The following intelligence organizations participated in ihe preparation of this estimate:
Tho Control Inlelligence Agency and mc intelligence organizations of theof Slate and Defense, the AEC, and Ihe NSA.
Concurring.
Vice Adm. Rurui I. Taylor, Deputy Direcior of Central Intelligence Mr. George C. Donney,or Tho Director of Intelligence and Research,of Stole
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, tho Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Dr. Loub W. Tordella, for lhe Director, National Security Agency Dr. Charles H. Rckbordt, for tho Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. William O. Crcgar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
CONTENTS
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
II. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
CAMBODIAOURCE OF SUPPLIES
EVALUATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMBODIA
V. THE ROLE OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT
VI. OUTLOOK
SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE VIETNAMESEWAR EFFORT
conclusions
the Communists the use of Cambodian territorywould make life more difficult for them; it would nota decisive element in their ability to conduct militarySouth Vietnam.
availability of Cambodian territory is of considerableand military advantage to the Communists. They usesanctuary to evade allied forces and more permanently as arest, training, medical care, storage of supplies, and as aand secure route for the infiltration of personnel from
to the Cambodian rice surplus has alleviated one ofmost serious logistics problems. Movements ofrice to the Communists in the South Vietnamese highlandsPanhandleesult of an officialand some smuggling, could have0 tons andThis quantity more than met the annual consumptionof Communist forces in the rice-deficit Vietnamesethe Laotian Panhandle, and obviated any need to moveof food downotian route system from North Vietnam.
Communists continue to smuggle small quantities ofother military equipment from Cambodia; some of thisunauthorized diversions from the Communist armsimported by the Cambodian Government for its ownwc have no evidence of large-scale diversions of these arms orsubstantial clandestine movement of arms into Cambodia and
thence forward to the Communists in Vietnam. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Communist command would choose to rely in any major way on such an uncertain and indirect source of arms for its main force units, so long as the overland routes from North Vietnam are available. Some other supplies such as drugs, communications equipment, and chemicals useful in the manufacture of explosives are obtained from Cambodia, but the quantities involved are not critical to the overall Communist effort.
ommunist use of Cambodia will probablyto increase, as it has over the pastonths. Theare the logistic burdens imposed on the Communists bymilitary buildup and the increasing military pressuresallied forces.
is probably aware of the general nature ofin Cambodia. He has shown some concern that hetoo far to the Communist side, and over possibleBut Cambodia lacks the military capabilityile border with South Vietnam, and any determineddo so would run counter toasic aims of avoidingin the war, of avoiding too close alignment with theof maintaining cordial relations with the Communists. Thus,not foresee any substantial change in Cambodia's posture overyear toward the war in Vietnam.
DISCUSSION
or some years live Vietnamese Communists have used Cambodian territoryariety of way* to support their insurgency in South Vietnam and have also procured various types of supplies in Cambodia. This exploitation ot Cambodia by the Communists has been facilitated by chronic bad relations between the Cambodian Government (RKC) and the South Vietnamese Governmenthe Vietnamese Communists were using Cambodia for infiltration andof war material into South Vietnam from at least the earlys. The quantities of war material were relatively small compared wiih the riuantities obtained from within South Vietnam or through other infiltration routes from North Vietnam.
know more of>y. the Communists have utilized Cambodiaecause of improved agent reporting, Intensified aerialincreased numbers of captured documents and PWs, particularly sincebuildup of forces inrom these sources there is convincingto show that the Communists have increased their use of Cambodiapast year or so. particularly to the nrjrtheast, to support tlx-ir struggleVietnam.
communist use of CAMBODIAN territory
Nature of tlie Border. Communist use of Cambodian territory has been facilitated hy the nature of the lightly inhabited, poorlyile border. Tbe southern half of the boundary from tlie South Vietnamese Province of Tay Noil, to the sea is difficult to control because it is marshy, laced withand subject to extensive annual flooding, llie problem is complicated by the fact that Cambodians and Vietnamese are intermingled along both sides of the border and frequent movement and trading bark and forth is the traditional partem. From Tay Nmh north, the boundaryeavily forested and sparsely inhabited upland. The few inhabitants of this region on lioth sides of the border are mainly minority tribes who live in small villages, utilize slash and burn agricultural methods, and move their village sites fairly frequently. The Communists can move extensively in this area without detection Iryauthorities.
