the
ETJTJUIA20RY
THE
I. IMrTICATTOPS FORixiaiice aik) US
BELATions wits tJabTiwi
General
I=pact of Cu.tbe.ck3 on European Military Progrs^s
Political Intact of Cutbacks
Effectiveness of Various US Explanations
ii. COWOTIST
HI. ASER
J2JPRPJ
froo dovogradiiujDISSEM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
STJEJECT: : FOREIGN REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF
ACTION REGARDING US FORCES III EUROPE
noes
This SNXE was done at the request of Mr. John J. McCloy, tbe President's Special Representative for the current negotiations with tbe United Klngdcc and the Federal Republic concerning Allied strategy, force levels, and financial problems. The -ems of reference were provided by hie and his staff. In view of tbe special character of tbe paper, the suaxs&ryusually provided In NIEs vere omitted.
THE PROBLEM
To esti^aze foreign reactions to various OS courses of action affecting American forces stationed In Europe. Tbe alternative courses are:
Excluded free
Case 1: To maintain US grouse and air forces In West Geraany at
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their present level- cn the basis of German agreement to continue to bear atubstantial portion ofexchange costs.
Cone 2:
To0 men from US ground forceshinning-out process, which would eLlnlnate soae subordinate units but retain the present amber of combat divisions; in addition, to establish dual basing arrangements forercent of US aircraft and associated personnel now assigned to Germany, so that they would In the future be baaed part of the time In the continental US. These measures would reduce C3 dollar expenditures abroad bynnually.
Case 3: To00 men froa US ground forces, including withdrawal of one cachat division; in addition, to arrange for dual basing ofercent of US air strength. These measures would reduce CS dollar expenditures abroad by0 annually.
Present US ground forces In West Germany totalen (authoriseden) Including five combat divisions and three brigades and supporting elements; present US Air Force strength consists ofircraften Including Ik squadrons plus supporting elements. The number of US naval personnel based in West Germany is insignificant.
Case ToCO men free US ground forces, Including with-
drawal of two to three coabat divisions; in addition, to arrange for dual tcslng ofercent of US air strength. These measures would reduce ijS dollar expenditures abroad by0 annually.
EXPLANATORY. HOTS: Each of the postulated US reductions of ground force strength given above would not necessarily beby the specific change in air strength with which it Is Listed. For example, the cut (Casebove)0 men froa the US ground forces could be acccapanied cy dual basing of either LO percent,ercent, or kOof US aircraft and associated personnel. Thus the specific cases we have chosen are intended to beof orders of magnitude and are not the only -osSirl" combinations.
THE ZSTCIATZ
I. KPLICATIOrS TORESTERC AIIJAECT AZiD US RELATIONS KTTH "ESTERS EUROPE
General
1. For some tine, many West European voices, not confined to France have called for their countries toreater influence ovtr the area's policies,oncomitant reduction of US predominance. la power and interest were bound to give rise to this attitude In
tlrce, but they* have received strong stimulus from the spreading conviction that, despite the USSTt's great military paver, the likelihoodoviet attack against Western Europe bas greatly diminished. n certain countriesurther assertion of an independent European interest: the forcal "French withdrawal froa kato, domestic attacks upon the pro-OS policy of the West German Government, and auneasiness and concern over tie growing Co involvement in Vietzan. The issue of OS troop levels in Vest Germany and the related financial problems will obviously affect the evolving political climate cf Western
2. Case 1: The retention of US forces at present strength, under seme financial arrangement accepced both by tbe Co aad etcherations concerned, would not eliminate the present malaise in, "ilar.ee. roubled phase in German -American relations Is in prospect even If the US decides to aglntM- present force levels inr=aay. Thus, it does not appearholly amicable settlement of the offset problem is vithin reach, given the history of the issue and the likely German Oa the other hand, if the tripartite negotiations did resultS decision to continue present force levels, relief would be felt by those who bad feared an early and radical change ln CS policy. Especially in Germany, there would probably be some temporary improvement in theof relations.
