6
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
r i
a.
SblmAad b,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Contunvd inUNITEO STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Ai Indicoicd overleaf
jo October iraa AL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Authanricaled:
opy
fcfcwwg fifliVufelll orooniiarionsnporofion o/
MMte.nd the AfC. Concurring i
Or. R. J. Smith for (ho Deputy Director ol Control Intelligence
Mr.ughes, th, Director of Intelligence andDeportment of MM
tl Cen. Joseph F. Con-oll. thoefense InrefLgertce Agent, It. Cen.irector.ooncy Or.or the Auolont Ger*roi Monogor.nergy Cor..
AbHaming-
Mr.irll.von. *MM Director. Federal fiu.oau ol Instigation, th.g outildeurisdictlor.
-MX1 iLLTcTI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washing.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM 6
MB-ORAl-JDOf! FOR: Recipients of NIE6
Extreme Sensitivity of,
"Soviet Capabilities Tor Strategic Attack"
RJCIfARD )tEIMS Director
In accordance with theof the President, disseoiinatlon ofas been carefully limited because ofrCRQ sensitivity of tiie irtfornation therein.
Xn thisfish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this Katioate, and that no revelation of its erristence be code to unauthorized persons.
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CQNTENTS
THE PROBLEM
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
.. .
I. TRENDS IN POLICY AND DOCTRINE
II. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
Deployment Activitiei
Levels and Com posilion8 Slloi (SS-9)
Small Silos
Capabilities of lhe ICBM Force
Survivability
Reaction.
Alternate
Reentry.
Aeeuraey
Reflr.
Research andActivity atof Currentof New Systems
Status of Solid Propellant ICBMs Status of Mobile ICBM Development Future Trends In SovietD
Levels and Com portion
III MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
Force Levels and Composition
of tlieResearch and Developinent
D. Foice Levels and Composition
IV. MISSILE SUBMARINES
A. Ballistic Missile Siibriwincs II. Cruise MissilepetJlioual Capabilities D. Future Force Levels
V. LONC KANCE AVIATION
A. Recent Developme-i'i fn . 26
D. Aircraft
Levels and Composition
Capabilities23
Aircraft Development . 29
Development30
C. Force Levels
COMMAND AND31
MILITARY APPLICATIONS IN32
Support33
ANNEX A: TABLES OF WEAPON SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
ANNEX B: MAPS OF RANCE CAPABILITIES
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategicthroughnd lo estimate general (rends in thesethe nextears or
SUMMARY ANO CONCLUSIONS
A. The Soviets retain their belief in the primacy of strategic attack and defense forces, to deter the US and lo support their foreign policy. Soviet strategic attack forces will continue toariety of weapon systems, with chief emphasis upon ICBMs. The Soviets are building forces which we believe will give them, in the next year or two. greatly increased confidence that theyetaliatorysufficient to assure the destructionignificant portion of US industrial resources and population. They will probably also seek, through both strategic attack and defense programs, to improve their ability to reduce the damage the US can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and war in fact occur. Wc do not believe, however, that the Soviets will expect to achieve by thetrategic capabilities which would make rational tlie deliberate initiation of general war.'
'Mel. Cen. Jack E. Theaitu, theftaff. Intcllifirnte. USAF. boiM-vrs thai (Icclopntcftti at the pnit year reflectnnlinuinfi Soviet disuiulactwnnttute or strategic irtfeiiorityu the USiUintiiuiion lo eliminate imh IntVrlwily. Ilr wouht add the following In tlte flnil sentence:
ut ninj'rAtra alrrady underway, plmontlmtlnj; itronjffort,oviet netcrniinslinn tn rioets*nfcrimity tn one of al kwl numerical parity witli tlic US inid llaltetum would markedly inhorxi-the sgyrcssive pursuit nf'.*
7
Force. The Sovicls now havelaunchers. Wc estimate lhat thc USSR will have somelaunchers inhis is considerably moreanticipated In our last estimate and reflects our belief thatof launchers has been startedigher rate than ever before,
bout half the operational launchers will besmall and relatively inaccuratehii missile tsagainst large, soft targets such as cities. Deployment ofa large missile, more suitable for attacking hard targets,lower rate than the
present Soviet stress oa dispersed single silos,for therobably reflects decisions taken several yearsimprove sharply the survivability and thus the retaliatorythe ICBM force. Inboutercent of the.totalwill be hard.
Soviets might not fiod it advantageous to buildmuch larger than those we estimaten thethey might consider their deterrent Io be significantly moreand their military power improved if they can acquireforce about as large as that of the US. We thereforeSoviet ICBM force ofperational launchers inandn
orce ofaunchers would probablyof small, less expensiveorcer soincorporate greater qualitative improvements andof larger ICBMs. Characteristic of future deploymenthard silos and possibly mobile launchers. Qualitativewill probably include much better accuracies and mayreentry vehicles and penetration aids. Thethc force will probably be marked by interruptions aod leveling-off
On Jack E. Thorn Ji. lhc AiiWant Chlel" of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. believe* Out the Sovlcti could coiutrvct ilagle ido ICBM launcheriale which would enable Ihe USSR lo achieve numerical parity wtth the planned US programe would delete the lut sentence and fubatitule the following!
"Wcoviet ICBM force ofperational launcheri. If the USSRIRV capability, the launcher total may hold at; otherwise, the Soviet* probably will have upward!odSCO launcher* by thetTi."
3
phases ns new, more effective systems arc introduced aud olderare phased out.
C. We thinlc that ICBM forces falling anywhere within these estimated ranges could be considered asroadredible deterrent Thus we intend our estimate of future force levelsange of uncertainty, either side of which would reflect the same basic Soviet strategic concept.eriod so far ahead, however, much will depend oo the interplay between US and Soviet decisions taken ia the interim.
Soviets have recently conducted feasibility testsepressed trajectory ICBMractional orbitsystem. We cannot determine which, if either, of thesebe deployed.Either could become operationalould'hot be deployed in large numbers.'.
Forces. No major changes in thehave been noted during the past year. We estimate thatforce comprises somewhatf them hard, deployed atites. This forceofevastating attack against Eurasianis predominantly soft and concentrated. We believe thatthe period of this estimate the USSR will maintain somelaunchers. Qualitative improvements are expectedsolid propellant missiles, more hard launchers, andfor some portion of the force.
J. Missile Submarines. The Soviets presently haveissileuclear-powered)otal ofaunchers, and an equal number of cruise missile3 nuclear-powered) withaunchers. No new ballistic missile submarines have become operationaleew class of ballistic missilealmost certainly will be nuclear-powered and mayr more missilesange ofbe operational bye estimate that6 thc Soviets will have someoallistic missile submarines, including aboutf the new type. We believe that production of cruise missile submarines will continue, but
SCCBCT
er-
st ii reduced rate, intoj. Wc estimate thatf these units will be operational
K. Regular open ocean patrols by Soviet missile submarines have been stepped up in recent months. This patrol activity will probably continue to increase. By thes, as much asercent of the ballistic missile submarine force may be on station in potential missile launch areas at any one time. This number could beby whatever portion of their cruise missile submarine force tlie Soviets allocatetrategic attack mission,
L. Strategic Bomber Force. Long Range Aviation Isomber/tankerf which are heavies and the rest mediums. The primary mission of tlie heavies is intercontinental attack; at present,-the Soviets could probably puteavy bombers over US target areas oo twO-way missions. The medium bombers are mainly for use against Eurasian targets,ew squadrons might be employed for initial strikes against Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. The Soviets couldthc force over North America by using medium bombers onmissions, but we think this unlikely. The Soviets mayew medium bomber during the period of this estimate,ew heavy. We estimate that6 attrition andwill have reduced the heavy force to0 aircraft and the medium force to
M. Space Systems. For some years the USSR has been orbiting several types of satellites including reconnaissance types. Within theoears the Soviets will probably develop andariety of space systems (such as navigation and communications satellites) to further support their strategic attack forces. The Soviets
On Jack E.he Auiitant Chief of Stefl. Intelligence.elieve* the Soviets will continue to collider rrunned strategic aircnfl en Important element el iheir Inter-rontioental itriSce estlmatei the USSR hu the (inabilitythelimited lire of the Soviet ICBMrequirementajor manned strategic bomber efforthe US in the event of general war. and cold put ai many0 heavy and medium bombers over US target areai.
He eattmatae tbe USSR ts liiely lo incrodveeeOowon heavy bomberaew medium bomber into LRA within theears. Hc conclude! that8 LRA wfll coiubt ofeavy bombenwaneedium bombrii of both new and old types.
have long had the capability tuuclear-armed satellite and have frequently alluded to "orbitalecent feasibility tests could leadultiple-orbit bombardment system. For the foreseeable future, however, ICliMs are likely to bo much more effective and far less costly. This, plus the political liability which would be incurred byuclear weapon, lead us to believe that the Soviets are unlikely toultiple-orbit bombardment system in spacethc period of this estimate.
N. Research and Development. The Soviets continue torogram to develop and improve strategic attackigh levelctivity Is expected to coniinue. The USSR appears to be about as capable as the US of developing new strategic systems and subsystems which its leaders feel are important. enough to justify the expenditure of resources. Th deciding to deploy any new weapon system, however, the Soviets would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic cost and thc capabilities of the US to detect and counter it
0
DISCUSSION
I. TRENDS IN POUCY AMD DOCTRINE
The present Soviet political leaders seem more attentive than wasto professional military advice, and they have been willing to authorize increases in both military expenditures and manpower. Current military writingsearch for ways to broaden the options available to the USSR In the application of its military power. The Soviets arc showing increasing interest In improving thc capabilities of their general purpose forces to meet contingencies short of general war. At the same time, costly and intensive development of strategic forces is continuing.