Basehe Vietnamese Communists have established severalbase areas in South Vietnam next to the Cambodian border.1 There is
considerable evidence, however, that some of these bases extend into Cambodia, where they form part of the logistical system for tlte acquisition and storage of
supplies obtained from or through Cambodia. Thry also provide facilities for
sanctuary, hospttslization, rest, and training.
'See map.
The mosl important and extensive of these bases is the VC headquarters. Central Office (or South Vietnamocated in Warn northern Tay Ninh Province. Several subsidiary bases surround it, and the entire area stretching from Lo Go in Tay Ninh to the area of Binh Long Province opposite Snuol may he viewed as one complex. For the most part, activities in this area are centered on South Vietnamese soil, but occasionally extend into Cambodian territory. In two important instances inajor units of tins complex sought Cambodian sanctuary: elements of the VC 9th Division following engagement by US forces in operation EL PASO, and probably other major elements during operation ATTLEBORO.
Further north, another important Communist base exists in the Chu Pong Mountain area of Pleiku Province. While this base area is centered on South Vietnamese territory, it makes fairly extensive use of the adjoining Cambodian Province of Ratanakiriariety of purposes, including sanctuary. Three NVA regiments sought refuge in Cambodia following the battle of la Drang Valley with US forces in
Along the southern part of the border, the most important Communist base is probably the so-called Kas Kok Base which, we believe, is centered on Cambodian territory near the junction of the Mekong River with the border. There are other areas where use is made of Cambodian territory, mostly in the remote northeastern provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkirl. It is perhaps significant that in three cases, notably the Kas Kok and Chu Pong base areas and the base area at the extreme northeastern tip of Cambodia near Tasscing, the Communists use areas where the boundary is in dispute. In the Kas Kok and Chu Pong areas, however, the Communists appear to use Cambodianbeyond the extent of tbe Vietnamese claim.1
Sanctuary Sanctuary is probably the most important use made ofby the Vietnamese Communists in their combat operations. As the war has intensified, VC and NVA units have resorted more frequently to borderto avoid detection by or combat with US-ARVN forces. Most such useonly shallow penetration, and the frequency and nature of the use vary with the area involved. Along the more populous southern half of the border, company size or smaller VC units frequently move into Cambodia to avoid ARVN or Special Forces patrols, although occasionally larger VC units areFurther to tlie north, where large NVA and VC main force units are concentrated, resort to sanctuary may be less frequent, but it has involved large numbers ol Communist troops.
Infiltration of Personnel. Some important Vietnamese Communist leaders and cadres and occasional foreign Communists fly into Phnom Penh and travel to Viet Cong headquarters in Tay Ninh Province. But the main use ofterritory for mfiltrah'on is by North Vietnamese Army personnel who normally walk all the way to South Vietnam. In general, the main infiltration
'Sko map.
trails run on Vietnamese territory after leavinganhandle, but they follow close to tho border and cross into Cambodia in many places, in oneutilizing Cambodian territory for someilometers or so. There Ls some evidence that Communist groups may have been making more extensive use of tlie brails in Ratanakiri and Nfondolkiri Provinces over the past year.
