7
ajlj-? -7
Frolli
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
7
Proliferation of Missile Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons
APPROVED FOP RELEASE DATS: 3
rs) (S)
OF CENTRA! INTEUIGENCE
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD
a, indicated over lea I
7
Authenticated,
SECRET
conjroued dissem
The (allowingorganization, porticipofed in tnn ptoporation ol this estimate:
The Centro'Aoe-.cy end A* Irt'.elT.c, er.ee eee^totionsihefhe Aian. Hv*She Force. AEC, ond NSA.
Concurring]
Direc'c* cf lnutlTgence. and Ponoreh. Deportment of Stole Olreeief, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief o' Start for InttHigence, Deporimeel of ihe Army Assistant Chief of Navol Opetatlonsepartment of ihe Novy Assistant Chief of Start, Intelligence. USA* Director foi tnlelligimee, Joinl Start
The Atomic Eneioy Commission0 iheof the NaDonol Security Agency
Abstaining;
The Assistant Director, fedoiai tureatr of InvoMfciai.on. the rob-ed being outside of his juriseUctkm.
This material! ihe United States
.h- I | In liln,. ih. trans.
fri-.ion or revolution ol which in onv monner to on unauthorited person it prohibitoJ.
CONTENTS
PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and incentive* of additional countries lo acquire nuclear-capable ballistic missile delivery' systems over the neatears.
NOTE
In accordance with the terms of the request which initiated this estimate, we discuss the possible spread of missile delivery systems in coming years, but we do not discuss in detail the spread of nuclear weapons compatible with vuch systems. Our most recent estimate on the latter subject is. "The Likelihood of1 lea:atedhe principal findings of which are still valid. The nuclear problem is considered in this estimate only in terms of the ease or difficulty with which each nation might obtain warheads compatible with missile* It might acquire, and the economic burdenombined missile and warhead program would impose.
We consider in this estimate all countries which do not already possess missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons; the USSR, the US. Cuimminist China,nd the UK either now have such systems or arc in the process of acquiring them.
*
We have excluded from discussion missilesange of lessut we consider all ballistic imutlcs of greater range as long as they could be usediven nation for "strategic- objectives. The term "strategic missile" is employed in this estimate to describe
a missile designed ti> strike at some enemy's homeland and not at his troops in the field oi supply routes directly behind the front.
CONCLUSIONS
basic missile technology is already widely known,components for missile systems canught on thethe development, production, and deployment of anballistic missile systemifficult andwhichophisticated, industrial base and aof national resources.
consider that, over the next decade, there are only sixaside bom those already having strategic missile systems,serious candidates for acquiring such systems. Theseliavc or may come to have the requisite economic strengthmissiles ortrong political incentive to acquireboth.
umber of other nations which have, or mighthave over the nextear's, the economic strength to supportdevelopment program, but which lack foreseeableundertake one. These nations arc discussed in Part
countries having space or military missile programsto find the sale of components and even complete missilesor politically attractive. Few. if any, of the lesshowever, would be able to overcome the complexities oftogether the various elementsorkable missileeaningful capability only if they were providedsystems, already tested and operational.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS A. Introduction
ver the comingumher of nations may seek to acquire strategic ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Some nations inay be motivated to dooreesire for national pr"<tige than by icalutic military considerations. Other* may come to believe th.it ballistic inlisilewould guarantee them regional hegemony or provide them withe face of some regional threat. No other nation can hope toissile is .tern coaip*rabie in nw and rff-etiietici* to Ihe systems of the two Mtperpowvn. Someowever, may believe thai the poncunti ofew uudrai-capabSr mouses would enable them loreater role in world affair*.
allistic ir.mile systems arc expensive, butrovide uniqueITvry are at prevent virtually irmilnraable to lnlercr|>h'on or,are htddcu ot deployed in hardened sites, to destruction before firing.capable olissile delivery lyttem equipped withhe ml' might achieve groat regional strategic power with onlyewnucleartrategic missile force is little more llum verymlliMrvoi it', iii-jilcy
monl appean minimal Still, nations without nuclear warhradv might hope io acquire thorn somn day. depending in tlie meantime on high rvploalve or possibly BW/CW warheads.
