SUMMARY OF BOB-CIA-DOD STUDY ON OXCART AND SR-71 PROGRAMS (W/ATTACHMENT)

Created: 12/1/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Attachedopy of thetudy which was prepared by Bill Fischer of BOB, Herb Benington of DOD, and John Parangosky of this Agency for the Directors of BOB and CIA and the Secretary ofelieve that the author's appraisal of the OXCART andleets is objective and that the program alternatives identified by them provide reasonable choices for the decision-maker. As one would expect, however, the general thruBt of the paper implies that there is no great need for the

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Summary of BOB-CIA-DOD Study on OXCART andrograms

Subject study examines four aspects of the OXCART andrograms: Resources (Aircraft Systems andission Requirements, Needeparate OXCART Fleet, and Alternative Programs. The following paragraphs summarize the main findings of the study.

RESOURCES

Aircraft Systems: The OXCART and there almost equal in general flight performance; the only difference is that the OXCART flieslightly higher altitude. The reconnaissance capabilities of the aircraft are similar. The OXCART uses several interchangeable single-sensor systems and is, of course, already operational. Theill have capability for simultaneous operation of several sensors when operational in

Costs: The total estimated costs from82 for both aircraft systemsillion. Of this total,or both systems would5 million,osts would4 million, and OXCART costs would8 million. (These are not program costs. See section on alternatives for those costs. )

MISSION REQUIREMENTS

Strategic Reconnaissance: (This term is defined as peacetime reconnaissance primarily ofommunist China and theirhe OXCART andan play at bestinor role in strategic reconnaissance. Satellite capabilities now exceed normal requirements for target coverage, and new systems will greatly increase these capabilities. Also, satellitesower risk of causing an "incident". Afterdvanced drones will probablyood capability for reconnaissance of well-defended areas. Should the Soviet Union or Communist China be able to neutralize or destroy reconnaissance satellites, neither the OXCART nor theromise to be effective substitutes since they too could

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bc dcstroyod or neutralized. These aircraft could bo useful, however, for strategic reconnaissance of certain areas outside the Sino-Soviet bloc whore sophisticated air defenses deny acceBS to. In sum, there does not appear lotrong requirement for the OXCART or thetrategic reconnaissance role. mall fleet of less thanozen would be sufficient.

Reconnaissance of Force Mobilization: (This term is defined as that reconnaissance directed primarily against Communist China and the European Satellites when there are indications thatarc underway for attack against near-by nations. J For this mission the OXCART and theircraft could be of much greater value. They could provide intense coverage of large border areas on shorter notice and over longer periods of time than existing or >roy rammed reconnaissance satellites. AT

yatemeal-time readout for advanced satellite Systems"

would tend to reduce the advantages of reconnasasance by these aircraft, as will future drone systems particularly the TAGDOARD. In sum, the force mobilization mission will continue to bc an important one for the OXCART andegardless of developments in the satellite programs. As manyozen aircraft could be needed for this missioneconnaissance capability in two theaters to support both national and tactical intelligence needs is to be provided.

Reconnaissance for General War Crises: (This term is defined as that reconnaissance directed againstnd ultimately Communist China, in times of intense crises or in the event of indications of preparationstrategic attack against the United States or its allies. ) For this mission, over the next several years, the capabilities of the OXCART andould be much superior to those of satellites or drones. Later in this decade, satellites will become more competitive with these aircraft. In addition, the aircraft defenses of the enemy likely will become more effective against the OXCART and These aircraft also couldigh risk of "incident" in an escalating crisis. In sum, the OXCART andave considerable value in the immediate future, but this value will diminish over time. The numbers of aircraft planned for this requirement should be conditioned to possible enemy reactions to such over-flights.

SlOP Reconnaissance: (This term is defined as that reconnaissance aimed at the Soviet Union, and ultimately Communist China, after the

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initiation of generalheoot and the three OXCART aircraft carrying aide-looking radar would he uaeful lor this mission

General Assessment: The review of mission requirements indicates that during the next several years, the OXCART and theill remain uniquely capable in all four of the above missions, subject to improvements io Soviet and Chinese air defenses. Toward the end of the decade, however, certain satellites and drones could supplant these aircraft. orst-casehe need Io satisfy three of the above missions simultaneously, indicates that aboutXCARTS and/orould be required over the next several years.

NEED FOR SEPARATE OXCART FLEET

The study contains no conclusions regarding the needeparate OXCART fleet. It does, however, list severalwhich serve to illustrate that the authors could not reach agreement on the needeparate OXCART fleet. The authors note that the President might be less reluctant to approve the use of the OXCART fleet in peacetime or potential crisis than theleet which is under military sponsorship. The Soviets or Chinese might consider an OXCART over-flight less provocative and might minimi re their reactions because of the use of civilian crews and unmarked aircraft. One of the greatest potential difficulties inseparate OXCART andleets ia that great confusion could arise in the White House regarding schedules, targeting, etc.ime of escalating crista.

The authors also note that the valueovert .and separate OXCART fleet has been diminehed by the officially exposednd that the risk of "incident" is, therefore, not likely to hereduced by maintaining an OXCART separate fleet. In the event of anowever, established military sponsorship would probably reduce tho ability of friendly governments to support publicly the need for such reconnaissance by. The command and communication channels would be equally effective whether under military or CIA control. And finally, CIA channels for dealing with

XCART AND SR-71

The authors identified three primary alternatives for tho docision*makers:

Maintain the status quo and combine both fleets at currently approved levels. This would provide for two bases and theofperational aircraft Program costs (aircraft plus support) from82 would3 million.

Moth-ball all OXCART aircraft buta clandestine capability by sharingircraft between SAC and CIA; make certain primary mission assignments to CIA and others to SAC. This alternative would provide for two bases and theofircraft Program costs from82 would1 million.

Terminate the OXCART fleet inour months after theecome fully operational and assign all missions to theleet. This alternative would provideingle base and the availability ofperational aircraft Program costs from82 would8 million.

In arriving at the above alternatives, the authors concluded that by retiring the OXCART fleet, significant cost savings could bo made while only slightly reducing tho numbers and types of reconnaia-sance missions which could be conducted simultaneously. They note, however,recise determination of the sise of the fleet can only be made with more study because of uncertainties regarding attrition

rate, mission requirements, need for simultaneous missions, and the capabilities of satellite systems, dronesircraft to perform certain missions now and in the future.

U it is decided that both the OXCART andleets are to be maintained, the authors believe that it is very questionable that the sise of the fleets should be reduced since cost savings would not be significant. In addition, the savings from any form of baseare small, because base support costs for these aircraft are relatively low in comparison with the overall expense of the program. Finally, If the sise of the fleets is to be reduced at this time, the authors feel it would be wise to store rather than to destroy those aircraft which are retired, because of the uncertain.ty as to the factors affecting fleet size.

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