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CE8TBAL IlIILLIflSICE EBCX OFFICE CF HATIOCU. ESTDitfXS
9 January
H FOBCK8 SraiTECT- She Vex la Vietnam
TBS COnCOK IB CEEEBAL
1. In tba- course of tbe past yearalf the chances that the CcasanxLsts vould via Sooth Victnaa fcy military victory have vanisheo- Tel* la the clearest development of the pexicd; la other rvbpects the coarse of tba straggle remains lncxnclntive. In Selgon the political health of the Sooth VietnameseIs still precarious, though much hot tax than Itear ago. The progrsa far pacification of tbe countryside has made acme progress, hot results continue to he spotty. The fighting capabilities of tha Booth Vietnamese army remain generally poor, and its eventual usefulness lancertain^ The ayrrpathies of much of the non-CoraanrUt vorld, and tbe efforts
of cany nsg-Comvttst gorernnents, ere rrare concerned vlth stoTpiJig the war than vith the terestlanent. There Is no evident dijnfmitiaa of the Canaainist capability to contirme the struggle. In any ease, there is no evidencelmnr-ition of CvrrmTTrtnt vlll to eontlnne the vex.
The matter of will Is crucial. Hanoi's determination probably la stiena^hened by hopes that the US will lose heart if the struggle la prolonged and by Its belief that South Vietnan cannotiable political stxncture capable of winning &ass support. Bet the strains upon the Carnanist side are great and era Increasing. Above all, probably, the Cocamlsts face problem In recruiting manpower of good quality within South Vietnam, and in preserving the men-ale of forces which have been disappointed of quick victory and most continue the straggle under increasingly difficult clrecmstances.
Ve do not know how long the Crura lists vlll remain cteteralned to persist. There are sow Indlcatlnno that they may be reviewing their strategy and pondering their prospects.
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They Bay decld2 at come point, perhaps evenairly early date to taper off taa ccnflict, or conceivably to. enter into negotiations, we see no good reason to believe thatecisicn Is likely in tbe near future, thocgh It could happen sith little prior warning. At present, v* think the only safe estimate la that tbe struggle. If it is aired at the creationeaeefnl South Tietaaoaae state which can stand oa its can feet, will atlll be long and costly.
t. In tbe following paragraphs we discuss various aspects of the situation In greater detail.
the htjjtaid: cohflict
% Certain trends, which vere already apparent Inereduring The capability *ef themain force to conduct offensive military operations was bloated, vhile the OS and Allied forces gradually gained the battlefield initiative. Ooamnrtlat main force units vere manlad time ml again by tha xncxeaaingly effective "search and destroy" tactics of the OS comsmnd. Coc-minist preparations for major initiatives have been repeatedly spoiledoahiaatloa of good field irrtelllgence end quick response capabilities. Cbrsnunlst forces suffered heavy losses from the ccabined firs power of OS artillery and tactical air support.
6. nevertheless, the HYA/vc main forces remain in the field. Duringthe total irtrength of these forces increased from0, largely because of the heavy input of men from tbe Borth- There is no rear on to doubt that the present force level can be sustained If nasoi chooses. As far as materiel is concerned, capabilities for transporting supplies to the main farces hrve been more than adecpnrte and veil shove requirements.
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There Is considerable evidence that the military developments of the past year here led the CocBsanlsts to re-epprrise their itiattgj and tactics. Probably because they nou xeeacclze that ex outright solitary victory Is impossible, they appear to be adjusting their military effort primarilyiev toong var. Their objectlvca In the coming phase vlll probably be toure favorable ratio of attrition rates by avoiding large-scale battles In favor of numerous, videly dispersed small-unit actions, to harass and obstruct the TJS/CVB pacification program, to raise the cost of the bombing program, and. In general, to create as Impression that real progress, let alone victory, is Impossible for the US. Hanoi appears to believe. In tbe light of its reading of tbe American body politic, that Asarrlcen vlll to persist viU not prove equalrotracted and costly struggle.
The Bole of the Mala Forces. During the phase vhdeh the struggle is nou entering, the Ccnmnlsts vlll finest certainly nttenpt to heap rajor elements of their main force, including the EVA ctenants, in the field. Their principal rdoslons vlll be to
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protect base areas and to force the OS ando mintain large forces dispersed and in action against this threet. large-scale attacks vill almost certainly- be lannched whenever conditions enpear to augur success, ool especially when such an attack holds acme prccd.se of having an taporlant political effect onustained large-unit operations, however, seen likely to continue to diminish as the Ctxonuclsta seek to cut the rate of attrition on'the sain forces. Tab could aeon that It will be sore difficult for OS farces to strike large enemy concentrations with "search and destroy" operations.
9* In order to acocnrplish these alms, it is not necessary for tbe main forces to expend greatly. It is possible that Hanoi plana to slow dona the expansion of main force units, especially if there is to he greater emphasis on guerrilla tactics. This could resultecline In the introduction of complete units of the Horth Yletnaneoe army Into South Vietnam. There are come signs that ttdi may already be taking place. uly do new units have been identified; however, because of the time lag which often occurs between actual infiltration and confirmation byntelligence, it ia still too early to sayecline
bas occurred. In any erect, Borth Yietnsa vlll almost certainly bare to send sizeable groups of replaceroent personnel Into tbe South in order toexisting EVA mala force units at adequate strength.
10. Too Role of tbe Guerrillasv The next year is likely to witness an Increased anphasla on tbe guerrilla war. This war, of course, never ceased though it was conductedomewhat lover level this past year. Cconxalat strategists apparently now believe that intensified guerrilla operations offer the best prospect of countering the impact of tho OS military oullflup. xhe snaslons of the guerrilla forces vill probably eaphaslte barrassment of the oases and TJX's of the OS and AEVH forces in order to pin down these forces in defensive operations and, secondly, disruption of the pacification program by attacks On security forces assigned to BD, on ED cadres, and on peeifled Hamlets. To nchleve these goals, some VC main force units may be diverted to guerrilla operations, and the VC may make even sore Intensive efforts to motivate the population under Its control. Xn eddition, the Coamunlsts will almost certainly attempt farther "spectaculars" sneh as the mortaring of major airfields and OS
supply depot*. Each open-mtlon* vhlcb Involve relatively little xink, ccaamt few asserts sad. If successful, achieve major political exd propaganda, effects.
11. the Cosanmlcts vlll continue anil probably stephas been termed the "criminal" warend
terrorism- In the provinces such activity has tlvays been one of the CaanuulBts' principal means of attacking the local roots of central authority and of coving the rural population, ytm recent assassination of Constituent Assembly member Trsn Van Van and the attempt on Dr. Phea vnang Den suggests that the COamolstsbe embarking on an intensified campaign of urban terrorisn. =ho lirlffnt-ion ofaopalgn undex presentould actually beign of Communist weakness then of strcngtl (Ideally, urban assets vould be saved for the final push toovernment softened by military defeat.) The Cocnaniats may feel, hovever, that politically and psychologically they must eooepesisate for battlefield reverses and, farther, that byselecting their targets, they con exacerbate regional tension villi in the VietnasHtae body politic and fan already existing suspicion and hOBltUlty aong contending non-Conraml st politicians and factions.
12. C effort to pies* toe guerrilla rar vlll pose a
serious caellenge fox tbe allied forces, especially since the
strength of tbe irregulars may bore been underestimated: in the a/ -
peat. Tor senw years it baa been estimated that there verarregulars, but there is now documentary evidence which strongly suggests that at the beginningrregular strength vanOO end that the goal for the and5. More recent dc^unentary evidence suggests that this goal vas probably reached, at least
Conrxniat Problems end Prospects
13- Kenpower. Though ve say have erred in underestimating tbe site of the Irregular force, this is not to say that tba Ccascunists are free of manpower prohlsns. The heavy losses suffere. byftl vt forces3 ^rly for the Viet Cong. Total lossss forera, Inclndln
}j Irregulars are divided into full-time guerrillas, part-time militia, and secret guerrillas vbo operate clandestinely.
A statistical analysis of manpower problems is inhibited by serious dafiederaaie* in tbe available data. The three vital ceesures of manpover are estlnetca of losses, tbe level of IrnTiltratlon from the north, and the Order of Battle. The large- oreas of uncertainty vhlcb surround each of these key Inputs mean that tha judgments and estimates based on them rest on an inadequate factual underpinning and are thus subject to Bignlficaut changes aa more information isgvertbelecs, the statistics do permit Judgements on major trends.
lost to tha eVA/vC main forces. Against its own losses, however Borth Vietnam, was able to sustain on input of And as noted shove, the VC irregular force ees probably expanding, COO, as well as saving up for cenbat losses'in Its own end in Viet Cong sola force units.