ations wishing to acquire ballistic missile systems must determine strategie criteria in light of their own unique political and geographic situatiom. From thesentrrii. ihey can define their specific forte otnestives in light of the media likely to he available lo them Strategic requirement?iuilc deliveryvaryetweenystem capable ofucleariles would provideeterrent to threats from Pakistan; it
could nothreat from China.ystem would form an Israeli deterrent to threat from UV UAH, bnt it would not meet Japanese needs foe a
deterrent forceould breach Sweden- veil imposed renunciation of
strategic weapons which the USSR might find provocative
A. in order lo drtwnine what sortissile force it shouldountry would haw lo dcdaV on what warheads were likely to lie available und the distance- over which these warheads would have to be delivered, (lie iminim of missiles in combination wilh available warheads which would provide adoquntc target destruction or credible deterrence: the levels ol eecutacy needed loron military targets or on enemy population centers, tlie characteristics of missile and hiuitchci which woulduitable reaction time; -nd dually, the form of deployment which would best reduce lite vulnerability of the missiles
to enemy ariurk. There may bo inmp nation v. hnwevH. which will mlnlmta.-strictly military considerations nnil uudoilakc (ho acquisitionrude mUvllc fence lot'
5 WluteMt combinationngc. payload. and accuracy may be dktarcd by tfralegk-hweide choke, of specific hardware. LV-liwiiy vehicles may single or multiple stage, their propelliiuli solid, liquid, or combmatiom of ihc two- Each type of piopollant presents both advantage* and disadvantages It liquid. rMopcflantt mav be cryogenic* or itorable. Cryogenic proprltanti are diScull ro handle, require eb borate prodnitioti. transportation, and Hiirjzy facilities, and increase the react Mm tunc of tbe system. Although some itorable liquids are also difficult to handle because of tbcii toaicity or eorrmtvem'ss. liny tan provide shorter reaction lime. Solid propcllantt inquireto produce Jnd present formkLble design problems in flight control but *ond propel bnt rockets can be storedong lime and Bred wilh scryeparation
iimiUr range of choice* exist- for guidance and control systems. Radio or radarheaper and more readily obtainable lhan inertial guidance and cuts down on total vehicleince miicb of the navigation andecfulpnient stays on the ground. But guidance antennas are difficult lu promt against enemy attack. Fiuthcrrnot missiles guided by radio or radar most ho fired sequentially rather than in salvo, links* duplicate guidanceare provided fur eacheiy expensive solution toin* problem. Some nations might attempt lo devise guidance systems adapted from readily obtainable aircraft autopilots twit ihe Circularissile guided by this means might be on Ihe orderrmangein. Whatever guidanceountrymissiles would need precise geodetic data for effectiveing. In general, any nation undertaking the development of an effective missile capability would probably' find tbe acharvveaetil of vjfuiaetory accuracy to be one of the most eipernive andconsuming aspect* of its program.
inally, nation* which undertake the development of medium or longer range missiles' wnuld face Ihe problem ofeentry vehicle (RV) capable of surviving Ibe heat of high-velocity aimosplktK reentry and(he accuracy of its trajeclnrv during Ml high stress transition from flight in vacuum to Sight innos pie. HV design and toustrutlionifficult matter, and although the technology involved it becoming mote widely known,
alum In onlri In miuinI. Ihey
isut bepnlm pror la Iptra
se rjdwi ol thila wMfcia wkkfcW maoln
hiikIunI ird wtikr. <lo nMhl wll itilr.
' fli'l'-tn'winimwlyollows.
ShortSH8Mi -umtui HOB nm. Mnbuoi h. . m iHrnanloae lUnfr1 tW
ea,,
Ihe BV problem is likely lo present another obstacle to the luccois of domestic missile development program*.
&ear. then, that some component* of missile system)ropellants. guidance. RV design) require higher orders of technology than otheriabilityation to acquire these key components fnan foreign supplier* could weigh heavily in its initial decistoa toomestic intuiWprogram andr much to do with subsequent choices of specific hardwarr and the tempo and cost of the program
It Is unlikely that any nation set ontrategic ballistic mixsilt-system would be forced to design and manufacture the whole system itself Some nation' may Rnd it possible to purchase complete systems, asow doingthedepend heavily on the wholesaleof scientists and technicians from more highly developed nations. Any nation with sufficient cash canood deal of advanced technology In tlie form ol Buislsrd missile components, specialized machine tools, andcomputation Olid testing equipment. Nations with adequate Indigenous scientific capability can take advantage of the great amount ol technicalin open literature Some may obtain key technology throughGermany, France, the UK. andesser extent, Japan have access to US mluilc technology through normal channels established Isetwern UScontractors and their foreign subsidiaries and licensees. Many foreign lechnlctam base benefirtrd from their nations' cooperative programs with the US: soma1 have been trained in US plants and at US launch faelLtm
If US ctmtributiona to such regional space research groups as Ihe Europeanselopraenr Oigaiii/atson (EI.DO) and the European Space Research Organization (KsRO) increase,ations will enjoy greater access lo US technology, even if at second fund. Air defense missile* and louoding rockets, although without direct strategic inistile significance, ate already widelv available, nnd many nations hasTc acquired basic technical experience in the production (usually underesting, and maintenance nf these devices. Through the process of "reversehe careful disassemblyissile and analysis ol its component parts, many nations could shewten research and development time in their own missile programs. We will discuss the contributions to national programs of each of these sources of mivsile technology in subsequent sections nf this estimate9
The cost] of. and time needed for. acquiring strategic missile systems would vary icmaderahS from nation to nation with differences in itratcgk-requirements, hardware choices, and domestic coatong-rangt.-irnssiln cmt more than short-rangesiles; accurate mbulei mure than in-accurateuclear warheads much more than high explouve or CW/BW
' fctfHjRiUSanil Mrhnai>Qto hj3lfc nlwaln irr tubfnl to vamos
VS (ontnea t'Spnbcj ucorides pudelmeinuliUi>topaojaiti a* well as to
Iiy .NASA. iJnlnoVd .IniA I'mie duciioUc matins,ot wldiln ihrbis estlraatr.
warhe.uls.1 ions,and Japan, pinsis* advancedmi readily adaptable to fairly rapid missile ptodniltun Ofhcn. iih-Ii j*nd tlie UAH. lick wscb bases, and their total missile dc-vt^upsncnl tints would Mm hide considernvcstmnil in lime-consuming ls.su- industrial de-velnpmenl. Variations in ihv domestic iost 'melon nuuld also .dfeci mttidti' .imiit costs; Jip.ni. for example,bleevelopissile system moii' ebcaply lhanermany. Finally, the pate ofi/able nile in delermtning eventual costs. Crash piogiams Jv very expensive,he rigid adherence to ambitious development and production schedules and performance iritersa.
undertaking the domestic development, production,trntcgl> mls-sile force svuuld piobably have loeavilytest equipment As soon as esearch uml devdopmeot effort
-'the hardware stage, iudividiial uimpancnts mint lie cxhaiistisi ly testedlixnl facilities sun: ot which must apprnuoutc (he harsh emlrnn-nwTit wtlhanmile must operutt. Sucharc expensive, bnt naliors which iorego testing with wind tunnels, vacuum and low tcmpet.iturc chambers, vibration (aides, and so forth would run serious ihk of failure
socimsful flight (citingrototype missile and suhu-queiilkxis icjuucs an insti omen led lest range. The development ofolnd reudmevstmUse testinglong period Some nations might he ableest litest imvsiles on.y frkndly countries, as tin llntish fuse uses! (he WoomeraAustralia, 'thoso nationscomplete missilefioan more advanced nations might try to include iu tlie transactionfni the periodic useest rangetesting andBut nation desiring freedom from anyon otherIn- forced to build and mstnunxnt their own Ir-st range*.
H. However It ismasllc system musl lx> inatnt-siued inan* complex^ individual components can deteriorate in time, amibe tested and replaced on wine *oit of regular schedule. Inliaisons would make periodic firings in order to Train filing crews andthe syilrm to potentially hostile powcsionrponeots to maintain leadiBctt and tn< gular
l ilemoostriiriiin filing program canajor problem forodest missile force.
I. Tha dosuwenl unit dr-ex-noied by she Centre) Wett-jencey. This copy il to* the in lew motor ond or theind ol periom underf.ood tc know boiiv. AJl-otiol eiinnttal diivamloa'ion nioy be ouihorjted by tliu following officloli wlhin their recpetiiie dopu'lmciUsi
o. Director otPeseofi.lv. to* Dw Deporlaww el Stole
b. Director, Detente limlKaence Agency, lor the Office of the Scere'ory of
ot Slaft (or Intell.ocnco. DepcmmerHihe Army, lor ihe
Tienl ot tlie ai my AiiiOart Chiefo-ot Operationsee' ibe
Auitronttuff, Intelligence, USAF, lor the Dcpotlnwnl ot lint Air force
I Director taff, forlor ol Inte'ligcfite, AEC, for tSq Atomic Energy Commission h.an', for ihe Feduiut Bureau olirector ol NSA. (c- the twticiol Security Agency
Aivtfonr Dxoetar for Cerlrol Rctmunce. OA. lor ony otheror
Agent--'
IM: doeumrnl moy bn iclained. or destroyed by burning In accordance with opelkoble lecvreyor Warnedhe Ceetrolr I'twilh the Office 0'. Cenlrol Reference, CIA.
When this cocuiixin' ij dlvtenvrxited overseas, 'he overseas recipients mayet ii oiej o* one year. Ai endocinnenl tKvlcbe deitroyed. returned toforwarding oct-ncy. or pcrnissron should be requeued al the iorvrurding agencye'ain il In accordance with2J.
4 Ihc title of 'bit docrr-n'uied separately (romt should be cletwf-rd: COVty USE OHIY _
DISIR1BUTION;
While House
Naiionol Seeurily Council
Depor intent of Stole
Deportment ol De'onie
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: