LBJ LIBRARY Mandatory Review Case.NLji^lM Document ijg*l
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MEMJPANDOI FOR SEE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT; Implications of tbe Current Cabinet Cxlala In Sexrth Vietnam
X. uatlcn. Tbe current cabinet crisis derives fron an unfortunate ceasing of two of the major divisive factors vhlch have long complicated political Ufa In South Vietnamregional rivalries and the issue of civilian versus nllitary control. It does notov development, but merely the first sl^mificant manifestation of these fundaeental maladies sines the September elections. It vill not be the last.
2. Tne seven cabinet ministers (outho have prof-ferred their resignations are all of Southern (CochinChinese)
hird major divisive Influence is religion which is not yet openly involved in the crista; but should the crisis drag on, religious eninoaitlen and political jockeying among tba various religious groups could readily come into
play.
The exact status of these ministers is unclear. Ky has said tbat they have agreed to remain at their post* until after tbe Manila6 October). Nonetheless, the resignation statements have appeared In the press after the ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and tbe statements at least appear unequivocal.'
origin and are civilians.* They shore the general Southern antipathy toward tho northern "carpet-baggers" who dominate the Ky government and the military establishment. They also suspect that the military leadership will not fulfill its pledgeransitionivilian government. The visits of various OVN leaders (in particular those of Police Director, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan) to military-dominated South Korea adds fuel to Southern suspicions. Vith this backdrop of traditionalthe heavy-handed action byortherner. In arresting an acting cabinet ministerallying-point for the Southern ministern. Tney began to pressure Ky and to charge that Loan was attempting topolice state." Moreover, the imminence of the Manila Conference gave then an advantageous moment to bring pressure on Ky. The ministers assumed that Ky would be eager to avoid any political crisis before theln particular one Involving the issue of civilian-military relations which the US considers crucial to the "other war" in Vietnam.
It Is alao likely tbat General Deng Van Quang (IV Corps Commander) and perhaps General Nguyen Huu Co (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War) aro involved behind the scenes in the challenge to Ky's regime. Both men are Southerners. More iimportant, they have strong personal reasons to oppose Xy: both men are prime candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption.
k. In any event,ortherner (Tonkinsse) andman, is almost certainly the ultimate target ofalthough the ministers have scrupuouslyKy personally. Instead they have aimed theirthose close to Ky, particularly Loan, head of thesecurity organizations; but also at General LeHI Corps and Marino Commander; Bui Diem, Secretaryfor Foreign Affairs; and Dinh Trinh Chlnh, Secretaryto tho Primemen are all Northerners.
Because they command the security forcea In the Saigon area. Loan and Khang provide much of the physical protection for the Ky regime. Should Ky he obliged to remove these oen, his power base and prestige would be seriously weakened.
be crisis has already done some damage to Ky's image. Regardless of the immediate outcome of the crisis, Ky will go to Manila with bis domestic housetate of some public disarray.
There has already been adverse foreign publicity on thle score, and the heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila vlll engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has helped dim the glow left by the successful September election. It also has publicly raised the Issue of civlllan-mllltary conflict. This will have reverberations in the Constituent Assembly where thereizeable and vocal bloc of Southern delegates, the most notable and most vocal being Tran Van Van, vho may be vorklng covertly with the dissidents.
6. Implications. The crisis can almost certainly not be resolved before the Manila Conference, and the best that can be looked for ia its deferral until after the Manila Conference.eferral would put the best face on on embarrassing problem at Manila and night allow things to simmer down in Saigon. On previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning compromises vhlch have at least temporarily tended to placate the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this time, or If Ky is compelled to meet the problem head on, he has two alternatives: o accept the cabinet resignations, oro sack or substantially curb Loan.
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If Ky does accept the resignations, it vouldlew to civilian-military relations and vould further exacerbate regional rivalries. There vouldhorus of unfavorable publicity ln the foreign press. To lessen the Impact ofove, Ky vould probably try to replace the ministers with othor Southernere. Be could probably do so, and this vould help, lievertheleas, there vouldev round of anti-OVN statements, charges of "militarynd tbe like. Eome of the firebrand Southerners in -the Assembly might resign In protest. In these circumstances, there might be scae street demonstrations and the militant Buddhists might strikeemporary alliance vith some Catholic Southern elements.
8. ove by Ky to drop Loan could cause more immediate and serious problems. Ky realizes this and has said that he vill not fire Loon, though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this is probably not Irreversible. As director of the tvo major security organizations. Loanower in his own right. he Is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young, hard-line officers collectively celled the "Baby Turks." Loan's removal vould raise tho spectre of reneued military factionalism vhich has not seriously plagued the GVU since the removal of General Thi lost spring. Moreover, Ky has confidence in Loan,
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Original document.
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