3- Cases, and U: Any of the three force cuts would raise some doubts about the firmness of the CS commitment zo Europe's securixr/,in the light of earlier pledges that force levels would be maintained. Inndhe governments vould realize that the US still hadmilitary forces in place, certainly enough to commit It fully In case of Soviet attack. While the withdrawalivisional unit underrould attract considerable notice, we dcubt that ln the end reactions would be significantly different from these under Case 2. Under all the alternatives, the concern vould be far lesa with the immediate security implications than with what the more might signify about US Intentions over the long term. Nevertheless,ould give rise tc instant and serious alarm in many quarters. Host governments wouldonfirmation of their fears that US policy has shifted to give priority to Asia over Europe. There wouldarked loss of confidence la CS leadership within the alliance, and the Germans would feel ineal concern for their long-term security.
Impact of Cutbacks oa Euro peon Military Prcgr"-or.
n strictly military grounds, if such considerations could be separated from the political implications, there would be little strong opposition in 2IAT0 to either of the two smaller force reductions. Most uATC governments do not believe that the military security of "Western Europe
rsEisrrrvi S
D DISSS*
depends on iarce conventional forces physically located there, as their own reluctance to meet NATO corneltaents shows. Thest Germanwould argue that Its military security was endangered by even the scaliest cut, but would do so mainly for political reasons. It would fearrocossilitary disengagement in Central Europe vos getting underway and that this meant tacit acceptance of an indefinitely divided Germany. West Germany has, in fact, tended to follow after the rest of European opinion in downgrading the likelihood of Soviet attack. In view of possible changes of political leadership in Bonn, however, the views that the German Government would uphold must be considered somewhat uncertain.
In the absenceisibly revived threat fron the East, we do not believe that either tne smaller HATO countries or Great Britain would expand their own defease establishments to fill the military gap caused by theuts. They would not see any "gap." Great Britain'sproblems will alooBt certainly lead it to reduce its defensela coming years in any case. Kost of theO countries would probably reduce their defense efforts somewhat, and even West Germany would almost certainly not expand its forces. Bonn has only reluctantly supported the concept of flexible response which requires large ground forces, and wouldeterrent strategy basedower nuclear threshold.
If the US made theut, other KATO countries would probably consider that they were politically aad economically unable to maxe up the
R,s RESTRICTED DISSEM_^/
entire difference. West Geraany and France night attempt to moveommon, and perhaps eventually an enlarged, defense effort with other European nations vho wished to participate, "but this would depend on the outcome of highly uncertain political developments is the countries
Political Impact of Cutbacks
7. Though HATO governments are generally agreed that the Likelihoodoviet attach has diminished, all members except FranceT0 to continue to servoolitical Instrument of Western cooperation. Hose
vcuid also lihe to preserve itremevork in which to contain the
Germans, concerning whose future conduct there is still apprehension.
Almost all member states would in fact probably try harder than ever to
keep tho US politically Involved in Europe.
3. The largest cutomingime cf visible disarray la the alliance, would be Interpreted In some quarterseliberate US move toward substantial disengagement froa European affairs- It wouldider debate than has yet developed about the future cf the alliance, and bring into question the entire structure of political and military concepts upon vhicb It has been based. Some impetus would be given to the contention that Europe's best course would be to move toward
a neutral position between the US aad the USSR. This ln turn could alter the foreign policy positions and internal political balances In individual countries, and Ln tine change the political and allltary power structure of Europe. But this wouldong process, and its outcome would depend greatly upon subsequent US policies, upon Soviet reactions and attitudes, and upon domestic political developments which are not cov fareseeahle.
France. General de Gaulle would be strengthened in his efforts to undermine the US position in Europe, marginally Inrnda'or -ray If the US carried out the largest reduction. Any US withdrawal would bring greater receptivity for de Gaulle's statements that the US comnitment iras unreliable, and he vould encourage suspicions that smallf such are decided uponereirst step toward larger oa-s. Such tactics would probably not caly gain some support in other West European countries for French policies, but would also atrergthea de Goulls dcaestically. Hone of the cuts, however, vould of itself bring success to French efforts to destroy KATOolitical instrument of US-European cooperation.