3referred to either alnor or tn confcinctlan withs the "Sihanouk Iml"ba inmetlmea celled die "Sihanoukther road improvements utrlude what appears in photography to be tomoralrd truck parks along Routehich runs generally southeast from Sfem PanRunction with Routeear Bokheo. Sen map
alled llie Tonle Kong tn Cambodia and tlie Se Kongot.
fl outer of Supply- There are numerous roads, trails, and waterways by which supplies move from Cambodia across the border into South Vietnam. But the most interesting development in the past two years has occurred in the northeast The Cambodian Government has been improving the roads in this remote area as partong range development program, and probably to provide access to tbr border and better communication between lhe isolated military outposts in the area. Some of the route improvement lias also served to facilitate the delivery of Cambodian rice to the Communists in Ihe Laotian Panhandle and in Ihe Smith Vietnamese highlands. Indeed, there is somethat Communist work gangs assisted in the improvement of the road from Sicm Pang north to the Laotian border, where it connects withnn any event, these road improvements would facilitate the movement of trucks during the dry season from the Laotian Panhandle tlirough northeastern Cambodia all the way to the southern border of Mondolkirl Province.
Whether or not the Communists used these routes to move military supplies south during the last dry seasons not clear. If they did, the use was probably small relative to tlie established routes entering South Vietnamos further north.
At the same time, there is good evidence of increased traffic on thein this area. Three rivers flow out of the northeast into the Mekong at Stung Treng: tho Tonic Kong fromhe Tonic San from Ratanakiri Province, and the Srepok. The Tonic Kong is navigable by motorized craft, and tlicre is considerable evidence that it is being used to ship food and possibly other items into the Ijiotian Panhandle. Tho Tonle San may also be in use for rice shipments eastward towards the Vietnamese highlands, although tbe extent to which it can be used by motorized craft is not clear. But tlie more general significance of these waterways is that, in conjunction with the Mekong, theyotentially secure route from Laos well to the south in Cam-bodia, where transfers cau be made to existing roads and trails, as in the vicinity of Kratic, leading to the border of South Vietnam. As yet, however, we have no intelligence reports which indicate that the Mekong is being used for southward shipment of Communist military- supplies.
V
ak
* si *rum
VIHP
sakhon
c
REAP
ir
SPURSAT
I
ft&mpong* chhftjanql
uii'.i
pifiAi: s
i 'n.
fljult
q pyim
KOH KON
lim
KOMPONG
spectno1
ho
i i
AMI
ISUMDS IN IHE CUU OF SUH. WITH HAW YMMNTS
iismngr4
ta
- Tmi.
kiiiry It*tliru
lit dr Phu qim
tanla* ta I*.
imt v
trj
in
4>in*
K
t S" uaa i
DAO PHU GIAC
; guoc* piach gia*1
WHH KU
(kieh gianaj
Dl rono nivu
( .TRENG
jKbtel
. dacYac
aor
PHU' YEN
. THOM
KRATIE
MONDOLtCIRI
OU U"
iVDARL^C ;i
I Ml THUOT
Vjn
.KrtJANH
hoa
liMA TRANG
KOMPON(
-CHt
cham - a
DuJC
YEN DUC '!
.OA 1a1
DO>JG
J NGUYFr^til LJNi
AN
TUY
Oi
'binh THUAN
TMIST
tuy
t#IA DINH Vim)
ib CONG
AND SOUTH VIETNAM AREA
boundary
W/WA SaMelM base area
uponwimile KKaiton) ^ National aortal
.Oil
HOA
Phu Vintr.
IH
binh
nonn VJlahwnna
version
South tfetnarnraa version In Gull
Tn*
13 Rout* number
-.n. soot holsht two
1
Hi. ng
'Jim him
d i
LtgU
vinh LO.
III. CAMBODIAOURCE OF SUPPLIES
Vietnamese Communist Apparatus in Cambodia. Communist acquisition of supplies in and through Cambodia is facilitatedlandestine Communist Party apparatus which exists within lhe ethnic Vietnamese community ofho live in Cambodia; it is also aided by Chinese merchants. Most of this Vietnamese minority originally came from South Vietnam, hut theirare largely with Hanoi. Tlie parly controls several useful frontin the community. The primary mission of this apparatus is to support the Vietnamese Communist war effort. It collects money, purchases drugs,communications equipment, batteries, and other materials, and delivers these supplies clandestinely to various Communist bases in South Vietnam along the Cambodian border. It also does some small-scale recruiting of Vietnamese youths to fight with the Viet Cong, but indications are that this has not been very successful. The apparatus is concerned that its activities do not attract undue attention from the Cambodian Government. While wc feel reasonably sure that the Cambodian authorities arc aware of its existence, we are notthat they have any detailed knowledge of the extent of its activities.
Food. There has alwaysood deal of private trading and smuggling of rice back and forth across the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border,in the delta region.owever, coincident with tbe buildup of North Vietnamese Army units in the rice-deficit South Vietnamese highlands, the Communists began extensive private purchase of rice inice-surplus country, and this rice was smuggled to Communist forces through north-eastern Cambodia. We are not sure how much this additional smuggling amounted tout we believe the total was probablyons. We do know that this smuggling wasarge enough scale to disturb Sihanouk because of the loss of tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings Involved, and there are reliable reports that heeal late that year for an official sale of as much0 and0 tons of rice for delivery to the Vietnamese Communists
Intelligence confirming the total deliveries of Cambodian rice to6 is quite limited. We do not know to what extent the official sale was implemented. Moreover, some smuggling and private sales continued. There are some reports that indicate large quantities of rice were shipped to the Communists in the highlands of South Vietnam and tbe Laotian Panhandle. Projecting the limited evidence on actual deliveries reportedew months, we estimate that the total amount delivered could have0 tons, and possiblyther food supplies obtained from Cambodia include dried fish, salt, beef, pork, and milk, but the quantities of these items were not large.
'These computations assume that the reported truck traffic continued daily during the dry season, and that small movements on the main water route continued throughout tbe year.
Some drugs, medical supplies, and chemicals useful inof explosives are imported into Cambodia through normalchannels and smuggled forward into South Vietnam to thegoods can be relatively easily smuggled over the border and thenthe delta waterways on small sampans by paying bribes to localdistrict officials. Shipments of potassium chlorate into
01 2 3 MM'
Cambodian Imperii ot (Tons) 34 10 12
While some of this increase can be attributed to greater needs connected with the establishment of fertilizer, textile processing, paper, and match manufacturing plants which use this cliemical, and to increased production of explosives used in road and other construction, some of it is being smuggled to the VietnameseTlie quantities obtained by the Communists arc very difficult to establish; we do know that between3 and4 aboutons of explosive chemicals,ercent of which was potassium chlorate, were captured on delta waterways near the Cambodian border, some with Cambodian markings and obtained inn addition, small quantities were seized6 which clearly came from Cambodian sources. On the other hatvd, bulk chemicals, including potassium chlorate, are available in Saigon, which would generallyore readily accessible source than would Cambodia. One hundred tons of potassium chlorate were imported into South Vietnam under quotasll by one firm and all ostensibly for match production.arc inadequate to assure that quantities are not diverted to the Viet Cong.
'These figures were obtained from statistic* published by the Ombndian Government. We do not has* figures for the years
* If, for example, the Communists obtainedons of potassium chlorate per year, thb would he sufficient for the manufacture ot0 claymoro-type antipersonnel mineserage sias,and grenades.
Since Cambodia manufactures no arms, they are all obtainedsources, almost entirely through the port of Sihanoukville. Noflag ships and no cargoes loaded in Communist ports have beencome up the Mekong to Phnom Penh for the past two years. In anyVietnamese control of shipping on the river appears to haveintroduction of any substantial amount of arms and ammunition tothis route. Since3 nearly all Cambodian imports of militaryhave been delivered under aid agreements with Communist ChinaSoviet Union. The quantities involved do not exceed the plannedfor the modernization and expansion of the Cambodian Armedsome of this equipment probably reaches the hands of thewe have no evidence of large-scale diversions, and it seemsthey would rely in any major way on such an uncertain and indirect sourer.
are also large quantities of previously Imported US andother miscellaneous arms in Cambodia, and wc believe that there istraffic in these weapons. It is also possible that thein Cambodia is engaged in smuggling new shipments of armsfor movement to the VC. Ocean-going vessels could offloadalong the Cambodian coast whence they could bethe VC overland, via inland waterways, or along the coast. But we haveevidence of such activities, and since the advent ofin this area, any quantities of supplies currently beingvia coastal routes are almost certainly small.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMBODIA
ource of Supply. In the past, tbe Viet Cong madeasic principle, and theyarge and generally effectivewhich supplied most of their needs from sources in South Vietnam. Over the past two years, however, the expansion of Communist forces in South Vietnam and the increased pressures from allied forces have placed increasing burdens on the Communist logistic system and have substantially increased theirfor external supplies.
Apart from the matter of food, denial of supplies obtained In or through Cambodia would complicate Communist logistic problems, but the quantities involved are neither great nor critical to the overall Communist effort, and they could be shipped from North Vietnam. Denial of Cambodian food would be more serious. Food is probably one of the Vietnamese Communists' more critical problems in the highlands area from northern Tay Ninh through Kontum. Not only isice-deficit area, but allied operations are making access to South Vietnamese rice in other areas increasingly difficult. Without Cambodian rice it would be much more difficult for the Communists to provide food to their forces here and in the southern Laotian Panhandle0 for consumption in these areas may have0 tons, but we do not know what their stockpiling needs or intentions would have been.
If the supply of Cambodian rice were cut off, the Communists wouldstep up their efforts to obtain rice within South Vietnam through increased taxation and forced purchases. But these resources probably would not meet Communist needs completely. Depending upon the success of allied denial operations, the Communists might be forced toubstantial proportion of the resulting requirement from North Vietnam, thus substantially increasing the daily tonnage moved on the Laotian infiltration routes during the dry season. The increased movement required would be within their capabilities, but the movement would be more vulnerable to interruption and delay by US-ARVN operations, and food shortages might develop among Communist forces in these areas.
Use of Territory. It is exceedingly difficult to measure the overallof the use of Cambodia for infiltration, sanctuary, and base areaCommunist strategy has always been based on tbe maintenance of secure base areas in swamps, jungles, and moimtains. Some of these base areas appear to have been constructed deliberately to gain added security by locating them next to the border of Cambodia andotian Panhandle where sanctuary is available. Captured VC documents attest to the importance which theattach to Cambodia, particularly for sanctuary. One of these documents expresses the view that this importance will increase. But the documents also exhibit considerable concern over maintaining good relations with Cambodiaear of jeopardizing their present position through irresponsible actions by Communist troops while on Cambodian territory.
Even so, we do not believe that use of Cambodian territoryecisive element in the ability of Communist forces to conduct militaryin South Vietnam. It has not proven much easier to fix and destroytroops in areas of Vietnam far removed from Cambodian sanctuary. Base areas such as Warhich lack adjacent sanctuary have not proved any easier to penetrate, clear, and hold than areas like Warn Tay Ninh. next to the Cambodian border. The denial of Cambodian territory to thewould involve the loss of tbe psychological and material advantages of sanctuary, and it would make life more difficult for them. But they would probably be able to adapt their military operations to these circumstances, and to carry on.
V. THE ROLE OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT8
of RKG Knowledge.other senior Cambodiancertainlyeneral knowledge of Vietnamese Communistin Cambodia, although perhaps not of their full extentarc probably better known along the more populous andsouthern half of tbe frontier, where Cambodian border posts areThe RKC is probably much less informed of Communistthe desolate and unsettled northeast.
RKG Vita.
kvc believe that Cambodian border forces have on occasion
skirmished with the VC, but there has been no determined effort to police the border.
usinessmen in Cambodia, particularly Chinese merchants, have been quick to take advantage of this situation. Aside from the official rice sales, most of tbe support obtained by the Communists in Cambodia is in factthrough commercial and private transactions, handled primarily by Chinese and Vietnameseambodia who import materials, smuggle rice, and even on occasion use Cambodian Army trucks to effect deliveries.
28.
(The Cambodian Army,
security forces, and local officials are poorly paid, and dealing with theCommunists represents the chanceife time to make money. Asthere is much local collusion along tbe border, including tbe saleto the Communists and the occasional use of army trucks toIn the case of Communist border crossings, the Cambodian borderprefer to accept bribes or look the other way rather than runof getting killed opposingofficials in
Phnom Penh probably know in general wnat is going on, they have apparently chosen generally to close their eyes to it.
KG Capabilities. In any event, Cambodia's Armed Forces are far too small to close its borders and effectively deny Communist use of Cambodian territory. The Cambodian Army totals0 menucleus of somective battalions. This includesew battalions organizedhe majority of which have been deployed along the Thai border; this reorganization has not substantially increased the army's capability to deal with any sizable force at the South Vietnamese border. Deployments along the troubled border with ThailaiKl and in the southern central part of tbe country leave lessegular troops along theile border with South Vietnam. There areambodian regular soldiers, deployed in three locations, to coveriles of wild and inaccessible border in the northeastern provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri. There are0 Communist main force troops on tlte South Vietnamese side of this border region.irmer attitude and increased vigilance by the Cambodians might serve to discourageuse of Cambodian territory, Cambodia's capability to detect and resist
sizable Communist forces or inhibit Communist activities, particularly in the northeast, is extremely limited.
f the Cambodian Government chose to, it could probably do more to limit the shipment of rice, chemicals, and other goods to the Communists.
| the bureaucratic and military apparatus could exert tighter controls over rice shipments and the import of goods from abroad. At best, however, smuggling, false manifesting, bribery, and other tricks of the trade would serve toair amount of goods to move.
vi. outlook
n the other hand,
apprehensions over possible US-GVN
ssuming that hostilities in South Vietnam continue at or6 levels, tbe Communists will probably feel compelled to increase their use of Cambodia7 for infiltration, sanctuary, and perhaps for the acquisition of food aod other supplies.
i-ountc-ractioi] to increasing Communist use oi Cambodia will mount.
Perhaps theseeappraisal of the war, and annoyance at tne failure toorder agreement with the NLF. are responsible for what appears toougher Cambodian attitude recently toward VC-NVA border crossing.
ut more drastic measures appear unlikely because of certain basicincluding the lack of real Cambodian capability, the fear of involve-
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
I. This document was disseminated by lhe Central Intelligence Agency. Thisor thst information and use of Ihe recipient and of persons imder hi* Ujrisdictioneed-to-knaw basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by lhe following officials within their respective departments;
o. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and tho organization of the Joint Qitots ofssistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for lhe
Department af iho Army
Chief of Naval Operationsor tho Department of the
Navy
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air
Force
of Intelligence, AEC, for Ihe Atomic Energy Commission
Director, FBI. for the Fedoral Bureau of Investigation
of NSA, for the Notional Security Agency
L Director of Central Reference. CIA, for any other Department or Agency
cument may be retained, or desiroyed by burning In accordance vrtth applicableor returned to the Central Irrtelllgenee Agency by orrangemarrt with thoReference, CIA.
When this document is dissemtrsate^^sier^eas, the overseas recipients may retain iteriod not bi excess of onerid of this period, tha document should either be destroyed, returned to the fons^cTmg-flciency, orshould be requested of the forwarding ogency to retain it in accoTcTfjttras^wrth2 June
Tbe title of thb document when used scparaloly from the text should beEBB nEEICIiil IISF DNIY
DISTRIBUTION: White House
National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: