SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE DOMINIC

Created: 9/19/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

-i STATES" INTELUGSN.C

approved Cor Koleiiso Dot*

*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEIiCX

0

SU3JECT: SHIE FRCoPECTS FCR STABILITY IK THE

aC*ENICAN REPUBLIC

TEE PROBLEM

To estimate prospects for stabilityoerrt six ooaths

or so with particularn to thethethe Inter-Asericon Peace Perce (lArY).

TKE ESTIMATE

1. The Dooiniceo Republic Lacis caay of the basicfor stability. It has had scarcely any experience in achieving political cccprocise through representative institution The militaryor taajor groups within itave long acted as the arbiters of Doainican politics and have aot hesitated to intervene when they thought necessary. 5 revolution and ita aftersath produced sharp DM enlaosities aaong politically

activef tbe populationanimosities which cannot be readily overcome. The scope of economic and social probleos is such that, at best, progress can come only slowly.*

* These basic considerations are treated in some detailProspects for Stability In the Dcrrlnicanated

The 3alaguer Administration, in office for less than three months. Is only beginning to come to grips with the cost serious of its problems. The aandste be received in the June electionsomeercent of the votehelpedoneymoon period for his Administration, erd he moved quickly totrong decree of control over the bureaucracy oad to dominate the Congress. arge proportion of his Reformist party's adherents are in tbe rural areas end are politically tractive most of the time; partly for this reason he has been unable toolid, veil-organized political base, especially in Santo Pool ago. umber of members of his party have become disenchanted because he ha6 not provided patronage on tbe scale they expected.

Though Balaguer has appointed some members of other parties to cabinet and other administrative posts, this baa not

U. The Adsiaistratisn hasav positiveactions, sere popular,t . It hasdusad prices ofoods, it has reduced salaries ofpaid sovcrnwat officials (including ciUtarynd it has laidewioyees, Co tbe other hand, it hits cct put through any nejcr cev tax ceasures and, though thereizableof aid Doncy available, has ced?ai ted progress ia its ecer-ency investoecr. pro^rs-. Such projects as are uccervay have had enly sarginal irpact ca the severe une:rployi*nt prcbLeo, end the sovenrDcat plana in tbe near future toairly Lirgc

orkers so as to help reduce the exorbitant costs cf the government-run sugar establishment.

Among Halaguer's strengths arc his centrist political position, his staunch anticccmuilso, and his reputation for Another major asset is the general recognition that he has strong US supportas indicated byillion US aid prograa forve street and the recent increase in the US quota forrcm the Dceinican Republic. And perhaps the chief factor in his favor is that there is at present no viable alternative,

The various political opponents of the Balaguerhave so far ected with relative restraint, Elements of tbe extreme left and extreme right have perpetrated occasionalof terrorism sod violence, but this has not beenajor scale. Juan Bosch and his left-of-center Dealaican Revolutionary party have not goae so far as to cooperate vith Baleguer but haveeasure of responsibility in their opposition.

The cost Important rector affecting the goverrrrent'awill be aalaguer's relationship with the military. Ealaguer has calculated that his own hold on power cannot become firm unless end until be can establish his government's authority over the

oiiitary* To thi3 end, he has cade plans for anbitious ailitary

reforms alzcd at consolidating his control and curbing the power

of certain rightwics officers. cini car, leader since Trujillo

hss been able to impose his will on tbe military; those who have taken

even tentative steps to do so, as did Reid Inoon

find themselves on delicate ground.

3. Balaguer realizes that, thisisky businesssy his desire to have key refancs acconplished before the departure cf the IAFF. Resentment of the activities ofilitary aide and suspicion that the President nay eventuallyusber of ton officers have contributed to scire discontent in the ailitary. ew officers of the far right end civilians of similarre taking soundings concerning 3alaguerJs airy support, but they do not now seen to have the strengthuccessful coup,

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9. Ealaguer's orders Issued in late August, which would, break up tha fourth brigade formerly co=zsDded by Generalessin and which would shift air force ground combat troops to the arry, have been only partially inplenented. fte danger point ln the near futuren connection with dispersingored battalion of the fourth brigade to different cocnsnds;

the ailitary are well aware that this would is the -est potent single organisation for, oroup effort.

&ny of tha Dcreinioan ailitary,ajority, are sympathetic to BaLeguer's reform plans. rowing number of officers are lively to be cose restive as they see the government, moving to cut back cot only their cumbers and prerogatives, but also their power. In caking cew appointments of militaryhe trusts, Ealasuer will inevitably earn the enmity of these be replaces; this will be particularly so if he turns to certain Trujilloiat officers with whoa be has associated in tbe past but who ere new regarded with disfavor by cost of the younger military sec.

The departure of the IfirF will remove what has servedrimary deterrentoup in which the military would be the decisive element. However, the coup danger cay not be im-mediate; it will depend ca hew dangerous to the country or to their own interests, the military consider Balaguer's actions to be, aad to some extent an their ability to find civilian allies. During the psricd cf this estimate, we thick that the chler riskoup would occur if the military care to feel that Salaguer was pushing military changes too far or too fast. There will

probably be sooe Increase in terrorist activities by rightist seats, but in themselves these arc unlikely to threaten tbe stability of the retire.

12, The withdrawal of tbe IAPF will probably also beby an increase, the ugh perhapsajor one, in the activities oftrere left- The iVth ofwereat la likely to play the leed role, and 3oze centers of the orthodox ConnuniBt party will oloiost certainly be involved. The pro-Chiaosc Dominican Popular Movement, oilltautumber of past occasions, is so badly split that Its effectiveness will be ltaitsd for sow tine. The cccbiced assets of these tares extrete leftist organizations are cot Large; the Docinicao ailitary will be able to contain aad probably elicicate any guerrilla actions they nayLa the countryside, because the peasants vlll aot give the leftists such support. These groups do have the capability,to undertake violent and disruptive operations in Santo Doniago; unless they obtain support froa the con-Ccoscunlst left, they do acterious threat to the goveraacnt. Thereanger that the police cry over-reacting to agitation or demonstrations which they presume to be Cceroidat directed, cay create oartyrs and drive seme erstwhile coderate leftists Into conaoa cause with the ertrecists.

13. Faced with these aaifold problems, Balaguer vili cottrong or stable position during the period of this estimate. Moreover, It is unlikely that he can accomplish enough in the My of econccic improvement to make any net gala in his political support. Co thee of the econooic measures he finds it necessary to take for budgetary or balance of peyaects purposes are likely to contributeradual erosion of his support. We think, however, the chances are soneuhat better than even that he will survive in office for the six month period of this estimate.

Original document.

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