ANNEX V
THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Viet Cong Economy and Its Manpower
A. The Viet Cong Economy
The Viet Cong have successfully organized and expanded an economic organization to meet the basic task of funding VC revolutionary activity. The basic economic organization, operating through the Finance and Economic Section of the People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party is assisted by the National Liberation Front and Communist military components in acquiring, transporting, andwithin South Vietnam almost all the non-military supplies required by the Viet Cong. During the past five years, the VC economic organization has expanded with the development of VC forces. Startingocal self-production unit, the economic structure progressed, first,oluntary fund drive, then, into an organizedand finance mechanism and, finally into anactivity supporting enlarged base and battlefield
Taxation appears to be the principal means used by the Viet Cong to acquire financial and material resources within South Vietnam. Agricultural taxation remains the most important source of VC tax receipts and is clearly dependent on continuing Viet Cong access to or someof control over the rural population. The Viet Cong currently exercise predominant political influence overoercent of the rice-cultivated area of South Vietnam which producesetric tons of rice per year. Annual consumption of rice by Communist regular forces could be obtained by an average tax ofercent of total production in VC areas alone. The Viet Cong usually taxubstantially higheroercent). There is no indication that resentment by the rural population against taxes of this magnitude has reached levels adequate to stop rice collections. in money or into be
collected and are an important source of supply for Viet Cong forces in the northern III Corps. Internalbusiness establishments, and commercialare also widely taxed.
-VC-initiated economic activities, seizures, and clandestine operations supplement VC tax receipts. Bond drives, food production, and simple manufacturing units have been initiated by the VC to support military Significant supplies of war booty continue to beby the Viet Cong. Clandestine front business operations and discreet purchases by civilians acting for the Viet Cong, provide access to resources from GVN-con-trolled areas, including imported manufactured goods.
For specific goods in certain areas of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong have utilized traditionalalong the South VietnamCambodia border. During recent months, however, Viet Cong use of Cambodiaource of non-military supplies has increased and "been organizedystematic fashion. Although thissupport is more costly than domestic acquisition and evidently requires external financial arrangements with banks in Hong Kong, the immunity and proximity of such logistic support to large VC/NVA forces along theborder apparently has made this source of supplies increasingly valuable. On an annual basis, it isthat atnd probably as much0 metric tons of rice are being acquired from Cambodiarequently reported figure0 metric tonsto be possible. Some of this rice is alsoto support Communist forces in Laos. In addition, the VC are acquiring in Cambodia substantial quantities of cloth, pharmaceuticals, salt, fish and fish sauce, gasoline, communications equipment, explosive chemicals, and other supplies.
B. The Economic Impact of Increased Militaryure
- The build-up in VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam during the last year haseavy strain on VC logistic operations. Confirmed VC/NVA main force strength has approximately doubled during the last year. Whereas guerrilla personnel, like the civilianare expected to be self-sufficient in basicmain force units require extensive logistic
support. Food supplies, especially rice, remain thebulk commodities required by these forces. Theincrease in main force strength has been recorded in rice-deficitnd II Corps and northern III Corps. There has been no increase in VC main force strength in the rice-surplus IV Corps where logistic requirements for food supplies are relatively small.
With the concentration of VC/NVA main force strengthnd II Corps and in northern III Corpsrice requirements clearly exceed the total riceunder VC control in the provinces of Pleiku, Kon-tun, Phu Bon, the western districts of the coastalof central Vietnam, and the rice-deficit areas of VC military region 7. In all of these areas, there isthat the VC are experiencing food supply problems. Forecently captured document cited thedifficulties experienced by the VC during an6 campaign in rice-deficit Quang Due Province that did not have sufficient rice for its own provincial force; region forces assigned to the campaign wereto arrange their own rice supply "through thepresumably the Cambodian border. During the course of the campaign, one-third of VC combat strength wasto the transportation of rice.
The increase in allied military action hasto hamper the logistic system of the Viet Cong. military actions have had an adverse effect onproduction in VC controlled areas and on the percentage of the harvest that the VC can acquire and transport to their base areas. The area covered andof crop harvested in these rice-harvestingis not reported, and no aggregative estimate of their impact is possible. Even with continued VC access to rice-producing areas, the Viet Congeconddifficulty in transporting this commodity. The major portion of this movement has been carried out by civilian laborers, but the danger of involvement in militaryhas caused serious disaffection among the VC-con-trolled population as the tempo of military activity has increased. hird major difficulty caused by allied military activity has been the disruption caused bydestruction of VC supply caches.