10. The main thrust of da Gaulle's diplomacy in the aftermathS force reduction would probably be renewed efforts to displace paramount US influence in Bonn with his ova. pressure would be brought to get the
STU^ DISSEM
associated financial burdens have their greatest impact on Germany, where they have already helped to sharpen policy conflicts and personal rivalries. The administration of Chancellor Erharc and his Foreign and Defease Ministers, Schroeder and von Bassel, which has in the past strongly supported close ties with the US, has for various reasons cone under heavy attach. Afeature of the current political infightingendency on the part of Erhard's opponents, both within and outside his party, to accuse him of having placed too much tr^st in US willingness to uphold German Interests.
12. The opposition Social Democratic party (SPD) has recently been engaged In efforts to show greater initiative on East European and all-German policy issues In ways andace which the Erhard administration
does not favor. Although these efforts are not contrary to US policy (th
and Presidenthey reflect Inrowing inclination to pursu* German interests more independently of US guidance.
13. Much of the Gernan public still retains basic confidence in US policy, and probably neither of the two smaller troop cuts would seriously erode this confidence. There would, of course, be lessrotlem if the German political leadership defended the US action. In the presentinfighting, however, cost Gernan political leaders and opinion makers will either be unwilling or unable to do this.
l'-t. Either of the scalier force reductions would strengthen the arguments of German Gaullists in the CDU/CSU and would further weaken the Srhard government. Either would also add to existing pressures, both from Gaullists advocating priority for Franco-German cooperation and from the advocates of flejdbility toward the East,eexamination of West German attitudes toward the US, France, and flATC integration, nevertheless, despite considerable political ccamotlon, we believe that the basic course of present West German policy would survive this event. There would be some deterioration in the climate of German-American relations, however, especially since other factors are independently working in this direction.
factor in German politics. The Case I* cuts would almost certainly mean either the end of the Erhard government orhift in its composition that it vould in effectev government. In either case, broader representation would almost certainly be afforded to those Cermans who advocate greater independence from American policy guidance and some degree of Increased cooperation with the French.
l6. Large force reductions, comingime of confusion and crisis In internal German politics and of growing uncertainty about whether the allies support German interests, would of course stimulate Germanto consider alternatives to Bonn's present foreign policies. The Germans have been movingecognition that their Western partners are either unwilling or unable to do anything about Germany's national problem. 2ut they realize, too, that initiatives of their own toward the USSR have no foreseeable prospect of success, exceptrice and with risks they are unwilling to contemplate. olitical leadership might finally appear in Bonn which wouldolicy of rapprochement with East Germany. If this did not bring movement toward unification, the West Germans would have no choice but to reconcile themselves to their situation for an indefinite period. We cannot foresee what this night do to the
17- Great Britain. Basically, Britain sees no alternative at present
to the political status quo In central Europe, and teLieves It can be maintained with some reduction of present forces as long as the basic OS guarantee of European security renains fim and believable. The British Governcent would accept with equanimity either of the scalier force cuts and would continue with its own plans to remove part of its forces fron West Germany. Britain's reaction to the Case l* cuts would probably be for the most part negative. The predominant feeling would probablyoncern for the long-term stability of tho Continent and for the viability of present arrangements for the containment of Germany.
Effectiveness cf Various US Explanations
l8. Throughout Europe, the impact of US force reductions could perhaps be marginally softened or considerably exacerbated by our public handling of the Issue. We doubt that emphasis on US balance-of-payments problems and US inability to work out full offset arrangements would receive much sympathy; the sums to be saved probably would not seen large enough to providefor the cuts. It would prcbably further complicate US policy toward NATO for the US to Join publicly and officially the comnon West European vlevs that the Soviet threat to Eurooe had diminished. It would not be
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helpful to referroop cut In the context ofS policy cf detente. This explanation wouldarticularly adverse effect In Wesr, Germany, where the government argues that force reductions should be mace only In return for specific Soviet concessions on tbe German question.
Another line of argument would be to emphasize that significant US forces remained in Europe and that advances in weaponry and logistics now make It possible for the US to meet its commitment to the defense of Europe with fever forces on hand cn the Continent. This line of argument would not be particularly cogent in Germany, but it would reassure some Europeans that the cuts did notundamental shift in US
Regardless of how the cuts were explained, however, coot European governments and the bulk of sophisticated opinion would conclude that the reaL reasons were US balance-of-payments problem* and the manpower needs
of the Vietnam war. There would beoncern that US preoccupation with Vietnam would in time lead to still further withdrawals, and many would feelutback tied to Vietnamign that the US night bein its comnitments.