IA. e estimate that the Viet Cong recruiting and training apparatus will be required to supply0 personnel per jsonth. She VC ere capable of this effort, hut it is probably close to their aaximua capability. Of this total requirementill be earmarked forin main force units. This can be done, but upgrading irregula at this rate would probablyecline In tho quality ofplacements sent to the Main Forces. The Borth Vietnamese, hovsver, seem to have been more successful In meeting their manpower require-vents0 then they were
15- There is already evidence that competition for Eanpower was creating problemstaff officer of the "VC 5th. division, fortated that his division vas having difficulties In keeping up to strength because of lack of adequate
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replacements. The division rats using Borth Vietnamese asthcugh one vould nang-.lly expect upgraded guerrillas and local draftees to he none then adequate as repjaccstents xor the VC Mainecently captured docnasnt also Indicates that seme hard-pressed guerrilla cxracanders were trying suoterfuge to prevant guerrillas from being assigned to coin force units.
}tarale. Morale la likely toore critical
factor than In the past. Ve know that in geaernl Viet Cong morale
Is lean goodear ago. The reasons Include the defeats and
bcrassaenta resulting from superiorirepower aad nobility and
good tactical intelligence; sane var weariness accentuated by the
diminishing proapecta of any foreseeable end to the var; the
poocr pinch which has forced the VC to send recruits to main
force units from their native Delta habitat into the Inhospitable
and disease Infested highlands; food and medicine shortages.
Bone of these mnxooovex or morale problems is likely to he
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significantly alleviatedrotracted var, assuming DS-ABVh" and Koreen forces maintain rrressures on VC base areas and main force units.
There is bound to he sees senseoss of avrsentua, which could amscportsxt bearing oa the attitudes of officers sod cadres ubo vera led to believe that victory vas not far off. Ard perhaps rjore irrxxrt*rjtrthero naysychological iapact on the people. It can ho fataluerrilla movementevolntlonmxy var If the people decide that the rebels cay not vis after all. Bat, as already noted, the Communist sain forces no longer have tha capebility ofhe of major tacticalMch vould sustain their aoaentun.
18. To sun up tbe allitaryha focus of the Con-aunist effort laely to ha core on snail unit actions, terroriso, sabotage and those tactics vbich pose the cost difficult challenge to the allied forces. As far as capabilities and will ara concerned, the Ooaacmlsts are encsocrtoring growingut none of thee* aupeer to he critical. Thus, from tha purely Military standpoint there are good reasons to believe that the Qa ,iulists vlll persevere.
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TBS KUTICAL STrUJgg
19. Tbe political aspects of tho war oar nov loom sosevhat more inn?ortent to the Cam-ami eta ao the rdlrtary situation aasumea more and mre tba characterrotracted and costly struggle, fee CrsBsraist effort, of coarse, still dependsreat extent ao the dedication and cocaUuacnt of It* cadres and their ar*Bni-aatlcnal sad military skills. But these mould be of no avail vith-ont the active or lufjiued supportrfYttaTfttal part of tbe pssialatlsn. If thin support could he denied, the VC vould be highly vulnerable, and pxnoably cccld be driven off Into the hfiiw to starve or slovly deteriorate In strength and no rale.
SO. Tha Coasnroist* lost ground6 In terns of vhat tbey can offer tbe People. They are likely to lose even core ground The developrr-ntegree of stability In Saigon, the rnldlrg ofad the process of ham ding natlaual tirrrltm-tions began to provide the first credible political alternative alnce Dion. At the level of sore particular and irxsediate concern to the villagers there vaa no decisive shift, but the strains on the VC apparatus and the pressure of GS/aSVTT military, pacification, civic actlca, and economic and construction programs vera beginning
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to tell In parti ralar areas, if rot eerterelly throughout Sooth Yietacn. Tha VC hare been driven Increasingly to treat the population nare harshly. Increased taxation, ftereadt, and less selective acts of terrxrisn nave hurt their image as defenders of tba people. And asrvl'tl'vi with the VC seemsthe vrong path to what the villagers vent most of allpeace and security*
21. The VC anility to defend villages against US/ARTs" attacks has declined, and it has become increasingly likely that the prosence of VC forcesillage will bringain of beat* and gunfire. Ta contrast, in gnverravart-<ra=tr3^ areas schaols are being built, awnUeel assistance Is available, econorxU activity Is pcawrlblo, thereegree of lrxstnlty from beefcings and battles, and tbe sheer valght of the resources availabletrucks, eartheorcrs, irtrplmvrssuggests that this cey be the vxnnlng side. There are, of course, rssny shortcomings on the GOTCMinpnt aide, Winning the pervasive threat ofterrorico agaJj those vho go over or take active roles, nevertheless, vbole villages hare moved to govexnaent areas, others have been
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nd recruits have haen found grrgy: the people to tele an active redo In ell the various phases of revolutionary dcrrel^pnent and paclftcatlna.
The Cnsrsanists recognize thecar depart. Ire tbe paciiloatlon prosren. Over "thetbey vQl probably attempt to roll bees: the vrjgxuuthey rolled up Wen's etratesie banOete3 whenta threaten the VC grip cn sob* porta of thepacification pxograa depends oa assy factors, not the leastIs the steady cacxxltnent of the Saigon Covarncent. But
ia the near tern, the hey factor probably la joins to be the protection of pacified erase. And this restsonsiderable degree on tha ABVH and the Regional and Popular force troops.
Bale of ASSTf. The ARTS today is not In goodgeneral, its norala Is poor, and Its training has f Itsivisions are capable of reasonable
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paxforaaasce in eomhat. This la prinarily because of tbe vide diversity In the oualitiGc of division level leadership.
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Bevcrthalost, AKVH Is not nocosserlly doomed to failure In Its Devest roleocority force In the pacificationaving element in the present situation Is the' presence of US and BOS troops to reap tbe larrje sola force units off the ARVH's hack end in general gals cone tine for tha AEVB to besln retrain in.-for Its new alnatna. latch vlll depend on whether Saigas naiatalns Its interest and pressure and on how the local ccrranders respond. It Is likely that perfornanee vUl he spotty for sone tine end that both paslflcatlon end AHTU's effectiveness In supporting It will advance only aloaly.
25. TietiMsuiLsa Politicalhe outlook for eeatSnaed stability la the politics of South Vietnam seems soTsevbat brighter. To bo aura, fundamental problems remain and co assurance can be given that stone incident night notayor crisis.eriod ofooths, however, tbe ty re-lme has survived
A fuller discussion of tfaa Tietnmoere political outlook is contained* "Problems of Political Dcvelojccnt in South Vietnam Over the Bert Tear oratedB&T.
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several crisesod which have broajot town earlier re glees. First steps have been taien tcvordense or national identity end, the Institutions to ecbedy it. Ilie enlarged XS presence has heinefl greatly, and despito the danger of incipient entl-jtaerlcsrrlsmt vlU probably csstiiros toorce for stebilit
asrrly, South vletnmakepassing through national electionsjarnnent, then this cannot help but have anHsaoi. Any improvement In the chanrps for orderlyin Sooth Vietnam la discouraging toime vbzn tha opportunity for nllitary victory has Eenol would ho even more impressed araalso eeemad to shear progress in en^eslng the loyalties
of tbe people.
She outlook far tbe political phase ofIs quite mixed. Progress In pacification and winningpopulation is likely to coma slowly end painfully. are godirj to wage tbe political battle asthe military contest. They vill almost certainly allow one
and prooably too years to deternina tea success of their strategy lu the next phase. Bat IT the paclTicetlon prosron naves for-urrd steadily, even if slouly, sad Seigoa continues to sain In stability, then tbe impact an Hanoi is lively to he far greater then any statistical measures of pregrass night suggest.
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probably expect fnxtner DS escalation of will take additlooal steps to cake the OS airthe Earth tncreaslsalr costly sad difficult. Vith 8orletassistance, Knnol has already hoilt ap Its airby step: luiiiiillml AAA, tWat, UXOa, thaa sorenlr-to-elxfaaasyanf. radars, intenxsxedvttb China, and finally, Hortb Korean pilots havecannot exclude that as the nest step to cneck the OSVietnamese vlll Baffin to dm Communist Nolnateers" InBorth Ikveams holme tbe first test of OS reactions.
la not oaanostzmhle that tbe boshing of Borthhas tbn= far ussiinnl Baned'a rill to contlrtnr theappears to be conflcenca that Borth Vletnaa cam livepresent types ana scale of attack and can also lacxaaseleases, the principal economic cost to Banaltbe diversion of xaapover, although ve astlaate thatreacbeS Its peak land may nov hato tba acoaoey srs almost certainly visaed by nancd/s
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leaders as tolerable: given vfaat is ct stake Io- Tbe bcchtng of infiltration, routes has not resulted In shortages of caterlel for tbe forces In Sooth Vietnam, or significantly reduced Hanoi's ability to maintain logistic MDnport of these forces. It eaaeni clear bob that the air campaign b> itself cannot persuade HanoiacVm tbe var. Other factors vould weigh much core beorUy lathe northTjatnssaaaa leaders' anproisel of the prospects of victory and there forevwrtrre their will to
persist.
anoi has even seen political advantage in the hoaMng canpalga. Torjetbor with ita allies and supporters It has need the bcoblacdiscredit tbe whole US effort In Vietnam. Theo nartalTTreasure on the US to desist from ooatbing Is no doubt seeneons of persuading the US to niter la var alas. There is no persuasive evidence at this timealt to the bearing vooldcrammlst moveruce end negotiations. Other considerations vould figure mere InportnrrUy, In particular the Ceernmlst Jor^aent as to likely political development; In the vakerace.
TBE AIJHgATTVB Of nBTHArUSS
31- Tbe optico of tryingavorable political aettle-mcnt throng* negotiations la probably given periodic cmaidcrat!ca In Hanoi. That it bee been rejected so fax bee probably been due, at least In part,eep aoaplciao of tba entire concept cd* errMerlns Hanoiends through pnlltWI, barenininga suspicion veil grounded In vast the north vlctassDaae aost regard aa tbe sell-ont of their jnteaeata Horemer, their rsTcOntlcoaxy ayatleue lopeia tbasieelalvw victory von throosh their owe allitary In tha field ratherualified victory von at tbe coufciauLO tail* vlth the help of other posers. Thcugn tbey probehly zecoenla*ecisive victory la not noc in eight, they probably atlll hope that persistencerotracted war will bring the OS to vrtfcdxar or ccoeent toe serJOaaeat elaarly advantageous to Baaed.
32. the only other clrconstenco* la vMeh Bcnoi seen* likely to negotiate mould he those ia which it case to believe that its alas In Booth Tletnan were actually being prejudiced by coatlnoed vex aaj[otlated political axraogrrjcntaaaaae" to preserve Ita aaaeta there, for useurely political
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strurclt arew rr-colut ionory attempt later. At present there la no clear Inalcatlcn thataming Id Hanoi'* attltnae la lathe offing, but this could coae at any tin* and ve vould be ralltrTy to lane edtamcd lrxUcaxlons ca* It In any case.
33- Arother factor bearing on the issue of necpUatlons Is tbe Irfluaaoa of Hanoi'a allies, ibe argnueut la often made that Moeecu vlll aimiti silly paiauailu Hanoi to settle the var, la order to recess Tlataei from tbeaaaada aad set en vith tbe business of llquldat.ina; the cold var. lb fact, the Soviet attitude toward the nar appears to be mired. Tbe novleta can sen certain adieula^in tbe problems vblch the var aenerexes for US policy, ooporla-Hy la aarope. On the other band, they are auere that the eltmetlrrt carries riser cf direct confrontation vithMrh they wich to avoid. Tor the Scnrlets, the optimum outcooa vooia be one Imolitical process,eluding; nasjjllatiom, gov*ood prospect of achieving Its alas in South Vietnam; this vouldajor reverse on the OS and would tin credit for the OSSS la the Interrartlooal Cceranrlst movement, perhaps even to tbe detriment of faring.
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Evidently the Soviets co not think that the accent has yet coat In vhlch they can set Incenario uhlch vould end in this say.
5*. naaent, stand agalnxt esy nafctiaticns has been cm of the cceartant fact oxa In the vex, and It soens likely that raking will saaavBaes toattlenent andofcAUanatlon of tha flgfatine. Batcannot ignore the ixsartnVsn developneata lo Peking and the possibility that la the next year or two great aaaahJaSJ say occur In the leedersMp. It does not seem likelyuture Chinese regine, follonlag after Mao, vill see Its interest* in Yletaaa and Southeast Asiaadically different way. Bat it ia possible that tbe deeds* of Ken would brine lapmUiit rearprnicals, vhlch elaost certainly vould bare to include the Vletnaseae onestlaa.
35. Ve conclude not only that the Coraaaxtsts are capable of fightine en for at least another year, bat that they are probably detexsdned to do so. In oar vltrj, however, they fee* inportmt probiOBS, and ve believe that the CoaDunist position, both nilitarily and politically In South Tlatnsn, will deteriorate
further owr Om next roar, let, Bencdtrcsai political Incentive to tsep the ear ftoina, eajacially until it baa soaa clearer notion about tba ataMlltr of tbebe OS Prealdeartial electloaa, ana thelaseat of both, oa TJS poller.
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