6
' IB
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this ntimatei
The Control IrtfelBoento Agency end the Intolbgeneo ocgo<*iatlone ofof Stole, Mmm and mo NSA.
Concurring;
Dr.. Smth. for Deputy Director of Control Intelligent*
Mr.he Director of Intelligence and. Department of State
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agencyouianonl General Morsholl S. Corter, USA. Director of the Notional Security I Agency
Abstaining;
Mr.tewn,seistonl General Manager. Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. Wiluen O. Cragor, lor Assistant Dk-actar. Faderal fcireou olma svbJeci being outsida ofsdkttaa.
VVAftNiNG
This materia) contains information affecting tha Notional Defense of the United States within ihe meoning of the espionage laws.SC., theor revelation ol which In any manner to on unauthorised penwn li prohibited.
PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ISSUE
CONCLUSIONS
International Court of Justice (ICJ) will soon renderon the case brought against South Africa concerning itsover South-West Africarrespective of the termsdecision, we expect the black Africans and theirtake the occasion to press the UN to end apartheid in SWAin South Africa itself. They will put particularthe US and UK who, they believe, could bring South Africaif they really tried.
Africa, in order to improve its legal and politicalcomply with provisions of the judgment which did notcontrol over SWA. South Africa is highly unlikely to give infor further steps and its opponents will probably seekaction. Although the UK could ill afford to join fullit may not veto Security Council action and no othermember may do so. If, as is likely, economic sanctionsthe matter of military sanctions would arise, thoughsupport in the UN for such sanctions is highly unlikely.not believe that the South Africans would capitulate in the facesanctions or the threat of military sanctions.' )
African states will portray firm US action againstas the touchstone of US relations and influence in Africa- Ifdoes not force South Africa to retreat, the Africans andwill keep the issue alive, in the UN and out. and itAfrica's relations with the West. )
TVan L- HofhM.Dtftrtar of latcBlfraca and Fewrcb, Drprhnen* offrom thea lbWfn of ihb puaptph, bcrnac bel.vv depend iipilStMilT on tutara US pollerf. hi. footnow* loand
DISCUSSION
Tbt lotTMbcod Court of Justicexpected toon to deliver a
decUoaooplaint brought by Liberia and Ethiopia alleging that South Africa has violated the mandate granied to It over Soutb-Wnt Africa (SWA) by the League of Nations (teelthough tbe Court* decision is likely to reaffirm that Southtill bound by the mandate and that the UN is the successor to the League's supervisory responsibilities forikely to be vague on South Africa's other obligation'. It may hold thatnconiiitent with the mandate, Whatever t'w decision, It will give the Africans and others who strongly oppose apartheid the opportunity to try to involve the UN deeply in South African affairs. Their objective will probably be to revoke South Africa's mandate in SWA and eventually to force South Afrkra to abandon apartheid and political discrimination In South Africa itself.
AND CURRENT POLITICAL SETTING
A. SounVWeri Africa
1 Soutb-Wett Africa seems an unlikely arena for high international stakes. Approximatety one-half million norrwhites are scatteredargely arid expanse ofquare miles. Most live la the tribal reserves in the north where they eke out aa existence. There are. In addition,0 whites, of whom aboutercent arend slightly overercent are of Cerman descent. All the whites live in the "Policehichtbe larger,t of the mandate. Most of the0 wage-earning Africans, chiefly from the northern reserves, also work in the Police Zone at contract laborers. The African tribal reserves arc controlled directly from Pretoria. The white electorate has ten seats in the South African Parliament,WA Legislative Assembly with limited powers. In most respects theoverned as an integral part of South Africa. Despite part id pa lion in South African and local electionsittle political activity among the whites. Such political activity at exists among the tribady dividedonducted largely outside SWA by two small exile groups whose headquarters are in Dar-es-Saloam.
k OM am applied to wto* Airfrtif SJaamaW Sou lbvrndaoai ol DMdi <Boh) Mdm.
*llackatPoUn Zona (aw map) are *trieU> rartroOed by waft* oaVmb aad BumorjjsSBJ have no power wfcgreai the ncrthera im an ruled bdfcrctly BPNxh Bum duets or couneo*.
he modern sector of theased on mining, fishing, andenterprises. The first two are dominated by South African and foreign interests,ominated by the resident whites. Growing amounts
v
ol diamonds, cadmium, and other mineral* are exported and SWA earns largeof foreign exchange. The modem economy ii currently booming, partly because of largo South Afrioin government expenditures on housing, hospital, and other projects and for purchases of white owned farms on which to resettle Africans. The South African government is also spending substantial sums on the improvement or construction of airfields and paved roads.
B. South Africon VWwi
In South Africa, the present political atmosphere appears to be one of great determination, andittle truculcnce. Prime Minister Verwoerd is freshecisive election victory which gave his National Party an overwhelming majority in the Parliament. For the first time, Verwoerd was able to go beyond bis Afrikaner power base and secure significant support from the Englbh-speaking community. Vcrwocrds cautious handling of the Rhodesian and other issues has appeared to many voters as sound and In the national interest. Despite uneasiness In some quarters over the consequences of the Rhodesian and SWA problems. South Africans are more united on racial policy than they have been In the past and appear less concerned over world opinion. The country is steadily emerging from the effectsnd punishing drought; inflationary pressures, which at one time seemed to threaten South Africa's vigorous economic growth, have been contained.
In the last year or so Verwoerd has become UKreasingly assertive in stating South Africa's intention to hold on to the territory. Prior5 there was no clear expression of South African policy although, following theof the controversial Odendoalubstantia] sums are being spent lor road, water, and agricultural projects in areas which that reportas prospectiveutontentious speech last year. Verwoerd said that South Africa "will be compelled to fight to the death to see that SWA docs not fall Into Communistnd nude It clear (hat heN presence as on equivalent danger. And lostn Windhoek, Verwoerd claimed that the fortunes of the Republic and SWA arewovenlthough these were campaign speeches,sounded the same note in private exchanges.
Moreover, subsequent statements In similar vein by important South African officials, combined with the extensive construction underway In the territory, some of it tailored to military usage, strongly suggest that Verwoerd plans to stay in SWA Ooe fact Is plain: the oxcrwVlnuhg majority of white South Africans are prepared to follow the Prime Ministers lead on policy toward the mondatr Thus supported. Verwoerd saw fit in April to lecture the US and the UK about the hnmrdt of being drawn into "imprudent action" over the South-Writ Africa (or Rhodesian) Issun.
We think that Verwoerd has become persuaded, or chooses to believe, that SWA'i empty reaches are vital to South Arica's security. By and large, white South Africans view political difficulties in Block Africa as inevitable The
Congo's chaoseep impression on many, and it suits them to keep black rule as distant as possible. Consequently.aluedtrategic extension of ihebe South African government fears that any yieldingnan or UN pressures oo SWA would make it more difficult to resist on South Africa itself.
C. African Views
lthough poUocal leaders in independent Black Africa continue to call for an end to white supremacy in southern Africa, they are embarrassed and frustrated at their lack of power to do anything but talk. Among the radicals.all and Toure's troubles have dramatized the weakness of Africa'sven the more impatient are arutely aware that Africa must soil rely on doo-African instrumentalities and ruhons to gain its political goals in southern Africa. Africans of all political hues are frustrated by tbeir irsability to topple Ian Smith in Rhodesia (or to get some one else to do it) and by their failure to force South Africa to modify in the slightest its racial policies.
lthough the Africans hope eventually to seo SWA emerge as anstate, in tbe present circumstances the issue serves chiefly as anto place South Africa in the international dock, putting pressure oo South Africa at one of its few vulnerable points. The Africans, having endured the long drawn out legal procedures of the ICj, will insist that the US and the UK must take vigorous sctioa against South Africi* in support of the UN. The Africans hopeolitical decbion in the UN which will revoke South Africa's mandate. They also intend to exploit tbe situation against South Africa for its practice of apartheid at home, an bsue which has been already before the UN for many years.
III. US AND UK POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY INTERESTS
lthough there are some US and UK miningWA these are minor compared to US and UK economic and security interests in South Africa itself. The UK investment in Southbout S3 billion and the UCi net earnings on current account with South Africa are0ear. The balance of payments difficulties which the British are experiencing thus make economic relations with South Africa of major importance. Theflow of South African gold lo the Freeercent of annual Free Worldmportant to its arrangements for mternabonaJ payments based oo sterling and tbe dollar.lso concerned with the interests of over one million Ehglblt-snealong South Africans. Insofar asoncerned, the British contend that the use of Slmonstown naval base bto them, and they are also largely dependent on South African goodwill for access to the former High Commission Territories (Bechuanaland, Basuto-Und, andhich are aimost wholly dependent on the South African economy.
As against
St
9 - I i
thesehe UK must weigh its relations with the multiracial Com-monwealth and British trade and investment with the rest of Africa, For its
t
part. Southregards British self-intemtM inhibitmgS cernntetctaJ bes to South Africa are also important, though not crucial5 US exports8 million and the US net earnings from South Africa on current account0 million. US investment amountsillion. The US also imports substantial quantities of strategic and otherlatinum. US security interests include trackingaccess to airfields, and port fueling facilities for US ships.
IV. PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE KJ DECISION
A. The United Nations Organization
II The SWA bsue willruel test of the UN. Should it prove unable to take substantive action in the case, the organization willamaging blow. On the otherecision to take action,andatory sanctions against South Africa, could also seriously damage the UN if they were not fully imposed or were otherwise not effective.
la Tbe Court In its decision will almost certainly find fault with South Africa's administration of its mandate. The decision will probably be vague or ambiguous in some respects, however, and the Court will probably leave to tbe UN the problem of applying the decision to detxiL Irrespective of the exact terms of the ICJ decision, the judgment will provide the African statestarting pointtepped-up political and propaganda campaign against South Africa and the apartheidegal slap on tho wrist by the Court would be condemned by the Africans,trongly critical judgment would be takenointdeparture forbon. But either way. the issue will be quickly Joined.
U In the Gm Instance, many of the Africans and their svmpaUuam will probably prefer that the matter behe General Assembly since in that forum theyuch greater voting weight. Irrespective, of where the initial moves are made, however, the matter will eventually come to the Security Council which alone has enforcement powers under the UN Charter. In either forum, some will prefer drastic immediate action to force the end of apartheid Inevocation c* 'he mandate, the application of sanctions. Others will figureorelication of pressures on South Africa willreater chance ofhe Western powers along with them. Sooner or later, however, the Securir.ill be facedtrong demand to force South Africa to comply.
erwoerd isasern, politician, and he will probablyool hand, neither rejecting the Courts iecision abruptly nor moving, as some have suggested, to annex SWA Initially, the South Africans will probably play for time. In the hope that UN action can become bogged down In legal
(
and procedural difficulties, Altnough reluctant to alienate the US and the UK, South Africa wul be stubborn In defense of what It regards as matters of priao'ple and nabonal secstrity.
outh Africa will probably hope to avoid rejecting all the provisions of rise Judgment To the extentomplied, it would strengthen its legal case against the Africans and others who. wc believe, will press the UN to go beyond the strict terms of the judgment and it might gain lome tolerance. If not support, from other UN members- lo thb end. South Africa might, if the judgment so orders, agree to make reports to the UN. transmit petitions from inhabitants, or carry out other provisions which did not alter its control of SWA. South Africa would probably, in any event, make some gestures of compliance or enter Into discussions of compliance in an effort to limit and postpone as long as possible any further UN action.
think it unlidy that any actions taken by South Africa willAfricans. We believe there would be demands In the UN for strongmeasures against South. all-out diplomatic andIn view of the actions already taken by the Security CouncilRhodesia, the Africans are doubtless encouraged lo believe thatcan be invoked against Pretoria. Verwoerd would hope toeto by the UK or France (we thick that the UKand that France might either abstain orhe status ofquestion at the time would probablyood deal ofthe UN's handling of the SWA issue, and the Africans might seek toproblems in an effort to majamize pressures on Vorwoerd.
B. Sou* Africa
Should the UN impose economic sanctions, we do not think Verwoerd would scuttle and run (If ha did, thb wouldew set of problems since it wouldizable International effort to administer theut thereood chance that be would take South Africa out of the United Nations, and any remaining chance that he would support sanctions against Rhodesia would disappear.*
Indeed, we do not think that South Africa would relinquish control of SWA even If the UN later aVcided to impose across-the-board mandatory economic sanctionshapter VII (threat to WternaHooal peace)Especially if supported by South Africa's major trading partners, these measures would create misgivings amongouth Africa. However.
such economic sanctions, even if appliederiod of two or three years, would be unlikely toritical effect on South Africa's economy, partly
"Mr. Taw t- HorJwa, TW Director ol IrOrDifeocr aad Hew arch,ofthat tf South Africa wen> aaaaassaaallghiy ufararmUe rdng of tha ICJcmi.Hr threat of rnfororawnt by mafor powers. Including ih* US. Pretoria mithta tulat.ntlil modtfkaUon of itsor. coocafvaUy. even withdraw from
SWA alUavthr*.
i
I
I/
beau* itrKS*asingiy self-tuaaocnt and partly because of the extremein enforcing air-tight sanctions- Furthermore, the UK hat compelling national reasons against participation in etooomfc sanctions. Tbe Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Bantu nationalist organizations are unlikely to be able to arouse such internal troubl" at to affect the South African economy. In the event that economicroved Inadequate, the question of apply* ing military sanctions would arise. We believe that it would be highly unlikely that the necessary support for the latter form of sanctions would be found in theowever, in the remote eventhreat of military confrontation with the UN. backed by the UK and the US. we believe that South Africa
would interpret the situationhreat to the security of South Africa itself
and would refuse to capitulate,*
Black African states believe that the UK and the US canAfrica to their will on the SWA issue if they choose to do to.be put on the US to apply the principles which it has traditionallyincluding telf-defermination for peoples, the nile ofsupport ofand opposition toumber will seek to exert pressure onand the US through ether pending and often unrelated issues both inof the UN tuch as the juestion of Chinese representation Some maydiplomatic rupture, and denial of faculties. These pressures arebe supported by both arranged and spontaneous demonstration', againstand some incidents Involving US personnel. Therefore, unlessand the West back what the Africans regard as sufficiently strongwith Black Africa arc certain toecline. The West willhowever, to maintain an important presence in Africa, even inmoat deeply concerned in the status of SWA. and Africans willto depend on the West as the market for virtually all their exportsmain source of economic, technical, and other assistance.
C The Communist Powers
West's embarrassment will provide tempting propagandathet the UN. they will be likely to championSWA, and probably will urge mandatory sanctions against Southmay step up training and material support for "liberation groups" from
Thomaa I-he Director oi InWlllgenc* and Research. Department ol Slate, beffevn that thli judgment most Imotwt an atau-npttoci regarding USf It li auunird that the US will sot Rapport UN military mmurea ha the. SWA cw. then l> oMraate In tharobablyhe US wero to rapport men nrimm. It umore hkrlj tha* tha amaaary rapport for them would bo forthcoming to tho UN.
* Mr.ofhea. The Davcmr of iMaMgnc* and Hearareh. Department of State, beta-vet that tha Scam African reactmntoa IBatd mOOary ceo/roetattoi with OW UN would oVprtvd on the credibility of tho threat TV tarnation devribeda highly apecubttve one. But If Sooth Africa wrre facedredible threat of UN military acttnaavalacked by the US and dtaeetrd solely toward enforcing UN decUlaiu on SWA,t trait an evrn chance that Pretoria wouldn accommodation rather than "refuse to oapRalaM,"
southern Africa. However, both Moscow and Peiplng arc handicapped by tbe fact there i> no active insurgency in either SWA or South Africa. Moreover, given Its setbacks elsewhere In Africa, and its extremely cautio-is approach to the Rhode* ian problem, the USSR is likely to move slowly, if at afl, toward direct involvement in SWA. Specifically, we think the USSR would be dubious about joining any UN military action against faraway South Africa.
V. THE LONGER TERM OUTIOOK
hould South Africa successfully defy the UN and tbe 1CJ. there willery considerable and highly vocal reaction, There will be, for example.
S
ic outbursts against the West in the UN and elsewhere. Anti-Western in the underdeveloped areas will also receive an assist, and racial relations in Atnca will be set back, Nor is the SWA issue likely to disappear. For the Africans, it will remainocal point for mobilizing pressures on South Africa. For one thing, it involves issues affecting the authority of the UN itself on which the Africans can win support from countries which ought otherwise be reluctant to support UN action against apartheid in South Africa Itself. They willlink it with other unresolved southern Africa Issues. Therefore, even though African pressures are unsuccessful in the short run, the Africans and others will continue to press strongly for UN action to compel South Africa to give up SWA and to abandon apartheid in South Africa itself.
ANNEX
BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICI)
ooth Africa was designated as mandatory ^ower for South-West Africa (SWA) by the League of Nationsollowing World Wax II, the South African Corernntent refused to place SWA under the UN Trusteeihip Syr*in, though all other mandatory powers accepted UN Trusteeship arrange-menu. Ihe UN0 requested trie ICJ for an advisory opinion on the status of SWA In substance, the ICJ advised that South Africa had no legal obligation to place the territory under the Trusteeship System, but remained subject to the obUgjlions set forth In the original mandate in administering the area. The Corrt also decided that the UN Ceoeral Assembly was Icompetent to exercise the League of Nations' supervisory functions with respect to territorial adrtuntitration. Further, the Court held that South Africa could not modify the international status of the territory without consent r* 'Se UN.
Z. South Africa rejected those aspects of the opiniont it had responsibilities to the UN and has tailed to respond to Ccncral Asm .resotu-lions which call upon South Africa to put SWA under trusteeship.esolution of the Conference of Independent African Statesthiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings tn the ICJ against South Africa which resulted in the current case. j
In their case, Liberia and Ethiopia are seeking to establish four mainhe mandate continues to exist; (I) the UN has replaced the League as the supervisorypartheid violates the mandate which requires the mandatory power to "promote to the utmost the materialral well-being and social progress of thehe Court should declare that South Africa is bound to cease the practice of apa-theid in SWA, Neither renlacetnent of South Africa as mandatory power nordence for thet Issue before the ICJ, since these are regarded essentially as political matters.
Pretoria's response to the complaints about its stewardship haslend of high-minded concern for the legal aspectsigid defense of apartheid based oa their concept of the empirical situation. South Africa's legalhat the mandate survived as an institution but Pretoria's contractual obligations ended because of the dissolution of the League, and that the mandate is notreaty or convention in force" within
the meaning of Articlef the Statute of the icj. South Africa hat largely applied apartheid in SWA, thus in effect placing apartheid on trial.
s the foregoing suggests, the caseegal quicksand. For example, even though the debilitating effects of apartheid normally are manifest, in practiceifficult to determine whether, how, and to what degree apartheid breaches the mandate.lassmandate, such as the League granted to South Africa, seems to condone "second-class citizen' treatment for the subjects: ft permits forced labor for essential public works and services and prohibits the supply of in toxica ting spirits and beverages to the African in-hamtants. Nor are mandatory powers specifically enjoined to advance the indigenous population politically.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
document wasy ih* Control Intelligence Agency. Thi*(or tho information and us* of the recipient and of peoom under hit jurisdiction onto knowdditional essential dissemination may be authorized byofixioli within their respectire department*!
of Intelligence end Raitareh, for the Deportment of Stote
Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of ihe Secretary ol
Defame and the orgofiliation of tha Joint Chief* of Staff
Chief of Sloff 'oreportmerit ol the Army, for the
Department of ih* Army
Chief ofOparaliomor tho Department of tho
Navy
a. AwiHon! Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for ihe Deportment of the Air Fort*
of NSA. for Ih* National Security Agency
of Intelligence, AEC, for tha Atomic En*rgy Commission
Director, FBI, for th* Federal Bureau of Investigation
L Dir*clor for Centrol Reference, CIA, for ony oiher Deportment or Agency
This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable securityr returned to ihe Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Centrol Reference, CIA.
When thisisseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain ileriod nol in excess of one year. A! 'he end of thii period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to tho forwarding agency, or permiiiion should be requested of Ihe forwording agency lo reiain il In accordant* with2
A Th* till* of this document when used separately from Ihe text should beFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION!
White House
National Security Council
Deportment of Slot*
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Imeiiigotion
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: