CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SPECIAL MEMORArTDUM6
SUBJECT: The Current Political Situation and Prospects in Tropical Africa
SUMMARY
Africa today Is groping for new answers and reassuring Old nostrums such as Fan-Africanism and one-man, one-party rule have failed to deliver prosperity or dislodge vhite regimea in southern Africa. Radical nationalists such as Nkrumah. who once seemed to be the wave of the future, have proved to be poor managers, and enthusiasm for their brand of militant change has lost steam. But moderates like Ealewa equally have been turned out of office. The military are Increasingly becoming the decisive power group, but they lack ideas and stature. Euring recent poUtical skirmishing both Hoaccv and Peiping suffered notable setbacks.
Ve think current political floundering viU continue for some considerable time without any African or external force or Ideology becoming dominant. Iffrica's problems are likely to rpread. For example, frictions between Arabs and Africans seem gradually to be emerging in countries on the fringe of the Sahara. There is also an Increasing failure to meet current food
Africa's mood of the moment is largely one of drift andIntractable economic problems will continue to troubleAfrican leaders. But thc entrenched vhite regimes irtriconvenient target for those Africans who wish to diverttheir internal difficulties and to restore their
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1.zr.bcr of recent events have shaken African self-confidence.ash of coups has toppled radical and moderate regimes. Evidence has cense to light which ls disillusioning those who believed that the USSR andere meraly disinterested providers of aid. The staying power of white Rhodesia is ancontrast to the stagnation of black "liberation move-menta". For much of the African political elite, it seems to be a
The Current Situation
2. An important result cf the recent political upheavals
was, of course, to dramatize the fragility of Africa's political institutions and regimes. This was reflected ln the recent con-ferenceast and Central African states, during which they tacitly agreed to cease interfering in the affairs of neighboring states and to curtail the political activities of refugees from other HLack African states. There are acme who are evading this
he Somalis in Kenya, and others who are unable to control all refugeeurundi, but by and large theretronger disposition on the partumber of African
governments not to do unto others what they would not want done to themselves.
3. Recent political developmentsetback for the proponents of African "radicalism". Many Africans, particularly the young educated elite, set considerable store by the maxims of political showmen such as Nkrumah and Toure. These leaders succeeded in representing their brand of radicalism, including militancy, rapid change, and close links with the Communist powers, as the wave of the future. Riding the political crest, they carvedole in Afro-Asian circles disproportionate to their countries1 power. Then the radicalsajor setback with the humiliating disappearance of their colleague Ben Bella. Bov, .Ciaih'i ouster, Toure'o troubles, the near eccnoalcof all tbo radical regimes have at least temporarily sapped ouch of their political appeal.
h. However, the radicalsonsiderable potential for troubleaaking. Indeed, they still dominate regimes in Guinea, Mali, Congond Zanzibar, among others. Figures
such aa Eabu nzd Cdluga are not without influence sral funds .*
disturbing factor is the growing number of nraed exiles, especially ln East and Central Africa, cany of them extremely primitive and ready to bitch on to any cauoe. More importantly, there remain substantial numbers of discontented intellectuals and youth even in moderate states such as Senegal and Higeria. But the political Image, so crucial in Africa, of radical notables has suffered grievous damage, and for the moment ths radicals seem unable to fire Africa's Izaglnatlaa or to marshal ruch in the way of political backing.
5- At the some time, so-called "moderate" or "conservative" governments haveull measure of trouble. Balewa's assassination, tho ouster of Presidents Dachoican Republic) and Yomeogo (Uppernd growing pressure on Halle Selassie are manifestations of various kinds of discontent arising froa various causes. In acme places, governments have been
Their adhoreota and other like-minded extremists recently formed the loosely-organized and Comouniat-financed "East Africanesigned to promote mutual interesta in trade unions, youth groups, and women's organizations, and to promote radical policies ln the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Afro-Asian organizations.
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because of belated attempts to Imposelittlen others apparently becouao of extravagance and alsnanagement. In some Instances, tribal and regionalhave probablyajor role; elsewhere they seen to have had little effect In setting political forces ln motion. Indeed, In moderate as ln radical states, as often as netchange occurs when growing disillusion with the maximum leader concerts with the dispositionmall organized groupusually military or laborto taka action.
6. Although military leaders haverowing willingness to take power, it Is doubtful whether military regimesanacea for Africa's problems. Probably the lessarmy leaders are closer to the simple people ln the bush than are the Western-educated professional politicians, who now constitute somethingelaas" of their own. But the thin layer of military leadership is IU at ease with the "educated elite" and the bureaucracy, though they must depend upon then (and the bureaucrats to far find it advantageous to go along). In those cases where tho military has chosen to return nominal power to civilian authority while retaining itsogo, Dahomey, the politicians have again become quickly mired in
familiarmilitary chooses to hold on to
power, other profciees ccme into focus. The amies, like tbe politicians, ore frequently beset bylgerla, ond corruption in their ranks ls notganda. Discipline is often lax, and they tend to deal harshly with the populace, as ln the Congo. Also, nllltary figures such as Colonels Laalaana (Upper Volta) or Bokasoa (Central Africanr slightly core impressive individuals such as Mobutu, simply lack the stature aod skills to do auch more than keep thoir nations limping along. hole, the Africanisplay little of the administrative and organizational talent for nation-building apparent in some military regimessay, Ftkirtan, or seme of the better examplesir. America.
7. In general, the lusty confidence and assurance that marked African politics in the wake of independence has eroded, to be replaced by somethingnornlng after" syndrome. political slogans and institutions no longer seem to generate much excitement. Pan-Africanism is in the doldrums, end "Kegri-tude" failed to catch on. Even the one-man, one-party system, often claimed by Africans to be their unique contribution to the
art of government, ic increasingly on trial as it appeoro that these parties are usedechanism to control or indoctrinate the populace as in the case of Ktaumah's Convention People's Party. Meanwhile,ican cooperation has been slight in nearly every field, though it is always possible toeasure of agreement on anticolonial issues. The most generous view of the CAU Is that It has held together. The Organ!satloa Commune Africaine et Kalgache (OCAM) and its predecessors huvo been slightly more effective in practical terms, but this has been due chiefly toubsidies and interest. Finally, the only regional organization which has worked in the past, and which was set up under British rule, the East African CommonOrganization, shows serious signs of breakup.
8. At the same time, the "liberation movements" seeking political change In southern Africa have come nearlyull stop. The African Liberation Committeeffiliated with the CAU, has been an acknowledged failure. It la short of funds, and several states haveesire to pull out. The guerrilla movements in Angola and Mozambique also have failed to flourish, though they continue to tie down large mashers oftroops. Rationalists in Rhodesia are ineffective, and those In South Africa have been forced into trifling clandestine activity.
9- The Communist powers have also suffered some political setbacks In Africa recently. Tne most Important of thesowere in Ghana, where Moscow and Peiping separately had established close links with Kkrumah's clandestine operations and wereood position to abet subversion and guerrilla activity throughout the continent, and in Kenya. The depth cf Communist involvement In these matters is now widely publicised in Africa. However, Cnirminlet setbacks are not due merely to expo.Ture of clandestine operations, but are in large part caused by the every day hazard* of thc African scene. Tor example, despite sul jtontial ecoacmlc and military aid, events continue to go badly Its? the Soviets in Somalia, and tbe Chinese have lost ground witit the mercurial Toure and, momentarily perhaps, in Mali. However, thisontinually shifting situation, and as against these difficulties, the Soviets seem to be improving their position in Uganda and the Chinese are apparently becoming even more deeply entrenched In Zanzibar.
s they contemplate the larger world scene, manyhave had to recognize that their Influence on international politics is not going to measure up to their earlier extravagant dreams. They have succeededarge extent in remaining outside
tho Cold Wax. But they fctM notew ac-allty on the bad old powers, nor have theyecisive factor ln extra-African affairs. Adjustaeot to these facts of life has been going on slowly for sono time; the recent troubles within Africa itself have probably brought the processittle further.
Prospects
U. These developments could be healthy if tbcy encouraged African states to turn to the work of internal development, to stop meddling In their neighbor's affairs, and to cease their International posturing. Tho record of upsets, frustrations, and disillusionments shouldtrong case for discarding the sloganeering and the cliches in favorragmaticupon the enormous tasks at hone.
12. The recent decline of some of tbe radicals willreathing spell for the West and additional tine for moderate Africans to work for economic and "social progress under somewhat less political pressure. But this atmosphere is partly conditionalodicum of economicsense of success". For the attraction for grand prescriptions is far from dead. It is hard to see where new ones will come from; Ecupnouet-Bolgny's economic
despite acknowledged achievements, is not exciting enough, and the military regimes are unlikely to create popular concepts. Thus uncertainty, floundering, and apathy will almost certainly continue to be the hallmarks of African politics for some time to come.
13- This ls not to say that extremist and radical figures may not come to power or prove to be very troublesome from tine to time. This eventuality seems almost certain to recuregion with so many weak, one-nan shows. Additional military coupe, particularly in the extremely backward states of ex-?rench West Africa, are likely. As the military regimes fall to moke hoadvay on fundamental national problems, factiosnlizatlon and internal conflicts within the African armed forces probably will
grow. It is worth noting that three large African countries in which the OSonsiderablethiopia, Higeria, and the Congo, are among those beset by major problems which in large part involve the local military establishment.
l*v. Moreover, serious new problems are Just ahead. Most
African countries traditionally have been self-sufficient, but thererowing trend toward dependence on imports for staple foods. This Is already apparent in Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone,
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Liberia, Senegal, and Kvli. Prolonged droughts have also caused
food shortages throughout much of east and southern Africa, but nay also conceal more fundamental agricultural problems. -or capita tcii prcaiirtioa is dueost of economic and social conditions, including among others, rapid urbanization poor distribution, and mismanagement and neglect of national agri cultural resources. In any case, tbe Increasing failure ofto meet their food requirements aggravates other troubles as the military government in Nigeria is now discovering. Food shortages and high prices contribute to latent urban discontent, and drain off funds required for capital development. Ferhaps most important, the failure torogressive agrarian.
population limits the national tax base and economic development prospects generally.
15* Furthermore, ve believe that Arab-African relations in Tropical Africa are gradually movingroublesome stage. These difficulties vill be particularly severe in tbe statessouth of the Sahara, vhere there are large numbers both of Africans and Arabs, but they vill also affect the Eora, and Africa generally. Racial and religious differences which could lead to civil strife ere already apparent in Ethiopia, Mauritania
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and Chad and lie Just beneath the surface In Malt and Nigeria. Meanwhile, Sudan's efforts to deal with black dissidents ln its southern provinces have caused an outflow of refugees andpolitical problems in Congoganda, and Sctcali-backed insurgency in Ethiopia and northern Kenyahronic irritant in African circles. In general, weairly high incidence cf quarrels, coups, and political upheavals of one sort or another. They will stemariety of causes, primarily local, and it seems clear that they will not lead to the domination of any single force or ideology, either African or external.
l6. In this setting, Moscow and Peiping will continue to be attracted by the prospect of quick political gains on the cheap. But the USSR, at least, seems toood understanding of the
limits of political opportunity in Africa. Moscow evidentlytoew andew, recognizing at times that this
Is not the proper historical era for traditional communism. In
Ghana, for example, the USSR is calmly trying to weather the storm,eating for the present in hopes of staying In place while awaiting better days. China's policies still seen less realistic, and there may be additional setbacks in store for Peiping.
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17* In sun, the prospect for Africa ls for continued,even acre frequent, sudden political upheavals. Indeed, African political institutions have yet to establish sufficient vitality to permit constitutional succession or change. In almost every country the situation ls complicated by growing andeconomic problems. At the same time, the white-dcmlnated regimes in southern Africa provide an attractive target for those Africans who wish to divert attention from their internal troubles and to restore their political standing.
FOB THE BOARD OF KATIOKAL ESTIMATES:
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Original document.
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