The Soviets retain their belief In the primacy of strategic atuck and strategic defense forces, to deter thc US aod to support foreignajor element of their'policy for many years has been to build strategic attack and defensive capabilities so as to achieve forces which could posc'a'direct threat to the US and its allies snd could defend the Soviet homeland dgainst Western nuclear attack. To this end. the SovieUariety of forces to hold Western Europe hostage. Over thc years, they developed an intercontinental attack force, at first relying primarily on bombers, then increasingly on ICBMs in soft sites. They are now deploying hardened aod dispersed ICBM systems at an accelerated pace. They probably expect that theseby the other elements of their strategic attackincrease the credibility of their deterrent byetaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destructionignificant portion of US industrial resources and population.
We believe that over the nextears, Soviet strategic attack forces willariety of weapon systems, with chief emphasis upon ICBMs. Weonsiderable strengthening of these forces, particularly their capabilities for survival and retaliation. In addition, they will probably seek, through both offensive and defensive programs, to improve their ability to reduce the damage the US can inflict on the USSR.
Since Khrushchev's ouster, there has been some renewal of discussion about preemptive attack In Soviet militarynarshal Sokolov-skiy stated that "there is an increase in the possibilities for the prompt detection not only of the onset of the attack, but also of the onset of direct preparation of anIs, there arc possibilities touddene goes on to implyoviet attack may be directed toward blunting Ihe enemy attack and disorganizing his command and control mechanisms, as well as against the broad economic and military base of the nation. This type of theoretical
' By preemptive attack we mean a> attack Initiated on the conviction that an enemy attack Is imminent.
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TOP GCCRCT"
discussion may be Intended toationale (or developing strategic attack forces which could contribute to improved damage limiting capabilities.
We have considered the possibilityoviel attempt to acquire aof offensive and defensive forces which wouldrst strike sufficient to limit damage to the Soviel Union to acceptable proportions. Considering the number, hardness, and reaction times of targets to be struck in such an attack, and the likelihood that many would escape dcstiucUon,oviet effort wouldarge, highly sophisticated missile force, widespread and effective air and missile defenses, and an effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capa-bility. In view of tho technological and economic magnitude of the task and the likelihood that the US would detect and match or overmatch the Soviet effort, we believe the Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve, by the, strategic capabilities which would make rational the deliberate Initiation of general war.
The specific Soviet force goals will be influencedwide variety of factors. Tlsese could Involve, for example, the sheer momentum of deployment programs, attempts to capitalize on some lempoiiiy technological advantage,sychological urge to match or surpass the US 1st delivery systems. The large US strategic missile foice has almost certainly influenced the USSR to increase its ICBM force and to develop and deploy an antimissile defense system. The Soviets must be aware, however, that current US programming callseveling off of sUategic missile deployment within lheyear or so; they may sec this as offering them the opportunity to catch up with or surpass the US in numbers of ICBM launchers. On the other hand, the prospect of continuing qualitative improvements in US strategic attack forcesn accuracy, multiple reentry vehiclestc) wjU require cooitanl Soviet reevaluatfon of the numbers and types" of weapons they need US deproymeiil of an ABM System would probably elicit an increase in Soviet attack capabilitiesariety of ways, including development of sophisticated RVs and penetration aids. Bul in aoy case, lhe Sovieti will piobably face great uncertainties in deciding what precise force levels and composition would constitute adequate deterrence.
The Sino-Soviet dispute is not likely to affect Soviet programs for strategic attack forces during the period of this estimate. Such plana as the SovieU have developed in recent years have probably considered the possibility of awith the Chinese. Soviet forces for strategic attack in the Eurasian area are Sufficiently large and flesibleeal with Communist China as well as other targets
The SovieU will almost certainly continue intensive RfVD on strategic attack systems. They probably regard such an effort, like their otherrograms, as imperative in order to prevent the US fiomechnological advantage and. If possible, to gain some advanlagc for themselves. Evidence
fifXRCT
8
shows that (he Soviets are still intensively developing systems to improve (heir strategic attack capabilities, especially in the missile field. However, in deciding lo deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh thc prospective gain against the economic cost and the capabilities of tho US to detect and counter it
II. INTERCONTINENTAL BAUISThC MISSUES
A. Recent Deployment Activities
principal new development in Soviet ICBM deployment duringyear has been the starting of launcher constructionate higherbefore.ossible slowdown during thc first halfhefor small single silos was accelerated.elay has occurredcompletion of the small silos and somewhat fewer launchers are nowoperational than were previously estimated. The large silo* programahead about as estimated, although some increase in the startoccurred in this programlight speedup in thc pace ofbeen detected at these latter sites and the large silos are beingthree months earlier than estimated. We do not know bow longwill continue.
orce levels and Composition8
f the first and second generation ICBM launchers are believed to remain operational. There is no indicationoviet effort to modify or phase out older sites. We believe, however, that at least one of thcites mayole in the Soviet military space program.
We have identifiedCBM complexes, and we believe it highly unlikely that additional complexes remain undetected. On thc other hand, we consider it likely that some single silos in early stages of construction at these complexes have escaped detection; we make allowance for this in our estimate. Wc believe that operational Soviet ICBM strength over the next two years will be comprised solely of thc types of systems shown below.
TOP SCOUT
9
*
t
isa
H
(Triple Silo)
89
78
(Single Silo)
SS
(SS-ll)'
lS
41
Soft Hard
TOTAL .
Mi
4
78
leait one of these lakincbeitow be alloc)ted to the Soviet ipacc program
Thirty ol theae launchers may be tepipped with SS-9e.
These evrnbers do act reflectatbtbry that theigle idot (oemergency launch capability ihordy before they become fully operational.
"We eilimite lhat aome,f the launchen at Tyiuataoi could have an operational aj wed at RAD and training role. We judge that die other launchdlliei al Tyviatam arc not normally available for operaUonal use. but they could be prepared to Hie ICSMi at the US. the oumbri depending upon lhe amount of advance notice.
Cen. Jack E. Thomas, the AiiOUntf Staff, Intelligence. USAF. believrs lhal inasmuch a> operational Launchers at Tyuratamhreat to target areas in lhe USf"
-Tan ryuraUa. ICBM launchers srWd be mclvded In tbe
operational telali.
OG8
s
44
7It SOT
Por the 1> hers lined in (be table be would substitute:
Field Sites TTMTR
4
1 Oct
TOTAL
9 41
e}
onstruction of large stnglo-su'oj for iheissile began in4 at si* new ICBM complexes. We believe that unlilhe eomtructioo start rateites per quarter but subsequently increased somewhat to an averageites per quarter. We have now identifiedarge jilos operational and under construction. These silcn are deployed fn
GCCItfr-
groups of six. but we believe that each has its own launch control facility and lhat they can become operational one by one.
Small 5ifoiIJ
onstruction of small single-silos for theissile began inherogram differs from other Soviet ICBM programs in several respects: (a) thc silos are smaller and less complex; (b) they are being built in greater numbers; and (c) construction had been started onsites before the first test firing of theissile.
of small jingle-silos Is now underway at ninebelieve that untiljnstructlon startsitesalthough the rate was not constant and there may haveatubsequently, however, the rate increased touarter, and perhaps as many ase have now identifiedsmall silos operational or.under construction at the nine complexes.apparently being deployed In groups ofith one launch control'each group.
C. Operational Capabilities of the ICBMurvivability
thanercent of the launchers In the current Soviet ICBMsoft and are hence highly vulnerable, but the vulnerability of the forceas hard single-silo sites become the predominant elements.types of Soviet hard ICBM sites, including the new single silos,toesign overpressuresi" We believesites arc so widely dispersed as to present separate aiming points.
ft corf ion limo
times for current Soviet ICBM systems vary widelypropellant (cryogenic or storable liquid) and site configuration (soft,hard, or single-silorom normal readiness conditions, theto fire after the execution order Is received are estimatedecondsinutes for theystem to at leastours for Somewhat more than half of thc launchers in the current operational
'For performance characteristics of Soviet ICBMs, see Table I.
A bardesigned to remain completely operablepecified overpreisure from given weapon yields. This specified overpressure la called design o'Crpressure. Hardness is the Qveipicsiure at which, for given weaponite becomei inoperable. The dcitgn overpressure estimated above is0 MT weapon. Hardness will vary with difference* In engineering practice and In weapon yield.
'en. Jack E. Thorn as, the Assistant Chief of Stiff. Intelligence. USAF. considers that, given Ihe uncertainties Involved, no meaningful estimate of the design overpressure of Soviet hard sitea can beigure it required, be believe)alueit should be wed.
-ret* secrct-
forco ate capable o( firing ininutes or leu when at normal readiness; about two-thirds of the estimated operational launchers in8 will be capable of filing in five minutes or less.
Alltinalm Toioe'finj
believe that Soviet strategic missile forces are capable ofbut that this capability is not as flexible and rapid as In USof the nature of the guidance systems and the lack of onboard computers.
Vehkfti
Soviets have moved toward RVs with lower ballisticlarger radar cross section. Such vehicles are less accurate and moreto detection aad interception. On the other band, they lendto simpler nuclear weapon design and would be more adaptable toguidance (though the latter would require an RV design different fromemployed in theurrent Soviet RVs may have someagainst
Aeeivocy
All present Soviet ICBMs have radio-inertial or aD-inerua|
best current Soviet ICBM accuracy is represented by thehichEP. now and will probably approach OS run,with normal product Improvement. With its large payload and thisthes suitable for attacking hard targets. Thehoughsomewhat more recently, was evidently intendedifferentand does not incorporate its accurate guidance as theWIth Itssmall payload and an estimated presentagainst large, soft targets. The very blunt. slow-speed RV of theto its inaccuracy. Theould incorporate accuracylo achieve
redesigned BVest piogram covering aboul two years. Wc think itlhat the Soviets will undertakerogram in light of tbe probable development of more accurate follow-on systems.
e have considered Soviet capabilities to achieve very high ICBMfocusing mainly on whether and when the Soviets are likely to achieve CEPs ofm. to increase the effectiveness of relatively small RVs against small, hard targets. To achieve CEPs in the lower end of this range the Soviets would have to develop new guidance systems, probablymid course corrections, and to design new RVs for either faster reentry or limited terminal guidance maneuver. These changes could be incorporated into present or follow-on ICBM systemsevelopment program of about
-fep-seoBcf-
five yeats, though in lhe case of any pi went system iho changes could he such as lo constitute for all practical purposes the developmentew system. We would probably detect the testing ofystem one to two years prior lo IOC.
We think it unlikely that the Soviets have embarked on tbe development of very high accuracies for their present systems. In the case ofasritical factor and the Soviet object has clearly been to rapidly develop andarge number of suivivable city-busters. In view of past Soviet development practices, the major changes that would be required In thend the probable Soviet intent toollow-on ICBM withof various sorts (see latert ts likely that very high accuracymall ICBM wouldew system. In lhe case of theery high accuracy would be required if the Soviets elected to develop an effective MIKV capability agaimt hard targets. In this case, retrofit into tbeorce or Incorporationollow-on large ICBM system would be possible
We do believe, however, that tbe Soviets Will seek very, high accuraciei for some future ICBM systems. Considering the techniques 'required anddevelopment tunes, we think that such systems will probably haveCEPs ofm. when they reach IOC in ther.ecision to achieve. CEP It made soon, these new systems could have ihu accuracy by2 We have no evidence that the Soviets have madeecision but consider It likely that they will do so in the next year or so.
tain
e believe that Soviet soft launchersc6rc capability and that on the average two missiles are available for each such launcher. This gives the currentheoretical retire capability of more than HO ICBMsours after the initial launch from soft sites. As soft sites are phased Out. thu capability will decline It is unlikely that the bard sitese&re capability.
D. ICBM Research and Developmtml Com'ruclJon Acfm'y ol rj-uro'om
e estimate thai there areaunchers operational or underat Tyuratam. Most of the facilities there can be associated with nisi ing ICBM systems or with the space program, but some of those recently completed or under construction ate probably intended for systems slill under Testing of some new missiles appears bkely during the nest year or so.
of Current fCSMi
2S. Test range firing of all currently deployed ICBMs has continued over the past year. Launches have been made from Tyuratam and. for some ICBMs.
13
from Plesetsk and Omsk.Terllno of New Systems
During thc pan year the Soviet! have been conducting from Tyuretirn whit we believe to be feasibility teatsew and quite differentwhich we designate thehis syslem (theoosterew third stage and RV) has been used in two typei of tests. Based oo available data, it appeals that differing objectives were attempted.
Onay, tlie second and third stages and the RV were launched. ballistic trajectory having an apogee of. (ICBMs Sred to the same range on normal trajectories would reach apogees-
. [_
his suggests that thisest of components and techniqueseapon system.
Inhe same system was used to put the second and third stage andV into orbit We believeeorbltoccurred during the Grit orbit and that tlie vehicle was intended to impact in the normal earth satellite vehicle recovery area In Kazakhstan. At some point the components In orbit disintegrated. We cannot determine whether the deorbil attempt succeeded or failed.
These tests could lead to the developmentractional orbitsyslem (FOBS)epressed trajectoryOBSICBM could serve to degrade the value of US antimissilesystems and complicate lhe US problem of developing effective ABMMany DICBM trajectories could avoid thc ballistic missile earlysystem (BMF.WS) radarOBS could attack from many angles, and possibly pass unidirectional warning or defense systems undetected. Either syslem would be less effective than ICBMs in terms of CF.I's (two miles or more) and deliverable payload, but could be used for surprise attackew key soft targets just before the main weight of an ICBM attack penetrated the BMEWS. If the Soviets elect lo pursue the development of either DICBMs or FOBS, they would probably be deployed in lelitively small numbers to supplement their ICBM forces. IOC could be achieved by7
There is no evidence that lhe Proton booster) will be developedery large ICBM. This booster has been employed in four space bunches,
'These tests could also be leUted to the developmentultiple orbit bomnxdmcnl syiiemee.
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three of which were successful, from Tyuralam over Ihe past yearalf Tlte slow firing mioton indicates that the Soviets are not pressing the development of this vehicle, whatever its intended role. On ihis basis, even assuming that the Soviets decide toeaponlscd version, therewould notery large ICBM operational within thetwo yean.
Proton booster probably was In anhase at that time. Sincethere hasharp dedine in the attentionto such ain Soviet writing and oratory. Consideringdystem and the obvious emphasis on other systems, weconsider It probable that the Soviets will deploy an ICBM of the However, we slill cannot entirely ex-
clude the possibility 'hat an ICBM system will be developed during theoery large payload.
Sfofui of So/id rVopellanl ICBMl
here Is no' evidence that the Soviets have flightomplete solid propellant ICBM. In the5 Moscow parade, theyhree stage missile design (Savage) which appeared compatiblemall, solid propellant ICBM concept. We think it unlikely that the Savage itself is good enough lo warrant development for operational use. but it may be partong-term program to develop solid ICBM systems.
e have identified sii Soviet solid propellant manufacturing and test facilities. We estimate flat the development program at these complexesdid not really get underwayolid propellant missiles have been tested at Kapustin Yar to less than ICBM ranges. Some ICBM launchers at Tyuratam could be used for solid propellant missiles. Considering these factors, we think the developmental test firing of solid mis tiles to ICBM ranges could begin soon. Because thc USSR's solid propellnnl technology evidently lags considerably behind its liquid technology, and because different guidance methods are required. It will probably take the Soviets some time to develop solid ICBMs which are effective enough to warrant deployment. The IOColid system for hard-silo deployment could probably occur two or three years after the Hart of testing to ICBMobile system could probably achieve IOC somewhat later.
Slofutop<*eni
he Soviets have displayed what they daira to be two mobile surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers and have claimed that one of lhe missiles (Scrooge) has an intercontinental range. We have no Information on the missile itself and iho size of the canister ts more compatible with an IRBM. Hence we doubt that these missiles are prototypesobile ICBM. However.
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there is some chines lhat lhe USSR willobile ICDM asof increasing lhc survivability of its ICBM forces. Wc believehe adaptedobile syslem but we consider this unlikely. thus far to less than ICBM range couldtep in the
directionolid propellant ICBM;ystem could be used for mobile as well as hard-silo deployment.*
Future Jrendr in Soviet (CAM flSD
3
Thc Soviet Union appears to be about as. technically capable as thc US to develop new ICBM systems and subsystems which its leaders feel areenough to justify the expenditure" of resources. There Is no known major technical weakness that would preclude Soviet development ofaids, advanced reentry systems, and new guidance techniques.
The Soviets have extensive experience in chaff and electronic counter-measures in conjunction with aircraft defense. The SovieU couldeet) penetration aids two to four years afterevelopment program. The low ballistic coefficients and highof present Soviet RVs decrease the effectiveness ofeet) penetrationerminal decoy program including aRV would probably require at least five yearsoviet decision to develop any particular penetration system will depend on their knowledge of the nature of the ABM system the US plans to deploy. Testing of penetration aids, if conducted to ICBM ranges, would probably beear or two before IOC.
The development of RVs with increased hardening to withstand nuclear effects is probably well within the Soviet capability. Because of their size and shape, thendVs could readily be hardenedariety of nuclear effectsignificant degradation In yield. .The Soviets flewthrough the region of their high altitude nuclear detonations1hese tests, while probably oriented primarily towards the electronic defensive systems problem, gave tbe Soviets data on thc use of nuclear weaponsrecursor role.
There is no evidence that Ihe Soviets have initiated an advanced RVand we think they are unlikely to do so for penetration alone, unless
'For detailsSection (II, 'Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic
M issues."
TOP
the USefensive system. However, the Soviets might, regardless of US programs, develop multiple RVi and multiple independently targeted HVs (MlrWs) for purposes other thao as penetration aids, eg, incr easing the numbers of deliverable warheads.
A relatively simple multiple HV delivery capability probably could be achieved withinonths after thc start of flight testing. Wc would aspect to detectevelopment during the test phase. Development of either MIRVi or maneuverable RVs (MARVsJ involves significantly greaterthan multiple RVs. particularly in guidance andtrol; operatiooalcould probably be achieved about two to three years after flight test began.