C. The Manpower Situation
The South Vietnamese population in VC controlled areas is atillion people and could beuch as-five million people depending on the extent to which the VC have access to contested areas. Most of he VC controlled population live in the delta region. This controlled population probably containshysically fit young males. Anouths annually become old enough to fight. In addition to this controlled population the VC also draw on the population of military age in contested areas, on GVN deserters and on recruits from urban areas.
An increasing requirement for manpower5 forced the VC to resort to monetary inducements and to forced conscription and returnee programs to obtain local personnel. With these new methods VC have. able toignificantly higher level5 comparednnually. We estimate, that the VCapability6 to recruit and train0onth.
Recruitment at this scale must be regarded as close to the maximum capabilities of the VC, particularly if these recruits are to receive adequate training. There have been increasing signsrowing squeeze on VC manpower This is reflected in the growing dominance of North Vietnamese troops as the NVA/VC force expands. There are also frequent prisoner reports of manpower shortages and the poor quality and training of new recruits.
In addition to making up for their own losses of ane estimate that VC forces will increase byroops The VC are also required, however, to provide replacementsrowing number of NVA losses. 6 wethat the NVA will infiltrateroops at the same time that they are expanding the NVA troop level by an0 troops. NVA losses during the year, however, will range. Thus the VC could have to make up0 NVA
LRE1
depending on the rate of infiltration andof NVA forces. Thisotal VC military manpower requirement6 ofhis requirement is within the higher end of the range ofestimates of VC recruitment capabilities.
If the casualty rate increases as expected7 to an annual rateommunist losses will be beyond the estimated recruitment and training capabilities of the VC. More of the manpower burder will then be placed on North Vietnam creatingpressures on its manpower resources.
II. Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam (See Appendix A)
The Communist forces in South Vietnam have createdcentralized system of Supply Councils to meetrequirements of the VC/NVA forces. This organ-
ization operates at each administrative level inworking closely with counterpart economicorganizations of the Central Office for(COSVN) and the Rear Services Staffs of thecommand. This elaborate system controlspersonnel engaged full-time inactivities. Additional thousands ofconscriptedart-time basis to assist insupplies, the construction of logisticsthe maintenance of supply routes. The VC use an system of land routes, trails, and inland_connecting the infiltration routes from Laos and Cam-
bodia with the major COSVN base areas.
The VC storage system is greatlyarge number of small depots,0 tons of supplies each. This dispersedprovides maximum protection against large scaleor capture of supplies but also serves as aconstraint to the initiation of large sustained enemy actions.
The logistics system used by the Communist forces in South Vietnam has been able to satisfy adequately the minimum requirement for movement and storage of supplies.
This capability has been weakened and made more difficult as the scale of combat has increased and Allied ground operations have disrupted normal logistic movements and overrun storage areas. Difficulty in effectivelythe internal distribution of supplies has also been compounded by the manner in which VC/NVA forces are dispersed throughout South Vietnam.
Inne-third of the enemy combat and combat support troops was located in the II Corps Area, one third in the III Corps, and the remainder about equally betweennd IV Corps. The IV Corps area with onlyercent of total VC/NVA regular forces, is the area in which the VC have the greatest self-sufficiency insupplies, particularly foodstuffs. The predominant' share of VC/NVA forces is concentrated in food-deficit areas. Thus the II and III Corps areas which are the predominant rice-deficit areas account for almost two-thirds of the total daily logistic requirement.
The inability to transport food from rice surplus to deficit areas has become more severe as Allied ground actions intensify. The Communists have been compelled to turn to Cambodian sources in order to provide rice to the forces in the central highlands. Use of this source of supply has increased in the last half year and may now be as much asay. The need to turn to sources outside the country for rice indicates thatdistribution is one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists and is probably the mostaspect of their entire logistics operation.
If the disposition of Communist forces in Southremains unchanged during the build-up projected throughnd internal distribution of food istheir dependence on external sources forcould double. Our present estimatesaximum external requirement of aboutay. But if internal distribution of food to the food-deficit areas cannot be effectively accomplished, thiscould be increased to atay.
This added logistic requirement would not beparticularly if it were met from Cambodian sources. It would not even tax Che Laotian infiltration route very severely but would aid substantially in reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic requirements.
The present disposition of Communist forces is much more favorable for the internal distribution of supplies infiltrated into South Vietnam. Overercent of the NVA forces andercent of the VC forces are innd II Corps areas in close proximity to the Laotiancorridor and the northern infiltration routes from Cambodia. These forces account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from external sources.
The data available on the destruction and capture of supplies by Allied forces during the past year are quite incomplete. Pood supplies amounting to atons and0 weaponsounds of ammunition are the major amounts known to have been captured or destroyed. We lack almost completely any meaningful data on Communist stock-piles and are thorn- -fore unable to assess the impact of these losses. But as minimum losses, the food stocks may be relativelyparticularly as Allied operations uncover more storage areas and interfere more with the internalof supplies.
The substantial increase in incidents of Communist terrorism and harassment of local population may indicate that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to obtain local support in terms of food and/or labor for its war effort.
APPENDIX A
THE COMMUNIST LOGISTICS SYSTEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I.
VC/NVA* logistic operations are under the control and supervision of Supply Councils found at everyof command from the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to the village level. (See Figureillage Forward Supply Councils are responsible for pro-curemeht and for the distribution of supplies to troops in the field. The province level controls the planning and regulatory agencies which furnish logistic data to the military Rear Service Staffs at the various levels of command. Communications and liaison sections, under the Supply Councils, exercise an important^role in safe^ guarding all types of logistic operations. Party cadre associated with the communication and liaison sections serve as guides, security personnel, station attendants, and supervisory personnel.
Supply Councils also supervise the work of two basic transportationPeople's Revolutionary Party (PRP) Finance and Economic Section transportand the military Rear Service Section transport elements.
*The organization structure outlined in this section is estimated to apply generally to both VC and NVA forces Some of the material appearing in this section is based on an analysisaptured document discussing the VC Sao Vangivision containing both VC and NVA elements.
"Figureollows pagen Annex III.
Transport and supporting elements under theof military Rear Services Sections are organized
ransport elements of the Rear Services Sections which are organic to the various echelons of the VC/NVA regular military forces, eparate military transport units (not found below military region level) responsible for the receipt and redistribution of supplies,rdnance sections and armament sections. The RearStaff organic to the VC/NVA Division is organized into four functional sections: uartermaster section for procurement, storage, and distribution of food andan ordnance section for procurement, storage,and distribution of weapons and ammunitionj asection for medical support and evacuation;inance section for financial support.
A. Personnel
Enemy forces in South Vietnam inmountedncludingersonnel engaged in logistic support. The composition of important VC supply elements is shown in the following tabulation:
Conbat Support
Separata Military Transport Units Region/Province/District Ordnance
and Ammunition Sections Other Combat Support Troops
Total
Forces
Finance and Economic Transport Units
Infiltration Corridor Personnel Communications and Liaison Units Organic Military Transport
VC/NVA Crewmen on Hater Craft
Total TOTAL
0
In addition to these regular employees the VC have conscripted thousands of temporary, civilian workers to assist in logistic activities. Recruiting is carried out among men between the ages ofndnd women between the ages" ofith the annual period of service usually beingonths. This conscripted labor is given, both political and security training. It is then organized into platoons and companies, and assigned by village and district forward supply councils' to the combat units orear services staff. Front line oraborers are used by combat units to transport ammunition and food supplies; to evacuate battle casualties; tocaptured supplies to collection points, and tosupply depots and defensive positions, as well as in other miscellaneous tasks.. Local inhabitants have been conscripted to carry weapons and. ammunition inland from coastal areas and to'transport.food to the mountainous' regions. Special:groups are assigned to carry supplies and ammunition, from the Cambodian border area to enemy_ base areas.
II. Storage and Distribution
The VC supply system is designed to satisfy bothcontinuous troop requirements and those requirements imposed by rapidly changing battlefield conditions. The VC have established an area supply system whicha large number of smallgenerallyapacity of five-tenthroughout areas in which VC units operate. Although classes of supplies in depots are usually mixed, some depots store foodand others contain only weapons and ammunition. Even in the larger war zones, supplies are dispersed throughout the area. Villages that are located close to combat units may also act as supply points. In certain areas, only one-third of the prescribed stock isto depots, with the remaining two-thirds dispersed among civilians for custody. This system limits thethat can be caused by the destruction of one large depot or supply cache, but it also actsajorto the initiation of large, sustained enemywhen large amounts of supplies need to bein relatively small areas.
Regiments are given an initial issue of0 day supply, which is to bewhen half of the supply is consumed. Rear service staffs are charged withtock equivalent to one month's supply for all forces operating in their area of jurisdiction. egiment leaves the area the remaining rice must be returned to these staffs. Troops usuallyeven-day supply of rice in their individual packseserve for emergencies; the unit draws rice from supply points located along the line of movement. This method reduces the supply train and the requirement for porters. Each regiment is assigned an area from which food is purchased. ear supply element of the regiment normally sends out purchasing teams to the area, to contact local VC authorities and to arrange for purchase in the prescribed quantities.
III. Transportation Routes
The enemy in South Vietnam makes useeryand variety of lines of communication. Thesemajor South Vietnamese highways, secondarytrails and innumerable footpaths. any of the land routes, especially inare narrow, unimproved trails, negotiable onlyanimal, or small two or three-wheeledtrucks are sometimes used on segments of thewhen they are under Communist control, andon routes nominally under GVN control. is made of water craft in the Delta
A. Land Routes
The most frequently used land routes for the movement of personnel are probably the twoorth-south orientation connecting the Laotian and Cambodian infiltration corridor with the large established enemy base areas in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon. The first route, which runs just inside South Vietnam along the Cambodian border, consists for the most partonnecting group of trails although it follows orexisting roads in its southern segments. The second
route runs between the first route and the coast .androuteor many miles. Many lateral routesthe two major north-south routes and with coastal points. Some of the north-south routes in the eastern section of the country running roughly between routend the Saigon area are used mainly as supply routes. '.
Enemy forces attempt to use major Southse highways to the maximum extent possible. When such roads are only partly under their control, personnel and/ or supplies move parallel to the uncontrolledarge portion of the network is located near South Vietnamese provincial and military boundaries wheremay be least effective. The enemy selects routes in many cases which are just outside the fire envelope of static GVN artillery units..
Besideshe VC probably make extensive use of Routeorth from Saigon, Routeest from Khanh Hoa to Darlac, Routehrough TayNinh,Routes-n the Delta region.est from the coastal province of Phu Yen, and Provincial,orth of Saigon. Most of the use of trucks occurs on these roads.
B. Waterways
- The VC depend on water craft as the basictransportation in the Delta region of SouthVC main and local force units in IV Corpspossessraft of varyingilitia in IV Corps probablythousands of
Troops usually are transported in small three-man sampans, and supply movements vary from organized convoys of medium-sized craft capable of carrying loads of one ton or more to small individual craft. Theload per water craft is estimatedons but the enemy.also has much larger types at his disposal.
Several factors permit Communist forces to make extensive use of waterways in the Delta. There is no
registration of civilian boats, so that Communist boats are difficult to identify. Curfew restrictions cannot be imposed or enforced except on some major waterways because of the lack of adequate communications andcraft. Moreover, security is maintained by moving primarily at night, by taking advantage of foliage near river banks, by maintaining advance and rear units to warn of nearby flight activity and by sinking boats for later recovery when detection seems imminent.
IV. War Zones
War Zones usually consistroup of dispersed and relatively primitive supply caches, command posts, arms.workshops, training facilities, and troop bivouacsinkedetwork of unpaved roads, trails, andhey generally are located on major transport routes used by the enemy in areas which are sparsely populated -and/or populated by ethnic or religious minorities,ile to the South Vietnamese government. The war zones located near planned Communist areas of combat probably serve as staging areas, while those located well away from friendly forces most likely contain facilities for weapons repair and manufacture, training, and rest. Areas, such as War Zone C, adjacent to the Cambodian border also serve as access to sanctuary and as transit points for movement of supplies and troops. Untilhe enemy operated in these zones with relative impunity, but the areas have been coming underheavy ground and air attack in recent months.
V.' Logistic Resupply Requirement for Communist Forces in South Vietnam
The VC/NVA forces in South Vietnamailylogistic requirementons. ogisticis dividedlasses: lass II lass IIIlass IVengineer and medical) andhows the daily volume of each class ofand the amounts supplied from internal and external sources.
A. Class I (Food Supplies)
The Communist forces in South Vietnam obtain most of their food supplies within the country. Although
SOUTH VIETNAM DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OF6 BY CLASS AND SOURCE OF SUPPLY*
(ShortB1 Internal Supplies
'
these forces control sufficient rice production toall VC/NVA food requirements, large quantities of rice apparently are being transported from Cambodia tonemy controlled rice-deficit areas in South Vietnam. This is because of the difficulty in sustaining internal distribution of large amounts of bulk commodities.
-The principal rice-deficit areas with large troop concentrations include the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Due, all in the II Corps area, and Phuoc Long, Binh Long and the northern part of Tay Ninh in the III Corps. If the main andforce VC and NVA troops in these areas were madedependent on Cambodian sources for food, Cambodia would be providing aboutercent of the total daily food requirement for all Communist forces in South
Enemy incidents of terrorism and harassment have risenonthly average4during the first four months Although theseare attributable to various factors they may indicate that the enemy is finding it increasinglyto obtain local support in terms of food, and/or labor, for the war effort.
B. Class II and Class IV Supplies
1. Weapons
The enemy stock of weapons has beenfrom several sources. These include weapons which have been captured, locally-produced, buried or leftin South Vietnam from the Indochina War, andfrom North Vietnam. Local manufacture ofsupplies, however, presently emphasizes ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than the fabrication of individual weapons.
Significant quantities of Soviet and East European weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam from North Vietnam. Aboutercent of the VC main force is estimated to have been at least partially equipped with -the new family of2 mm weapons by6
With respect to heavy weapons, themm mortars are now found in most main force battalions. The recent introductionmalso has added to the firepower of Communist forces in the south. Other heavy weapons known to have been used by Communist forces include them recoilless rifle, them pack howitzer, and possiblym howitzer, the latter having been captured from friendly forces or dating from the war with the French.
The flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has enabled the VC to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within main force units. However,weapons are usedarge number of VC local forces and guerrilla forces. Data on weapons captured5 show that the use ofarms is increasing as seen in the following
(Percentages based on captured, items)
Home made and
S.
r"
(estimate)
-
ercent from USSR.
Of theeapons captured by Allied troops in clashes with the NVA near Plei Me last November,ercent were of Chinese Communistf North Korean manufacture,ercent of Soviet manufacture. These arms represent the most modern weapons used by Chinese and North Korean forces, suggesting that NVA units are well equipped.
2. Clothing
Enemy requirements for clothing and other textile products are not extensive, and most of it is obtained locallypecial VC clothingumber of clothing items such as khaki uniforms, underwear, and winter clothing for the mountainoushave been produced in North Vietnam and areto infiltrators. Some clothing is also required in Cambodia.
Supplies
Medical supplies are obtained both locally and from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Antibiotics, plasma and quinine are. the principal items acquired from ex-ernal sources. Medical supplies are in fairlyupply so that their external procurementigh priority.
Equipment
Trucks, water craft, and otherequipment used by enemy forces in South Vietnam usually are acquired in the country, sometimes'bybut also by purchase or borrowing.
Supplies
Most VC communications equipment has been supplied by East European Communist countries orChina or is of OS, Japanese, or French manufacture and has been captured on the battlefield. NVA equipment is infiltrated with military personnel.
and Chemical Supplies
Most VC/NVA chemical and engineer supplies are estimated to be obtained from within the country, although some chemicals are also smuggled inodia. arge share of the chemicals is used for the production of filler for locally-produced ammunition.
The total requirement for petroleum products for VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam is small, being needed primarily for confiscated vehicles, motorized junks in the Delta region, generator equipment at command posts, and in some crude arms factories. The VC obtainfrom taxation of the content of petroleum tank trucks in VC/NVA-controlled areas of South Vietnam,of petroleum supplies, and purchase from local gasoline stations or in Cambodia.
D. Ammunition)
In the present situation of relative independence from external sources for most supplies, ammunition is the principal determinant of the volume of supplies which must be infiltrated from North Vietnam. The supply of ammunition is particularly important to the major combat elements equipped with the new family of weapons who are completely dependent on outside sources for their ammunition. Due to the extensive useariety of weapons, however, the enemy utilizes both internal and external sourefes for the supply of ammunition. Standard ammunition is generally manufactured in the Communist countries. The remainder of the supply is from captured stock or is manufactured locally in VC engineer Viet Cong munition factories are not estimated toresent capability to2 mm There is no evidence that expended shells are reloaded, and2 mm ammunition is not compatible with Communist weapons.
The heavier ammunition employed by them antitank grenades,m andm recoil-less rifle rounds,m,m,m mortar rounds, andm,mm howitzer ammunition. All heavier ammunition is either captured or obtained from external sources.
VT. Geographic Distribution of Logistic Requirements for VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam
As of6 the strength of VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam stoodersonnel. The
disposition of these forces by Corps area is shown inhich also shows the major areas of rice The predominant share of these forces isin rice-deficit areas.
Ine show by Corps area the currentof total logistictons aandons amust befrom external sources. The distribution offorces reflects an unevenness in daily logistic requirements by Corps area and leads to internalproblems.
Thus the forces innd IV Corps areas require onlyndercent respectively of total daily The IV Corps, with the smallestof forces, is also the area in which the Communists have the greatest self-sufficiency in food. The II and III Corps areas, in which moat of the Communist forces are concentrated, account for almost two-thirds of the total daily requirement. These areas are also therice-deficit areas.
The inability to transport food from rice surplus to deficit areas is apparently becoming more severe. The Communists consequently have had to turn to Cambodian sourcesogistic expedient to provide rice to some of the forces in the central highlands. This movement has increased in the last half year and has reached an estimateday. The need to turn to Cambodian sources for rice indicates that internal distribution is one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists and is probably the most vulnerable aspect of theirire logistics operation. As US/GVN and allied forces have increasing success in capturing or destroyingstockpiles and in disrupting Communist control of transport routes this problem would be even more It would not, however, be critical,as long as food supplies could be obtained andfrom Cambodia. Even if they had to beby North Vietnam through Laos the volumes which we estimate would be required could be accommodated on the Laotian infiltration network.
The current estimates of the build-up of Communist forces and the highest probable levels of combat throughield an external logistic requirement for Class II and IV andupplies ofay. If the disposition of Communist forces remains the same and internal distribution of food is impossible,ons of food could be required daily inood-deficit areas (See This added logistic requirement would not tax the infiltration route through Laos very severely, but it would aid substantially in reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic But as the Communist build-up continues and the level of combat increases the excess of road capacity in Laos over logistic requirements could be diminished substantially.
The present disposition of Communist forces in South Vietnam is much more favorable for resupply from external sources. Overercent of the NVA forcesf the VC forces are innd II Corps areas in close proximity to both the Laotian infiltration corridor and the infiltration routes from Cambodia. These forces account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from external sources.
VII. Effect of Destruction and Capture of Supplies
The destruction and capture of Communist supplies by US and Allied forces during the past year as compiled from available data for selected categories of supplies are shown below. The data for food, ammunition, and POL basically represent losses incurred in the provinces of Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh in III Corps area, and Quang Due, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Pleiku in II Corps-areas where US forces engaged in large search and destroy operations. Weapons losses include those inflicted by South Vietnamese troops as well as US and Allied forces.
(tons)
arms7 mm machine gun (rounds)
(gallons)
junket*
SOUTH VIETNAM DAILY LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF VC/NVA FORCES AT VARYING LEVELS OF COMBAT
6 and Projected7
The quantity of food known to have been captured or destroyed represents an amount sufficient to feed the current Communist main and local forces in South Vietnameriod of about three months. This quantityrelatively significant when considered as theloss of food to the enemy. Moreover, recent allied operations have not only destroyed enemy food crops and uncovered VC food storage points, but protected rice harvests from enemy acquisition and interdicted theof some food to VC distribution points.
Known losses of small arms and heavy machine gunhowever, represent only about three days'for the current order of battle of VC/NVA troops at present levels of combat. Although the magnitude of losses sustained in engagements with ARVN forces oresult of air strikes cannot be determined at thetime, such losses to date have had little discernible effect on the enemy's ability to initiate attacks or on the rate with which he expends his ammunition.
Known losses of POL in South Vietnam represent lesswo week supply for VC/NVA forces. Lossesagainst POL stocks by ARVN forces and air strikes probably have added to the quantity of such suppliesthe enemy, but due to the small requirementfor VC/NVA forces operating in South Vietnam these
losses probably have no effect on enemy capabilities.
The known number of weapons captured or destroyed by friendly forces through6 was sufficient to equip someattalions. Losses incurredesult of air strikes have raised the total weapons loss, but again, if such losses are examined in the context of the number of VC-initiated attacks over recent months, it becomes clear that total weapons losses have not been prohibitive.
The quantities of destroyed and captured Communist supplies undoubtedly have added to the logistic problems faced by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam but the extent of these adverse effects cannot be estimated since we are almost totally lacking in knowledge of Communist stockpiles in South Vietnam. The data presentlydo not include losses inflicted by South Vietnamese forces (with the exception of losses of weapons);lostesult2 strikes; oresult of numerous strikes. tactical aircraft.
V-20
Original document.
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