The following inltUigence orgomzotioni portieipotwrj in th* prttporotian otesJimoftr
Th* Control Intelligence Agency and (he rn-ellfgence orgaf ionof rheof Stoic. Defense, the AEC, ond the NSA.
Concurring!
Dr. R. J. Smith, lor the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Thomai I. Hjghei, The Director of Intelligence and Reiearch, Oeportment ef Shale
AAoj. Gen. Roboit Taylor, 3d. fo' the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Mr. Howard C. Brown,he Aisriianl General Manager, Atomic Energy
Dr. louts W. Tordello, for the Director, Notional Security Agency Abefaintntji
Mr. Williamgor, for the Assistant Dwoetor. Federal Bvreaw of. iSe subject being outside of hi jurisdiction.
THE PROBLEM
Toreliminary evaluation o': recent information bearing on Communist China's advanced weapons program.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAM
THE ESTIMATE
he Chinese announced that theyuided missile whichuclearhave confirmed that thereuclear explosion,!
(detonated in the lower atmosphere about 1U> miles east of ffieTLop Nor nuclear test site. As nearly as we can ascertain, the device was deliveredallistic missile, as the Chinese claim.russile, in or near the MRBM class, may have been fired from the Shoang-ch'eng-tzu missile test rangeistance ofautical miles. At this point we are not able to judge with confidence what this event implies for China's advanced weapons capability. The Chinese may have conducted this test for propaganda andpurposes, using equipment that would not be satisfactoryeapon system. We tliink it somewhat more likely that they haveissile-warhead combination which, while considerablyUS or Soviet standards, could be usedeapon in the short or perhaps medium range. If this is the cose, the Chinese couldew such weapons ready for deployment7
have recently received information mdicating that thealso have underuch larger and moresystem. We believe that this is an ICBM, although acannot be discounted. Weaunch facility will beearly No major component of an ICBM has been
top
detected but there are indications that the Chinese might be able to begin flight testing by the latter partf so. and if they are able to produce the missiles and other equipment necessary to sustain an active and successful testew ICBMs, withnuclear warheads, could be operational by the. The first generation of such missiles would probably be large, costly, and. again by US or Soviet standards, deficient in reliability and accuracy. Nevertheless, ihe Chinese would probably wish toewat least for political and psychological effect. Thoof an ICBM booster would also give the Chinese the capacity toairly large payload into orbit early in the ICBM test program.
An ICBM could not be fired to full range within the borders of China, and we cannot establish at this time how the Chinese would carry out full range ICBM tests. Preliminary flight testing of system components, however, could be actomplished within the lwrders of China.
At the same time, the Chinese will be workingigh-yield thermonuclear warhead. The third Chinese test device, which contained some thermonuclear material, performed quite inefficiently and apparently was heavy and bulky, indicating that the Chinese have much to learn about thermonucleart did, however, coastitutc an initial step toward the attainmenthermonuclear capability. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Chinese will be able toa thermonuclear warhead by the.
TOP^Ja^fleT*
m
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
I. Iht* documentominated by Iho Control Intelligence Agency. Thii copy ii lo/ rhendof the recipient ondnder hi* juritdietlct on o Wbath Add'e-ot euen'Oimoyorued by 'he following official) within their re*pectiie deportment*'
of Intelligence ond Rciearch, (or lhe Deportment of State
Deferne Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secre-ory o(
De'emef the Jo-r* Chief,SrorT
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department o' Hie Army, for the
Department ol the Army
Chief of Nowil Ope'ofioo*or the DepO'tmort of
Nor,
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. for Ihe Department af the Air
Force
o* In-elligenee. ABC. fee the- Atomic Energy Commiuion
Director. FBI, for the Federal Bureau of
of NSA 'or the Notional Securiiy Agency
of Centiol Reference. CIA. lor ony other Deportment or Agency
may be retained.Wnroyed by burning in orccdonce with oppiicable iB^mJyrto the Cenfrol Intelligence Agency by orronger-eni with tfil^^ce of Central Reference, OA.
Wheel the documenti-icrtedhe overieo* recipient* moy rcain rieriod no* inAt rhe end of thii period, the document ihould either be destroyed,he forwarding agency, or per. million thould be requeued of lhe forwarding ogencyTOMfljoln il in accordance3
The rrrio of mil document -hon uied veporoietytheihoulli^jerhii lified cenFirtnieini
DISTRIBUTION:Hauie
Na'iO"o! SecurityI Deportment of Stole Deportment uf Defente Atomic Energye*o' Bureau of
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: