4
76
Document
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIAAATE
Author^
North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam
SubmMmd fay
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Conartnd in byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai Indicated6
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
3
Authenticated
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation at this
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organization* of the Depart-monti of Stole, Defenie. ond ihe NSA.
Concurrififlf
Mr. Sherman Kent, Ading CIA Member of USIB
Mr.enney, for Ihe Director of Intelligence and Research, Depart, ment of State
lieutenant General Joseph f. Carroll, USAF, Director, Defenw Intelligence Agency UetrteAOM General Morahatl S. Carter, USA, Director of tbe National Secvrlr, Agency
Abstaining:
Dr. Charlei H. Reiehordt, for AuhJant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-nilswon, and Mr. William O. Cregar, tor Aitlttont Director, Federal Bureau of InvMiganon, the lubjed being ouhide of their [urtwliction.
1-afaKfQ
T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
ASSUMPTION'
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
and Mobilization
Population and Manpower
Mobilization.
Armed Forces
II. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT FORCES IN SOUTH
VIETNAM
Current Situation
The Command
Logistics
Affecting Capabilities
Military Training and
Infiltration
Capacities of the
Trucks
Sea
Cambodia
Food
Combat Losses
VC Recruitment and Conscription
VC/NVA Relationship
Morale
Effect of US Actions in the
HI. THE PROBABLE BUILDUP OF COMMUNIST FORCES
Page
TABLE It ESTIMATED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE OF NORTH
VIETNAM WITH SEX BREAKDOWN 5
TABLESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. 8
TABLESTIMATED MILITARY STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM 7
TABLEONTHLY INFILTRATION 10
TABLESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY LOSSES U
TABLESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCE DEVELOPMENT (Units) 17
TABLESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(Numerical Strength)17
NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY POTENTIAL FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate: (a) the present strength of the North Vietnamese military establishment; (b) its capability to expand; (c) its capability7 to send troops to the South and support them there; and (d) the probable buildup of forces in the South.
ASSUMPTION
For the purposes of thise assume that North Vietnam will generally continue to pursue its current strategy in the war over the nextonths.
CONCLUSIONS
estimate the present strength of the NorthForces to be slightlyithfthe army. North Vietnam has sufficient manpower to providemill tan' force ofen without serious strain.
total Communist force in South Vietnam is estimated. The major combatorth Vietnamese troops,0 VCmain and local forces, anduerrillas.
Vietnam is estimated tourrent0ndividual replacements foraximum effort, this total might be doubled. FromVietnam could organize someonfantry regiments
1 Th* figure* Id this ctttmnto ue current aa ot
is considerable margin for error in estimating totallosses. Nevertheless, we believe these losses areThe loss rate has already begun to strain theof the VC in South Vietnam, but it appears thatCommunist losses could be replaced, if necessary, fromVietnam.
estimate that the VC could recruit andoper month. The replacement of cadre, however, is probablyand is almost certain to become more difficult in thethe endhe loss rate may exceed the estimatedthe VC to recruit replacements from within South Vietnam,if the rate of combat increases, ln such case, thebe forced either to scale down their plans for expansion orup the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam.
evidence suggests that the total infiltration forprobably be00 men. These wouldinclude one or two infantry regiments per month, additionalcombat support battalions, and individual replacements.
have no reliable evidence of Communist force goals.endowever, the Communist regular force mayregiments and other units and numberet gain of0 for the year.his force may grow to, providedsubstantially6 proportions.
ii. We believe that current and estimated future capacities of the Laotian road network are sufficient to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Even ii this capacity could be reduced, say by one-third, and combat activities were to double, we would still estimate that the capacities would be sufficient on an annual basis to support the requirements for the Communist forces at current and future levels. However, at these higher levels of forces andthe excess of road capacities over requirements would be reduced during the rainy season.
L Maintenance and operation of the North Vietnamese truck fleet in North Vietnam and Laoserious problem, and the regime is dependent on the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe for trucks, spare parts, and POL. However, despite truck losses from air
attack, breakdown, and retirement, we believe these losses could be offset by imports. The POL requirement for trucks involvod in the infiltration movement lias not been large enough to present significant supply problems. But local shortages have occurred from time to time and may become significantesult of attacks on the POL distribution system.
J. Other channels of supply complement the Laotian corridor. Cambodia has become an increasingly important source of supplies, particularly food. Although sea infiltration has been curtailed, the Communists will probably continue to attempt to resupply their forces by this means, particularly in the delta area.
K. We believe that morale problems for the Communists willaggravated in the future. Hanoi's problems in implementing its military strategy have increased, and the record of combat must raise questions, at least among some leaders in North Vietnam, as to the wisdom of their long term military strategy.
DISCUSSION
I. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES A. Manpower and Mobilization
L Population and Manpower. Tbo size aad structure of North Vietnam's population are more than adequate to support the war at Us present level and. if need be. expand it further. Though estimates vary, die total population is probably aboutillion. Inge group, there areillion males, and ofittleillion are believed to bo physically fit for military service. Moreover,hysically fit males reach the age ofach year. Thus, thereonsiderable pool of military age manpower available for the North Vietnamese armed forces.
Antensive society such as that of North Vietnam could not mobilise manpower resources for military or war-related tasks to the extent characteristic of developed industrial societies- But manpower could be taken from the North Vietnamese economy in three general ways. Use of tbe younger men who would normally enter the Labor force each year could haveanyales since the beginningnd Hanoi has probably already tapped this pool heavily. Transferring men out of various nonessentialsuch as non-state trade and consumer services, and education, could provideales, but no widespread efforts appear to have been mado yet in this area. The largest source, and the one which has been most extensively tapped, is agriculture, where tbe regime hasonsiderable effort sinoe5 to replace men with women, children and old people,
Agriculture accounts for moreillionotal labor force ofigh proportion of tbe labor force has always been women, exceedingercent in agriculture. North Vietnamese press and other sources have indicated this figure may have increased torercent. While we feel there is insufficient evidence to argue for tbe higher figure, we are confident that women now constitute at leastercent of the agricultural labor force. An increase ofercent in the proportion of women in tbe agricultural labor force could have released as manyales for other duties.
Mobilization Some preliminary steps to expand the armed farces were probablyome former servicemen, particularly NCOs, were recalled to duty4umber of military units were expanded snd some new units were formed. Inischarges were halted, at least temporarily. Inartial mobilization wa* officially proclaimed. Tbe draft age limits, which had,ool of
physical'! Bt males, were broadenedears, making availableorn physically fit menotal pool of approximatelyillion. Physical requirements were lowered and some of those previously exempted wero conscripted. he tour of duty was extended from two to three yean.
n our view, North Vietnam haseneral effort to place the countryar footing and probably has not yet exhausted tbe manpower resources tbat are available for military service or war-related tasks. Tbe regime's mam problems in utilizing its manpower resources appear to betarffidcnclw. low labor productivity, and dulocabun* caused by the war and mobilisation, and compounded by US bombing. Hanoi has attempted to maintain its economy as well as to meet its wartime needs, but the mobilization program and tbe war have bandicappod agricultural production and forcedof the Socond Five-Year Plan. The war has also forced the regime
SB^ET
lo Increase the number of those engaged in cotrvtmction, tansportatioo and communication to overincrease ofn the past two years. Despite these limits on the use of available manpower, we believe North Vietnam has the capability to expand its armed forces toithout creating serious manpower problems.
B. The Armed Forces
e are confident that the North Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded significantly sinceeither manpower availability estimates noron mobilization, however, offers the basis for exact estimates. Among the unresolved questions are the size of the infantry and air defense units and of the forces in or on their way to South Vietnam.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE AHMED FORCES SUMMARY
ARMED PUBLIC
TOTAL
MILITIA
North Vietnamese Army Breakdown Out^-Country
South Vietnam
TOTAL
Jn-Cotmrry
b composed of elements of the cMken populationDchdtog about one mffllooear distinction between full-tune rcgwroa! forces, reserves, and mUtii is not possible from available evidence.
include* AAA, SAM uniB, radar, and miscellaneous air defense admlniatni. boo and support. This forco operates under on Air Force/Air Defease Headquartera located tn Hanoi. Anen Involved ln air defenseAA battalions organic to tbe Infantry divisions and brigades, and are iocloded In the Infantry strength figure.
'Tub mchides artillery, armor, high command,ngfneen, andunits.
TS
Is no way of resolving this wide range of estimates withour view, the lower estimate, whichotal Increase of aboutthe last year or so, is probably somewhat conservative. There isabout the exact status of the infantry brigades, and the largerthe infantry assumes tbat four of the six brigades carried have beendivision status. We are not persuaded, however, that tbe evidence isto show that all four of these brigades have been upgraded, and weall units are continuously at full strength. We do think that theinfantry and air defense (primarily AAA) units, and tbo number of troopsenroute to South Vietnam arc probably larger than tbe lower figuresTableherefore, we estimate the strength of the army to be aboutthe total armed forces slightly. These estimates areHanoi's capacity, and well above the estimated minimumin-country forces.
II. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM A. The Current Situation
estimated VC/NVA military strength in South Vietnam, as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
VC Main and Local Forces' .division-typo headquarters *
2 front headquarters'egiments
attalions (regimental and
eparateeparate platoons
North Vietnamese Combat
Troops division-type headquarters"
egiments
attalions (regimental and separate)
Combat Support Personnel
Armed
* Main Forces ore subordinate to tbe Central Office for South Vietnam and to tbe Military Regions; Local Forcea to tbe Provinces.
*Tbe VC and NVA divttioo-type formations In South Vietnam do not conformtructure or strength to tbe normal NVA division. Forces under tbe division-type headquarter? range from two regiment! to aa many ai six or seven. Moreover, tbe field artilleryormal featureVA division, is not present in any of the division-type formations ia South Vietnam. Instead, units armed with mortars and recoiUess rifles provide Gre support. In addition to those forces regularly composing these formations, local foroes and guerrillas are sometimes temporarily assigned to them for tbe executionpecific operation.
'See
4
LAOS PANHANDLE AREA
COMMUNIST ROADNET
There is room for error in these estimates. The combat strength of the various units is carried at the last reported total At any given moment, specific units could be well under or over reported strength because of casualties, desertions, or replacements. Totals for guerrillas, political cadre, and combatough order of magnitude based on available Information.
NVA force in South Vietnam has been built up primarily by theof complete units sincehough preliminary traininginfiltration took placeresent evidence indicates thatNVA troops entered South Vietnamnd0 infive monthscceptance of the presence of NVA units andin South Vietnam often lags several months behind their actual timeand tbe figures on infiltration are subject to continual revision.the basis of past experience, it is almost certain that the total infiltrationunits and replacements so far6 actually
Command Structure. To accommodate this expanding force,structure in South Vietnam has grown systematically. Platoonswere formed0attalions and the first indicationsVC headquarters were notednd the first NVASouth Vietnam inhe first division-type and frontwere also detectedor many years, tbe two majorpoutts in South Vietnam have been tbe Communist Headquartersin VC Militarynd tbe Military Affairs Section ofOffice for South VietnamOSVN appears to be tbeheadquarters in South Vietnam. Both COSVN and MR-5to the High Command in Hanoi. Tbe overall direction of tbein Hanoi, but wo arc unable to determine the extent of tactical controlby Hanoi or the military relationship between COSVN and MR-5.
IL VC and NVA units are being integrated into larger, more cohesive bodies with the formation of division-type and frontimilaroccurred within the Viet Minh during tbe Indochina war. The frontappear to be associated with specific geographic areas, while the division-type headquarters do not Both have the capability for conducting multi-battalion and multi-regimental operations. Three NVA division-type headquarters have been confirmed inwo composed of both NVA and VC units and one with NVA units only. There are also two front headquarters with multi-provincial responsibilities, directly subordinate toeadquarters. Further south; two probable VC division-type headquarters have been identified. The remainder of the command structure Is composed of provincial commands, with their own organic and attached units, and of separate units, both directly subordinate to the respective VC military regions.
ogistics. The daily logistical requirement for the Communist forces has steadily increased. It is estimated that as of0 VC/NVA troops required aboutons of supplies each day. Inn estimated
C/NVA Droops probably requiredons daily at present levels of activity.
bulk of this daily require merit is not drawn from outsidewe believe there is no external requirement for POL, and food isprimarily in South Vietnam and to some extent from Cambodia. Theforces are not estimated toignificant external logisticalThus the main requirement levied on external sources is for some typesIIV (quartermaster, engineer, andnde estimated that this external requirementoons.his has risen, and we now calculate aof about2 toons of Class V. Themay increase substantially depending on the rate at whichforces arc built up snd tbe rate at which they are engaged inthe nature of the external logistic requirement could changeif, for example, the frequency and level of combat should depriveforces of access to local food supplies in South Vietnam.