H. OEIS7 REACTIONS
has been implied above, there wouldarge measure ofbetween attitudes in Western and Eastern Europe in the wakehange
in the OS posture. most west european opinion nov proceeds from thethat the policy of the ussr and its allies has changed and is directed toward detente. the implication of this attitude is that there is no longer much reason tcenewal of aggressive pressures from the east. if soviet behavior in the wcxe of force cuts should disappoint these expectations, obviously the reactions attributed to western europe in the foregoing discussion would he quite different. but the attitudes and behavior of the USSR aad its allies would in turn dependreat extent on the movement of opinion end policy in western europe.
22. rincipal soviet objective for some years past has been tc obtain from the vest an acceptance of the status quo in central europe, including the division of geraany. curing the prolonged crisis over, the soviets pursued their objective by threat and pressure. subsequently, the soviets used the tactics of "detente" with the us. [lore recently, their propaganda and diplomacy have stressed the neededuction of tensions in central europe and for all-european security arrangements which would be built oa the existence of two german states. they pr-jsunably calculate that acceptance of this thesis by the vest, includingould isolate the federal republic, introduce strains into its relations with the allies, and ultimately set inhift of political forces within the federal republic more favorable to soviet long-term purposes. the reduction of os military strength in europe
- Ih -
would be seer- as favorable to these ales aad tactics, acd probably alsoiga chat NATO's further disintegration van In prospect.
23. 'e believe that, initially at least, the Soviets would consider lt to their advantage toonciliatory lice toward Western Europe, except of course toward Bonn. They would protahly say that the OS hadnamelled*'by the pressures of European opinion and by the strains of the Vietnam varto retreat from its "domination" of the Vest European states. The Soviets would not wish to do anything to arrest this process, and they therefore would probably not revert to tactics of pressure and threat in Germany. They would recognize, moreover, that the drawdown of US forces did not mean an abandonment of US commitments in Europe endenewed cnalle-ge there would stillajor crisis, with areversal of European attitudesenewed buildup of the American saUltary presence.
2*. The initial Soviet reaction, therefore, would probably be toiplomatic and propaganda stance which would encourage Vestopinion to believe that no new risks threatened because of the G3 moves. It would be emphasizedurope in which US influence was diminished and the independence of European states wascould easily arrive at broad end lasting security arrangements. The outline of such aa all-European settlement is contained in the Bucharest Declaration
adopted by the Warsaw pact states innd this would no doubt he the centerpiece of the Sot let diplcoratic effort. Its main features include acceptance of existing frontiers, that is, Germany's frontiers, recognition of two German states, and their permanent exclusion from any sort of access to nuclear weapons. The declaration also adrocates an all-European security conference to adopt these measures and other undertakings which would insure peace and stability ln Europe for the indefinite future. Probably some such political line vould be the main immediate response from the East to the new situation createdrawdown of US forces.
25. The Soviets would probably also believe that EATO itself was becoming more vulnerable to diplomatic and propaganda pressure by them. They would presumably intensify efforts they have made in the past to get Tforway and Denmari: to loosen their ties to SATO or even to exchange this Link for entrycandinavian security zone. pecial security arrangement for southeastern Europe might be devised to attract Greece and Turkey avay from BAXO. And the Soviets would do what they could to give more substance to their rapprochement with Prance. ould expect that any new discordsight bo able to foster in the Western Alliance would help to accelerate tho departure of CS power, and bring then nearer to their ultimate goalragmented Europe in which their own power was clearly unchallenged.
The Soviets would of course consider whether, to promote an advantageous climate of detente, they should reciprocate U3 forcewith withdrawals of their own- We believe that they would not wish to negotiate ar. agreemftnt to do this, mainly for two reasons. It is their current line to emphasize dealings among Europeans on European questions and to minimize dealings with the US. Pcrnaps more important at present is their policy to avoid any acts which would suggest that they were facilitating US military reinforcsment in Southeast Asia.
27- We do, however, believe the chances are good that the Soviets
would, after they had taken some tima to appraiseltical-military
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effects of theithdrawals, earn' out some withdrawals of theirThey have advanced proposals for mutual withdrawals In the past, and they would probably like,ariety of reasons, to reduce their forces in East Germany. Hen; deep the cuts ni^ht ro saems to us beyond prediction, at present. The extent cf such reductions would be determined mainly by the USSR's appraisal of -he condition of IQVEC end of the political and policy tendencies developing in Western Europe, in particular ln West Germany, and
2/ aj. Gen. Chratsr L. -Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartmsnt of the Army, belisves that,ossibility of Soviet withdrawals exists, available evidence is insufficient toudgment that "the chances are good that the Sovietsarry out some withdrawals of rhsir gun."
whether these could te core advantageously influenced by intimidation or by inducement.
23- In general, tbe reactions of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies to the moves discussed in this estimate would be such the same as those of tbe USSR. The ideaeveloping detente on terms which the East has advocated would be congenial to them- They would welcome the opportunity to develop their trade with Western Europe, and would hope that military burdens could be eased. Some of then might want to move faster In developing relations with West Germany than East Germany, Poland, and the USSR would want. The
USSR might think it had reason to be concerned about the degree ofthat would develop in time from the assertion of these interests.
But unless there were fundamental changes in the political snd military
structure of Europe, the basic alignment of these countries with tbe USSR
would not be affected.
29. The Soviets would be less interested In the reasons given for the US moves than ia what the changes meant far power relations ia central Europe and for the possibility of developing endolitical estrangement between the US and its allies. If the Soviets should Judge these factors to be favorable, they might eventually depart froa the cautious tactics which we believe would mark their early reactions and return once again to policies of pressure. Ic the general struggle with
American power, 1ji which they see themsolves as inevitably Involved, their aim remains to Induce as many European states as possible toeutral position- They have shown in the past that they consider both pressure and persuasion as suitable tactics to this end, and would presumably employ both again as their judgment of circumstances might dictate.
30. The Asian Coras-in.'sts. Hanoi and Peking would believe, oc the one hand, that US resources were being strained and that the US hadurther setback in its efforts to gain European support for its Asian policy. On the other hand, the/ would expect that US power was about to be concentratedtill greater scale in the Asianowever they struck the balance, we doubt that their will to persist in pursuit of their own declared objectives in Southeast Asia would be affected.
ST3LS escaee? -OwTLicATiC-rs
31. Interpretations aad no doubt overinterprctatIonsf the meaningS cove to change its posture in the vital European theater would be made by political leaders all over the world. Many would probably believe that this developmentelcome further stage in theof the cold war, at least in Europe. Some might think it provided proof that American power and resources were overextended and reverberations
free American domestic debate night help to sustain this view. On the whole, ve do not believe there vould be any substantial political costs In other areas ln consequenco of US withdrawals fron Europe.
32. Cur Judgment that no serious problems for US policy in other areas ore likely to result from troop reductions in Europe applies only to the relatively near term. The al lgnment of forces which has obtained in Europe for two decades has been the central feature of the world's power structure. If, in consequence of US moves and react iocs to them, it came to be believed that this alignment vas changing, perceptions of what power relations are aad where interest aad security lie might alter, both in Europe aad elsewhere. We do not suggest that th* particular measures to reduce US forces in Europe which are discussed in this estimate would predictably have such far-reaching effects. We do, believe, however, that they might set in motion Important changes in power relations and political alignments, the full scope of which cannot be foreseen. Some unknown degree of risk inevitably attaches to deliberate moves to alter long established politlcsl-fallltcry relationships.
33- It is also true that timingey factor affecting theof such moves. Initiatives which at one moment aad in one set of circumstances night have entirely tolerable or even advantageous effects, might at another moment set inrain of wholly adverse repercussions.
At present, cocXider.ce lr. the ulsdoc of American policy his suffered in cany areas because of Vietnam. In HAM itself tbere is disarray and uncertainty ovirr; tc the French challenge to the foundations of the alliance, partly because of the developments, Soviet prestige andappear to have gained in comparison with US standing. Altogether, there seems to us to be considerable risk that withdrawals froa Europe, especially if they ere large, would at this Juncture convey an impression of American weakness in many quarters. This would probably notasting setback to American policy, but again, bow others aay reacthange in their perception of the relations of power is largely
Original document.
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