If the Soviets undertake early ImplementationIRV program, we think lheould bo the most likely carrier because of Its large payload capability. To giveIRV capability against haid targets would involve the development of some method to accurately distribute several independent RVsombined weight ofounds. Accuracy would bo the pacing Item and would probably requite improvements in boost-phase guidance and the additionadio midcoursc collection system. IfIRVwere to be initiated In the very near future. IOC could be achievedc would expect to detect testing ofystem two to three years prior to itsess accurateIRV system, capable of attack-ing soft targets, could be attainedWe would expect to seeystem testedear prior to its IOC. We consider it unlikely that this latter program would be undertaken In light of lhe growing capability for attacking soft targets represented by thoCBM deployment program.
Force levels ond Composition
many uncertainties involvedairly wide range inof thc size and compositson of Soviet ICBM forceslies in trying to judge the extent to which the Sovicis willimprovements or numerical growth in their ICBM forces, orfor example, the Soviets were to continue to deploy both current typessilos at the recent high rates, making no attempt to introduce newand were to retain all current first and second generation launchers,ICBM force would numerically equalCBMprogrammed by lite US, sometimen this same basis, thecould be as highperational launchers byy
here arc. however, certain factors which 'm our view will serve to limit the sire of tbe force16 to numbers well below these extremes. Among these are precedents from past Soviet ICBM programming. While the receni construction start rate in the single-silo programs Is higher titan that
17
observed in earlier programs, short-term fluctuationsower long-term average haveommon feature of Soviet ICBM deployment. Further, deployment Harts for any one system have not extended beyond about four years. In this connection, current Sovietctivity is strong evidence that they have not fixed upon their present combination of systems as the optimum one, to be used indefinitely in building their ICBM force. Past Soviet practice makes it seem likely that pauses and interruptions in deployment activity,in plateaus in force levels, wouldransition from current to follow-on programs.
Such precedents could readily be shattered, however, and wo must base our estimate of Soviet ICBM forces8 largely on Judgments about broad Soviet objectives, the Soviet assessment of the capabilities andof the force they are now deploying, and the possibilities available to them through. Anticipated developments in US and Soviet forces, particularly in strategic defenses, will bear significantly on Soviet decisions. Based ot present information, we think thc Soviets need not plan'on an effective US ABM capability until late in the period at best. But' they also cannotonfident calculation of the damage-limiting capabilities of their own ABM defenses over thc long term, in light of the US development of penetration aids. Soviet strategic defense, space, and other important national programs will be In continuing competition with the strategic attack forces for resources. It seems certain that any present Soviet decisions about the future size and composilion of their ICBM forces will be modified repeatedly in response to changes in resousce availability. In US and Soviet military technology, in US forces, and in thc general Soviet view of world aHairs,
Wc continue to estimate that, through thc, the Soviets will regard their ICBM forcesital elementtrategic posture designed to deter attack and toowerful buttress to foreign policy. In strategic military terms this callsorce which can threaten heavy and assuredand which can alsowith their defensivesome prospect of reducing damage should deterrence fail and war in fact occur. The Soviet force now being deployed clearlyecision, which must have been reached during the last years of Khrushchev's regime, toowerful retaliatory capability. Thc sharp near-term increase in hard silos is attributable largely to deployment of thehose estimated payload and accuracy make it suitable only for attacking soft targets, such as cities, not hard counlerforce targets. Current deployment programs will probably give thc Soviet leadership,. greatly increased confidence in their assured destruction capabilityapability, even In the caseurprise US first strike, to guarantee the devastation of the US in retaliation).
n considering thc goals of their ICBM program beyond this point, the Soviet leaders will, of course, have examined the possibility ofirst
strike counlcrlotcc capabilityconjunction with their strategic-would be sufficient to limit to acceptable proportions the damageS retaliatory strike could inflict on the USSH Conceivably the Sovieis could contemplate achievingapability, in part by continuing large scale ICBM deployment, emphasiring missiles with heavy payloads. and incorporatingguidance and MlliV systems as they can be made available.thc number, hardness, and reaction times of targets to be struck In such an attack, and the likelihood that many would escape destruction,oviet effort would require notarge, highly sophisticated missile force, but also widespread and effective air and missile defenses, and an effective ASWThe technological and economic magnitude of the task would be formidable, however, and the Soviets would have to reckon with the likelihood that the US would detect and match or ovennitch the Soviet effort All things considered, therefore, wc continue to believe the Soviet leaders do not expect to acquire an ICBM capability sufficient to permit them loirst strike against the US without receiving unacceptable damage In return.-
Thus, strategic military considerations give us reason to believe lhat the SovieU might not find it advantageous to Increase their ICBM foice muchaunchers we estimate they will have byn the other hand, the Soviets may build more launchers to add to their damage-limiting capability, or because they want lo gain still greater assurance of theirpower, or both. Moreover, we think thereood chance that. In thc view of the Soviet poliiical leaders, the USSR's deterrent would be significantly more convincing and its national power belter appreciated If its ICBM force had about as many launchers as the US. This, given the larger payloads of most current types of Soviet ICBMs, would altoonsiderable superiority in megatons. In their propaganda, the Soviets have emphasized the sire and payload of theiroal of rough numerical parity with the US ICBM force as now programmed may seem attainable and atti active to the Soviets.
Within the general rangeeveling off in numbers or continued growth to rough nurtvrricel parity with the US. the sire and composition of the Soviet ICBM force6 willunction of Soviet decisions about qualitative improvements. In general, we think thc Sovicls will seek to preserve andthe survivability of the force and to achieve better capabilities for attack. Most of their present systems lack sufficient accuracy for attacking US hard targets. Thendystems in soft sites have relatively long reaction tunes and require considerable maintenance effort and expense. Finally,of iheir fixed basing the survivability of even the hardened systems could be degraded by possible future improvements in US weapons.
Tlie current PAD activities provide clues as to how the Soviet! maytheir capabilities in follow-on systems for use in thcs and. Evident Soviet Interests include solid-propellant missiles, mobile sys-
19
terns, and ay items wiih unusual trajectories. Given Soviet technical capabilities and Soviet needs, these considerations lead us to estimate new systems lor this time period as follows:
mall, more accurate solid or storablc liquid-propellant ICBM in hard and rsossibly mobile configuration.ued deployment liquid system would be more hVety lo appear during the early part of this range; solid or mobile systems could probably be achieved somewhateployment in fixed sites would provide better alert rates, reliabilities, and reaction times than mobile deployment, and would reduce maintenance requirements as well. Fused deployment could be by retrofitting intosilos or In new silos, or both. Mobile deploymenl would greatlyvulnerability, especially if it featured concealrneut aud/or random movement,
a possibilityew large liquid-propellant ICBM with high accuracy.ystem would have improved capabilities against hard targets and might incorpotate Ml RVsAn alternative would be continued deployment of thencorporating improvements .in accuracy and MIRVs, if and as developed.)
a possibility forICBM or FOBS.
Thc probable adventollow-on small ICBM system contribuics to our belief lhal the currenteployment program will have Lean completedeployment might coniinue intor be supplanted by an improved system. At the same lime, it ij likely that the obsolescentndoft sites will begin phasing out innd the remainder of theear or so bier. At some point in, thc Soviet* will probably also begin to phase out soilites,ew years later tbe remainder of theorce (by then aboulears old) will piobably be phasing out as well. Thus wc believe lhat new systems will, in pari, replace and. In pail, supplement the exisling fotce of launchers.
Considering the various factors we have discussed, weoviet ICBM force of someperaUonal launchers inndnorce near the low side of the range, thoughsubstantial numbers of small single silos and possibly mobile launchers would probably incorporate greater qualitative improvements and significant numbers of large ICBMs. perhaps with sophisticated RV* and penetration aids.
" Mej. Cen. Jerk E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief ol Stsf. iMcTKcence, USAF, would icwoid this furl lenience ai follows:
"Coraldeilng the veiloui factors we have dliciiued, weoviet ICHM force ofperational launchen by I'HO-lfWl. If the USSRIRV capability, lhe launcher total may remain at. otVi-iv. the SoviruwillpwardsndMO launchers by Ihe mid-laWa."
TOP SfrCiK-f-
In addition. the phase-out of the second generation hard launchers wouldbegin earlier and be completed wellorce near the high side of the spread would probably consist primarily of small, less expensive ICBMs in single silos and possiblyobile configuration and alio theof second generation hard launchen upoward the end of the period, the emphasis is likely to be oa the incorporation of better guidance, penetration aids, and perhaps MIRVs into missiles already deployed, rather thanheer increase In numbers.
think that ICBM forces falling anywhere within these estimatedconsidered asroad Soviet criterionrediblewe Intend our estimates16ange of uncertainty asnumbers and types of weapons, either side of which would reflectbasic Soviet strategic concepteriod so lar ahead, however,depend on the Interplay between US and Soviet decisions taken in
III. MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALllSTtC MISSIIES
A Current force levels ond Composition
have no evidence of additional MRBM/IRBM sites, either underor operational, nor any other major changes in the force. Ourthe composition of tbe force throughs shown below:
On :
Si
tm
Oil
50
SI
ToT
MRHM/lltOM
..
10
In addition, (here areixed field sites, located al or near MRBM complexes. Most of these sites have four potential launch positions but few. if any. permanent facilities. They may serve as Iraining sites or alternate sites; Soviet documentsiscussed tbe use of alternate tiles for refire purposes after the initial salvo from the pcimsry site. There Is nothat sufficient crews and equipment are available to use both ibe primary sites and the fUcd Geld positions simultsnecusly.
T^vsm *
-fQP-SgCftCT-
of iho forte "
Thc Soviet MRBM/IRBM forceassive capability for attack on Eurasia and especially on European targets. Approximatelyercent of the force is deployedroad belt in western USSR, from tlie Baltic to the Black Sea. The remainder is mostly deployed in the Far East with aof sites in thc Caucasus.
Soft launchers are generally deployed fourite, with two or three sitesomplex. We believe that al) thc soft launchersefire capability. MRBM and IRBM hard sites contain four and three launch silos, respectively. We believe that the hard sites are configured for In-sllo launch; they probably do notefire capability. Because of their similarities to hard ICBM sites, we continue to estimate that they have the same design overpressuresi (see
Ond-.
test programs at Kapustin('iat 8system ^development.^
solid propellant missile, has been flight tested six times. Although it has been fired only to. impact
hf. lofted trajectory of the flights suggestachieve IOC in
iSoviet publica-
lionsjhow that the SovieUequirementobileto be the most likely candidateobile role. Hence
it is possiWelnat abe deployed with Scamp, or Scrooge,
or both,
" For performance chancre rut ies of Soviet MRBM/IRBMi, see
ci> (net E. TliOinas. the Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence. USAF. considers thai, given ihe uncertainties involved, no meaningful estimate of the design oveiptcsture ol Soviel hard sites can be made.igure is required, he believesaluesi should be used.
D. Force Lcveli ond Composition in
e believe that the size of tbe Soviet MRBM/IRBM force will remain within the general rangeaunchers throughout thc period of this estimate. We do, however, look for changes In the nature of the force during this period, when the obsolescence of thendystems will probably require thc Soviets to carryajor replacement program. We anticipate that the two most important features of the follow on systems will be (a) further dispersion in hud sites and (b) mobility.
f these newew missile In hard sites will probably beto appear.probably begin to replacend SS-5
missiles at Misting hard sites by the middlehis retrofit program should be completed and additional deployment of new hard siagle-silo launchers, utilising existing support facilities, could be well underway, to be completed in its tuin by
Mobility continues to be emphasized In Soviet statements, and.would clearly make thc MRBM/IRBM force more flexible and far less vulnerable. Mobile launchers could be concealed and moved at irregular intervals, making it difficult for us to determine their numbers and locations. They could also be shifted tohanging threat, for example, some might be deployed along thc Chinese bordereriod of worsening Sino-Soviet relations.
e estimate that6 the present force ofndissiles will have been phased out. The projected force will consul of new missile systems in mobile, mullisili. and slngle-sslo deployment. These systems will be more survivablc. more flexible, and more costly than current systems. Considering these factors, and thc probable advent of other improved systems for theater force support, the Soviets may conclude that their slrategic requirements can be metmalleraunchers. On the other hand, thc Soviets may continue to see the needorce of, If, for example, they considered that thc threat fiom Europe or China bad increased.
IV. MISSILE SUBMARINES
present Soviet missile submarine force comprisesubmarines withtotal ofaunchers, and an equal numbermissile units withaunchers.
A. Ballistic Missile Submarines
the Soviets intended to employ ballistic missile submarinesbroad range of strategic landecision was apparently madeto limit potential targets for ballistic missile submarines to enemyand support facilities, and to emphasize efforts lo counter US carrier
SCCRCT '
taikccordingly, construction of ballistic missile submarines wasand cruise missile submarine production increased.owever, si new decision was apparently made to augment and diversify Soviet strategic attack forces with an improved submarine-launched ballistic missile system.
We believeew class of ballistic missilealmost certainly will be nuclear-powered and may carry eight or moreunder construction.ew weapon system would probablyew solid or improved liquid propellant missileange of. Some recent test-firing activity at Kapustin Yar may be related toissile, but it is also possible that an appropriate missile has not yet been test fired. In any. missile could probably bo ready for Installation withinear from now. Considering necessary systems Integration and testing weomplete weapon system could becomo operational by
'Ihree other types of ballistic missile submarines are currently operational in the Soviet Navy, (he long-rangelasilass and thclass. These submarines carry.issile systemlass boar was equipped toew. longer range missile.low paced program Is nowto convertlass to Ere theome oflass units may be similarly converted.
B. Cruise Missile Submarines
cruiseew years laterfirst ballistic missilea primary mission of counteringforces, particularly carrier forces. Cruise missile submarines can beagainst land largcls and as the number of these units increase wewill be so employed,
e hellcvc lhat cruise missile submarines are being built at three of the four Soviel shipyards now engaged in submarine constructinn,nits are being delivered each year. Ofre nuclearre diesel-powered units. The Soviets probably will continue to build both thend thelassesut production of the latterare equipped with only four missiles perwill end soon thereafter. Construction of thc morel-dass uniu with eight missiles per boat probably will continue into.
ll Soviet cruise missile submarines carry theissile whichserviceepending on Sight profile, this missile may be fired lo ranges upiles. It bas an active radar homing system possibly sup-
plcmcuted by Infrared. Tht* missile was designed primarily fo* use againsi surface ships, bul can also be used against land targets, probably with inertial guidance. The Soviets are still developing improved techniques forof thet least against ships. During the neatew type of cruise missile with increased range, speed and accuracy may belo further enhance tha capabilities of this versatile weapon system.
C. Operational Capabilities "
pen ocean patrols by Soviet missilenotedegular basis iobeen stepped up in recent months. The Soviets appear to have gained considerable confidence In thc reliability of their nuclear submarines and now send them on frequent open ocean patrols without benefit of surfnee ship support As many as five missile submarines have been noted on simultaneous patrols, some of them Io patrol areas which, by now. are well established. Ballistic missile submarines still do not'deploy Io strike stations off thc US mainland, but generally cruise within two or three days steaming lime of potential launch areas off the US cast and west coasts. We estimate that this patrol activity will increase. Because of the UcV ofarea bases, however, and operational limitations of their force, the Soviets could probably not keep more than aboutercent of their ballistic missile submarines continuously on station in potential missile bunch areas. We believe that by thes this may be the normal level of operation! This number could be augmented by whatever portion of their cruise missile force tbe Soviets allocatetrategic attack mission.
hc latest lype of nuclear-powered missile submarines operational with the Soviet fleet can reach speeds of aboutnots and normal operating depths ofeci. Using presently available material and technologyew class of missile submarine, speeds of aboulnots and operating depthseet probably can be achieved. Slgnlflcanlly greater speed and diving deplh capabilities for Soviet missile submarines are not expected during the period of this estimate.
xisting Soviel nuclear submarinesubstantial amount of noitel
^especially at speeds
abovernots. When seeking to counter such US systems, thc Soviets apparently use the technique of operating at lower speeds. An effective noise reduction program for existing Soviet submarines would require extensive and costly modifications Toelatively quiet submarine over all speed ranges would probably require developmentew class, with redesigned
" For performance characteristics of Soviet submarine launchedable HI.cha.ecterlit.ci ofTable VI.
internalew hull formew propeller arrangement. Any new type of submarine will probably incorporate tome of there features.
e have little evidence on which to base an estimate as to whether the Soviets still rely mainly on celestial and bottom contour methods of navigation. There is evidence, however, of Soviet interest inquipment Several under ice cruises by nuclear submarines suggest the csistence of an advanced navigation system, perhaps inertial. Nrw navigation systems will probably be in service soon; these mightLK radio system, an earth satellite system, or an Inertial system.
The Soviets have substantially Improved the support for their submarine forces during tbe past several years. Additional auxiliary ships have been built, new bases have been established, and eristing bases have been expanded and hardened. Additional Improvements along these lines are expected. The lack of forward area bases, however, will coniinue to handicap any.Soviet eSoct toigh level of submarine patrols oU tbc US rruunUnd.
uture force Levels
P
orce goals for the missile Beet will be determined in part by futurein both US and Soviet weapon systems. Our estimates of missile -ibmarine programs take account of the Soviet commitment lo their ICBM ograms. and their estimated requirements for otber types of surxnarines.'*
We believe that (he new lype of ballistic missile submarine will enter service bynd that aboutf these units probably will bebye estimate that aboutould be in servicey then, however. Ihe oldest class of ballistic missilethave been scrapped or placed in reserve. Thus, thc total ballistic missile submarine force6 is estimatedubmarines.
If. as we believe, cruise missile submarine construction continues, buteduced rate, aboutf these units will be in service inay stop altogether at about that time. On the other hand, the Soviets maytrategic attack role for this type, in which case production would coniinue for several more years. We believe thatost of Ihelass conversions will have been retired from lhc force. The total number of cruise missile submarineshen, is estimatedh thc number remaining on tbe high side if construction continues inlo the.
. o ^programs, see NIE
CapabinUej of Soviet General Purpose Forces, ECRET.
KS'nMATED SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINE
5
3-5
5-8
0
37
27
. i
2
Muiflo Sot-aiarine* Nuclear
3 lubea)
HIIubes)
Newrtuba)
Subtotal
Dicac!
Z-Coovcnloaobaa)
ai (stubM)
'.IIubea)
Subtotal.
TOTAL Balhitte Mbeik Saba
tile Submarine* Nucleai .
6 tubal)
8 tube*)
Subtotal
Diesel
ubes)
Subtotal
TOTAL Cruise Mead* Saba
V. LONG RANGE AVIATION
Range AviationA) continue* ioignificant componentstrategic attack capability. Tbc force now computes tomeaircraft ofre heavies and the remainder,heavyanker force is believed to have the primary mission ofattack while lhe medium force Is behoved to be mainly foragainst Eurasian targets."
A. Recent Developments in IRA
general. LRA activity during the past year continued to reflectlhe primary missions discussed above. The secondary mission of
major
n Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant duet ol Slaf. lrM&re-oe, USAF.because ol their ranga and weapon oarryiaf; capabdlUet. and in view of thetire of the Soviet ICBM loice. Soviet mediumnfta>H>
million of attaili against tbe US In general war.
27
navalinucs lo he given some emphasis with boih heavy and medium bomber aircraft noled in this type of activity during the past Yeaj..
the past year, there hasarginal decline in thefrom slight reductions in the Bison heavy bomber/tanker andbomber/tanker components. The iniroduction of Blinders intobomber force, while continuing, has not been at the ratedelay may be attributable to some dissatisfaction with Blinder, andwith the development of the ASM associated with thc Blinderacquired over the past year or so indicates that LRA Dadgerjacquiring an ASM capability. This suggestsew programto prolong the life of the aging Badger by providingrogram may be io response to difficultiesitchen ASM for the Blinder B.
ircraft Production
Blinder supersonic-dash medium bomber and the Bear heavythc only slralegic attack aircraft now in production. Bear productionat about one aircraft per month with virtually ali going toAviation. Although we believe that even this very limitedend within the not year orear modification program maylonger, possiblyew ASM. Blinder production atas proceeded slowly, probably because of technical duilcultics. Plantprobably now producing thelassic transport In addition, aprogram is also underway there. While it may be possiblethree programs to be carried out simultaneously, there is no Sovietone plant to produce two different aircraft and modifyhirdwc believe Blinder production will continue at the rate offour aircraft per month for the next year or so. with the majority goiM
C. Force Levels ond Composition8
believe that the Soviets will maintain their heavy bomber/tankerabout the present level over the next two years. The largestin the near term will be in the medium bomber/tankerout of Badgers is evidentlyate slower than previously estimated.
" Maj. Cen. Jack E.he Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, dees not considerdequate bamudgment that Bear and Blinder production will codear or to. unlesissumed that the USSR already is pceparinS to producedels. He believes thai Soviet efforts to moderniae the Soviel lona; range manned-aircraft capability, a* evidenced by Untiled, but continuing, production of Bear and Blinder, probablv will continue until (he USSR has decided upon specific fouow-oo model*.
-TOI
bul ii still noi likely to be offset by tlie introduction ofur estimate of the composition of LHA through mid-IOCS is shown below.
STRfcNCTIf OF SOVIET LONC RANGE AVIATION
Or.r 7
Bombers and Taolcrt
ZOO-BIO
Bombers and Tankers
0
965
is evident that the Sovieis view their growing ICBM force ascomponent of their stralegic attack capability. Nevertheless, theproduction of Bears, thc slow development of lhe Blinder, andindicating the development of an ASM capability in the LRAshow that lhe SovieU consider manned bombenecessarystrategic attack, at least for tbe near term. Thus, we believe thatintend to retain suable bomber forces, but that they willecrease through attrition and gradual retirement of older models.
D. Operational
operational capabilities of the aircraft assigned lo LHA and analysispatterns continue to indicate that an aircraft attack against theAlaska) would involve heavy bombers almost eaclusively. Wcthat the SovieU would commit virtually their entire heavyof LRA to this mission. Considering the requirements for Arctic staging
" Mat- Cen. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of SuH.USAF. consider* this section seriously undcmtimatei lhc manned aircraft threat So th* US. II* believes that the Soviet medaun bontbert stillajor mission of itritegie altatk againat the US.
Theiriieiusability againat Eoraiia* targetsMR/IRBMi. ihorter rangeactical fighters aad lightnd bewban of Naval AnaUeat. buihaselaliiely aauall ICBM and heavy bomber >ibdrtj The Soviel meiik rabmarine force is noi known ltd so have operated in Ml potential launch arcu off the US coasts. In this aituition, the Aiiutanl Chief of Staf. Intelligence. USAF, believe* the Soviet leaderihtji recugniaes athat medium bomher* ha picptrad to augntcnt other elements of th* inleuontinenlal iluke forces. If the Sovirisan all-out allxk he estimate* they could putomber* over US target areas, includingedium bombers on range millions.
-For peefc-msam- rbaiacfito-c* ol Soviet strategic bomber aircraft andee Table* IV and V,
"TOP-SfrC-tffcf-
aerial refueling as well as tioncombat attrition, we estimate that at present thc Soviets could puteavy bombed over taiget areas in the US on two-way missions.
Wc believe that medium bombers do not now figure prominently in Soviet plans for an initial attack on the US (exceptange limitations of the medium bombers would dictate Arctic staging and aerial refueling for two-way missions against US targets. The success of any attempt to use Badgers against thc US would depend, in large part, upon logistics. While LRA has gained extensive flying experience in the Arctic, its capabilities are limited by an Arctic airbase structure which must be supplied almost entirely by sea during tbe short shipping season. The Soviets have not yetogistics capability toarge force (several hundred bombers) quickly through the region. For these reasons, .we believe that the Arctic staging bases could notsupport heavy bomber and medium bomber strikes of majorWe consider it possible, however,ew squadrons of.Badgers would be employed in attacks on Alaska, Canada, Greenland,'and Iceland on two-way
The Soviets could further increase the number of bombers arriving over North America should they resort to one-way attacks with medium bombers. Considering the growth in the Soviet ICBM and missile submarine forces we think such use of medium bombers is unlikely.
Available information indicates that LRA does not continuouslyortion of its force on an airborne or ground alerteaction time ofinutes Ore estimate that with current manning, LRA could establish and maintain one-third .of thc force on ground alert;light augmentation in personnel this could be raised toercent,
E. New Aircraft Development
There is no evidence which identifies any specific Sovietollow-on heavy bomber. Discernible Soviet work in large aircraft is directed primarily toward the development of new transports. This workthe state-of-the-art andechnological and production base which could be applied to bomber development. If the USSR has actively pursued RID and committed funds for production andew subsonic heavy bomber wiih capabilities slightly better than the Bear could enter servicen the other hand, they may prolong the life of thc Bear byew ASM. Wc believe that we would obtain indications of the development and production of such an aircraft one to three years prior to ils introduction into operational units.
Considering lhe probable growth of Soviet ballistic missile capabilities over the nextears, wc believe it unlikely that the USSR will introduce a
lollow-on heavy bomber inlo LRA during the period of ihii estimate.'* It is possible, however, that Soviet views on thc primacy of missiles will change. For example, US deployment of an ADM system might lead them hack lo the manned bombereans of circumventing thc new defenses.
requirement which led to tbe Blinder, and the troublesthe Blinder, may lead thc Soviets toollow on mediumSoviets couldupersonic-dash medium bomber with betterand radius than the Blinder inimeoncurrent development with their supersonic transportcouldupersonic cruise medium bomber,adiussame as Blinders. In the same time period.
F. ASM Development
Development work on land attack and antiship ASMi continued during thc past year. There is some evidence indicating that the Soviets, may bethee estimate that Ihe guidance system is being improved. The Soviets are also continuing the development 'of the Blinderystem. For land target attack the missile is estimated to cruise00 feet and terminatereprogrammed dive to warhead-burst altitude. Cuidance Is unknown but could be track/command or Inertial, There is some indication that the antiship version may be deployed initiallyaximum cruise speed of aboutaximum range. For thiswe estimate that the guidance system will be track/command with terminal homing
There is no evidenceew Soviet ASM in development other lhan thend the possible new ASM for LRA Badgers, and we estimate that no new strategic ASM win be operational byhe Soviets may decide to adapt theo the Bear foe both land attack and antiship missions. For theear period the Soviets will have the technical capability to develop new higher performance missiles with inertial guidance systems. The Soviets have the technical capability to developew turbo-jet ASMaximum speed of Machange of. By thehey also could develop an air launched ballistic missileange of. This latter development is contingent uponuitable launch aircraft
O. Force Levels
estimate that tho heavy bomber/tanker force will decline over theyeantrength, of which0 will he Bisons5 will
"Maf. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, believes it is tiktlyollow-on heavy bomber will benduced Into LRA with Hi tbe ncit few years.
he medium bomber/tanker force will probably declino more rapidly Ihan Ihc heavies. Wc estimate lhal1 the medium fence willircraft ofill he Badgers5 will bo Blinders. We estimate that the decline will continue throughout thc period so that6 the force willircraft, ofill bo Badgers and the remainder will be Blinders. If tho Sovietsew6 the force willircraft, ofill be Badgers current types rather than being additional to lhe above strengths."
VI. COMMAND AND CONTROL
n peacetime the highest political authority eierases control through tbe Ministry of Defense, bul in the event of war the channel would probably beupreme High Command. The General Staff coordinates planning, targeting, and operations of the separate Soviet strategic attack forces (LRA. missile submarines of Ihc navy, and thend would in time of warthe decisions of the Supreme High Command.
perational control of thc elements of the strategic attack forces has been organized primarily with the aim of achieving maaimum attack capability In minimum reaction time. Operational alert and readiness orders emanating from Moscow apparently flow direct from SRF hcadouartcis to SRF launch complexes, from naval headquarters Io missile submarines, and from LRA headquaitrri to operating divisions. At the tame time orders lo release nuclear weapons and authorizations to use them would probably be Uansmitied from the Cen eral Staff.
ommunications of the Soviet suategic attack forces are Ijex-ible and redundant and are becoming increasingly reliable and survivableartime
Cen. JecV E. Thornei. the Assistant Chref el Siad, Intelligence, USAF. notesel the Soviet heavy honioei/lanterhas remained quite its bit (or lheyears and he believes the USSRcontinue lo "ilnUieuch aircraftunits,ewtritegic aiiriaft iynrm to lupporl thb forcethe mld-lB70's. The follow-on lyalem icmld ba an improved Rear. or an aircraft oY. ilaynuM hara Miaearch and develepenesM lelaied. anmpcriontc
"Mai, Cen. Jack E. IWiai.t Chief ol Sii.flbg.nce.ore gradual decline la> lhe moan bssanber/uaacr force thin paragraphstulales. Hr eilimatri that1 LRA soil will includeo TOOncluding moteadgers.lindan, and probably the Initial ieeiemealollow-on evedi-jm bomber. He beUe-es that in JBTo theforce wsll evmber *COireraft. Including, noi moiF than ISO Badgers, alllivlen. and the balancerowing number ol follow-on booibers.
TOP 3CCHLI '
sihi.it ion. The Soviets continue to harden underground coaxial cables on major links, bypassing major urban centers, and locating underground control bunkers in outlying areas- They are increasing the use ofadio for command and control coinmunications; frequencies in this range are relatively invulnerable to blackoutuclear environment.
believe that the Soviets will continue to improve theirconcentrating on the development of faster and more secureincreased redundancy. Data systems which are capable of aninformation rate can be expected lo become even more widespread.use of communications satellite systems wiU probably provideredundant circuitry for mil it iry purposes during the nextears.
VII. MILITARY APPLICATIONS IN SPACE A. Space Weapons
The Soviets almost certainly are inveslisjating lhe feasihility of space'nd have long had the .capability touclear-armed satellite.hey have orbited and recovered ao increasing number of satellites inound classes. They also have put inew satellite. Proton, which weighs0 pounds. The booster used to orbit this pay-load couldeapon payload of0 pounds in near-earth orbituitable third stage, this booster could put0 pounds In near-earth orbit
Soviet published statements and writing on the subject dealing with US space programs attribute aggressive designs to thc US, and hint that the USSR cannot ignore safely such developments. There has been ao increasing number of allusions to "orbital rockets" In Soviet propaganda. Inarades, the Sovietsehicle. Scrag which though described as an 'orbitals not believed capable of performing the mission ascribed to it. In any case, the Soviets seem Intent upon convincing both the Western world and their own people that they have some form of an orbital bombardment system.
As noted In an earlier paragraph, thc recenteasibility tests could lead to the developmente believe that toeliable and accurate weapon, particularly for out-of-ordetonation near the earths surface, woulderies of tests extending over atear. After such testing, the USSR probably couldmall Dumber of bombardment satellites. They could have CEPs on thc order. against targets located within. of tbeir earth tracks. Orbital lifetimes could range upew mouths.
There tests also ooulil be related to the developmentepreased trajectory ICBMrecUorial orbit bombardment ivitem. Sea paragraph
t vJ Jt_r
33
There ue considerable differences In developmental requirements, costs, and effectiveness of various MOBS. Tohreat of retaliation against population centers, the Soviets mighlelatively small force of limited effectiveness composed ofeapons in orbit For large-scale use against smaller or harder military targets,uch larger andforce with short times to target, near-simultaneity of delivery, and an accuracy approaching that of ICBMs would be necessary. Bven tlie lesser of these forces would be extremely complex aod expensive. It wouldajor Soviet effort to perfect new hardware aod to develop advanced techniques.
For tlie foreseeable future, we think that MOBS will not comparewith ICBMs In terms of effectiveness, reliability, vulnerability, aversgo life, and susceptibility to loss of control due to accident or cojctermeasures. Tbe Soviet leadership probably would recognize that the orbitinguclear-armed MOBS would be an act of major Internaliorial Import which would intensify greatly East-West hostility andtrong new stimulus to US. rnilitaryIn view of these factors, thc much greater cost of such orbital weapons, and Soviet endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that thc Soviets are unlikely toOBS in space during the period of this estimate. However. Soviet technology applicable to this Held will improve In thc normal course of continued development of nuclearand space projects.
We recognize that tho Soviets might reach different conclusions aj to cost and effectiveness and that altered political cocisideratioos in lorne future phase of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision. Even to these circumstances, wc believe that they would regard space weapons primarilyeans of supplementing existing forces, of introducing additionalinto US defense planning, and of supporting Soviet claims to Strategic parity or even superiority. In any case, developmental testingOBS ihould be observable to us atear or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.
B Military Support Systems
I0G. The launching of recoverable photoreconnaissance satellites will continue, and this project may come to involve missions of various orbital parametersltitude andhere is evidence thatbotovideo reconnaissance system was under tovestigatson.f^
1 This project has
been inactive for several years, but Soviet military authors have written thatystem is needed. Within theoears, wc believe that the
aeoner
Sovicls will attain the capabilily for near real-time reconnaissance of areas of the world that are near the tracks of their reconnaissance satellites.
hc high priority evident In the recoverable phororeconnalsjanceproject probably will be applied to other selected military support systems which Ihc Soviet leaders decide are essential.5 the Soviets have launched three MOLNIYA satellites that have been used for communications and TV relay. They have been collecting meteorological data by satellite. Some of the photoreconnaissance satelliles are alsoeodesyWe believe that the USSR willavigational satellite within tbe next few years. Multipurpose vehicles incorporating combinations of these missions are possible, and It may be that bolh military and nonrnililary Interests in such satellites can be accxxmplishedingleaneuverable satellite for electromagnetic and photographic reconnaissance may also beto meet military needs in the next few years. Penetration aid satellites with electronic payloads probably could not be operational untilecause of power requirements. -
ANNEX A
TABLES Of WEAPON SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TEBMS
Table I: SOVTRT ICBM SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND
Table II: SOVIET MRBM/IRBM CHARACTERISTICS
Table III: SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEMS
Table IV: SOVIET AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMSAND PERFORMANCE
Table V: SOVIET STRATECIC BOMBER WEAPON SYSTEMSUNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFII.B
Table VI: SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINES ESTIMATED CIIARACTER-ISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
-lep-st-efiEf-
GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
Initial Operational Capabilitythe first operational unit Is trained and equippedew missiles aod launchers,
MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE
Air-toSurfacerange between launching aircraft and targetof missiie
Sur/aee-TO-Sur/aoerange under operational conditions with warhead weight indicated. The maximum range figures disregard thc effect of toootation.
ACCURACY
Circular Error Probabilityradiusircle centered on the extended target, within which SO percent of thc arriving missile warheads are expected to fall
REENTRY VEHICLES ANO '
Reentry Vehicle (fiV)_That partissile designed to reenter the earth's atmosphere In thc terminal portion of itj trajectory.
payload package consisting of two or more RVs. The in-dmdual RVs are dispersed (but not independently targeted or maneuvered) during the free Bight or terminal portion of the trajectory in order to confuse enemy radars, aid penetration, aod/or increase kill area.
Multiple Independently Targeted RVayload consistingwo or more RVs each of which is independendy targeted.
ManeucerabU RV (MARV)-An RV which has thc capability to maneuver during free flight or reentry.
Warheadweight of the explosive device and Iu associatedtuiiig
RV Weighf-ltV weight includes that of the warhead, necessary shielding and structure, any internal penetration aids that may be present, aod any other necessary or desired componeotj.
Pat/foodweight of that part of the missile above the last booster stage-
RANGE CI ASSES
Short Rang* BflH.rtie Murur (SRBM) L'p to.
Medium Rangee (MRBM).
Intermediate Rang* Ballirtlc Mitiite [IRBM)m.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).
Fractional Orbit Bombardment Syittm (FOBS)
A system whicheapon that isrbit but reenter, short of completing an orbit.
Multiple Orbit Bombardment System (MOBS)
A system whicheapon that is put into orbit aod may be deoibited at any time subsequent to its Erst orbit
RELIABILITIES
percentage of the missile tlert force that wfll be successfully launched io their normal preparation time with possible delays which do nototal ofinutes.
percentage of RVs launched that will successfully erjiveEPs of the intended target
percentage of warheads arriving la Die in (coded target area which detonate as programmed.
Weaponpercentage of tbe alert missiles thatEPs of their targets. This is thc product of launch,warhead
Alertpercentage of the operational missile force that is retained at normal readiness condition.
percentage of the operational missile force that wiU successfully detonate in thc target area.be product of Alert Rate and Weapon System reliability.
Reactionrequired to proceedeadiness cotjdirion to launch.
Refirerequired toecond missile from the same pad or launcher.
TO-Strict f-
REA01NESS CONDITIONS Soft Site Readiness Conditions
Conditioncrew in launch aica and oo alert RV aod missile mated and checked but still in ready building.
Conditioncrew at launch station. Missile with RV erected on launch pad. Propellant facilities (liquid) in position, attached, and ready to start propellant loading. Initial guidance alignment aod subsystems checkout complete-
Conditioncrew at launch station. Propellant loading complete. All systems ready foe Goal check and launch sequence.
fiord Site Readiness Condition*
Condition
Conditioncrew on alert Missile with RV mated ln place in the silo. Cuidance aligned and subsystems checked. Slorable liquid missiles loaded. Cryogenic liquid missiles ready for loading.
Conditioncrew on alert Propellant loaded, all systemsready for launch ".
top occffcr
TAIL! t
SOVIET ICBM SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
sa-t,
SS-Urr
1 FOBS *
Follow-on"
OpmootW
300
V.fckkt WolfM
COO
tsi
WaigM
m}
(MT) .
.
o
:
tymtmrn
taMM 1
aadfraa. ClitMll 3
kraal If
Hard
Hard
hra
il!
min
rata
bUb
0
atU
aMa
rata
TlBM
i)
1 br
1 hr
-SK'ftCr-
TABLE II
SOVIET MRBM/IRBM CHARACTERISTICS
M RBM/JRBM
S
Mailing oa Operational
Ban,.Reentry Vehkle Weight
(lb.)
Werhrad WeightYield (MT) V Soft/Bard Site*
ercet
Capability
Alert
Weapon
Reaction IT
bra
mui
Hold Tlenc <CoodiUon
Hours
i i'hrs
Stage
c.iTMJtM
Liquid
Normal readinrea ooodltion.
7
SoM/Hardard Si toe/
Mobile
Target Ca-
J
1
About
r t
T
pability
io Oaya
iihra-
i'ii
d in Many
Three Stage
r
Inertial
Solid
Ron Single Stage
nertia)
Slorable Liquid
table iu
SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEMS
220
IOC
Mm Range (nm)
Min Range (nm).
Speed
Cruise Altitudeype and Propulsion.
0
Inertial
m Siibsiirfcd
Cruise, brdtlsUe e-sUg. balll.Uo
liquid
. Preprogramed autopilot Inertial
with activelar tar*galnat lend large ta, simple
Warhead Weight (Ibe) . uclear.
m
Surfaced SO
n
high eiploalre or Yield (MT)
Undn
Launch Condition. Surfaced Reliability on Launcher
Ho!.ability S3
Salvo Tim*:
min)
"CI"S min)"8 mio)
3 mio)
per aub- . or 4 I"9 mln)
8 mio)
"J"5 nsla)"ln)i"(IS mln) Reaction Time (min)Includes mln on but- ln) lace before launch)
SSX Folioi-oa
I
Solid or etorable liquid ballistic Inertial
3
m
Submerged T
t
1
7
t
(no)
aerodynamic considerations, various flight proftlea areltilode/ipeed/range combinations might,hla ayatcsn haa beer, subject lo upgrading over the years and may oot have attained ila maximum performance capabilities aa
There as aome possibility that theerminal homing system may involve an additional lalraied homing deviceach-Bp system
hit pi stability i) essentially equal to tbe functional reliability ol ita eomponenta systems less the probabilities of acquisition aaduantitative ealimata ot acquisition aad identification eapabilltiei oanaot be made at this time.
* Salvotime from the launch of the Drat mhatle untilailee aie launched.andClass SSGN arc capable of launching two ioImIIm simultaneously,
' Time required lo pioeaedpecified readiness condition to firing. For submarino launched inlmilm. lima ie taken to include the time from the moment of the order to 6ra to launch of the first mdaitebe submarine
ie onaigele have beenbe missile system indurlee continuous computation of firing dala;ba iniviiire have been checked and are ready for countdown. Foi auiface launched SLBMa eubmarlne time on surface
la Included In reaction lime: 'or underwatera.lea submarine lime to attain proper launch attitude la included
The actual reaction timeruise mieatle submarinearget of opportunity would probably be eoaaewbal tooger
than the lima baaed on tbeae aaaumptiooa.
-rop-secatf-
TABLE IV
Unknown (PossiblyOr Track
Im *
SOVIETKACE MISSILE SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
Char* kUch
AS-3
ASM For
Preprogramed WithComoiaodm *
Mulmum Range
Guidance
s.oooC 3
nd C
Agaloal Land
0.!
0
Blinder B
I
0 High Subaooio
80
ro
33
Target* (CEP)Weighsai head Yield
Speed (Mach. No)
Carrier Alreiafi
noU
f Mbailea
Uudco Altitudes (III
Launch Spe*d
IB
70
SS
This range applies lo attack* againat landgainat abip Urgtta weaiimum rang* of,
' Againat ahlp targeU, afor terminal guidance to reduce thb CEP is feasible.
- The terminal phase of the flight profile would be al low aupenonk apeed.
reliability rate* may be high because lhe etTceu of Soviel operationalnd IreJmng standard, are at leaat aa important as teehnieU char.eterialiea in delermina-iioo or ayateo reliability. We have doia for eaUroaUng tbeet efJecU.
-TOP-SCCRCT
-ftr
tef-
TAHLE V
STRATEGIC BOMBER WEAPON Sv-iTPMR
BISON
(Irosa Weight (lb*)
Empty -w
Combat Radlua/Ban go (nm)'
b bornblond
0 Ib- bombtoad
on* refuel .
lb. bombload
on*
Ih bombload
Oav* refl
*. With ASM
I.
one refuel (Bear B)
U.(Blinder B)
ooe reluel
PERFORMANCE UNDER ANoTp^FILB (Calculated in-ilh USIIA Rnoe ,
BEAR
0
b. bombload'b)
ooe rafoat
b. bombload (Superuoeic Daah)
one refuel
WithSupeooalc Daah) (Blinder B)
am.
Speed Altitude (kta/'U
a. Maaimum apced at optimum altitude 0 0
b Target apced/Urget altitude 0 0
a. Target tpeed/Urgcl altitude (SuperMnl*)
Cocnbet Ceilingystem Accuracy (CEP)
0 ft. .
H.0 ft. .
Aeeuraey
i. AS-3
d. Launch Bpeed/Jauncli altitude
tnaiimuni ol .
BLINDER'
00
l*nd target*
-^OP-StCRCT
Coi.finu.4j
BEARBLINDER*"
Sjelctn'
ft. Aircraft reaching target areas in North America
b. ASM rtf.Wityc,
c. Aircraft and ASM over ell uprefueled/rel.ieied.
K,mber;ndre missile carriers equipped will, oneengeroo missile.bs stfgniiy reduced performance dala Irom lhat olue lo diflereni basic weight of aircraft.
Aomber.issile crier equipped -ill. onemissile; It la probably not yet operational. Blinder aircraft missions are baaedm dash io and out of target area on radius missionm dash In only oo range- mission.o direct evidence ol en operaUonal refuel capability for theseat present
range and radius figure* given io tbb table are maiitnum figures. Thay are applicable to tbe moot up-to-date models ol these aircraft, flying optimum mission profiles. The use of older model aircraft, other mission profiles. Indirect routes, low-level penetration or other tactics designed lo delay or evade detection and interception would reduce the effec tlvt range. The calculation or degradation In range and radius resulting Trom sophfalieated, penetration ladiesom-pies process which can beat bo accomplished for individual missions.ule^-tbumb for low-level operations of beavy bombers, the radius at optimum altitude will be decreasedoiles (or every mile (townct, level.
combat load0 Ibe for Bbon and Bearbs (orod Blinder A: oneorod C; and oneor Blinder B.
- Bobbing accuracies, indicated are for visual bombing or radar bombing against well-defioed targets with freo-frdl bombs. These figures are not applicable lo drogue-re larded bombs, which would be touch lees accurate.
' These reliability ,atcs may be bfgb. since thc cfTecia of Soviet operational concept* aod troop training standards ar* at least aa important as Mchnita)etermination of system reUability, and sr. bave no reliable bub for estimating these eflccla.
the following operational attrition rales, excluding combatf aircraft at home baseo would beommission0 day maintenance standdown prior to initialf aircraft in com-rn.sa.on ol home bases would be launched from etagingf eircr.fl launched from staging bases e, directly (rem home baaeanrcfueled missions would arrive in targetf aircraft launched on refueled mission, would arnv. in target areas. Calculations for Bear and ASM are based on refueled Sight, direct from home boos. All others assume ArcUc alagmg, nod refueling of Badge, and Bison airerali. IL should be noted that without prior maintenance standdown, tbo io-cora mission rate of heavy bombers at horn, base* would bend for medium bombers.
TABLE V]
SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINES ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
Cepibi.mea
Bum
(Feet)
uifiotflV
Submerged
k
Depth Limit
Depth
Surfaced
Snorkel
Speed Endurance
(tun.)
00
Station
Dura'-loo (Day.)
no
<
or
|Q
3
1
Ll '3 n -v (, [i
cr.
O O
-ft
li 11
s
S
CI
s
i
o
3
= OT .
si?*
fOP--SCCRCT
-TOP oTCHtiH
ANNEX li
MAPS OF RANGE CAPABILITIES
MRBM,'MUM CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE NOPTHERN REMISPIIERE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSIXE CAPABILITIES ACA1NST THE US RADII OF BISON
RADII OF DEAR
RADII/RANGE OF DADCEB
RADII/RANCE OF BLINDER
TOP CCCPH-
Nosia jojra^a
BEST COM*
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