B. Factors Affecting Capabilities
MQUary Training and Infiltration. Prior to US bombing, infiltrationin North Vietnam was conducted in several training centers. Army basic training was normally two to three months, training for infiltration six months, and specialized training up to one year. After the US bombing began, unit training and training for infiltration was decentralized and transferred tomilitary units, which then formed new units, trained them, fleshed them out, and dispatched them to the South. Inhis type of training lasted three months. Byhere were several instances where some individual prisoners reported their training lasted only four to six weeks, andew cases even less.
It is estimatedVA division has the capability ofombat-ready men every three months or00 per year. Reports indicate thatt least six divisions have conducted training of units for South Vietnam. It is doubtful that all elements of tbe six divisions would be used cooeurrently for infiltration tanning, because of the requirements of normal duties plus the scheduling of tbe training cycle.we estimate that North Vietnam has the capability of0ear for infiltration. By broadening tbe number of units in tbo training base or shortening the training cycle. North Vietnam might,aximum effort, train double the above number of individual personnel in one year. Actual training performance prior6 has apparently been short of these projections of capabilities.
While we estimate that individual replacements could be trained at the rates projected above, we do not believe that all of them could be organized into infantry regimental units and provided with tbe requisite leadership atate. th Division, the most active source of infiltrated regiments,
frained and dispatched six regiments into South Vietnam between the fall4 and the springe consider it possible to accelerate such unit-type training so that North Vietnam could produce infantry regimentsate ofoer year. This would account for00 men per year.
Infiltration* For thenclusive, anere infiltrated into South Vietnam.he rate increasedand varied betweenn June toor October.he rate of infiltration appears to have climbed further. No clear pattern for infiltnition is apparent, but with the buildup of Free World combat forces in the summerhe complexion of the war in South Vietnam changed, and the Cornmunists evidently decided to increase significantly tbeir effort Almost all of the personnel infiltrated into South Vietnam traveled by foot, and the trip usually took up to ten weeks. Infiltration Is not geared to the dry season, as those who arrived in September and October would have been enroutc during tbe severest part of the rainy season, perhaps to take advantage of factors which would limit surveillance.
Wc believe we have not yetaximum rate of Infiltration. Factors limiting the rate of irrfUteation to some extent are the weather, time en-route, and the logistical problems of feeding the troops enroute. Because of sickness, desertions, and hostile actions, there is attrition among the troops during infiltration. However, we believe the North Vietnamese have theto increase logistical support for the infiltration system and that more
TABLE 4
LY-
March
April
July
0 .
Theae figure* Inctode all four acePjXed fciffleraooo categories.n based on confirmation by two or more prisoners or returnees, orW statement, tbe major portion of which Is confirmed by other sources.t based on PW utcrrogationi which are judged to be probably true, but the major portion of which baa not been confirmed by other sources. s derived from PW statements not supported by Other source*.
important detennining factors working on infiltration are the number of troops available for deployment, Hanoi's estimated requirement for them in South Vietnam, aod fmally, Hanoi's decision to send them there.
centerspread map.
capacity figure* are osprcived In ibort tow per day. These road tormage capacity figures axe very conservative, based on estimates for sustained heavy use over at0 day period.hort-term period it Is estimated that the roads oould carry at least three tiroes tbe capacity figure, but the roads would then require some maintenance work. Further, the capacity figure Is set by the most restrictive pointhoke point) on tbe road; capacity for other stsctcbes may be considerably higher.
Capacities of the LOCs? The capacity of the roads in North Vietnam and Laos to deliver supplies to South Vietnam is restricted by tho capacity of the roads in Laos rather than by those in North Vietnam. In Laos, tbe total unmterdicted capacity of tbe infiltration roads for truck movement Isons per day in the dry seasonons per day in the rainyhis capacity is available to pointsew miles of tbe South Vietnamese border. The movement of supplies Into South Vietnam is dependent on the trail system and on the numbers of porters, bicycles, and animals used.
Aerial interdiction has increased the cost and difficulty of keeping traffic moving, has slowed truck movement, and has reduced road capacity to some extent. Nevertheless, during the past year the North Vietnamese haveto maintain the overall capacity of the roads both in Military RegionII-IV) and in Laosevel sufficient to meet their military needs. They have at the same time significantly extended the road network, increased its flexibility, and made it less vulnerable to interdiction by construction ofroutes, short cuts, and bypasses, apparently aimed at providing an alternate for each major supply route. The new road from North Vietnam into Laos alleviates tbe pressure oa the Mu Gia pass road and adds to the totalwhich can be delivered into Laos. Tbe new "Sihanouk Road" from Cambodia into southern Laos also permits the acquisition of some additional supplies which can be delivered all the way to tbe tri-border area.
Logistical problems, caused by aerial interdiction, are imposingerms of manpower, transport and construction equipment Several hundred thousand workers are being employed full time to maintain transport routes in North Vietnam. In Laos, possibly four engineering groups are employed in mamtaining, constructing, and improving routes in thearea, and for each engineering specialist up to five civilian laborers are believed to be recruited at least for part time work. Because of the scope of this effort, we anticipate that, despite the cost and difficulty caused by aerial mterdiction and slower truck movement, the North Vietnamese will continue to Improve the motor routes into tbe Laotian Panhandle and will concentrate their construction efforts in Laos on increasing tbe existing road capacity,for tbe rainy season.
Trucks. This expansion of the roadnct indicates increasing dependence on truck transport for logistic support North Vietnam is estimated to havo00 cargo trucks. Imports totaledo fartrucks hav* been imported. The POL requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement has not been large enough to presentsupply problems. But local shortages have occurred from rime to time and may become significantesult of attacks on the POL distribution system.
Maintenance of the truck fleet which consists of overifferent models,erious problem, primarily because of lack of adequately skilled mechanics and because lack of spare parti has become critical. In some cases, it has been easier to get new trucks than to get the spare ports needed to put vehicles back into service. Vehicles damaged by asrstrikes have been removed rapidly and caumirsallxed to salvage usable parts. However, despite truck losses from air attack, breakdown, and retirement, we believe these losses could be offset by Imports.
Anrucks are believed to have been operating on the infiltra-tion routes within Laos during the past dryive-ring at leastoet tons of supplies per day to the South Vietnam border area. Waterways and primitive means of transport are used to deliver additional supplies, the amount of which cannot be quantified. Transport aircraft, including bclicoptm, are in the North Vietnamese inventory- However, wo do not believe that these aircraft will be used lo any slgniflcanl degree in transporting supplies into tho Laotian corridor and South Vietnam.
S. Sea Routes.0ea routes appear to haveajor means of infiltrating supplies, particularly to the southern part of South Vietnam. These havein importance sinoe tbe inception of the US Market Tone Operation inevertheless, there aro0 cssmmcrcial and private croft registered in South Vietnam,f which are at sea on any given dayoastlineomparable In overall length to that from Maine to Florida. Ofhips detected between5 andere inspected and an0 boarded and searched. While this large operation continues to expand, there is stfll room for infiltration. Recent reports Indicate that larger rteel-huDed craft are attempting to resupply the VC in southern South Vietnam from time to time. Even ifew craft reach the coast of South Vietnamew tons of supplies each, they would stillaluable means of supply, particularly for the delta area.
ambodia. In the past Cambodia served moreanctuary for the VC rather than as an infiltration channel for men and supplies into SouthDuring the past year, bow ever, Cambodian increasingly important source of supplies other than armaments. For example, tn recent months Cambodia has apparently reached some sort of agreement for tbe sale of substantial quantities of food to the Communists. Sihanouk has also offered to permit hospitalization of wounded Communists ln Cambodia and even their
return to South Vietnam after recovery. Sihanouk stated that this offer was made in an attempt to deter the VC/NVA from establishing their own hospitals in Cambodian territory, and there is some evidence that the offer is being implemented. The Cambodian portion of the so-called "Sihanouk Road" has apparently been constructed, if not by or with the cooperation of the Cambodian Army, at least with its knowledge. Bice is being purchased in Phnom Penh and delivered to Communist military units via this road. Other suppliesin Cambodia either clandestinely or privately are primarily goods such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and some radios. Armaments would probably be moved through Cambodia only clandestinely.
Unrestricted use of Cambodiaransit zone for supplies would provide the Communistsogistic route capacity far in excess of their rruudmum projected needs. Arty physical limits on this potential would be set by tbe capacity of the ports rather than by that of thenoukville is the only port of significant size on tbe Gulf of Siam and at presentapacity ofons per day above and beyond the normal Cambodian traffic through tbe port. The roadnet from the port* to the South Vietnamese border is capable of handling more than this, The degree to which die Cambodian government will itself become further involved In traffic with the Cornmunists or accede to unrestricted use of its ports will depend on Sihanouk's fluctuating views of the course of the war and of where Cambodia's best interests Hc. At the moment, Sihanouk appears to be making efforts toore neutral posture. Nevertheless, Cambodia will probably continue to condone tho transit and sale through well*established private channels of supplies to tbe Communists in South Vietnam but wiD probably not officially permit armaments traffic.
Food Suppbf. Rice is the main food essential for the Communist forces, although salt is the scarcest item. The total Communist force would require atetric tons of rice per year; current NVA/VC main force units probably do not consume much0 tons annually. These totals are far below the amount of rice available to the Cornmunists in South Vietnam, but their problem is moving supplies to the rice-deficient areas in the highlands where most of tbe NVA/VC main force units are located. This problem has been aggravated by the increased level of combat which has disruptedand limited VC harvesting operations in the highlands. And in recent months US operations into Communist-cxmtrolled areas have seized an average ofons of rice per month.
The Communists have resortedariety of measures to overcome their food problems. The country Is studded with food caches. Tbe VC have raised food taxes in most regions and have increasingly resorted to coercion into meet their quotas. To meet their needshe VC have moved closer to tbe food-producing areas. They have also increased their procurement of rice in Cambodia. The Communists are not likely to solve completely their food problems by these tactics. But neither are they likely to suffer serious-food shortages on any large scale in tbe near future,
>
of youths each year who become old enough to fight, perhapsome VC recruitment Is undoubtedly conducted in contested areas and in GVN-controlled areas as well There is no way to determine exactly how far the VC have drawn on their manpower pool, but tbe growth in Communist forces plus the increasing casualty losses probably have begun to tax the VCand training apparatus in South Vietnam.i"imn'n, tbe VC have had to relax their recruiting standards and rely more on conscription.
The squeeze on VC manpower bas become more apparentnumbers of prisoners mention the lacs: of personnel and tbe poor quality of tbe new replacements, many of whom arc very young and poorlysometimes with only two or three weeks of training. Moreover, the use of combat units, even regiments, for training appears to be increasing. We estimate that the VC could0 men per month, in addition, the VC probably recruit and conscript large numbers of personnel who receive little or no formal training. Thus It appears that current in-country training capability couldcurrent Communist operational losses. But over tbe nextonths or so, the loss rate wiD possibly exceed tbe estimated capability of the VC to recruit and train replacements from within South Vietnam, especially if the rate of combat mcreases.
The loss of VC cadre, however, is probablyroblem and is almost certain to become worse in tbe future. The development of cadreengthy process, and hasty, stop-gap measures to provide new cadre create almost as many problems as they alleviate. Tbe Communists also have rapidly advanced personnel to serve as cadre; nidging from prisoner statements and captured documents, this hasoticeable drop in quality among the cadre.
VC/NVA Relationship. There Is little evidence of significant friction between NVA and VC troops, although personality clashes, food shortages, and misuse of guerrilla forces have created isolated incidents. The integration of North Vietnamese personnel into the VC organization as both high and low level cadre9 has aided in controlling problems arising between the two regional groups. The use of both NVA and VC personnel in the same unitthat the Communists consider the two groups compatible. Nevertheless, thereossibility that as the war takes oo even moreorth Vietnamese character, antipathies between the Southerners and Northerners may increase.
Morale. Also important in the long run, though difficult to measure, is the impact on Communist morale of tho adverse factors in the war. Captured documents and prisoners indicate that there, is mounting uneasiness among the Communist ranks, and that many of the troops are having doubts as to tbevictory of the Communists. For example, VC documents have candidly discussed the adverse effect of the GVNs "Open Arms" (defector) program, and many documents have gone to great length to counter pessimism within the Communist forces. But there have been no mass defections and the Communists continue to fight weD. Life for the Communist soldier has become even grimmer
than previously, and morale problems for the Cornmunists will probably become aggravated In tbe future.
Effict of US Actions in th* South. The stepped-up activity of US forces has almost certainly upset Commomst plans for the conduct of tbe war. The Corrrmurtitti have been Increasingly unable to pack and rhoore combat at times and places to their lubxtg. This has forced them to rery nwreauangly onmeasures and rmprovitation rather than on their preferred tactics of well-nlanneil battles Finally, the I'S torOBI Lave- pushed deeper into Communis! base areas and have forced tbe Communists to place more emphasis on self-defense and protection of their main base areas than ever before. They have retained, nonetheless, considerable strategic Initiative and are capable ofwith sizable forces In many areas.
Thus, Hanoi's leaders have not been forced to change their strategy for the war, but their problems In Implementing It have been increased. While Hanoi's Leaders believe in the conceptrotracted conflict, they must,tee tbe warar longer and more costly affair than it appeared to them two years ago. Andust now recognize the high risks Inlarge numbers of their troops and have serious doubts of everanother Dim Bien Phu. The CommiuiisJs haveonsiderable price in both North and South Vietnam to increase their forces and continue tbe battle. They are probably willing tn continue doing so for some time to come. But tho record of combat must raise questions, at least among some lenders in Hanoi, us to the wisdom of their long term military strategy.
Ml. THE PROBABLE BUILDUP OF COMMUNIST FORCES
lthough the VC/NVA are apparently developing higher level cornmand and control headquarters and are Including mare units under control of these IMartntiaiUil (drvfcdoo-type andot anticipated that they wfllLarge scale conventional operations, at least not within tbe time frame under consideration. It is more likely that these headquarters will be used to centralize control over multiple, widespread, and possibly simultaneousIn their respective areas of responsibility in South Vietnam.
Present evidence suggests that the North Vietnamese regime will probably send00 troops Into South Vietnamhese forces would probablyumber of units and combat support battalions (artillery, mortar, and AAA) and replacements tn meet combat losses. The buildup in infantry regiments will probably continue at about one or two per month
Wa have no reliable evidence of what force goats the Communists hope ultimately to achieve. They are likely, ba any event, to reassess their tactics and strategy periodically, especially after6 summer campaign. Present trends Indicate that the Communists are probably movingorcethis year of seven to nineeadquarters and two front head-
ESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCE DEVELOPMENT (Units)
7
Division-type Headquarters
Front Headquarters
Regiments
Battalions (Regimental and Separate)
ESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCE DEVELOPMENT (Numerical strength)
Units 7
VC Main and Local Forces
NVA Troops
Combat Support
Political
Guerrillas
quartersegiments. By the endhe Communist regular force strength may total, thuset gain of0 for the year. By the endhis force may grow to total, provided attrition remains substantially6 proportions.
We calculate that the force structure outlined above for the end6 wouldons of external logistics daily if current levels of activity were sustained. If tbe level of activity were doubled, the external need wouldons per day. Sranlarry, by the endhe force postulated wouldons of external supplies daily at present levels of activity,ons if the level of activity doubled. Though we cannot be confident of what the requirement would be, we believe the lower figures more nearlythe actual requirement
We believe that current and estimated future capacities of the Laotian road network are sufficient to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Even if this capacity could be reduced, say by one-third, and combat activities were to double, we would still estimate that the capacities would be sufficient on an annual basis to support the requirements for theforces at current and future levels. However, at these higher levels of forces and combat, tbe excess of road capacities over requirements would be reduced during theeason.
Tbe projected force structure for tho end6 would require heavy recruiting within South Vietnam. The total NVA/VC manpower requirement may be as muchnd could perhaps go even higher if the rate of combat forced on the Cornmunists increased substantially.
Iroops are sent from the North and allowances made for combat losses, VC requirements could be0ecruits. Such an effort is within VC capabilities. By the endowever, the possible- increase in force strength aod the combat losses will possibly exceed VC recruitmentespecially if the rate of combat increases. In this case, the Communists might bo forced either to scale down their plans for expansion or to step up the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
I, Thbwoiby tbo Central Intolageoc* Agency. Thfai copy Is tor tho information ond uw of tho redolent and of person!is jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorited by the following officials within their respective deportments
of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of Slate
Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the organization of th* Joint Chiefs ofssistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department ol the Army, for the
Department of th* Army
Chief of Naval Operationsor th* Department of th*
Navy
f of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, for tb* Departmont of the Ac-
Force
or of Intelligence, AfC. for th* Atomic Energy Commission
Director, FBI, for the Federal Boroou of Investigation
of NSA, for iho Notional Security Agency
L Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any othor Department or Agency
This document may b* retained, or destroyed byecorocmce with applicable security regulations, or returned lo the Central Intelligence Agency by arrongement with the Office of Oanlral Reference. OA,
When thislssomlnoted overseas, the ov*rs*ai recipients may retain kteriod not In success of on* year. At lh* end of this period, the document shouldbe destroyed returned to th* fcrwordutg rsgeocy, or pereiission sho.ld bo requested of th* forwording ogoncy lo retain it In accordance with2
DISTRIBUTIONi
Whir* House National Security Council Daportmont of Stole Department of Dofonse Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation
1 IM VI
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: