
ig picture (before thend be couldig plan, but be could not iee il through.
There ii no particular reason to believe that if Meade hadthe armyoing intelligence outfit, he wouldup asne as Hooker did. But he had one abilityHooker did not especially distinguish himself, as anmtelligcTKC evidence be could hit the bull's eye as surely astarget. On the Naming he left the Fifthrode over to army headquarters to take command, he wasuninfceraed of the enemy situation (Hooker had carriedtooy evening be had picked out thereat welter of conflicting reports.'* In thehe continued this performance, though not against such It is bard lo believe that if be had beenChan-
lanking movement would have been readetreatlanted story of enemy reinforcements would have beenfor several days.
But Meade was far from an ideal aripUer of intelligence. While in Maryland he read the evidence correctly and then acted as if the erroneous reports were as sound as tbe correct ones, and tho army would therefore have to go out and look for enemy corsceotnttoos all over south-central Fennyslvania. It is reasonable to question whether, if be had not had his generals' views to rely on fn the council of Julye would have made the deeds ion that his information pointed to.
Lee, as has been shown, did not do anything hie the job Hooker dad in providing himself with intelligence Evidently he also lacked Meade's fhur for evaluation; for example, despite his own habitualdeception, belanted signal message that should have seemed suspiciously gratuitous. But Lee eicellcd in putting information to work. Givecrap of it and be knew what action to take, and be took it, and saw it through.
Thus each of these men seems to have eareelTed in but one of the threeintelligence, evaluating it, and applyinghe second of these skills isigher order than the first, and the third is higher than the second, but the higher orders do not seem to require any degree ofhe lower ones. This stratification, though
Sharpe aided Meade to this, hut the language of Meade's orders and Of hat dispatches to Washingtontrong evaluative role played by the
Itittle ova-shaxp. may be exactlysycrK>losrirt would expect to find; but it is sometning that the abundant legacy of Civil War history has not previously been made to denjoostrate.**
Evaluation
Clearly. Civil War intelligence was not tbe pale. Irrelevant stuff that tbe literature refects (and here we are speakingnf .the whole literature, not merely that of the horseflesh and inagoolia blossomet one may fairly ask whether its story Is more valuable 'than any other piece of antique Intelligence history.
newhat might be called Intelligence's publicThe Civil War retrains our most profound rariooalIt is disturbingollection of mythsas been permitted to usurp the place of intelligence in the historytruggle so Important and so wellusurp without even filling It. leaving millions of words of campaign narrative that explain critical decisions weakly if at aB.
Will the story, once set right, necessarily establish that intelligence contributed substantially to the result? At this distance. Northern might looks so overwhelming that one is tempted to believe the end would have been the same, and would have come as quickly, tf the Union armies had made no organized intelligence effort at alL Yet the fact remainsebellion which holds at theig and integraluite likely to prevail even in tbe bee of greatly superior might The American rebellion ofasne. Aod tbe outcome was touch and go up to the autumnhe Confederacy's defeat could not be foreseen until the Northern anti-war element lost at the polls that November, thanks largely to the Federals' battlefield successes of the months mimedlateh/ preceding
The contribution of mtclhgeoce to4 victories is missing here, and until it is supplied wc cannot represent that this was another American war in which intelligence had as much to do with the outcome as in, say, the Second World War. But there were at
"One cmmaaAar who mar have mown two or all three stsDs is CraaL He teems to have been well informed from his Vicksbuig campaign onward, and his ability lo use InteUigeuce sometimes appears to belong tn the nine data with Lee'*. Bert this study has not yet toe-hed bis briery in detail
"atalog of these rayth* art against the exiereapoe-iutg leabnes aae the author'* "Mythology of Ceo. Waro Crod War..
least two earlier points atonfederate victory might have won Southern independence. These were Lee's Invasions of Maryland2 and Pennsylvaniaad Antietam or Gettysburg gone the other way. the North might have given up. At Antietam decisive intelligence came to the Federals merely by virtue of their being in the vicinity of tbe enemy. But in the neat year's campaign they won an intelligence contest that ran from the Bappaharmock to Cemetery Badge; they won every round of ft, aod by organized effort in each ease. And tbe product of this effort affected the battieheld result as profoundly as the Lost Order affected tbe decision at Antietam.ad heritage, all by itself.
Original document.
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