STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1962-1967

Created: 2/24/1967

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OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

STRAINS ik SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS:

STRAINS IN SOVIBT-KAST GERMAN RELATIONS:

Prefatory Note

This working paper of tho DDI/Research Staff examines Soviet-East German relations during the period ofcalm in Europe that has followed2 Cubancrisis.

The paper ia an expanded and revised versionunpublished study of4 tactics onquestion written in4 by ? 1' " former member of the Staff, and

though the final version of the paper has not beenwith other offices, tbe paper has benefitedthe author's discussions with colleagues in OCI,FBIS, and ORR. In particular the author of thethe naDor.thanks

_Doth ot OCI

of ONE, for their The author also thankscontributing Appendix One, originally anon Soviet policy toward Germany In the monthsStalin's death.

The author alone, however, Is responsible forof the paper. The DDI/Research Stafffurther comment on tbe paper,

seKrjeh

STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS:

Summary and Conclusions

The diminution in Soviet tensions and the comparative Improvement in Soviet-West German relations that2 Cuban missile crisis has had an adverse effect on Soviet-East Gorman relations.

The East Germans have shown concern that, if adevelops between West Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies on the other, then the East German state will first be weakened by that accommodation and then eventually fall victimolicy of reunification. Moscow's foreign policy since2 missile crisis has not consistently pursued the tactic of improving relations with Bonn, and Soviethave repeatedly tried to convince East German leaders that they have not decided to reverse their long-standingconsolidating the status quo inthe interest of advancing reunification. However,developments, political changes in Western Europe, alterations in West German policy, problems with East European allies and the Chinese Communists, internal Soviet concerns and other elements which led the East Germans to make that radical assessment in the last two years of Khrushchev's reign have not fundamentally changed during the Brezhnev-Kosygln administration.

Thus, strains in USSB-GDR relations will probably persist as long as the present Kremlin regimelexible positionis the West Germans, and as long as Moscow refrains fromtrategy of trying toerman settlement on its terms.

Khrushchev's strategy of brandishing military threats and serving ultimatums on Berlin81 (the period of the supposed "missilead not

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only failed to bring about the desired results, but proved to be counter-productive, first, in drawing tho Westorn powers closer together, second, in showing by several backdowns that Moscow recognized its strategic inferiority Frustrated, heinal, unsuccessful attempt2 to break the East-West deadlock over the German questionadly miscalculated venture to place strategicin Cuba. The humiliating and costly failure of that venturo, which weakened Khrushchev's position at home, marked an Important turning point In Sovietho tactic of trying toerman settlement was gradually shelved.

Following Khrushchev's recovery in internal Soviet policy dobatos in the spring3 and following the rather aimless drift in Soviet policy on the Germanduring tbe remainder of FBG Chancollor Adenauer's administration, evidence began to accumulate thattactics, and perhaps his goals, with respect to Soviet-West Gorman relations were being modified. The establishmentew Bonn Government, interestedpolicy of movement" and in taking soundings of Moscow's attitude toward German reunification, was privately greeted with Khrushchev's probeseeting with Adenauer's successor, Chancellor Erhard, and Khrushchev'sof interest in greatly expanded trade relations with West Germany. Apparently to mollify tbe Increasingly anxious and disgruntled East German leaders, the Soviets in4riendship treaty with the GDR (which changed nothing basic in the Moscow-East Berlin oquatiqn). But this holding action had little positive effoct on East Gorman anxieties. For Khrushchev continued to press forward in his own policy of movement with Bonn, In July Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey in bis visit to Bonn to make advance soundings made repeated statements suggesting that East German party chief Dlbrlcht was an obstacle that would not long stand in the way of groatly improved OSSR-FRG relations. Adzhubey also renewedearlier expressed Interestoscow-Bonn accommodation along the lines of2 German-Soviet Rapallo Pact. Adzhubey, who was snubbed by Ulbrlcht on the return trip through East Berlin, coautbored in August

two highly conciliatory articles in Izvestiya on the "changed" mentality of the West German people and their leaders. Meanwhile, Chinese and Albanian propagandists were charging an intended "sell-oat" of the GDR, and East German leaders were making remarks suggestingover tbe possibilityoscow betrayal. Theneptember, Khrushchev accepted Erhard's Informalto come to Bonn forhad the visit taken place, would have been another Khrushchev first.

Tbe unique acceptance of Bonn's invitation was as far as Khrushchev had gone in implementing his new German probes before his opponents in the presidium intervened. eptember, two days after it wasannounced (outside the USSR only) that Khrushchev would go toechnician attached to the WestEmbassy in Moscow was attacked with mustard gas, touchingcandal that imperiled Khrushchev's The Soviets did not offer Bonn an acceptable apologyay the CPSU presidium voted in camera to oust Khrushchev. Also, in September, thereumber of other developments that suggested that Khrushcnev's opponents were resisting him and were gaining the upper hand: onciliatory statement by Adzhubey about PEG political leaders was deletedravda version of his remarks but was published in Izvestiya

he GDR-Sovlet friendship treaty

last ratifiedalf month delay (alsoravda warned that it wouldistake to think that an improvement in the Soviet-FRG relations could take place at the expense of theASS announced oneptember that Brezhnev, notas would have been expected, would go on to the GDR anniversary celebration. Then Suslov "guaranteed" that the GDR would not be sold outnd Brezhnev pledgedctober) that there would not be any deals made with Bonn behind the backs of the Easteek later, Khrushchev was stripped of all powers. The timing of these developments, in view of the importance of the German question and the allusions to Khrushchev's misconduct of German affairs reportedly raised at thectober CPSU Central Committee trial, would seem to suggest that Khrushchev's German.policy was at least one of the factors that led to his downfall.

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settlement" replaced callsS ?S ty and references to the need MUS eventually ?ion Th* ;JIer"eW Swiet Staten^nts on the Gorman ques-

The,Efls' 9eraans- while enthusiastic about the new regime's attitudeonn visit reacted to

Moscow's holding operation bywith thJ 5oSLJ2 mx .Cu?tinHing' heated discourse raised the subject of German-Soviet strains during the

ihTELSS* in the weekKhrushchev's ouster) over

apethe^ and praised CPR support for GDI; policy.

In the latter half5 and6 how

defensive counter to Chinese Communist charges ihtttht over'lJr?^Pr^soow-inltlatod crisis

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edge between. and its remainingallies. Id the wake of the CPSU Congress in6 tensions with the East Germans roappcared, as Moscow renewed conciliatory gestures toward the West Moscow made plans to renew the USSR-PEG trade treaty andirect, private exchange with West Berlin Mayor Brandt, while Dlbricht publicly revived the fears about an abandoned GDR which be had expressed in tho days before Khrushchev's ouster. Dlbricht was upset by. his ally's exchange with Brandt, and, unlike Moscow, particularly upset by tho subsequent politicalin DecemberBrandt's party (the SPD) with the party of Krbard's successor, Chancellor Kleslnger (the CDU/CSU).

Currently, relations are strained over the FRG coalition's efforts to establish diplomatic relations with East European states. (Rumania has alreadyformal ties.) And Moscow has not given effective support to East Berlin's Insistence of formal West German recognition of East Germany as the precondition for tbe improvement of relations with East European nations.

1. THEIliSILS CRISIS AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

rustrated by the failures of four years of Berlin ultimatums and realizing that the Sovietposition had to be drastically improved if the United States were to give in to Soviet demands inEurope, Khrushchevinal, unsuccessful attempt to break the Berlin deadlockard-line approach. This was the venture to place offensive missiles in Cuba in order to Improve the strategic balance in his favornot militarily, thenenough to make another ultimatum on Berlin produce tbe desired results.

The timing of his Cuba missile plans was closely tied in with his effort to overcome bis earlier German policy blunders. Shortly before. discovery of the missile launcher construction activity in22 TASS statement on Cuba pledged that no initiatives on the German problem would take place before the.hich at that time were close at hand. In retrospect, what the statementwas that no new Soviet initiativehance of success could take place before tbe establishment of the Cuban missile bases, which was also close at hand.

Theeptember TASS announcement with itsliquidate the occupation regime in West Berlinin oviet Foreign Ministrypaper datedeptember, which also presented"problem /of? how to reconcile /sovmestit7peace treaty with the West's interests inand West Berlin." The position paper citedoptimistic2 Supreme Sovietthe2 Geneva meeting. Reflecting the wishful thinking inventure in general, the position paper. State Department's reaction toreaction which did not supporton tho possibility of reconciling tbe West's

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interests in West Germany and Westemphasized only the "positive factors" that Gromyko saw leadingeconciliation of Soviet and Western interests:*

A.A. Gromyko noted,eeting with Secretary Rusk in Geneva ina positivehe declaration of the American side that it does not see obstacles to the combining of free access to West Berlin with the demand for respect of the sovereignty of the GDR.' With respect to the question of the non-arming with nuclear weapons of the GDR and the. Gromyko noted that *on the American side there isof the importance of this Thisositive fact, if, of course, these sensible gleams do not die out here under the influence of other winds.' . Gromyko further notedn the course of exchanges of views bei-tween the Governments of the USSR and. there was achieved in principle mutual understanding regarding the necessity of concluding,ne form oract of non-aggression between NATO and theof the Warsaw Pact. Thisoveseful direction.1

TbQpaper went on to claim that the

Governmentest Germany had successfully "appliedon Washington in order to disrupt the contemplated agreementut, in conclusion, left the impression that the Soviets could stilledge betweenand Bonn and accomplish the intended Moscow-East German maneuver:

. does not want to leave West Berlin. But in this case, after the transfer of

days after the Rusk-Gromyko meeting, Khrushchev in his2 speech made his first commentSSR-GDR peace treaty since his1 central committee report tod CPSU Congress, when hehis threat to sign the treaty before the end

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control to the GDR of the routes to West Berlin, the Americans vill have to negotiate with the Government of the GDR on questions of access. Thereiscussion in. press with regard to the degree to which. should recognize theof the GDR. In this matter it is borne in mind that Chancellor Adenauer is against any kind of recognition.

t mt time that the soviet Union was making extensive military and political preparations for the signingeparate peace treaty with East Germany inhe election month which would also have marked theofissile launchers in Cuba. Khrushchev for the first time may well have seen himself, once thebases were in Cuba, uch more favorableeither to employ successfully his one-sided demands that the West upgrade the position of East Germany by negotiating access procedure with the GDR Government, or to offer the withdrawal of the Cuban bases forconcessions in or withdrawal from Berlin.

Tbe failure of the Cuban venture turned out to be an important turning point in Khrushchev's German; policy: with that event, the policy of trying toerman settlement upon the West began to founder.

2. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CUBAN CRISIS: THE DIMINUTION OF THE GERMAN CRISIS

The earliest high-level pronouncement to the effect that Moscow was attenuating the crisis atmosphere on tbe German problem which had preceded and accompanied the Cuba missile crisis was given in2 speech on the anniversary of7 Communistin Russia.

did notreports to the effect that after2 the USSR wouldeparate peace treaty, and thatew 'blockade' of West Berlin will take place."

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The Soviet Government has announced /slc7 and Is announcing now that the peaceful normalization of Gormany can bewithout detriment to the interests or the prestigo of any country or group of countriesoodwill agreement on tho part of all interested sides.

Kosygin in his November speech did noteparate USSR-GDR peace treaty, as had other Soviet loaders prior to the week of the missile crisis, such as presidium mea-bor Kozlovctober Moscow speech on thoh anniversary. Nor did Kosygin demand the withdrawal of the Western occupation forces from West Berlin--asaid Foreign Minister Gromyko onctober in East Berlin during the week of the Cuban crisis, for any agreement leadingerman peace treaty.

The decrease in the intensity of hostile,remarks from Moscow did not, however, follow an even pattern afterovember speech. Id fact on the day of Kosygin's remarkably mild call foroviet Ambassador to the GDR Pervukin in an East Berlin Neues Dcutschland article threatened thatoparate peace treatywith East Germany,of access to and from West Berlin and other areas within East Gormany would be turned over to the GDR. And Khrushchev and Gromyko renewed the separate treaty tbroat in their Supreme Soviet speeches ofndespectlvely.

But following tho Supreme Soviet session, threatseparate treaty diminished, and by3 such threats had virtually disappeared from Soviet propaganda. (For example, SED media, but not CPSD media, publicized ananuary East Berlin interview in which Khrushchev made his last recorded referenceeparate treaty. The reference, incidentally, was couched in conditional terms and stressed the desire to reach an agreement with

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the West "so that no uailateral actions will be takenAnd along with the diminution of such threats, pressureerman solution decreased in elite Soviet comments.

Khrushchev himself in his3 East Berlin speech made the argument that the conclusioneace treaty was no longer the problem it had beenthe construction of the Berlinn an exceptionally defensive passage, which attacked the views of "some people" who "think that four years /of

erman quest ion7 have beenn fact,iplomacy for the Ger-manies represented an inglorious record of policy failures

manvafailed toed*emany and other Western powers and to set West Germany

adrift fromo prevent the recrudescence of a

eatthoy keeping Germany divided; toeace treaty with the

*"ln responseuestion, reported Die Wahrheit (the organ of the West Berlin SED) onanuary,onanuary in an interview with West Berlin SED repre-

-II?!Astern powers, we will leave West Berlin untouched We shall merely take the following road: the line of communication will be placed under the Jurisdiction of the GDR; the occupation will end; the rights of thepowers will end, for order on this territory will then be guaranteed by the peace treaty. This is our posi-

m seekin8 t0 reach an agreementIt^ilateralwill bZ taken, after

njt demanding any gains for ourselves, wo are demanding nothing, we want to finalize what exists."

thepowers drew closer together

"helping the Joviet champions of stronger theater forces to halt the troop cut instituted earlier by Khrushchev and to push

! .Pr8flrred defense Programs at the expense of Khrushchev's schemes for general economic progress.

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Gennanies on Soviet terms and to alter the status of West Berlin; toithdrawal. forcos from German soil; to make Eastiable sovereign state and to gain non-bloc recognition for East Gormany; to expand Soviet Lnfluence in West Germany and promote Soviet hegemony in Western Europe; to get West Germany toclaims to territory lost to East Europo after World War II; to cut back substantially Soviet forces stationed in East Gormany; or even to acMevo some degree of military dlsengagoment through an East-West nonngRroa-sion pact.

One of the "some people" that Khrushchev on3 was rebutting may well have been presidium colleague Kozlov, who did not relterato Khrushchev'sanuary substitution of the Berlin wallerman peace treaty, and continued to appeal for theerman peace treaty and normalization, on the basis of that treaty, of the situation in West Berlin" (Leningrad election speech,. Almost as if be were replying to such "people" and as if he were trying to allay fears in soae quarters that he mightabandoning the GDR, Khrushchev in his3 election speech pledged that the Soviet Onion would not engageargain with the "West German revanchists" to solve territorial disputes by purchase. Later, in3 Moscow speech, Khrushchev criticized Beria and Malenkov for making "the provocative proposal to liquidate tho GDR as'a socialist state."*

*The first reference to an East Gorman sell-out was given in the Soviet press in the daysPSU Congress withdrawal ofoaco treaty. It wasime when (as inhrushchev's freedom of maneuver was hamperod. His aggressive policy had brought about mobilization and increased combat efficiency in the West and had led to the suspension of his proposed one-third troop cut plan. The source of the sell-out reminder was an Ulbricht speech published in Pravda in1 which included astating that "it is known" that Beria, like Malenkov, opposed tho building of socialism in East Gormany. The appendixxamines the "Beria heresy."

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3. THE DETENTE AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In mid-April, Kozlov, whose influence on Soviet policy in general was at its height, left the Soviet political scene, the victimeart attack.* in the spring3 than managed to get the upper hand in the internal policy debates, and foreign policy began toore deliberate course in the general direction of relaxed tensions.**

theearly springany of Khn shchev's earlier policies were either halted or reversed And Kozlov in public speeches at that time appeared to be leading the challenge to Khrushchevian policiesto the correct role for the CPSU, resource allocation, reform in agriculture, art and literature, and Yugoslavia (Kozlov's heart attack came at about the time of the uniquepril Pravda "correction" in3 May Day slogan that Yugoslavia "is building socialism." The8 April release of the slogan did not state that Yugoslavia is "buildingKozlovian, butypically Khrushchevian omission.) By lateozlov's name, which had followed Khrushchev's in protocol rankings since the1 CPSU Congress, was and continued to be listed in strict alphabetical order.

of the Soviet delegation to the Genevatalks, Tsarapkin (currently Ambassador to thebig concession" at Geneva and accord was reachedashington-Moscow direct communications link, the "hothe Soviets asked for resumption of bilateral talks on Berlin and Germany, etc. The new course gained momentum, with the signing of the partial test ban treaty in July, the signingN agreement to ban orbital nuclear weapons in October, the announcement in Decembereduction in the militarycontemplated" cut in the size of Soviet forces,olicy of arms reduction by "mutual example."

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But even in the new warmer atmosphereto be troubled by tbe German question,many of his other foreign policy goals were tiod The German question stood in the way oftoward improving East-west relations,in Europe, and controlling the arms raco,have permitted him to press forward with hisoconomlc programs. In addition to tho Germanpolitical relations with Communist China added

urgency for the achievement of Khrushchev's post-missile crisis objectives with the West. Particularly after tbe crisis, there van growing evidence that their neighbor to the East was being looked upon by Soviet militarymoreotential military opponent than as an ally. Soviet military capabilities against possible incursions by Chinese troops along the vast borders were beingbuild up, and the Soviets were beginning toew and more flexible military doctrine suitable for dealing wltb tbe kinds of military threats short ofretaliation" which China might pose for tho USSR.

In this environment, Khrushchev, who seemed to bo movingolitical showdown with the ChineseParty, began to reveal the desire to alleviate the military threat from the West and to consummate hisof detente with the West. And throughout3 Soviet propaganda references to Westernof Wost Berlin and the air corridors to Berlin, to the importance and urgency of settling the German problem, to the need to "liquidate" the Western occupation regime, and to other past crisis themes tookerfunctory air while reforonces to the possibility of better. Moscow-Bonn relations recurred more frequently.

The desire for good relations with Bonn, for example, was given unusual stress in3 East Berlin speech. Thus Khrushchev, while indicating that the Soviet Union could certainly liveorman peace treaty for the time being, gave considerable omphasis in his lengthy speech to the need to normalize economic and trade relations between West Germany and the USSR. He even recalled personal experiences in the Donbass coal mines working near German engineers during tho period of

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the Rapallo Pact after Worldwhen Germanmustered the strength and courage to acknowledge that friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union would benefit both countries and both peoples." But he also went out of his way to reassure Ulbricht that he would not sell-out the GDR for the price of goodwith the FRG. Without naming Beria or Malenkov, he stated that the condition put forth by "statesmen of the FRG"change in the policy and social system of the GDR" for good relations with the Soviet Union had been "smashed to smithereensearsThis was the last recorded instanceo sell-out pledge from Khrushchev, as well as the last time be alluded to the "Beria heresy.")

However, another figure, FRGrake on any major Khrushchevian policyregarding Germany. Adenauer's nearexperiments" policy toward the East gaveflexibility with which to explore economic andmatters with Bonn and, in Khrushchev's lights,reflect the "strength and courage" which heJuly to early post-Worlderman policy. apparent inability toerman policyduring the last year of Adenauer's reign wasreflected in an Intransigent statement of hisin3 that a

reuniiea uermany could, in the Soviet view, onlyommunist Germany."*

one year later, when Khrushchev spoke about the future political compositioneunited Germany, he avoidedommunistondition for German reunification.

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I1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KHRUSHCHEV'SCTOBER

1. EVALUATING THE NEW CHANCELLOR

With the Erhard administration taking over inowever, Khrushchevautiousof Bonn's "policy of movement" toward then fact, Khrushchev's initial movement on the Germanmay have been little moreeaction toore flexible approach toward Moscow-Bonn problems. enerally favorable evaluation of Bonn's new course was reflected in the propaganda which in the main treated the new chancellor with circumspection, and in Soviet diplomacy which did not attempt to frustrate Erhard's (and the FRG businessmen's) "policy of movement" in regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Soviet propagandists criticized Chancellor Erhard's first Bundestag policy statement ontinuation of the "anti-detente" policies of hisBut in the months that followed, the propagandaore conciliatory turn, the German "anti-detente" policy theme was dropped, and, with rarehe image

*wmie tne "policy of movement" originated in the last two years of the Adenauer administration (the policy was authored by Foreign Minister Schroeder), it was limited in scope by Adenauer and was not given Impetus untiladministration. Under Adenauer, the policy's main success was the exchange of trade missions with Poland in

to lay the groundwork for Mikoyan's talks with Ulbricht, MoscowASS release4 launched its second propaganda criticism of the Erhard government. But even in the middle of Mikoyan's visit to the GDR, Moscow | " *ffirmed its intentions to maintain highest level contacts with the Erhard.

erman Chancellor was no longer presented to Soviet citizens as thatevanchlst, militarist, anddemagogue of the former Hitlerite Reich. Rather, Moscow propagandists greeted statements by Erhard onrelations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with optimism and expressed hope that "practical deeds" would follow the new Chancellor's policy statement. (Erhard, in the meantime, had been probing for new trade contacts with the East.)

At the same time, the Soviet press and radio made very little mention of such dissonant themes as checkpointntra-Berlin traffic incidents, wall"provocative" occupation maneuvers in West Berlin, "revanchlst" meetings, and "violations" in access procedures to West Berlin. Regarding access, for example, the October and. Berlin convoy incidents were played down in Soviet propaganda. The first2 October) was publicly regarded by Moscow radioeaningless event (thes nothe6 November)hort lived and relatively mild reaction which, without elaboration, ambiguously warned of possible "undesirable .consequences" of. checkpoint "violations." instead ofthemes, attention was paid to West Berlin-GDRwhich Moscow encouraged. For example, the ground-breaking West Berlin-GDR agreement ofecember

West Berlin holiday passes to visit East Berlin

said*to have

ledertain "detente" between East and Wost Germany; it was said, too, that "as additional similar agreements are reached, they will further efforts toward Also, significantly, Bonn-Moscow cooperationa common theme in private statements and practical steps were taken. For example, in the early spring of

West German industrial firm, Krupps, wasMoscow to open the first West German commercialthe USSR.

An important development in this period, ain Khrushchev's new approach toward Germany, occurred onarch when Ambassador Smirnovessage from Khrushchev to Erhard that gave rise to the first

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speculation in the Western press that Khrushchev night beeeting with the new head of the West German state. The message itself reportedly made no basic changes in the prior Soviet positions on thequestion; it wasambit, but the first of many which ledreatly improved atmosphere in Moscow-Bonn relations during the remainder of Khrushchev'scontrol of Soviet foreign policy.

Also significant was the fact that Moscow'sto an offer made In3 by Erhard tothe GDR was one ofthan thedisdain that spiced Khrushchev'shat the USSR would not engage in bargainsterritorial purchase. Erhard, when he firstidea of reunification-through-purchasein earlyaid that Germanyindustrial installations for theSiberiaear period if

suggested mat West Germany mightear for ten years forMoscow subsequently became acquainted with atgeneral idea of Erhard's reunification scheme iscertain. For in early June, Erhard's messageconveyed. News and World Reportwith

We are ready torade treaty.

I can only repeat we would not shun

sacrifices, if by economic means we" could

improve the lot ot the German people

the Soviet occupation zone, or could move

a step toward reunification and

supplied bere and elsewhere in this paper unless otherwise noted.

Moscow's propaganda in June scored Erhard's "self-determination" appealt means the absorption of tbe GDR by tbeut remained silent on the expressed willingness of Erhard to mako economic sacrifices in tho interest of promoting reunification and Similarly, Khrushchev, in extensive remarks on the German problem in hisune Kremlin speechself-determinationnon applicable"principle, but nowhere in that or any other public speech mentioned Erhard's economic approach toKhrushchev, In fact, failed4 to make any explicit "no sell-out" pledges; these, significantly, wen first made by Khrushchev's presidiumeekthe Kremlin coup.

2. TROUBLE WITH EAST GERMANY

The shelving of Moscow's strategy of trying toerman settlement and the concomitant diminution of East-West and, in particular, Soviet-West Germanin Europe had begun to adversely effect East German relations with the Soviot Union. As if to counter the openly expressed fears of Ulbricht and his East German SED colleaguesonn-Moscowtream of high-level Soviet leaders arrived in the GDR.

arch trip to East Berlin,to celebrateh birthday of inactive Premier Grotowohl, was particularly curious in light of the fact that no other bloc dignitaries of Mlkoyan's rank attended. Mikoyan's appearance seoned tooviet effort to assuage East German fears on certain economic and military* points of disagreement. However, judging from

*At this time, Ulbricht may already have been awareontemplated Soviet scheme, reports of whichin June, to withdraw0 troops from the GDR. Ulbricht may have also been concerned with the consequenceslanned reorganization of the Group (footnote continued on

the East German propaganda treatment of Hikoyan and thopossiblyof Marshals Grechko and Maainovskiy, the Soviets' mid-spring effort to reassure the East Germans was not entirely successful.

One of the most likely topics of discussion during Mikoyan's March visit was the GDR's resentment of tbe action of other East European countries in signing tradewith West Germany that recognized West Berlin as part of tho Wost German currency area. The East Germans

(footnote continubd from

of Soviet Forces/Germany (GSFG). That Ulbrichtleast during March and earlythe proposed Soviet military changes might be less than advantageous for GDR security is suggested by East Berlin's andpropaganda treatment of the visits of Grechko and Malinovskiy. The TASS and ADN reports ofpril Malinovskly-Ulbrlcbt meeting atypically deleted the stereotyped references to cordiality; ADN devoted six full paragraphs to Ulbricht'a Invective on Bonn'sappetite, ignored Mallnovskiy's reply, and thus left the impression that ulbricht hadtern lecture to Moscow on tbe truo nature of the West German menace. East German media apparently ignored Grechko'a visit altogether.

However, subsequent developments suggest that Ulbricht'i anxiety over Soviet military plans was at least partly assuaged. Tbeune Soviet-GDR joint communiqueUlbrlcht's praise for Khrushchev's policy of "mutual example"anner that could be read as giving approval in principal to further Soviet efforts in thateduction in the GSFG.

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vers publicly critical of East Germany's allies for having participated in this West German "scheme" to isolate the GDR, and their criticism was candidly expressed in the SED politburo'sebruary report to4 SED plenum.

No direct evidence bearing on Mikoyan's stand on the "Berlin clause" controversy surfaced during hiswith Ulbricht. That the Soviets hadhands-off" policy on the problem, however, was reflected in Moscow's propaganda, which virtually ignored the SED's campaign against tbe Berlin clause, and Moscow's intra-bloc diplomatic positions. For example, Moscow did not express displeasure when Bulgariaayest German trade agreement whicherlin clause and thus joined Poland, Hungary and Rumania in the FRG "scheme" to isolate the GDR. Another example of Moscow's "hands-off" line may be read into article six of the4 Soviet-GDR friendship treaty. The stipulation in article six that "West Berlin is regardedeparate political unit" allowed the Soviet Union to conclude economic treaties with West Germany that, might include West Berlin without recognizing it as part of the Federal Republic politically.*

Khrushchev's ouster, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenovalk with FRG Ambassador Groepper onovember in Moscow flatly stated that article six of the USSR-GDR friendship treaty barred inclusionerlin clauseSSR-FRG trade pact. However, Semenov promptlyeans of getting around article six His suggestion, discussed on in effect recognized that Berlin is part of the West German currency area. Semenov's proposal was later shelvederiod of cool Moscow-Bonn relations

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Buying Time with tbe Frieodship Treaty

The signing of that Soviet-East German friendship treaty onune afforded Khrushchev an opportunity to mollify Ulbricht, who was becoming increasingly restive ovor Khrushchev's "detente mood" and, in particular its moaning for the German problem. For example, this mood was reflected in Khrushchev's efforts to notify inthe united States, Britain and France that the troaty with Ulbricht would not affect existing Western rights In West Berlin. While the treaty andune joint communique endorsed demands for apeace treatyhango in tho status of West Berlin the friendship treaty was inurther postponement of long-standing Soviet demands.

Some curious developments tend to betrayInterest inriendship treaty with his German ally at that time. First, within hours of Ulbricht's departure from Moscow onune, Khrushchev called in tho West German Ambassadoronversation in which he indicated his interest in mooting with Chancellor Erhard who only five days beforo had been quoted in tbe press as having favored making economic sacrifices in thehleving reuniMcaUon. (As in the case of

* Khrushchev, continu-

ing to play the delicate diplomatic game at thiseportedly made no chango in the Soviet position on tho Gorman question.) Second, Khrushchev, In projecting the nature of future Soviet-feat German relations, reportedly

tnat it Visuestion

tUesolution2 wouldhird, despite East German pressures to ratify the friendship

'interestapallo-like rapprochement appeared in tho Soviet press in August under the editorship ofon-in-law Adzhubey. See.

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treaty at an early date, the Soviets managed to delay ratification foralf months.

The Early Summer Quarrel With Ulbricht

In the latter half of July, the unrelieved tension between Ulbricht and Khrushchev over the direction in which Soviet policy then appeared to be moving spilled over into the public domain. Differences between them were reflected in the open press both during andtheh anniversary celebrations.

Significant differences appeared, for example, in theuly anniversary speeches given by Khrushchev, Gomylka, Novotny, and Ulbricht. Khrushchev, unlike the other three, completely ignored the issues of borders, Bonn's alleged appetite for nuclear weapons, the NATO multilateral nuclear force (HLF) issue, any reference to the danger of revanchism, and surprisingly, any calleace treaty. (On the same day in the West German city of Dortmund, Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey, emarkably conciliatory speech which stressed the need for better West German-Soviet Union relations, pointedly stated that the German press should pay attention to Khrushchev's simultaneous remarks in Warsaw.) Khrushchev' failure to mention publicly the peace treaty issueoffended Ulbricht. In addition, Khrushchev's treatment of the source of the main military threat was somewhat different than that of his East European Khrushchev placed the sole onusho arear." Gomylka and Ulbricht presented the main military threat as In the first place, in West Germany and, secondarily, in the "imperialist" countries.*

this point, Gomulka's remarks seem to be directed not only to the West but to Khrushchev as well. Under the section entitled "West German Militarism Is Still the Mainrybuna Ludu gave Gomulka's veiled remarks to Khrushchev:

(footnote continued on

si:biiET

Ulbricht's hurt feelings were baredpeech he delivered in East Berlin onuly, upon returning from Warsaw. In tho speoch Ulbricht mentionedname only twice, and then only in passing. But Ulbricht mentioned Gomulka some ten times, dwelled on Gomulka's remarks at Warsaw, and repeatedly expressed GDR agreement with Gomulka's views. The implied Invidious comparison with the state of Soviet-GDR relations and the adroit slighting of Khrushchev could hardly have escaped the notice of Ulbricht's listeners. Moreover, in the samo speech, Ulbricht hinted that agreement had not been reached among the Communist leaders on the matter of meeting the MLF problem. While he said that "fullhad been reached on other matters, he said only that the MLF Issue had been "studied". (Khrushchev'suly Warsaw speech, however, belied the suggestion that agreement had been reached on many matters under discussion at the Warsaw meeting.)*

T^ootnote continued from

The invariable response from the West is that we only Imagine this threat /of West Germanhat tho NATO powersight ban a* on West German and that West Germany follows a

peacefulhave never- Imagined

anything.

Seo page:or post-coup indications that Gomulka was not pleased with Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn.

ASS report on4 stated that GDR Foreign Minister Bolz had called on Gromykofriendly" talk onumber of questions of interest to bothoming so soon after his participation in Ulbricht's state visit, andime when Adzhubey was seeing Erhard, tho Bolz visit may have reflected now East Germanons.

While Khrushchev and Ulbricht were quarreling in Warsaw, Khrushchev'swas then the subject of rumors ia Moscow to the effect that he would shortly replace Foreigneries of remarkably conciliatory comments in the territory of Ulbricht's chiefest Germany.

3. ADZHUBEY'S LAST AMBASSADE Conciliatory Comments in the FRG

Adzhubey arrived in West Germany onuly. One of his primary missions there, evidently, was toErhard's intentions about meeting Khrushchev and

about the scope of Issues to be discussed.

I AdzhubeyQ-OIB uuauuuxxur li^Tre-were-serious abouteeting with Kbrushchev. (Khrushchev on at least two previousMarch andreportedly acquainted Bonn with his interest ineeting.)

liazi

additioneeting,

nuDey, xn responseuestionate Julyin West Germany, stated that be couldonfidential exchange of letters between Erhard and Khrushchev, and that "nothing but good can cone ofPer

Trade, Adzhubey let it be known, was to be one of the subjects of the Khrushchev-Erhard exchange, f

h Also onuly Adzhubey told Bundestag member Erler that be (Adzhubey) could appreciate the close commerical connection between the Federal Republic of Gormany and West Berlin, tbe fact that West Berlin

SEChE

had the same currency, and so forth. According to Erler, Adzhubey was confident that "due account" could be taken of the Bonn-West Berlin relationship in future trade agreements. Thushad let It be known to FRG Journalists upon his arrival onuly that he had met with Soviet Minister of Trade PatolichoV before bo (Adzhubey) left theto suggest that the Soviet Union could take due account of the economic ties between West Berlin and Bonn without getting into the question of the political ties between them and the friendship treaty ties between Moscow and East Berlin. And In if ' alks with tho chief editors of the Rheinlshc Postdzhubey reportedly stated that Wont Germany should have no difficulty inrade and cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, since all the two parties had to do was toface-saving" formula on the Berlin Issue.

The issue of West Germany and the NATOforce proposal was also treated with iscussion with prominentuly, Adzhubey Indicated that the nuclearWest Germany within three years through tho MLFforce do frappelanning assumption onpolicy toward West Germany was based. not link thisnuclear armed FR&any threat, but merely stated hisa fact which the Soviet policy planners wereaccount. On the next day, Adzhubey made hisabout Gorman nuclear armament

Adzhubey said that the German Interest in nuclearwas represented by its support of the multilateral nuclear force. And he seemed to have been trying to convey the thought that West German participation in tbe MLF would wreck any chancesegotiated settlement of the German question, f

on the next

sovxe't zone.

jtnat tne xz June inenasnlp treatywas not "Intended for eternity and that it contains within its provisions for amendment.

That reunification could be one of the subject to be discussed by Khrushchev and Erhard was also made clear by Adzhubey in his Per Spiegel interviewugust ina question regarding the subjects to be examined ifeeting were to occur, Adzhubey

*The reunification^^HCF withdrawal offer may notimmediately affected by tho October change inleadership. Western pross reportsited Bono sources to the effect that Westwas planning tolause in tho MLFwould provide for German withdrawal in thereunification. As if to dampen the new Sovietpropaganda campaign against Bonn'sovember reunif ication-MLF withdrawal

reports were circulated three daysASS statement warning of the dangersuclear-armed FRG andvague countemeasures to tbe MLF. Moscow's initial reaction to the reunification-MLF withdrawal reportsense of Interest in the "deal." Moscow Radio commentator Zakharovroadcast to Germany4 stated that West Germany is not sincere in its desire for reunification, but the commentator went on to indicate that an FRG withdrawal from "dangerous policies"he MLF) wouldrecondition for reunification. After the MLF proposal was placed in abeyance at tbe end interest Indeal" was not pronounced and has not recurred rocently in monitored Soviet propaganda.

answered that "it you are referring to tho German problem it may very well be among the subjects ofnd2 July luncheon in Essen and9 July TV interview Adzhubey repeatedly stressed the need for the two to talkixed agenda and without Although Adzhubey made no explicit concessions with respect to the question of German reunification, his remarks on the subject were unusually .mild. uestion by Der Spiegel editors In an Interview shortly before bis departure as to whether he couldeunification of Germany under non-Communist auspices; he did not reiterate the lineeunited Germany could beommunist Germany.*

*Hor aid Khrushchev when he spoke about the future political compositioneunified Armani i

P

1 in Moscow:

The ruling class of the Federal Republic of Germansnited Germany founded on capitalism while the people of the German Democratic Republicnified Germany founded on socialism. In all probability, the status will continue for some time and the problem will be solved by history. However, youwould not be surprised oven if I,ommunist, should express my beliefnified socialist Germany will emerge. When will it emerge? o not know, who will decide It? It should be decided by the Germans themselves.

position made In a

3eunified Germany had to be Communist (pageague expression o$ belief that it would

be so.

ST

SECRET

Adzhubey also commented. In responseuestion by Der Spiegel editors as to whether he foresaw any chance of relaxing- Che Bonn-Moscow atmosphere, thateally big step" should be taken to Improve relations. The nature of the "really big step" Adzhubey may have had In mind was not defined. But Erhard's stunned reaction to tho fall of Khrushchev some months later makes tempting the speculation that Erhard's hopesreally big step" on tho Gorman Question had indnud bann ratand

ot of littleho makeult for Khrushchev to carry out his policies, and his public statement in theuly TV interview that if the media of the FRG and USSR "were now to create certainin anticipation of the /Khrushchev-Erhard7 talks this would not be good either for Erhard or fordzhubey, In effect, seemed to be striving to leave open the possibilityodgo for his father-ln-law. For indeed, had Khrushchev become convinced that a of the reunification question with Erhard at that time would haveailure and/or would have led him into irreversable difficulties with his Kremlin colleagues, then ho would have been able to repeat his past practice

was one of the chief opponents of Khrushchev over5 Austrian peace treaty. See Appendix, page

seKrkt

of executingurnabout and covering up the Intenthigh degree of demagogic skill. And In thisletterswhich reportedly made no chango

in the past Soviet position on the German question, could have been used in defense of Khrushchev's "innocence."

Adzhubey while In the FRG combined his tory gestures toward the FRG with froqueotremarks toward the CPR. In

adshu-

Communist Chinathreat"

to the soviet onionAdzhubey

left the "clear implication" mat this threatrelations with Germany. Two days later in his in the context ofCPR mliitauuy, maae tbe point that Russia haddefended Europe from the Tartars. And In aconversation with Mueucbner Merkur chief editorAdzhubey said that tbe Russianseaceful Germany at their back duringof trouble with China.

And that Ulbricht should not be regarded as an insurmountable obstacle In the wayonn-Moscowwas indicated in Adzhubey's repeatedabout tbe seriously deteriorating condition of Ulbricht's hoalth. Adzhubey made at least three remarks to thethat Bonn ought not to worrycancer-ridden" Ulbricht who would not be around too much longer.*

tne4 Pugwaah meeting held inCzechoslovakia, Soviet General Talenskiy, atheoretician, also discussed the Eastproblem. He reportedly statedthat the

major Soviet problem was Communist China and that tho USSR "Is eager to have the Chinese Communist nuclear potential smashed." He reportedly added that the Soviet Government was embarrassed by the Ulbricht regime, but they were so involved "at the present timo" that they cannot disengaee

themsolves. But in the decades ahead, I

(footnote continued on page

SEOR.ET

Ulbricht's Conspicuous Snub

On his way home from his three-week tour ofAdzhubeyugust stopped over in Eastone day. During this short visit theremained "unavailable" and chose as histhat East GermanAdzhubeyembarrassed prior to his trip to the FUG. authored an article that appeared in Izvestiya Inreferred to West German President Luebke as aof the Nazi Gestapo." Adzhubey, in order toa more favorable Moscow-Bonn atmosphere for hispromptly ordered his duty editor to deliver anto tho West German Embassy in Moscow forremark. Adzhubey's apology stated that theof Horden's article hadmistake'of theand that Izvestiya did not agree with

eception in East Berlin, thus,oor second to his grand tour of the PRG. His comments on his FRG-visit with Horden and Horden's response did notut assuming that they were as enthusiastic

tram

Cht

| Adzhubey had implied that Russia might ro-iinquish East Germany0 toear period, but the principal difficulties at that time were Moscow's prestige within Eastern Europe and the concomitantof the Soviet positionis China.

iiau ojnpiiea tnai Kussia expecrea to do so Bus* ilnese problem over the next two decades that the Soviet Union might have to make concessions as to itsboundary.

People.'s Daily4orden statement made after Adzhubey's visit thattoeprimand to Adzhubey and Khrushchev. See

his subsequently published Izvestiya accounts (discussed presently) Adzhubey may well have added to the GDRconcern about the extent to which Moscow would go in ite "rapprochement" with Bonn. And in what appeared to be an effort to reassure tbo East German leaders, one German language radio commentary broadcast the day after Adzhubey returned to. Moscow tried to balance his efforts to develop trade with the FRGather vaguethat "unrealistic political deals" are the "main obstacle" to further expansion of FRG-USSR trade.

The Adzhubey "Rapprochement" Articlesndugust

Upon returning to Moscow, Adzhubey evidentlydirectly to Khrushchev alone on his Bonn mission, rather than to the party presidium. According to post-coup Adzhubey did not give an" accounting to the otherof the presidium until two days after his private talk with Khrushchev. The difference. If any, between his private report to hie father-in-law and his report at the presidium meeting is oot .known; it is tempting to speculate, however, that tho charge that Adzhubeyrivate version of bis Bonn visit before bispresidium debriefing may well have fanned thewhether justified or not, of Khrushchev (Khrushchev was not present -at. that reportedmeeting; be had leftour of southernut Adzhubey's articles in Izvestiya on his German trip probkbly reflected the tone of his report to the presidium and/or to Khrushchev.

A week after bis return from Germany, Adzhubey and three colleagues* published two articles In Izvestiya, entitled, "le have Seen West Germany." The tone set by the articles was not one of antagonism and rasping on the theme of German militarism and revanchism. Rather,

r.h. Polyanov and E. Pralnlkov.

SKlsRET

the authors adroitly soft-pedalled those traditional themes, and against the backgroundest Germanin warm colors and nostalgicallyin verse-^they set about the business oftheir readers that tho West German people and their present leaders have changed, that they have become more reasonable and realistic, by and large, and that it has therefore become possible to negotiate outstandingwith them.

The first, more cautious article warmed up the audience gradually to Adzbubey's extraordinary depletion of the "new" German mentality. One passage in the first article that stood out from the remaining, rather turgid, commentary seemed to convoy the main message. The authors described how,ressirector of one of the large Ruhr steel firms passedote say-ingr "How is the timeew Rapallo." Then Adzhubey and his colleagues drove their point home: the Germans have changed. Commenting on the note, they wrote:

This was an interesting detail. How much ingenuity has been expended by Bonn's official propagandists on blackeningin the eyes of the Germans' Rapallo was the treaty which took its name from the small Italian town where it was signedreaty between young Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic. Rapallo was the first breach in the tightf international isolation which had been clamped around both conquered Germany and the Soviet Repablic. Of course much has changed in the past four decades or more, and it would be naive to try to reconstruct the Treaty of Rapallo in its original form. Obviously the author of the note was not thinking of doing so. He was probably thinking of the spirit of Rapallo, of the spirit of realism inbetween the Federal Republic of Germany and the DSSR. And incidentally, at present this is by no means to the

liking of tho ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Yet the little piece of paper pushed across the table became, as it were, the symbol of an important and intelligent idea,rofound understanding of the state of the modern world, at whichwho wants toealist would willy-nilly arrive.

This plug for the "spirit of Rapallo" was usedto introduce the remarks of Berthold Beitz,director of Krupp who had interrupted histo return to Essen and meet-the Soviet group. reported as being convinced that thereealof raising the USSR's share of West Germanto six percent.* But Adzhubey's purpose inthe "spirit of Rapallo" may have gone beyond Be may have been paving the way forattempt at "Leninist compromises" in foreignof which was2 Treaty of Rapallo. (Anwas devotediscussion of "Leninistin the4 issue of Problems of HistoryCPSU.)

*Exports to the Soviet Union amountedittle moreercent of West Gorman foreign tradahis small amount was reduced by almost one half toercent5uzzling TASS addendum to95 plenum speech, cited on pagelaimed that the Soviet trade with the FHG remainedon the formernd for the first seven months6 (the best available recentthe decline continued with onlyercent of FRG trado going to the USSR.

In the second installment, Adzhubey and histook unprecendented liberties in depicting the new

SEck

face of Vest Germany. After asserting that the question of postwar border changes In Europe could not be tbeof "political negotiations or politicalhe authors made it clear that other parts of the Germancould be settled in that way. The authors said that while there were still some militaristic typos who boasted that there Is no "German question" which cannot be solved by German military forces, most of the German leaders, including Strauss (the bete, noire of earlier Sovietfully appreciated tbe futility of any such thoughts Tbe authors quoted Strauss as sayingew world war would moan "biological extinction" for the Germans. Erhard, for his part, was quoted as having described Khrushchev as the man "representing in the best way the great Soviot power."

They pointed out that they bad not originally planned to meet with Vest German political leaders, and interpreted the fact that they were received by "so many prominent leadersribute to tbe enormous importance of the USSR, its government, and to Khrushchevoreover, they said, in the FUG, "among people ofpolitical, social and economic positions, there is ripening or beginning toore sensible view of the contemporary world from which there is nohoy concluded with an anecdote about an incident during their visit: their car had crashedoad barrier upon leaving Erhard's office, and they explained to curious onlookers that "we wanted this barrier to be the last on the road of improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG."

4. MOUNTING GDR INSECURITY

As the Soviet-West German "rapprochement" began to growore serious affair in the late August and early September days, the East Germans grewrestive. Several developments In particular gave them cause for alarm.

SE^&EX

First, Khrushchev cast the die for talks with the

West flpraan haari nt

fur many expressing nia desireesting with him in Bonn.

nuvworse

wwwnox even have informed him directly through official channels about Khrushchev's definite intention to visit Bonn. Rather,eptember, the Soviet Embassy in Bonn informed the Bonn correspondent of the SED newspaper Roues Deutschland that Khrushchev would visit West Germany. On that day, at least one GDR radio commentator flatly stated that Moscow "officially" informed the GDR of Khrushchev's visit through theBonn correspondent.

Second, at about the same time, Khrushchevigh-level conference in Prague at which he and Gromyfco were engaged in secret consultations with Novotny and the foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. absent from the meetings was an East German representative. Yet Germany may have been one of the principal topics discussed. Peking's NCNAeptember pointedly noted that the "leaders of the GDR were notto the meeting which discussed the Germant does appear from the composition of the group and the Joint Soviet-Czech statementeptemberumber of foreign policy questions affecting bloc relations with the West were discussed.*

Third, over the weekendeptember, reports in the West Gorman press stated that West German industrialists

-Tne ostensiDie occasion for Khrushchev's visit to20th anniversary of the Slovak.?arrRntJ*o* his rank. h anniversary of the founding of the GDR, however, did warrantattendance; Khrushchev, at the "insistence" of the presidium, went to Sochi, and Brezhnev to Berlin.

were ready to offereal ransoming tho GDR for long-term credits (some reports saidears). Ulbricht'sDR radio commentatoreptember promptly ridiculed the "speculation"DR sell-out, but he did not go on to reassure his listeners that Khrushchev would reject such an offer. Similarly, on the same day another GDR commentary on Khrushchev's visit called tbe GDR sell-out, conceptut left the impression that Moscow and Bonn might, nevertheless, consider such an absurdity. It is absurd, the GDRsaid, to think tbat "an improvement of Soviet-West German relations could bo Implemented at the expense of any third state, for example the GDR; the GDR isountry which could be bought from someone in thewayuckster." East Berlin, hence, was publicly warning Its principal friend and its principal enemy not toilateral arrangement at tho expense of tbe GDR behind its back.

Peking Plays on GDR Sensitlvltes

Peking media seized upon the sell-out issueitriolic propaganda campaign skillfully designed to play on anxieties of the East Germans and at the same time to discredit Moscow's good faith toward its allies.*

"While Peking was accusing KhrushchevGDRCPR considerationsGDR backout" werediscussed by the Chinese in talks with the West

reported in4 that the Chinese Communists indi--cated that they might be willing to move their embassy to Bonn, provided that tbe FRG opened an embassy in Poking, and the Chinese indicated they would be willing to remove the CPR embassy from East Berlin and reduce itsthere to somethingrade mission. Regarding CPR trade policy toward Bonn, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi4 intervieworrespondent of the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitungay edition) indicated tbat CPR trade relations with the FRG are not entirely determined by political relations with the GDR. Chen Yi made the remarkably noncommittal statement that "it is certainly not our intention to exploit our relations with West Germany to place East Germany under pressure, nor to exploit our relations with East Germany to put Wost (footnote continued on

c

Peking's propaganda barrage oponodeptember with an NCNA report* which stated that the agenda for the forthcoming Khrushchev-Erhard talks was not restricted, that Erhard was willing toigholitical deal with the Soviet Union on the Germannd implied in conclusion thatmight accept Bonn's deal. Reported NCNA:

UPIeptoraber quoted 'informed sourcos' in Bonn as saying that West Germanleaders were prepared to offer'largo trading credits' in return for Soviet 'political concessions.* Tho concessions would 'have to include aof the Communist regime in East Germany.' It added that some West Germans saw 'a ray of hope' forovietin the fact that the Foreign Minister of the GDR did not participate in the Prague meeting of the Soviet and Czechoslovakwith the Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian foreign ministers.

On the next day the report of West German trading credits for Soviet political concessions was transmuted andby Peking into an elaborately documented charge of

(footnote continued from

Germany under pressure." Less than two woeks earlier, SED Politburo member Matern had roundly scored CPR policythe GDRpeech in Bastpril). to ADN, Matern charged that in its final"the endeavors of the Chinese leaders amounts toabandonment of tbe GDR as tbe western outpost of the socialist world system in Europe andow form of tbe German policy of the Beria clique which has beenby the CPSU Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Khrushchev." The lengthy Neues Doutschland account (onpril) of Matern's speech did* not include this passage, which among other things, explicitly exonerated at least tho CPSU Central Committee from tho"Beria heresy."

appeared in People's Dally on the noxt day and was summarized in the foreign language Peking Review foreptember.

KOKKT

.SKCKKT

a planned Soviet sell-out of East Germany. onspiracy that warrants attention" was the opening judgment of an authoritative People's Daily article, transmittedeptember by NGNA, on what Tt called the "current maneuvers"dirty political deal to sell-out the GDR." Then, the article posed the leading questions:

What makes tbe Bonn revanchists so bold as to advance barefacedly such an insolent1 plan.of;buying the GDR? And what makes them regard the GDR as something put on salo by certain persons? Can it be that they have received tacit approval or hints from those who recently talkedinion in praise of the West German militarists? But in so doing, these people are reckoning without their host. They should know that the days of Munich are gone for good.

Finally, the article proceeded to provide its evidence for its opening guilty verdict by juxtaposing certain statements by Adzhubey in July and August withpositions taken by ulbricht during the same period. The contrast, which People's Daily sharpened by editoral-Izing upon Adzhubey's statements, encompassed divergent remarks on the:possibility of fruitful negotiations with the West German leadership and on the basic nature of West German foreign policy. With regard to negotiations. People's Daily reported that Ulbricht hold that there were no grounds for the idea that the Erhard Government would make peaceful and reasonable policy shifts, while Adzhubey held that the West German leadershipealistic attitude toward negotiating with tbe East. And with regard to Bonn's basic intentions, the CCP paper reported that Ulbricht saw no change In the "revanchlst" policy of Bonn, while Adzhubey was reported as stating that Bonn had abandoned the idea of wiping out the Soviet Union, in addition, Ulbricht-Khrushchev differences were Implied by People's Daily treatment of the presumedin negotiations on the future status of Germany. Ulbricht was quoted as stating that the German question cannot be settled in the absence of or in opposition to

SKr.ft la-

the GDR, nor "can it be settled by other countries." Yet, implied People's Daily, this was precisely what was in store in light or the GDR's exclusion fro* the early September Prague meeting of the Soviet, Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian officials. The People's Dally article reitorated tho earlier NCNA itemwas notto tho meeting wbich "discussed tho Germannd added that Khrushchev's decision to visit West Germany had been taken at the Prague conference. The final point in the articleuote from the highest East German leader, Norden, with whom Adzhubey talked during his short stopover In East Berlin in early August. According to the article Norden said that it was obvious that "it is impossible to annex the GDR, or buy it from any other Socialist country, or isolate it from its fiocTaTist"neigh-Dors ."

And onh, CPR media carried an extensive summary of an article In the East Berlin quarterly Freie Wolt entitled, "Bow Much Does the GDR Cost?" The Article scored as "sinlater" the idea that the GDR could be boughtind of merchandise. However, the Chinese report Included the East German article's curiousof Khrushchev's role in the sinister idea. ide effect of the exoneration, however, was to keep alive the. suspicion of an Insidious role on Khrushchev'sccording to NCNA's extensive summary, the articlethat:

wo would not be insulting Khrushchev if wo shielded him from suspicion. This in no,way concerns Khrushchev'sbut the political understanding of the speculators who have no moral sense to speak of. No man in his right mind can imagine that the head of government of the Sovietorldreaty of friendship with the GDR only to send bis friend to the butcher at the first opportunity. But in Bonn (and not only there) there are people capable of such imagination.

Albania's capability for just that was soon displayedopullit article oneptember which charged, among other things that

there is no doubt that behind this visit /Khrushchev's proposed visit toew N. Khrushchev conspiracy isn the name of 'peaceful coexistence'approchement with imperialism, from which It hopes to draw political and economic advantages, theroup does not hesitate to deal with the imperialists at the expense of the socialist countries. It does not hesitate toargaining pawn of and toocialist country like the GDR. But the GDRovereign socialist state which cannot be annexed easily and still less be sold or bought by anyone.

5. THE PRESIDIUM OPPOSITION INTERVENES

That Khrushchev's new approach to the Germanmay have encouraged opposition in Kremlin ruling circles, and hence figured in the coup against him, is worthy of consideration. One well-known incident that occurred in early September raised speculation in the West that some Soviet leaders, with the assistance of the KGB, tried in an underhanded fashion to torpedoplanned visit to Bonn. eptember, only two days after it was announced in public (not in the USSR) that Khrushchev was going to Bonn for talks with Erhard, electronic technician Schwirkmann attached to the West German embassy in Moscow was mysteriouslywith mustard gas. The episodecandal in West Germany and it was touch-and-gohile as to whether Erhard's invitation to Khrushchev would be rescinded. Oneptember, the Soviet Government formallyest German memorandum protesting the affair, with the haughty and deceptive statement thatchwirkmann

SK&RET

case' venture was needed by certain quarters of tbeFederal Republic to prevent an Improvement of Soviet-vest German relations." Curiously, the Sovietdid not offer Bonn an apology acceptable to tbomay the CPSU presidium voted to oust Khrushchev from power.

The long delay on the part of the Soviets could be interpreted to mean that Khrushchev could not marshal sufficient power to prevail upon the presidium toormal apology to the West Germans.* To be sure, the mustard gas incident can only be regarded as circumstantial evidencelot to foil Khrushchev's plan to visit Erhard. Still, the incident seems to haveurning point in Khrushchev's efforts toarmer Soviet-West German atmosphere. For after the incident, bismomentum, which had boon gaining through July and August, was broughtead stop.

Another indicationispute in the Kremlin over Khrushchev's German; policy turned up^oneptember. Pravda and Izvestiya were at variance in reported remarks made by Adzhubey on the previousday that Moscow rejected Bonn's protest over the mustard gas Incident.

*By wayontrast, Adzhubey promptly apologized to the West Germans over the Norden incident in July.

Brezhnev, through the coercive power of the KGB, may

have taken the lead in trying to torpedo Khrushchev's

German policy by authorizing the Schwirkmann affair

' "Since the '

mustard gas'incident took place on the same dayreturned from bis visit to Czechoslovakia, runs the hypothesis, the oporation may have been approved In his absence. And due to Brezhnev's responsibilities of tho CPSU secretariat at that time, the KGB would have had to aeok clearance for such an oporation from Brezhnev In Khrushchev's absence. The hypothesis concludes tbat had tbe KGB been acting withoutpeedy apology would have been issued.

SEfVRRT

SKOU Kl-

ineeting of the foreign affairethe Supreme Soviet convened to discuss theTreaty, izvestiya (then under Adzhubey'sPravda

Sometimeas in West Germany, visited its cities, and talked withumber of its political and state figures. This trip and these meetings once again confirmed thethat It would be completelyto consider all Germans who live in the FRG to be revanchists.

Both Pravda and Izvestiya carried his next sentence which said Wal

The overwhelming majority of thepopulace of West Germany want to live in peace and friendship with all peoples. Thoro are sober reasonable figures even among the bourgeoisie and in business circles. We will hope that It is they who will gain tho upper hand In the Bonn political arena.

Hence, the truncated Pravda version did not make clear that West German political leaders were among the sober elements of West German society, while the Izvestiyasuggests that they were and that it was feasible to discuss political matters with them,.

That the presumed opponents of Khrushchev's German policy had gotten the upper hand by this time is suggested by several other developments. Oneptember,ery long delay that could only have been embarrassing for the GDR regime, Moscow at last exchanged instruments of ratification of the friendship treaty with East Berlin. (On the day before, the extra-legal procedure of the East German People's Chamber in ratifying the treatysigns of haste: the requirement of two readings

ftKP.&RT

SKORET

of theune treaty was not mentioned in the published proceedings of the late June and early September People's Chamber meetings.) Khrushchev did not attend the ceremony in Moscow, although he was in town at the time and although he had been athe treaty and had participatedeeting held ta honor it in June.

Onravda editorial devoted to the ratification of tho friendship "treatyarning that may have been addressed to Khrushchev and Adzhubey as well as Erhard. Pravda gratituously asserted that

whoever thinks that an improvement of relations between the USSR and West Germany can be achieved in thedegree to the detriment of the interest of the GDR is deeply mistaken."

Oneptember, TASS announced thatKhrushchev, whose rank should have dictated his presence at the East Berlinhead the Soviet delegation to theh anniversary festivity.

Oneptember, Khrushchev leftacation in the south at the "Insistence" of the presidium-J

available statement oyuTafe Soviet policy toward Westhe /Khrushchev) expected West Germany, which was not then and is notember of the United Nations, "to contribute greatly"uture member of the Unitedrp^rtAHin-

.,. . According to former Japanese Foreign

Minister Fujiyama in an interview with the Washington Post at the Japanese Embassy in. onhrushchev in Sochi brought up the subject of West Germany in an oblique reply to Fujiyama's suggestion that the UN Security Council be broadened to include Japan. Khrushchev, said Fujiyama, roplyed that "Japan, India, toan7 WOuld in the *uturo contribute greatly

On the day Khrushchev left for his vacation in Sochi, GDR leader Willi Stophudden visit to Moscow and commenced an intensive three-day series of

sk<Nret

talks with Kosygin and other high-level Kremlin leaders The timing of Stoph'sfor the purpose' of opening an exhibit devoted tob anniversary of

? eBestsay have been more concerned with finding out the actual consequences of theC'new Soviet

line toward West Germany than with the more mundane subject of trade matters.

*Tb6^iD raDid succession, Suslov and Brezhnev came forward with strong statements reassuring the East German leaders about Soviet intentions toward Germany. Suslovlat no-sell-out pledge in Moscow on tho same day if*.that Brezhnev was welcomed in East Berlin by Ulbricht, who had refused to greet Khrushchev's son-in-law two months earlier. Ulbrichtctober respondedather defiant lecture on the limits of Soviet interference in GDR sovereignty. And at the same podium Brezhnev promised that there would be no "behind-the-back" deals detrimental to GDR interests.

Suslov's Guarantee

Suslov inctober speechremlindevoted to the GDR anniversary went out of his way to deny the possibilityonn-Moscow deal at tho oxpense of the GDR's "sovereignty." Suslov voiced the till ven if all the gold in the world werehe relations between Moscow and East Berlin would still not be for sale. He seemed to take seriously the idea that there hadeal in the offing:

Of late theircJes of West Germany have begun to spreadabout the possibility ofommercial deal with the USSR at the expense of the GDR. if the USSR wants to be on good terms with West Germany, let it sacrifice the interests of the GDR. To say that such plans arerovocative nature is putting it mildly.

seAilet

ft

Thoy prove how pig-headedly bourgeois their authors are, who, in our times, still believe in tho possiblity of managing the fates of peoples by means of purchase and sale. The treatythe USSR and the GDR puts an end to these foolish illusions. It says to those gentlemen: First, the GDRovereign state, and no one has tbe right to be the master of its interests except its people, second, theof fraternal friendship and socialist solidarity linking the USSR and the GDR are not for sale, even if all the gold of the world were offered for tbem.

Forget your foolish illusions, gentlemen revanchlsts; thoy will never come true. As far as normal relations between the USSR and West Germany are concerned, both sides are equallyin them. These relations can be successfully developed, not on the basis of some shady deals, but on the basis of good will and cooperation in thests of all the European states, of the cause of peace and international security.

Andejoinder toeptember People's Da11yon the "shady doals" between Moscow and Bonn, Suslov added:

And we are firmly convinced that noof imperialist reaction in Test Germany, no provocations of the Chinese leaders, who attempt to introduceinto relations between the USSR and the GDR and to start quarrelsthe SED and the CPSU, caninute shake tho fraternal unity, eternal friendship, and coinprohensivebetween our states, our peoples, and our Marxist-Leninist parties.

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SEOiRRT

Suslov also took this occasion to give thetreatyigher priority than it hadin Soviet propaganda in late summer. He stated

that "one of the most Important problems, on theof which depends the liquidation of tension in Europe and in the entire world, eaceful Germann addition,Suslov, like Kozlov innjected

sense of urgency into the questeace treaty. He stated that "from the viewpoint of the vital interests of European security, the neederman peace treaty Is becoming moro and more imperative." He also tried to putace of unity among the Kremlin leaders byto Khrushchev the statement that there are no differences in outlook between the CPSU and tho SED. ummary of his speech in Pravdactober deleted this reference to Khrushchev^ thcroby dissociating him from Suslov's line. (Izvestiya ignored the Suslov speech altogether.) Moreover, in the light of the reported major role that Suslov played in tho ouster of Khrushchev, Suslov's policy pronouncements indicateecision bad been taken on certain aspects of the German.issuehrushchev's Bonn visit, Ulbricht's tenure) in the absence of or without the approval of Khrushchev.

Ulbricht's Challenge

Ulbricht In his own way exacted retribution from Khrushchev by totally ignoring himengthy speech0 words)ctober, delivered at the East Berlin celebration of the GDR anniversary. And in that speech he made the startling statement that the East Germans paid all of the war reparations for the two Ger-manles, implying that the GDR had "purchased" itsfrom the Soviet Union. Ho also declared in an indignant tone that the "sovereign" GDR cannot boby anyone else.

Ulbricht's startling discussion of the sensitive World War II war reparations matter was couched In an anti-Bonn framework, rather than In terms of resentment directed toward Moscow's heavy postwar drain on tho

economy of the Soviot zone. But Ulbricht, nevertheless, placed the main onus of the GDR's postwar economicon the Soviet Union:

The year the GDR was founded many ruins were still not eliminated; it wasain concern to deal with the needs and to make restitution for what German imperialism had done to the Soviet Union and other nations. The citizens of the small GDR at that time made restitution for allhard "work.

Ulbricht did not go on to discuss the amount ofthe GDR had mado to the Soviet Union, but heSocial democraticho verified thisthrough his studies of the first postwar period and who "came to the conclusion that West Germany owes thoew dozen billion marks." In addition to the "few dozen billionlbricht citedillion marks West Germany allegedly owes tbe GDR for "ruthlessof the open border in Berlin in the yoars prior to the wall."

Peking propaganda seized upon Ulbricht's remarks andrief report of the speech under the bead-line "GDR Pays USSR War Reparations for Two Germanies, Says Ulbricht." Onctober, tho Hong Kong Communist Ta Rung Pao cited Ulbricht's statements and relatedto show "tho East German people's rosentment at the Soviet demand to pay their debts when East Germany wasifficult time and at Khrushchev's attempt to sell out their country to West Gormany.

* identified by Ulbricht in bis5 SED Central Committee speech, examined onr. Badde. Presumably this is economics professor Dr. Fritz Badde of Kiel University, an SPD member who retired from the Bundestag

KR

Later;in his speechctober, ulbricht renewed the lineeunified Germany can only be Communist and again placed on the record his anti-Beria argument that the building of Communism can take placeivided country. Then, by indirection, he Informed the Soviet Union that it had no right torice on the GDR. He may have had Khrushchev as well as Erhard in mind when he said that

a reunification also cannot be had in the way that some incorrigible fools imagine, namely that the GDR be bought from somebody. The GDR belongs toit belongs to its citizens who are not prepared to sell eitheror their republic to theWestern powers. For this reason, one should finally put an end toon such foolishness in West Germany once and for all and face life as It is.

It is possible that Ulbricht at the time of his speech had been .told about.presidium resistance to Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn. The fact that Khrushchev was conspicuously slighted in Ulbricht's two-hour speech, combined with Ulbricht's "hands-off-the GDR" challenge and an indirect war reparations barb, suggested that Ulbricht, at any rate, was confident enough to serve notice that he would not surrender his postsight. (In private, and after Khrushchev was removed, the Soviet leadersinformed some visiting delegations of foreign Communist parties that Adzhubey during his German trip hadrave error by criticizing Ulbricht's leadership.) Ulbricht's challenge also seemed to warn thatajor change occurred in Soviet policy toward Westlbricht would publicly retaliate by

*And Adzhubey in theccording to

I ' ' was regarded as the harbinger of "major"

change in USSR German policy.

diroctly raising and elaborating upon embarrassing issues. (Such issues might well have included Sovietthrough war reparations, failure to support the GDR through substantial credits in the early years of its development, vacillation on Soviet policy regarding the peace treaty matter, and, perhaps, other specificaccrued during almost two decades of East German peonage.)

Brezhnev's Pledge

After Ulbricht left the rostrum, Brezhnev arose tohrushchev-Mikoyan anniversary greeting, whichather ambiguous passage to the effect that any "plot" against the GDR will be rebuffed. Thenplunged into his own speech in which he pledged that no deal would be struck with Bonn politicians "behind the back of the GDR" that would be detrimontal to GDR national Interests and security. Tho realization that Khrushchev was planning to visit such politicians, and tbeInsecurity of leading SED members that Khrushchev might agreeolicy detrimental to and "behind-the-back" of the GDR, was only thinly veiled in earlier speeches by leading SED members in Brezhnev's audience. And after Khrushchev's ouster an SED politburo member in an East Berlin speechovember harked ack to Brezhnov's pledge and publicly tied Brezhnev's public statement toctober flat promise that the GDR cannot be purchased.*

ie SED official, Vomer, stated: "Anyone in Bonn or elsewhero still harboring illusions that the GDR can be negated', or that it is possible to make agreements behind the back of the GDR harmful to its intorest, shall bo reminded of the statements of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev at the festive meeting on the occasion ofhof our ropublic in Berlin. He said at the time: 'Today it is possible to state with the best of reasons that without the GDR it is impossible to solve eitherconcerning the German peace settlement or other (footnote continued on

SECkET

KT

Hence, It would seem that in early October Brezh-nev and Suslov intervened to prevent Khrushchev iron further developing his West German overtures and tothe East Germans that their interests would not be sacrificed for Soviet policy gains.

(footnote continued from

problems connected with the consolidation of security in Europe and the guarantee of peace.** And anyone in the sane places still dreaming that thererice for which the GDR can be purchased, or even believing that, in.the manner of horse traders, agreements can beat the expense of the GDR and improved relations with the Soviet Union, should carefully read theof Comrade Mikhail Suslov madeoviet-German friendship rally onh anniversary of onr republic in Moscow. He said: 'Such plans testify to the bourgeois narrowmindodness of their authors who, In our present era, still believe in tbe possibility that the fates of nations can be decided through purchase or sale. The treaty between the USSR and the GDR tells these one, the GDRovereign state, with no one except the people having the right to decide on Itsand two, relations of brotherly friendship and socialist solidarity uniting the USSR and GDR cannot bo sold or bought, even If all the gold of the world were offered.' This Is true and clear, and the gentlemen on the Rhine will be well advised to consider this more seriously."

III. THE HEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP AMD THE GERMAN QUESTION:7

1. THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE COUP

Tbe leaders who came to powor in tho Soviet Union In mid-October found little leeway for maneuver on the German question. With political power diffusedoalition of men with dlverso viewpoints on various policy questions, the new Soviet leadership was also hamstrungariety of problems inherited from Khrushchev, the solution of which was made difficult by unchangedcircumstances. With respect to the German question, they did not admit in public that there was substance to the Chinese Communist charge tbat Khrushtahov had been trying toeal with Bonn to sell-out the GDR for economic gain, though Soviet and East European sources in November and4 privately stated thathadeal with Erhard at the expense of Ulbricht. The new Soviet leaders may also have tried to convince tbe East Germans that lt was In their mutual interest not to implicate Khrushcheveal tothe GDR.

East Germany's Reaction to the Coup

Tbe initial GDR reaction to Khrushchev's ouster and its treatment of the sell-out question was ambivalent. On the one hand, tbero was evidence to suggest that's removal brought quick relief to the leaders in East Berlin about the fate of East Germany's future. The GDR's first official roaction to tho Kremlin coup, which was registered in thectober communique of the SED Centralfirst Eastern European partyon the Khrushchevthat tbe friendship treaty of4 will be carried out "honorably,"perhaps, that there was some question among the East German leaders as to whether it would have been honorably implemented prior to Khrushchev's ouster. As

SECkET

far as Ulbricht himself is concerned, his personalin the first few weeks following Khrushchev's ouster was not made public*

On the other hand, tho SED central committee'sofctobor declared in another passage that Khrushchev's removal caused "deep agitation in our party and among ournd that Khrushchev had merit in Implementing "Marxist-Leninist policy as worked out by the CPSU Central Committee." Also, Verner, the SED pollt-buro member who found it necessary to recall the pledges of Suslov and Brezhnev about no deals behind the back of the GDR, peechovember, exonerated Khrushchev by name by saying that he had merit for having advocated the policypeaceful and democratic solution of tbe German question." Though he followed this statement with the blanket charge that Khrushchev had "disregarded" and "violated" collective leadership, presumablythat worked out in the Central Committee, Verner did not explicitly connect these charges with errors in policy.

These discrepancies in the GDR's Initial reaction, may bo explained by any of several possibilities: in the SED, initial lack of direction from Ulbricht and/or tho new Kremlin leadership,autious attitude on tbe part of the SED in an effort to evaluate tbeof the new Soviet leadership with respect to the German question.

Subsequently, the GDB's public linoreater sense of socurity with respect to the new Soviet leadership. Some GDR spokesmen obliquely contrasted the

*It does not seom likely that the Soviet conspirators would have made (or felt it necessary toreak in past practice byoreigner (like Ulbricht) into an internal CPSUthendctober presidium arraignment and thectober Central Committee prosecution. Tho evidence that Ulbricht went to Moscow onctober is weak, dubious and solely speculative. Ulbricht was absent from the East Berlin scene fromoctober; unlike other East European parties, there was no public announcement of an East German partycommission being sent to Moscow; and all of the other East European leaders except Rumania's Gheorghlu-Dej were reported to have been in their respective countries on the fatefulctober.

KKOUKX

situation under Khrushchev with the one at hand, pointing up their grave suspicions about Khrushchev's intentions

ear' cUlbrlcht- for sample, in his speech at the SED plenumtated that the SED was not disturbed by the "slander" created (he said) in the Western press in connection with Adzhubey's July Bonn

nyone can see for himself that thetreaty between the USSR and the GDR, as stated in the CPSU telegram ofonstitutes the basis on which the relations of overall fraternal cooporation between our states and parties are further developed.

Ulbricht thus seemed to bo admitting that itost-coup telegram to put an end to the anticipation of adverse and radical change wbich had disturbed the SED during the last few months of Khrushchev's regime. SED politburo membermentioned as Ulbricht's successor--at the SED plenum went further than Ulbricht In explicitly

stating that "evon ourhad to admit that

the SED and Ulbricht have emerged from tho aforementionod events /Khrushchev's ouster7 not weakened but strengthened,"

Other Post-Coup Incriminations

Tho fact that the now Kremlin leadership, since taking over, avoided any specific public charge thathad mismanaged Soviet policy on the Germanstands in contrast to the Brezhnev-Suslov line of early October, that Implied that there wero elements inhe USSR interested ineal with the Westat Ulbricht's expense. Brezhnev's fullure too sell-out pledge in hisctober reply to Ulbricht's congratulations on the former's new "promotion" Iscurious in light ofctobern his statement ofctober, Brezhnev said only that "the CPSU will do all they can to guard that historicalunshakable friendship between ourlike the apple of their eyes, and to further develop the

et

rolatiODS of all-around fraternal cooperation between our parties and statos.1* The new leadership's failure to give such "guarantees" appeared to reflect thenot to implicate Khrushchevoal to sell-out the GDR. This phenomenon, along with other indications of tho now Soviet policy toward the Gorman problem, raised suspicions that the new leaders concluded, in light of their already limited maneuverability, that open disclosure of any devious Khrushchevian intentions toward tho GDR would have made the now Kremlinvulnerable to attack by friendhe GDR) and foehe CPR) alike, and would have unnecessarily complicated Soviot diplomatic relations with the East Europoan allies.

Even the public charges leveled against Khrushchev by Pravda contained only one possible link with an earlier lndfroct charge against Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn.

64 East Berlin speech

Only short-sightedwho have completely divorced themselves from real1stic policy, 1ikb some gentlemon on the banks of the Rhine, can indulge in tho hope of solutions and agreements behind the back of the GDR, to the detriment of Its national interests and security. No,this will nevor happen. These gentlemen will never find that we will do this.

4 Pravda editorial on Khrushchev's ouster

Tho Leninist party is an enemy of subjectivism and drifting in communistIon. Bare-brained scheming, immature and hasty decisions, and actions divorced from reality, bragging and phrase-mongering, command ism,to take into account tho achievements of science and practical experience are alien to

coincidence cannot, of course, be ruled out. The link may be strengthonod, though, by Ulbricht's useomewhat similar rhetorical device todivorce from realistic policy" when he revived similar worries after6 CPSUo one who has command of his five senses" can believe that the USSR would abandong theee ahead Frele Welt's use of the similar device) is another base in point.

SliCR

An oxplicit Indictment alluding to Khrushchev'sof German affairs vhlch Suslov vas purported to have presented at thectober Central Committee trial of Khrushchev was included in some reports written by non-bloc Communist reporters In Moscow. Tho Communlst-con-trolied Italian weekly Paese Sera onctober, for example,istharges" against Khrushchev, one of which criticized Kbrushchov for sending his son-in-law to Bonn as an authorized privatcomissary. (The xistence ofharges" was deniedoscov-datolined roport printed in the Italian Communist party paper L'Unita onctober. Interestingly, TASSovember chose to deny the authenticity of the indictment printed In tbe Italian leftist weekly L'Espressoovember vhlch did not include the Adzhubey-as-emissary charge.)*

tatea that Khrushchev had contemplated

agreement" with Bonn at theShJ' commented that "this idea"

iuiimi tUiiieSSmCllL

f the policy implications of the coupthat with Khrushchev's ouster

oias not in any sense new, that Khrushchev naa suggested it on several occasions in the past, and somewhat along the lines of Erhard's initial assessment

wavuuster

there would not be any agreement between Moscow and West Germany or the West on the Berlin question for "many, many

'While in the r'Uti Adzhuboy reported directly toby phone, or so he told Per Spiegel editors Inthoy publishedugust In resoquestion, Adzhubey himself suggosted that hoprivate emissary. Be stated that "nowgiveecret. The Premier wants us toto Moscow7 as quickly as possible." For aother reported charges agalostseeT

SEGRET

he "agreement" was not spelled out in the tremarks,

FWniCD nas-not-ncun xuuicnr

on tne nature of Khrushchevisr nart nf that

idea.

uoucucv 1

aeptenueThat he1shchev) bad been negotiating with the West Germans, that tbe West Germans had agreed they vould recognize the Odor-Neisse line if Khrushchev would remove the Berlin wall, guarantee free elections In East Germany and promise the removal of Ulbricht upon completion of his term of office. Tho report, vhlch listed no other West German offers, stated that Khrushchev told Gomulka that behard fight in Moscow" If he was to push through this scheme. Whatever tbe value may be of tho report, other post-coup reports from Warsaw stated that Gomulka vas apparently mistrustful of Khrushchev's intentions toward West Germany. According tj

Gomulka was "upset" by Khrubuciwvs eildrts to improve relations with West Germany. Thus, reported

vi- muni ieportoaKhrushchev's removal disturbed Gomulka less than oxner Communist leaders. Gomulka himself said cryptically on4 that there had been "justified grounds" for the ouster of Khrushchev. Onctober the Polish Central Committee Press Bureau briefed newspaper editors on the removal of Khrushchev and reportedly stated that Khrushchev was becoming too friendly with the Wost and his proposed trip to West Germany wasactor leading to his downfall.

2. SIGNALSENEWBD DISQUIET

Soon after Khrushchev was replaced, the new Soviet leadership altered Moscow's long-standing formula on the neederman peace treatyneutral, freef West Berlin. The new leadership referrederman'

settlement" rathereace treaty, and frequently omitted references to West Berlin in the Soviet formulas. The East Germans, however, obstinately and polemically

RET

SKtvR ET

held on to the old peace treaty-West Berlin demandsthe first half Ulbricht's polemical remarks to the effect that the West Berlin issue ought not to be shelved were complimented by his rewriting of earlyhistory which exaggerated his role and independence under the Soviet occupation, by his renewal of thesubject of the Soviet reparations rape of the Sjfv:*aV let zone, and in late April by his praise of CPR support for GDB policy.

Holding Off on the German Issue

The new leadership may have felt that other more pressing domestic and foreign matters demanded their initial concentration and that any major diplomatic actionas the Bonnthe German question should be postponed. Concentration on other foreign and domestic matters may also explain, in part, Moscow's dropping of any element of urgency in the new Soviet peace treaty line. An initial attempt by the new leadership to introduce the urgent element, by calling for an "early"'solution of the problem of the German peace treaty in thectober joint Soviet-Cuban communique, was shortly afterwards Brezhnev, inovember October Revolutionspeech and the majorovember Pravdaon post-Khrushchev foreign policy made no refer-ence to the need for an "early" solution.

In addition to dropping the formulation calling for the "speediest conclusion" of the German treaty,switch present in Brezhnev'sctober and 6speeches and in Kosygin'sovember speech, was the reference to "settlement""rather than German "peace treaty." hird switch in the formula shelved' the long-standing effort to alter the status of West Berlin on the basiseace settlement. Moscow's new line on solving the German problem frequently contained no proviso for West Berlin. The standard linereaty ultimatum had been the solution of the German peace treaty and the normalization, on that

E^RET

basis, of the situation In West Berlin.* Brezhnev in two speechesovemberecember) and Pravda in its authoritative foreign policyy dropping the Berlin rider to Moscow's Gorman formula indicated that the new Soviet leadership was. trying to dissociate itself from Khrushchev's six year old policy failures. (The status of West Berlin and the peaceowever, were not consistently ignored in the first fow months of the new leadership. The status of West Berlin wasnot tiedeacein formulations which reiterated tho continuing Soviet view that West Berlinolity separate from West Germany. For example,4 Soviet-Czech communique stated that "the whole international situation would be helped by the conclusioneace treaty with the two sovereign German statos and also an agreement on the status of West Berlin as an"Tndepondcnt political unit.")

Ulbricht's Pique

The shelving of the old peace troaty and Westformulas upset Ulbricht. laring affront to his wishes was displayed on the day of4 speech, which Ignored the subjoct of West Berlin and referrederman "settlement." GDR leaders telo-graphed Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mlkoyanovember and pointodly included the urgent appeal that "the conclusioneace treaty with the two German states and, on this basis, tho transformation of West Berlineutral free city are of extra-ordinary importance in the struggle for tho unity and solidarity of the Communist world movement.

"Tmsdating from8 Berlin crisis-had been reiterated inctober Soviet-Indonesian communique (pre-ouster) as well as in tho announced October revolution slogans (post-ouster, but announced prior to Brezhnev's speech).

Brezhnev did not link the solution of the German problem to the world Communist movement, and referred to it as only onenumber of unsolved problems" causingin the world.

And though Ulbricht stated that during his Kremlin talks with Brezhnev and others on the weekendomplete agreement" was reached on the requirementserman peacether SED spokesmenin public and private to call for the "speediest conclusion"eace treaty with the two German states and on that basis to solve the West Berlin situation. The SED's continuing (though sporadic) references to the old peace treaty-West Berlin demands in November and December were, perhaps, particularly polemical in light of the fact that theovember Pravda editorial had pointedly criticized "some people" who do not reject old doctrines and concepts in efforts to insure European security.

Ulbricht's displeasure with the altered Westfrom the new Moscow leadership was5 Warsaw Pact meeting in 4 January East Berlin interview on the Pact

meeting, Ulbricht in responseeading question about Bonn's "revenge policy" and Bonn's "claim" to West Berlin emphasized that the West Berlin question "is to us of as much importance as the question of tbe Oder-Neisse peace frontier is to People's Poland." The question of Europe's existing borders had appeared in the Warsaw Pact communique while the Berlin question was ignored, and the decision not to mention Berlin in the communique was, accordingigh level Polish Foreign Ministry source, aone" in which "all delegations did notlbricht's naked complaint regarding the continuing*of the Berlin question was overlooked in Soviet propaganda, which5 devoted the bulk of its German-related copy and time to the virtually dead MLF issue.

SF.fW FT

Kosygin's Cold Reception

East German displeasure over the Soviet shelving of the peace treaty-Vest Berlin Issues nay have accounted, inor the surprisingly low-key treatment given by the GDR to Kosygin's5 visit to East Germany to take In the annual Leipzig trade fair. Kosygin's arrival was noted in Neues Deutschlandne paragraph reportews Item about tho return of the Polish delegation from tho Leipzig fair. Ulbricht's greetingurt two-sontence telegram sent fromn the day Kosygin left tho GDR, and during his visit East German protocol and publicity for the new Soviet premier did not measure up to tho red-carpet treatment given by the GDR to the ceremonial head of state (Mlkoyan) in his visit twelve months earlier.

*fn addition to"the"peace treaty-West Berlin issues,

- ulbricht in the winter

ofas "gre-any agxtftted" over the Soviet's laissez falre attitude toward continuing West German economic probes with East European Governments. Recent reports on East Germany's concern over Bonn's efforts in late6 and7 to establish diplomatic ties with Eastern Europea generally similar attitude on Moscow'sis, to diplomatically caution tho East European nations to go slowly and shrewdly in their accommodation with Bonn, but not to exacerbate relations with the Eastby attempting to block their dealings with the FRG.

was in Cairo engagedain attempt toajor breakthrough in non-bloc diplomatic recognition. (For GDR loans and credits equivalent. dollars, the UAR agreed only toonsulate general in East Berlin.) The Cairo trip had long been planned; thus Ulbricht's absence, perhaps, was not inajor insult to Kosygin.

rt

almost tho only east gorman report evincingduring the visit was theebruary scoop by adh's correspondent in moscow which cryptically cited "official circles of the soviet foreign ministry" for the tidings that kosygin had not accepted an invitation to visit west germany. the invitation had beep" '

in moscow^ and itrecuivga by kosygin": kosygin ondto express his thanks for erhard's invitation,

"which kosygin riendly act designed to improve relations. be could not reply at once to the invitation, explained kosygin (perhaps with the khrushchev lesson inince be had to consult his colleagues. whatever the decision of his colleagues may have been, it remained curious tbat tbo means of conveying the answer to tho frg was by an east german correspondent in moscow who reported the news while kosygin was on bis way to the gdr. (the day after east german media publicized the hoscow-datelined story by adn's correspondent, kosygin, uestion, reportedly told an afp reporter that he was preparing no trip to bonn.)

east german coolness toward kosygin stood into kosygln's warm praise inarch leipzig

speoch for east germany's economic structure and his boost for ulbricht'sdisclosed that ulbricht called the5 warsaw pact meeting. by this and other gestures, kosygln's visit seemed to bear much in common with the mlkoyan mission to east berlin one year earlier; tbat is, to reassure the east germans that their security was not in jeopardyeriod of diminished soviet-west german tensions. thus kosygin inarch speech balanced temperateto westthe soviet government by no moans intends to consider west germany as an outcast where everything is bad and nothing isnd faint hints of interest in tho rapallo line (he praised the fairtrading bridge between east andtressed that the frg's interests were bettor served by "normal good neighborly relations" with the east, and, in private, reportedly expressed interest in expanding soviet-west german cooperation in tbe fabrication and construction of fertilizer plantseeting with west german steel

v56-

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executives) with sharp accusations allegingof revanchlsa in Bonn." And, Kosygin tried toEast Berlin that the Soviet Union would not sacrifice the GDR's vital Interests to West Gorman re-vanchism: "We would like to make lt quite clear to the West Germanmphasized Kosygin, "that they should not expect any concessions on our part where the program of revanchism is concerned." And to further theffort to assuago Eastlood of high-level Soviet officials* arrived in the GDRarch, to visit the Leipzig affair and meet with East German leaders. The rank and number of Soviet visitsecord high in Moscow's efforts to solidify intra-bloc views.

Two Viewsundestag "Provocation"

But trying to have it both ways with tho two Ger-raanles still did not sit well with Ulbricht, who returned from the Cairo visitarch and proceeded to talk tougher in the next few months not only to tbe Westbut also, in thinly veiled formulations, to the Soviets.

Ulbricht's diatribes concentrated, at first, on5 Bundestag session in West Berlin. The session evoked an official protest by tbe Soviet Union, Soviet fighter planes buzzed the Reichstag building in West Berlin during the Bundestag session, and the GSFG conducted military maneuvers with GDR forces which at times halted autobahn traffic to and from West Berlin.

belated retinue consisted of two fullmembers (Voronov andwo members of the CPSU Secretariat (Titov andive deputyof the Council of Ministers (first deputy Ustinov, soon to-behair on the secretariat and ain the presidium, Dymshits, L. V. Smirnov, Rudnev, Novikov) andinisters.

But Moscow soft-pedalled, while East Berlin highlighted,surrounding the Bundestag session. pril Warsaw speech appeared to furtherthe significance of the session by calling itprovocation." Ulbricht equated thesupposed military provocations, renewed andhis disputatious reference to thefrom the Berlinnd revived theof blockade and waringle paragraph ofthat appeared in the5 edition ofReview:

The illegal appearance of the Bonnin West Berlin and thethereangerous andprovocation, as important aof the policy of revenge ashe atomic-mineultilateral Bonn thinks that in this waysucceed in annexing West Berlinit as an outpost to "eliminate"and force the door open to thewe havo made it absolutely clear that

West Berlin does not and will never belong to the Federal Republic. The question of West Berlin Involves the vital Interests

*Tfce Soviet May Day slogansor anothermade no reference to the needfreeWest

atomic-mine belt, or theest German proposalone of atomic mines along the forward edge of the battle area in West Germny, evoked Soviet protest on5 which, interestingly, further placed the peace treaty issue on the ice. The note to. claimed that "pending the conclusion of apeace treaty" the Soviet Union, along with the USA, Britain and France, continues toand in FRG policy on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement.

VS8-

seqket

SKCVtKT

of tbe GDR. It Is every bit as important to usas thethee"jkse border "Is We recall that under Hitler tne Danzig corridor issue was used not only to foment revanchism, but also to prepare war. Thus, the question of ways of access to West Berlin coulda question of war and peace. the crime should be prevented in good time. Those who want normalwith West Berlin through GDR territory by land, water and air sbould accustom themselves to concluding permanent agreements with the German Democratic Republic. /Emphasis in original7

Brezhnev's relatively temperate analysis of the Bundestag session inpril Warsaw speech constituted the only comment on the subject during0 April Brezhnev-Kosygin visit to Poland. Ho Berlin blockade threats were made by the Soviet leaders and the Polish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed by the two partiespril included tbe first Soviet referencereaty to the Oder-Heisse line. (The4 GDR-Soviethad not been listed in5 tally of Soviet foreign policy successes inbut did not specify the GDR borders. Neues Deutschland's5 article on the Soviet-Polish treaty stated that the "Oder-Heisse border has been confirmed by the treaties concludedthe GDR and Poland" and made no reference to the4 Soviet-GDR border guarantee.)

Reaction from Ulbricht, which constituted anto the Soviets that the GDR cannot be taken for granted, was not long delayed.

Ulbricht's Rewriting of East German History

Nine days after the signing ceremony in Warsaw, Neues Deutschland took the unusual step of publishing

charging that the FRG owes the GDR anillion deutscho marks for the Soviet warand for West German economic "exploitation" of East Germany in the days before the Berlin Walltop to the GDR's manpower drain, Ulbricht bemoaned the llmitod scope of Bast Germany's nationalust imagine what our national economy would be like if we had Invested this additional amount ofillion deutschend, thus, as no had done in4 speech, indirectly placed the blame on the Soviet Union for its dismantling of the Eastern zonethe early post war years.

The speaker's personal role during the early years and his newly claimed independence from Soviet tutelage in thelauded the wisdom ef5 precept that "the way of the Soviets" could not beere again glorified in Ulbricht's lengthy SED Centralspeech0 words). He made no reference to Kosygin, or to the Soviet leader's visit to Leipzig one month earlier, though the Leipzig fairopic covered in Ulbricht's speech. Nor did Ulbricht mention Brezhnev, or conveypril formulation on potentially favorable forces for the development of West German-Soviet relations.**

In Praise of Peking

While -conspicuously slighting the Soviet Union and its leaders, Ulbricht warmly praised Communist China's support for GDR policy. Hispril praise for the CPR

*Unlike the way of the Bolsheviks, the German Communist Sovi^zo^ewltn the Social Democrats (SPD) in the

flke^dsygin's5 formulation, Brezhnev balanced charges of Wost German revanchlsm with the assertion that "West Germany is not populated by revanchists alone. There are many peace-loving people, and there are forces which reject revanchlst ravings andealistic foreign policy."

SECEKT

was particularly glaring; since Peking propaganda the day before commenced its;jpublic attack on tho post-Khrushchev leadership. (NCNA onpril transmitted the publisher's note to the fifth volume of Khrushchev's statements "in Chinese translation which scored "Khrushchev's successors" for "following in his footsteps.") And Ulbricht praised the CPRassage which indirectly suggested hisover his allies' activities with Bonn.

The Bonn government avails itself ofbecause it believes that it can exploit differences of opinion with the CPR and the various national interests of certain people's democracies. The Bonn government believes that the economic relations of the people's democracies with the West German Federal Republic can force the Warsaw Pact states to yield ground in the event of provocations against the GDR. The contrary was true, as demonstrated by tho rccont meeting of the Warsaw Pact statos. The Bonnwas quickly reminded of the limits of its power. The statements of the CPR Government, too, Indicate that the Bonn government has again speculated erroneously.

Peking's flirtation with East Borlin commenced In earnest shortly after the January Warsaw Pact meeting, which, contrary to Ulbricht's distorted denial id not leadDR-bloc agreement on dealing with Wests economic policies toward the East. In latePeking announced an agreement which, unlike most other Chinese-East European trade agreements at that time, provided for an Increase in trade. (CPRsaid that the agreement providedremarkable increase" In trade). Tho GDR reciprocated with several friondly gestures; oneress conference given by the GDR Ambassador to the CPR who thanked the Chinese for their support of Ulbricht's foreign policies. And

SEORKT

surrounding the development of improved CPR-GDR relations Peking propaganda in April sporadically referred to the indications of Ulbricht's dissatisfaction with the extent of Soviet and East European support. In Hay, thereturned to the September line of the previous year, that is to allegations of Soviet policy to sell out East Germany. (See) peech by CCP Politburo member Peng Chen at the PKI anniversary celebration in Djakarta onay:

If theynew Soviet leadership/ truly have departed from Khrushchev's course of revisionism, then why do they continue pursuing Khrushchev's policy to sell-outhe GDR. When West Germany's militarists insolently held the Bundostag session in West Berlin and launched their insensible provocation against the GDR, why did they not dare to take measures to repulse this provocation? Why did they put in cold storage the suggestion foreace treaty with Germany as soon as possible and for solving the West Berlin issue, and, moreover, not daring to touch on the subject again?

Kosygln's Second Mission

Prior to Peng Chen's charge, the Soviet Union had again attempted, through another Kosygin visit to the GDR, to demonstrate that East Germany would not be fore-sakeneriod of improved Soviet-West GermanThe occasion for Kosygln's second visit in one year wash anniversary of VE Day. And in the morning before his arrival, Ulbricht found occasion to

performance:

ay People's Chamber speech

ay East Berlin VE Day speech

Atmosphere in West Germany

criminal Hitlerite idoology /of revanchism/ prevails TnTwenty years after tbe liberation, thereagain In Bonn's domestic policy the spirit of the war-economytbe Hitlerite army officers,n the police, and Hitlerite blood judges In tho judiciary. Apart from some exceptions, the politically and morallymass press, rum inating on the most base Inst incts, systematleally poisons public opinion."

"Tho Soviet Union by no means holds that all West Germans are imbued with tho ideas of revanchlsm. We understand that most of the people of the German Federal Republic want to live In peace." "It is being said that the now generation of Germans who have grown up in tho Federal Republic since the warbe held responsible for the crimes committeod by nazism. It would indeed be unjust to saddle today's West German youth with this grave responsibility."

road towardof tho German stateseace treaty, and also through elimlna-tion of the remnants of World War II andof the great work of liberation fromand imperialism and fascism In West

hoever really wants to look for genuine ways leading to German rouni-fication must not seok them through political and military adventures but on tho basisoluntary agreement be-twecn "the two German states.

SECKET

SF.CVI'.T

West Berlin Solution

"No debates and noreferenceest

fllct vould besolution)

because of West Berlin Berlin did not let

itself be disused byrevanchiets, eutral

free city.

In addition to remaining sllontest Berlin solution, Kosygin did not broachay repeated callillion marks froa tbe FRG, his militant complainttho Bundestag meeting in West Berlin, and his distress over alleged Western proposals to the GDR's easternof vhlcb, Ulbricht disclosed,. scheme to buy off "in dollars" and border guarantees interested East European countries in return for East European support for Bonn's "rovanchist policy toward the GDR." This charge, presumably, was Ulbricht'sof. bridge-building proposal. Tbe FRG's trade-building proposals were Interpretedimilar distorted fashion, and in May, Neues peutschlandlood of articles cautioning its allies on Bonn'ssubversive trade tactics, the alms of vhlch vere also seen as strengthening Bonn's "revanchlst policy" toward tho GDR.

3. THE RESPITE, THEN THE RENEWAL OF THE TRIANGLE

East German expressions of confidence in Soviet support followed Kosygln's second mission to the GDR in

May. Ulbricht's confidence may bave stemmed from the

particularly hostile Soviotxpressed lnj *statements, toward West Germany.

were then inflating the West German "threat" in order to support the rationale: for limited activity In Vietnam. The Inflated "threat" may also haveefonsive response to CPR charges that tho Soviets wore planning to pull back from, rather than opensecond

seqrei

front" in Europe. The respite during this period of cool relations between Moscow and Bonn still did not restrain Ulbricht in July from his rewriting of East German history or Brezhnev in early September from sounding out the West Germans on the possibility of improving relations in tbe indefinite future. But in late September, after Ulbricht's trip to the Soviet Union, the Soviets appeared to have adopted the GDR's harsh assessment of the FRG. And after the conclusionong-term trade pact inlbricht appeared to have nothing but servile salutations to extend to the Soviet Union.

The period of comparative tranquility was not long lived. After the CPSB Congress in6 Ulbrichtpublicly revived old fears about an abandoned GDR while Moscow was making plans to renew the USSR-FRG trade treaty which had expired And though tbe Soviets were quick to reject new West German offers to buy out the GDR, Soviet-GDR differencesumber of keywere not papered over. Contrasting views wereover the proposed SED-SPD talks from which the East Germans backed away while the Soviets expressed the view that the exchange would be welcome and useful; over Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov's direct talks with West Berlin Mayor Brandt about which the GDR was not pleased; and over the evaluation of the "grand Coalition" in Bonn to whichattached some hope while East Berlin painted the new FRG Government in hues as black as the GDR depicted the Erhard and Adenauer predecessors of the coalition.

Signs of "Correct" But Cautious Soviet-GDIt Relations

The red carpet treatment given to Kosygin on his second visit to tbe GDR5 was followed byof confidence in Soviet commitments by ulbricht and other GDR leaders. For example, Ulbricht expressed such confidence in rebutting SPD leader Erler's5 Foreign Affairs proposition tbat since it wasto talk with the East German regime about the terms for its liquidation only Moscow could negotiate German rounification. Thus, in opposing Erler's proposition,

S EGRET

secret

Ulbricht's chief argument in his speech ath SED5as that "the Soviet Union has unequivocally declared that normalization of relations and reunification of the two German statesatter for thether SED speakers, such as Herman Axon, pointed to the talks between Ulbricht and Kosygin in East Berlin and noneckor and Stoph with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow in which "the leading Soviet comrades emphasized that tho alliance between the Soviet Union and the GDR is firm and lndisoluble." And by early July, Ulbricht came close to endorsingayagreement"formula reminiscent of Kosygin's2 appealgoodwill agreement." uly speech in Rostok, Ulbricht said that reunification is possible only through establishment of "good peaceful relations" In Germany Itself.

Independence on Ulbricht's part, however, continued to season his rewriting of early postwar history In the Eastern 2one. Andpeech onuly, Ulbricht directly referred to tho oxistence of early differences of opinion with the Russian occupiers. The post war antifascist parties in East Germany, Ulbricht boasted

can take credit for tbe great success ofirm unbreakableof friendship with the Soviet Union. This was not always easy. After our liberation from Hitlerite terror, tbe Soviet Union protected ourdemocratic reconstruction and helped us fulfill many tasks. However, our Soviet frlonds could not take from our shouldors independent creativeand independent initiative inthe democratic road of thedemocratic order and socialist reconstruction in accordance with the special conditions In Germany.

And through early August Ulbricht, while maintaining an atmosphere of "correct" relations with Moscow, was still sticking to his West Berlin formula: "we are willing to

guarantee accessree and neutral city of West Berlin1'in an interview with the Indianugust.

During this period of correct relations, Moscow did not close out the possibility of an eventualof affairs with tho PRO. Expressions of Moscow's willingness to eventually improve relations with Bonn, for example, preceded FRG State Secrotary Carsten's September trip to the Sovietvisit directly aimed at ascertaining the prospects for improving Bonn-Moscow relations. On tho eve of Carsten's4 September speechoviet-Czech meeting in the Kremlin, seemed to be offering hospitality to the Wost German foreign affairs expert:

In the Soviet Union we would naturally welcome the normalization of relations with the Federal German Republic, but one thing must bo clear once and for all. ormalization cannot be attained on the basis of satisfying revancfaist claims by Bonn. There can be no normalization at tho expense of the interests of the German Democratic Republic, the Czochoslovak Socialist Republic, the Polish People's Republic, or any other socialist country. Thishall not be. And if in West Germany there really exists the Intention of developing relations with the Soviet Union, then an end must be put to the futile aggressive desires, and the basis of reality accepted without ignoring the results of the war and postwarin Germany and in Europe.

Thus while pledging that the Interests of the GDR (among others) would be guarded by the USSR, Brezhnev left wide open tbe possibility of improved relations with theike suggestion was made directly to Carstens during his farewell dinner. Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov emphasized at the dinner that the West Germans and the

MIS Sl'XlWKT

Soviots should set aside their differences and "get on

with our business." And, according Carsten's hosts also allegedly assured him

ay could be found to exclude recognizing the

East Germans In any NATO-Warsaw Pact

Signs of Close and Confident Sovlet-GDR Relations

But after Carsten's visit and Ulbricht's September visit to the USSR, tbe possibilities for Improvedwere flatly disclaimed by Brezhnev himself in hiseptember speech at the CPSU plenum. However, some ambivalence was preserved by TASS's curious and as yet unexplained addendum to the text of Brezhnev's address:

/With regard to West Germany/ we are Healing with the main center ofand militarism in Europe and with the main ally ofircles, and it is but natural that under these conditions there are no possibilities for fruitfulof relations with West Germany. (Although economic links on mutually profitable basis continue to exist, in particular our trade with the German Federal Republic remains approximately on the formerTASS)

And leaving the Impression that Moscow was willing to sacrifice that mutually profitablo trade for USSR-GDR political principles, Soviet Ambassadorovember ADN account of an Interview in East Berlin, proudly pointed out that "for about three years /Iho USSR7 has signed no trade and culturalwith the Federal Republic because Bonn is trying to include West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic In these agreements." Abrasimov's public statement thus provided further evidence that the Soviets bad turned

SECrVET

from tho conciliatory line that had been raised anew after Khrushchev's ouster.*

East German leaders favorably responded toand Abrasimov's strong support for Ulbricht'sline toward West Germany, and GDRparticularly warm when it became clear thatby Abrasimov and others;accuratelyMoscow's discourse with the FRG had in factthe symptoms of political anaemia. Politburowho had praised the "indissoluble" GDR-USSRin June, amplified that themeovemberspeech which scored "imperialist politiciansKremlinologists who try to deceive theand themselves about the bankruptcy of theirwith silly and equally boring speculationsbetween the GDR and the USSR." Axenpunch to "those gentlement" who entertainthe GDR by lecturing that the widelyStorm" Warsaw Pact maneuver in East Germany"auxiliary lesson" aimed at dampening the ardorWest German "imperialists." Axen also demandedCPR press discontinue its public polemicsSovietdemand which was another gesture on

behalf of the Soviet Union inasmuch as the GDR Foreign Ministry had earlier denied rumorSS; circulated in West

is,onn-Moscow trade pact could in effect Include some type of Berlin clause, such as the implied or explicit, thatark West (FRGarea includes the area of Wost Berlin. oviet

overture to this effect surfaced

when Deputy Foreign Minister Semenovsuggested

3 aot resolving the Ber-

lin clause issue. He suggested that Bonn couldetter to the Soviets defining the area covered in the bilateral trade agreementark West Area, rather than making an explicit reference to the West Germans Lands and territory of West Berlin as the area covered by the trade treaty.

German media that Ulbricht would visit the CPR sometime within the next three months.* And Ulbricht's history lessons shifted from the theme of East German troubles with the Soviet Union to the theme, which he repeated over and overovember TV discussion, thatand alliance with Russia had boon and will remain the Germans' wisest and most important foreign policy accompl ishment.

With the knowledge that Brezhnev in lato September had disclaimed the possibility of improving relations with Bonn, Ulbricht in the TV discussion safely and hypocritically asserted that "as far as we are concerned, we, the representativos of the GDR, are willing to do everything In our power to promote the development of friendly relations between the West German Federaland the Soviet Union."

Economic policy support was, at that tlmo, another accomplishment that Ulbricht may well have had in mind. His subsequent and froquent references to Soviet support conveyed the Impression (later born out)enial to the West German news reports that the Soviet Union wasubstantial*cut in its economic commitment to the GDR. And following the conclusionecemberive year trade treaty, Ulbricht meticulously glossed over the technical troubles which preceded, and may have been rolated to, the dramatic suicide of East Germanchief, Erich Apel. Thus Ulbricht In hisecember praise of tho treaty ath SED Central Committee meeting did not provide support to the Western reports that Apel had shot himself to death on the day the treaty was signed due to his opposition to tbe USSR's trade policy toward the GDR. Instead, Ulbricht indicated that

*HahaoisDlatt (Di^seldorf) reported on5 that Ulbricht would visit Peking in December at theand February at the latest. Der Spiegel on 3reported that Ulbricht would

SECRET

Apel had been maneuvereduarrol "between tbe intorests of society on the one handand the interests of branch intorests, which frequently address unrealistic demands motivated by wishful thinking and which cannot be implemented byol's7 State Planningnd in support of The long-term trade pact with the Soviet Union, Ulbricht rationalized that its conclusionain for reactionary circles in West Germany because they had hoped to be able to blackmail the GDR by economic measures. Those gentlemen now understand thatthis long-term agreement ruined their plans."

But one year later, when the long-term tradewas up for annual readjustment and when relations had been showing signs of strain since the CPSU Congress inast German dissatisfaction with the Soviet's trade policy toward tho GDR was not suppressed.*

*The five year trade agreement praised by Ulbricht (above) over Apel's body called for, but apparently was not followed up in its second yearubstantialin total trade. And treatment of the6 trade agreement signed in Moscow betrayed Eastdisenchantment: Heuos Deutschland's announcement of the second year of the long-term trade agreement omitted the traditionalPravda's announcementthe "cordial atmosphere" of tho trade talks and of the "full agreement" achieved. Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patollchev In a.7 Izvestiya interview diplomatically sidostepped any indication that the long-term trade agreement signed in5 would increase as rapidly as earlier planned. that Soviet trado volume7 with socialist countries will Increase "not less than nineatollchev did not tie the projected Increase with trade activities with the GDR, which he, nonetheless, described as "the principal Soviot trading partner."

SECRET

se^rkt

Concern After the CPSU Congress

Emphasizing in public the stale line thatGerman militarists are poLsei to pounce on theto tho East, Moscowtelling

the West Germansthat they would

like to begin trade negotiations "without anyafterd CPSUpril).*

And in the Congress speeches by Soviet officials, the only precondition for improved relations was the vague insistence that Bonn shouldolicy of peaceful cooperation. In the context of this insistence, Gromyko at the Congress referred to Moscow's desire for the "normalization and improvement" of relations with West Germany where "far from allre poisoned by the Ideas of revanche." He had made similar points in5 Supreme Soviet reply tofrom Soviet deputies, but the tone of6 Congress speech was much less strident and demand-ing on other Sovlet-FRG related matters. For example, in December he stated that Chancellor5 policy statement "is an aggregation ofand revanchist ideas which is rarely met inaked form." In April, Gromyko judged Chancellor Erhard's generally similar6 policy statement asmlxup of notions." In April, Gromyko stated that "we stand for the normalization and improvement of relations with the FRG on the basis of its turning to the policy of peaceful cooperation and realism." ine had required that "good relations" were possible "only if therehange in the FRG'srom? militarism

One month earlier,1

Chat one precondition wvuxuw uolcs* would have to bein any trade talks. The talks, which beganere subsequently recessed, and are expected to commence with the new Bonn coalitionearly this year.

shosret

revanchlsm." Former Chancellor Adenauer, who was

derided by Gromyko in December, was applauded by Gromyko in April for makingeasonable admission"the Soviet Union's demonstrated desirehe Tashkent talks) for peace. And Gromyko, who in December haddue rebuff" to attempts to include West Berlin into the FRG, followed the example of the other Congress spokesmen in his Congress speech in not even mentioning West Berlin. Nor did Gromyko repeat the threat presented in his harsh5 speech whichine somewhat similar to Ulbricht's demands for FRG retribution for war debts,* .?

Ulbricht promptly took note of Gromyko's Congress bids and displayed earlier fears of being abandoned in hispril statement on the return of the SEDfrom Moscow:

Comrade Gromyko clearly stated that the Soviet Union, which is linked with the GDR through ties of close friendship and cooperation, desires good and objective

mm

s unusual December demand, which has not been repeated, held that "the Soviet Union and the other states which fell victim to German aggression are in the right toill for all damages inflicted by the war unleashed by Germany: for the death of millions of people, for the crimes perpetrated by German fascist troops on occupied territories, for the millions of people tortured to death in Nazi torture chambers and concentration camps, for the destroyed towns and villages, and for the innumer-ous.brutalities which marked the road of the Hitler armies. This bill cannot be erased from the memory of our people. And if the recklessness of the policymakers in Westmakes it necessary, our people will present this bill."

On the subject ofndharplytone, Adzhubey in his4 speech in the West German city of Dortmund stated that neither the USSR nor the FRG owed the other any debt.

KKf'V KT

relations with West Germany. However, he left no doubt that it is the task of the West German Government to prove by deeds that it is willing toontribution to peace and to abandon the adventurous policy of revanchlsm.

d congress also was designed to

end all speculation by incorrigible 4

revanchist politicians, and to induce

them to abandon their foolish hope that

they can make some kind of deal with

the Soviet Union at the expense of .

GDR. The SED delegation is convinced

that implementing the decisions adopted

atPSU Congress will contribute

to the further strengthening of the good

and fraternal relations of friendship

and objective cooperation between our

parties and states.

Pravda'spril) of Ulbricht's statement deleted all references to West Germany and its "foolish hope" of dealing with the USSR behind the GDR's back, though Pravda printed the last sentence of Ulbricht's above statement And nine days later Pravda and other Soviet media deleted another example of Ulbricht's fear of being betrayed by Moscow. The deleted passage in hispril speech in East Berlin markingh anniversary of the SED dealt with Ulbricht's display of concern over unrequitedupport:

The fairytale spread by West German anticom-munists that the socialist: countries of Europe could be played up against each other has burstoap bubble, d CPSU Congress testified to the inner strength, creative force, and purposeful-ness of Lenin's party and the peoples of the Soviet Union. No one who has command of his five senses can believe that in this period when the majority of the people of Europe live in the Soviet Union and in

SKCKET

socialist states, the Soviet Union could be willing to favor the dismantling of socialism in the GDR.

And in hispril speech, he rattled the old closeted skoleton of tho9 Soviet draft peace treaty and caustically recalled that "the Soviet Union declared that it would do everything Id its power foreace treaty with Germany." (That tbe new regime had placed that "power" in abeyance was instanced by the omission of the eight-year old callerman peace treaty in6 national day slogans, released onctober.)

9

While Soviet media failed to record Ulbricht's post-Congross references which kept alive the notion of an' abandoned GDR, West German statements on the subject of economic sacrificeeunited Germany drew prompt and negative reactions from Moscow in the spring* For example, within hours of Chancellor Erhard's comments on the publication of an FRG White Paper on the subject of reunification,0 April Moscow Radio commentary beamed to Germany concluded with the pledge that "there will be no reliable satisfaction of the aggressive claims of the industrial and financial oligarchy and Its political puppets at the cost of the GDR and tho territories of othor states." (The lengthy FRG White Paper released onprilreviously published documents describing Bonn's efforts since5 Genevato achlovo reunification. Hone of the documents shod any light on former Chancellor Adenauer's late6 statement made at the CDU convention, that when the Gorman archives are open for historians, the world will thon know what ho had offered for reunification.) imilar prompt Soviet pledge aimed at crushing any East German doubts followed Bundestag member Barzel's6 New York speech in which henification

" +o'ilence greeted such proposals in the spring ofpagesnd

SKCsKKT

plan which offered the stationing of Soviet troopseunited Germany and the assumption of East Germany's economic commitments to the Soviet Union for the next twenty years. For the same time period, heearly expansionercent in the shipment ofsupplies." Izvestiya quickly rejected Barzel's economic temptation, and Pravda writer Hayevsky onune referred to Barzel's novel troop idea as "the Teuton's crude, though it is presented as naive, proposal to 'guarantee' the presence of Soviet troops inayevsky said that the "hopes of some 'deal'" at the expense of the GDR's sovereignty are futile"and avowed that "all the socialist countries guard the gains of the GDR."

Two Key Developments, Two Different Attitudes

Soviet pledges notwithstanding, the renewedof Ulbricht's concern over the degree of Sovietand Moscow's renewed bid for improved relations with West Germany and West Berlin were common features in the two principle post-Congress developments relating to the German problem during the remainder of Erhard'sscuttling of the proposal for SED-SPD talks, and the development of direct Soviet contacts with Berlin Mayor Brandt.

SED-SPD talks, aimed at "breaking the ice in the German question" by bringing together the "two strongest German parties" to discuss what type of future nation "German workers" would like to see built, were proposed in an open letterebruary from the SED Centralsigned by Ulbricht. The Invitation was repeated in another "open letter" ofarch, and on the day the CPSU Congresseues Deutschlandanother Ulbricht history lesson whlcH warmly praised6 merger between the German Communist Party (KPD) and the East German SPD. But following the CPSU Congress and following SPD leader Brandt's "open answer" ofpril which accepted the SED invitation, Ulbricht seemed to display second thoughts about the risks of the

RKCHl li'I"

venture (such as SED party solidarity, and East Gornan popular reactions*) in debating the SPD. In light of the potential risks involved, it has been argued that the venture was Initiated by Ulbricht for tho sole purpose of repeating past propaganda tactics that would follow an expected SPD refusal. Indeed, clalias of SEDand SPD obstructionism had followed34 invitations, which were not accepted. On the other hand, if the proposal was intended to be moreepeatollow propaganda gimmick, it may have been aimed at promoting differences between the SPD and the Wost German government over their approaches toward East Germany. Thus tho talks would have been parterious GDR effort toetter image abroad in order to -support the GDR's protracted effort to gain eventual non-communist recognition. If tbe latter was tbe case, then full and credible Soviet support to offset the SED'srisks would have been essential. And following the Congress, Ulbricht's concern over Soviet support**references which suggested that Ulbricht was

German citizens reportedly purchased over one million copies of Neues Doutschland'sarch edition which printed the SPD'snd non-committal) "open answer" ofarch to theebruary "openho SPD's second answer ofpril which explicitly accepted the invitation was not printed untilay by Keuos Deutschland--at which time East Germans again snapped up the SED paper.

**Inasmuch as ulbricht in the past had evinced concern ovor Soviet plans for withdrawing troops from the GDR, It seems noteworthy that his renewed anxiety was coincident with post-Congress reports in tho Westorn press on an impending major withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany. Tbe magnitude of the reported withdrawal had grown to five divisions in the West German press by mid-Juno. (Die Welt,) And Soviet sources in late June alluoed to the "possibility"eduction of its force in East Germany. Whatover may have been the Soviet plans at that time, no subsequent reduction in tUC GSFG6 was confirmed.

also concerned about the risks of the SED-SPD speaker exchange.

The urgency of the exchange which permeated his February and March open letters notably contrasted with his post-Congress statement on the talks. For example,ebruary letter stated that "it is really high time" to create conditions leading to joint action. But the tone of ulbricht'spril remarks to visiting labor unionfirst comment after the Congress on the acceptedthat his interest had shiftedower gear: in briefly acknowledging the SPD's acceptance, he said that the main thing is "gradually" to achieve joint action of German workers. And in hispril speech, as in the two post-Congress speeches citedndpril) Ulbricht did not touch upon pre-Congress references to soviet support for GDR attitudes and policies toward West Germany. In fact, Soviet views toward West Germany and the SPD in particular contrasted with GDR propaganda in May and June and the divergent treatment evidenced in commentaries onune SPD Congress in Dortmund wasast German treatment of the SPD Congress was almost whollyeven roundly attacked leading SDD speakers (Brandt, Wehner, Erler, Schmidt andome of whom were to participate in the proposed exchange with the SED. Soviet treatment, on the other hand, was remarkably mild. une article by Pravda correspondent V. Mikhailov approvingly quoted remarks by the leading SPD speakers:

Helmut Schmidt^ who delivered the main thesis on foreign policy, spoke ofchances for peace: and limitation ofe spoke of 'an all-European system of collectivee said that 'there isingle

ood examination of divergent East European reaction to the SPD Congress,|

SF^SRET

nation in the world which could support the illusory dreams about changing the Oder-Neisse frontier.* He also indicated

that it would be possible *to

agreement on disarmament withoutpolitical conditions'and'guarantees of the inviolabilityfrontiers' of the German Willy Brandt, the partyexpressed the idea, althoughabout fthe possibility ofcoexistence of the two parts

With the contrasting SED attacks on the SPD becomingmore demanding and more frequent, SED Politburo member Norden9 June press conference signalled the withdrawal of the SED from the exchange. In antone, Norden made it clear that theafe-conduct law passed onune by the Bundestag made the exchange impossible: the lawross chauvinistic provocation which even transgresses Hitler's legislationit cements the division of efensive tone, Pravda commentator Mikhailov'suly reaction to the FRG lawircuitous rebuttaltatementonn spokesman to the effect that the law removed all obstacles on the road to the dialogue (which, in fact, it did). Mikhailov did not echo Norden's and other East Germans' hostileof the lawegression to Nazi jurisprudence, did not reiterate GDR calls for the repeal of the law, did not conclude that the law finalizes the division of Germany, and did not support the GDR's view that the law sounded the exchange's swan song.

The Brandt-Abraslmov talks in the meantime had been underway since early May. And byune(the day Pravda's Mikhailov approved certain SPD Congress statements) Abrasimov dismissed the violent SED attacks on SPD official Wehner as "being of little importance" and conveyed the impression, which Pravda's MikhailoV sustained inuly article, that the Soviet Union was assuming that the SED-SPD dialogue would take place. (Brandt himself8 June interview with AP

V80-

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correspondent John Hightower, said that Abraslmov had given him no reason to believe that the Soviets opposed the exchange.) Inuno meeting, Abraslmov also seemed to be trying to arouse Brandt's Interesteeting with Soviet leadors In his closing remark to the effect that Brandt haderious tactical error in refusing to accept Khrushchev's3 invitation to meet in East Berlin because, said Abraslmov,had had some Interesting things to say" tond in the weeks following another Brandt meoting with Abraslmov oneptombor, mounting East German worries were reflected In their esdalating propaganda attacks on the West Berlin Mayor. Thusay Brandt, by Soviet prearrangement bypassed East Gorman border guards on his way through Checkpoint Charlie into East Berlin (his first visit since the Berlin wall was built) to meetGerman propagandist Bislerharply critical article in Berliner Zoltung donouncing Brandt for, among other things,rime against the German workers class" by "riding the oxen of anti-communism." And on the day after Brandt's check-free passage through the 'wall, the GDR's People's Chamberaw empowering East German authorities toall West Germans and West Berliners who have ever committed the crime of "persecuting or helping to persecute"

"East Germany's enthusiastic reaction in3 to Brandt's refusal to visit Khrushchev in East Berlin betrayed the same general sense of relief reflected In the GDR treatment of Kosygin's5 shelving of an invitation to visit Bonn) . With gusto, the GDR promptly scored Brandt's decision' not to visit Khrushchev during the3 SED Congress. Soviet consent on the affair, which somewhat more mildly scolded Brandt for not making usehance to discuss "vital problems concerning tho West Berlinid not surface until early

skorkt

East Germans.*

ricTt"

uciK, rturasunov aaae more explicit his earlier hintsoscowsaid that his people in the Soviet Union would be' happy if Brandt could visitsaid Brandt, Abrasimov seemed quite interested

"The law, 'which on the surface appeared to be tho GDR's retaliation for Bonn'sune safe-conduct law,another GDR-sponsored threat to West German use of the access routes through East Germany. Control over Allied use of those access.routes also appeared to be tbe motiveeries of East Gorman probes in late August along the autobahn betweoa Helnstedt and Babelsberg, from which the Soviets dissociated themselves. And the Soviets did not backiup the GDR position on the Elbe River incident in aid-October, though East Berlin sought to engage their support. (British officers accompanied West German Elbe patrol officials in response to East German attempts toest Gorman survey boat from conductingalong the GDR-claimed eastern shoreegment of that river',) In contrast to the harsh and public GDR protestlbe incidentepetition of tho practices of the HitlerSoviets mildly protested to British military headquarters in Germany. And, as in the caseid-November Pan-Americancargo plane crash on East German territory, the Soviets did not give tbe East Germans opportunity to upgrade tbe "sovereignty" Inasmuch as the Soviets, not the Eastdelivered what remained of the PAA crew and cargo plane.

kt

oreconomicof East and West

heoveBber Brandt-Abrasimov SnJiS/lbrichteues Deutschlaiid interview vented himself in an outbursT-oT

Brandt tor his acceptance ofproposalest German political

4. THE COALITION AND THE CONTRASTS

waD?said ulbrichtast Berlin interview, overnment of "rightwine-

chtef talhitt BrDdJ "fS tG 3Ctfrils?fgL he4adventl^ist policy" and Wehner "is to enrifh AnHgainst the GDR with new methods And in even blacker terms, GDR propaganda axman Eisler HL SSH roundtable discussion with high-level SED(Matern, Norden, Winzer) unleashed another vitriolic barrage against SPD leaders, and Wehner in particular,ecember. Butoviet radio roundtableon the same day the inclusion of Social Democrats

treated not only with restrainthad characterized earlier Soviot comment on the prospect of such aalsoouch of

aSi Ssaid that the presence of Brandt

and Wehner in the new government "provides the Social Democratic leaders with certain opportunities" torealistic" turn away from Bonn's past policy.

the new Chancellor, Kiesinger, andstrauas. followed somewhat similar patterns: East German propaganda and GDR leaders made harsh and frequent attacks on both, while Soviet public media was restrained. Soviet propaganda noted but did not emphasize Kiesinger's past membership in the Nazi Party and acknowledged but did not stress Strauss'sympathies. And Soviet leaders were notably cir-

" their dlscusslon of the top coalitionforeutsche

V

Presse-Agentur (DPA: Harburg) correspondent.in Lyons Franceecember that it is up to Kiesinger to make the first move to improve Soviet-West German relations. And according to DPA, Kosygin in responseuestion did not shut the doorossible visit to Bonn. "At theave no reason toourney to Bonn; after all,annot go the Federal Republicourist."

In addition to their contrasting restraint oncomplexion of the new Bonn government, thehave continued to hold on to theirregarding the relationshipand East Berlin and tho significance of thatfor Bonn-Moscow relations. That is, Moscow,East Berlin, does not lay down the conditionWest German recognition of East Germany forof Moscow-Bonn relations. Thus,ecember reiterated earlier SovietWest Germany's policy contribution toinvolved, among other things,*the actual situation in Europe "that we have twothe GDR and tho FRG, and that no outsidechangeLess ardently, but to the samepreserving an element of flexibility,6

Warsaw Pact Declaration called upon the FRG to "takeoint of departure the existence of two Germannd Kosygin in Sverdlovsk on6 stated that to Insure European security means "to proceed from the fact that two German states oxist.")

But Ulbricht in hisocember SED Central Commit-too speech, while praising Kosygin's Paris remarks on tho existence of two Germanics, purposefully disregarded the subtlety of the Soviet formulation in support of his strident and rigid demand that West Germany and West

as, said Kosygin, recognition of existing fron-tiers and renunciation of efforts to gain nuclear weaponry.

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Berlin must "recognize" East Germany as the quid for all negotiations." (At the time the quo was the Christmas/ New Year pass agreement, which, for the first time since it was initiated inas not renewed.) And in hisecember speech, ulbricht, in roundly scoring Kiesinger'secember policy statement, made the explicit demand that the "establishment of normal state relations through official negotiations" between the two Germanics must be part of the new Chancellor's policy calling for diplomatic relations with East European countries. In effect, Ulbricht's demand of FRG-GDR recognition as the prerequisite for FRG-East European recognitionanother effort on East Germany's part to try to undermine the FRG's claim to sole representation of Germany.

The growing Best German contacts with certain East European governments prompted Ulbrichtew Year's reception speech in East Berlin to caution, again, the ambassadors and other bloc representatives to the GDR not to be tricked by Bonn's new policy of "expansion and in Ulbricht's lights, merely reflect old covetous designs on his possession. Ulbricht, however, did not voice Neues Deutschland's bitter lament at the turn of the year that "members of sister parties have nothing better to do than to stab Germanin the back." But his New Year's warnings and Neues Deutschland's plaint were sustained6uthorlzedlDN statement" which implicitly exhorted East Berlin's allies against legalizing the FRG's "aggres- -sive expansionist program" by establishing diplomatic ties with it.

In the meantime, Soviet spokesmen continued to echo the Soviet's calculated vagueness on this issue by reiterating Brezhnev's7 Gorkywhich did not specifically tie improved relations

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and negotiations with the FRG to its recognition of Erst Germany.* Soviet spokesmen havo also voiced Brezhnev's comment in his Gorky speech on Chancellor Kiesinger's December policy statement, which, like Kosygin'sin Paris and Lyons, loft tho door open for talks and called for "deeds not words." And Brezhnev'sreflected both Moscow's caution toward Kiesinger's grand coalition"unfortunately" contains "amplo evidence" that old imperialist goals remainMoscow's willingness to support "appropriate steps" undertaken by the FRG:

Chancellor Kieslnger said specifically that his government will strive to deepen mutual understanding and trust between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union in order to provide requisites for future successful meetings and talks. But so far there are only words. And these words, by tho way, aro denied by other statements in the program of the now government of the Gorman Federal Republic.

Naturally, we shall support everything that is sensible and useful for poace in Europe, including appropriate steps by the German Federal Republic, should such steps be taken.

WfJllouf referring specifically to the FRG, he said that the USSR "is firmly convinced that unconditional recognition of the GDRovereign independent state is, in our time, one of the basic prerequisites for roa normalization of the situation In Europe." in his6 meeting with do Gaulle In tho Soviet Union Brezhnev reportedly voiced tho similar line that progre could bo made once the "West" recognized "the realitv of tho two German states."

The step of West German-Rumanian diplomatic recognition, and tho advance reaction In Moscow and East Berlin to that groundbreaking dovelopment (formally consummated onrovides this study's final case in Soviet-East German contrasts on the Bonn coalition. Instead of the backdrop of alarmist caveats that Ulbricht's redundant appeals and ADH's "authorized statement" offered to the GDR's allies, Moscow onanuaryovietstatement which did not Include passages pressuring its allies to block the FRG recognition campaign and did not flatly demand that tho FRG's recognition of the GDR ought to be the prerequisiteolicy of recognition and cooperation with the East. In fact, the Sovietalleged that the Soviet Government would "continue to workooperation between East and West European states, Including, of course, the German Federalnd like Brezhnev in Gorky, the statement saw bothand menacing indications in the Eloslnger Government's policy statement. One of the menacing indications included the particularly malicious "attentive analysis" that "in the final count there ore numerous common features in the political orientation of neo-Nazis of different shades and in the official revanchist-mllltarist course of the German Federal Republic ruling circles."* However, the accompanying note to the statement to the FRGemark which tended to separate the West Germanfrom neo-Nazis; the accompanying note, according to TASS onanuary, stated that the Soviet Government "expected the government of tbe FRG to take appropriate measuros to curb the dangerous activities of neo-Nazi and militarist forces."

s Hostile association may well have represented an attempt to humor Ulbricht, who in his New Year's pleonasm had gone one step further in charging that the; Bonn government was "infiltrated from top to bottom" by "millions of little Nazis."

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IV. CONC^USION^_FACTORS FOR CONTINUING STRAIN IN USSR-

Ulbricht himself, taking rigid, black-and-whitethe nature of West German intentions, hasfactor opposing the development of improvedGerman relations since2 Cuban missilethe period of diminished tensions in Europe, hethe least, actedatalyst bringingto theInherent problems in the relations between hisregime and the freely constitutedon the one hand and the Soviet Union on And this triangular relationship in thecrisis period has been viewed, logically, bya form as sharp as his view of the unchangingBonn politics. That is ulbricht's seeminglythateal rapprochement develops betweenMoscow (and the capitals of Eastern Europe),and his ersatz state will be "stabbed inand will, inevitably, wither, ulbricht'shave not consistently fit Moscow's foreignsince the shelving ofon the German problem, and thus Soviet spokesmen

repeatedly tried to counter Dlbricht's apocalyptic

conclusion. But objective conditions, which havethe broad outline of Soviet policy since2 Cuban missile venture, have not radically changed and will likely remain in the near future. And these objective conditions (discussed below) have led ulbricht, andhiso the radical conclusion that the

school of thought on the political makeup ofleadership feels that the evidence is too thin toto discern major political differences with Another school, which includes West

Senat officials who claim to have credible information from East German sources, holds that two factions exist; the "hard-liners" are represented by heir apparent Honecker and the "soft-liners" center around Premier Stoph.

EX_

shelving of Moscow's forceful German strategy meant that the Soviet Union might well have decided to reverse the objective of consolidating the German status quo and to pursue, step byolicy of accommodation and eventual reunification.

Military considerations constitute one suchfactor on Soviet policy making. had been strongly of the opinion that Sovietand wartime requirements for the European theater did not require large ground forces in forward areas in view of the massive IRBM/MRBM forces and on that basis strove to cut back Soviet ground forces across the board. The commitment ofearly full strength divisions in East Germany, then, was seen by him as unessential for strategic purposes. And though the Soviet militaryin the post-Khrushchev period have strongly argued for the continuing relevance of ground forces inonditions of war, the fact remains that the modernized East Europeanbegan to takereater share of the defense burden on thefrontier in the earlythe projectedin Soviet airlift capabilities could serve as the basis for an eventual, low-risk withdrawalarge number of the costly and oversized Soviet force from Ulbricht's supported state. The apparent East German anxiety over the contemplated partial Soviet withdrawals in the spring4 and the spring6 might well recur in case of an actual Implementationajor Soviet redeployment In the future.

Political considerations regarding Western Europe, particularly in light of current military developments, also augur ill for the smooth functioning of the Moscow-East Berlin relationship. For example, Soviet leaders themselves have occasionally acknowledged and applauded

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de Gaullo's frequent pronouncements, which surrounded his defection from effective participation in NATO, that the danger of war in Europe is slight. And the consequent debilitating effect on the Soviet forces' raison d'etre in East Germany has tended to present Moscowilemma. If they choose to Inflate tho"threat" from Western Europe in order to rationalize their static position, then they stand to impaleon the horn of Ulbricht's political inflexibility. And current Sovietits interest inodge between the United States and its remaining NATOnot be helped by reverting torisis strategy which tended to upgrade the importance of the GDR while it proved to be counterproductive for Soviet interests.

East European and Chinese Communist considerations add othor complications to the Moscow-East Berlin With regard to tho former, tho new Sovietunlike the GDR leadership, apparently sees little advantage In trying to block the development of mutually advantageous FRG-East European relations. The addition of new elements of friction with Moscow's East European allies would add an unnecessary complication, particularly in light of the long range consideration that WestInvolvement in Eastern Europo might further long range Sovietis, to weaken the FRG's ties with the West, to develop an eastward-looking peaceful Western Germany, to settle border issues, to prevent Bonn's nuclear armament, and to gain long-term economic benefits, or to work out collateral and commerlcalreminiscent of tbe Rapallo treaty. At any rate, tension on Moscow's western front would constitutecomplication to Soviet policy makers, particularly in light of Moscow's sustained and expanding difficulties with the CPR. Rellovlng tensions in the West to concentrate on the hostility of Chinahrushchevlanhat has not been consistently rejected by the new leadership. And the effort to strengthen Soviet defenses along the Sino-Soviet border that got wellafter the reorganization of the KGB border guards3 has continued under the new Kromlln leadership with the addition of four divisions along the border and the

movement of Soviet combat advisers and air defense specialists into Mongolia.

Finally, internal Soviet problems, particularly the cumulative effects of the economic imbalance stemming from the monumental military claims on the Soviet budget were exacerbated during Moscow's attempt to force its will on Western Germany. And the opening up of another Moscow-initiated crisis in the West in order, among other things, to upgrade East Germany would do little to further the ambitious Soviet economic programs announced byand Kosygin5 ew crisis would, in addition, do, little to further Moscow's currentin easing'internal strains byajor increase in trade relations with Western Europe. Thesewhen viewed in light of East Germany's actual economic value to the USSR, take on added significance whon the examination of the extremeupof Eastled to the conclusion that the Soviet Union in purely economic terms has little ton fact, since the GDR payments for Soviet occupation costs were discontinuedirtually all thatis the Soviet interest in the East German uranium mines.

m ORR have recently reaffirmed theof an ORR report entitled "Economic Interest of the USSR In Control of East Germany" of5 which held thatolitical settlement on Germany, thechanges in trade terms and commodity composition would "involve little or no net economic loss to thehe study, which took into account the probability that Soviet-East German trade would decline after such astated that "the USSR could readily make the necessary economic adjustments at little cost, mainly by shifting from the production of certain goods now taken by East Germany to the production of substitutes for some goods now imported from East Germany. Under any such settlement, however, tbe Soviet government probably would insist on retaining control of the East German uranium mines until they are exhausted."

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In spito of assurances that the GDR's Interests will bo protected and that the Soviet Union will strive to prevent the isolation of the GDR, Moscow's current effort to naintain the broad outline of the status quo in Central Europe will not in itself relieve the strains in Soviet-East Gorman relations. For, Soviet vital Interests take precedence over the intorests of their German satrapy. And East Germany leaders will most prob remain fearful that in the long term, if the gains are good enough or the danger great enough, Moscow will again sacrifice German Communists in order to further Soviet Internal and international interests.

APPENDIX: THE ORIGIN OF THE "SELL-OUT" IDEA

t the abandonment of East Germany would t* o Soviet Policy-making cir-

AfbS traced backo'thiof Beria, Malenkov, and possibly even Khrushchev in

* ^ath' Khrushchev laid3 sell-out idea entirely on the doorsteps of Beria and

herG* noaUega-tion that Khrushchev himself had toyed with the idea as

r,?hat be wasSlily leading to the sell-out of East Germany

1- Beria Moves to "Undermine" the SED

.AccordlnB to Khrushchev, Beria began his effort

a fraternal countries in the "first few days- after Stalin's death. This may

ltttri !hthe GDRGrotewohl. received while he was in Moscow for Stalin's funeral.

that e told his colleagues that the Soviets would be unable to fulfill many of theiro the GDR. Moscow promised to cuss this question further, but Grotewohl had been put

anrtD?L *rotewohlrank in the hierarchy "hSas oviet politics at that time, it is probable that he held discussions with Malenkov, Beria,

ov: *spi* thls warning, the East Germanresponded by appealing to the Soviets in early April

a^actiod'"tbetba* theyhad concluded that they could not make the "necessarj changes"

t?J ^uleklyhemselves. (Some-

J? April Moscow replied by urging the SED leaders to soften their rigorous economic policies and taketo improve the lot of the populace.)

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Meanwhile, the GDR regime introduced no changes in its political or economic policies, in effect,still hoped to gain some economic subsistence to see his regime through the summer, and to permit the party to continue with its hard political line. It is possible that he chose to ignore Soviet recommendations on the advice of patrons in Moscow. At any rate, he was clearly headingrisis.

During thisefinite group of opponents to Ulbricht began to take shape. The group was led by Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of Neues Deutschland, and the Chief of the Security Service, Wilhelmerrnstadtandidate member of the politburo andull member. They had the support of at least three other candidate members of the politburo: Anton Ackermann, acting foreign minister, his former wife Elli Schmidt, head of the East German Women's Federation, and Haus Jendretsky, chief of the East Berlin party Other lesser functionaries supported this group. The most prominent was Max Fechner, Minister of Justice.

This opposition group went so far as toritten program. From what has been alleged about this document, it looked to sweeping changesasic revision of policy. Its main premise was that the entire course of East German policy since the war wasbecause of the impossibility of "building socialism"ivided country. The new program advocated areformation of the SEDeople's Party which would represent all classes. ew economic plan would bend in effect, the GDR would prepare toitselfnew Germany". Herrnstadt wouldhead of the party, Zaisser Minister of Interior. In effect, the program calledew party which might cooperate with West German Socialistsew state.

It is highly unlikely that this group would have contemplatedrastic policy reversal if they did not have good reason to believe that the Soviets would support them. There is various evidence indicating that, in fact, Beria was their patron until his undoing in After the purge of Herrnstadt and Zaisser,

inlbricht publicly linked them toof course there was no mention of Malenkov.

ulBFicnt J

revealed Berla's private contacts with Zalsser, as well as some of the details of their efforts to replace the SED leaders. As subsequent denunciations of Zalsser and Herrnstadt were made, the connection with Beria was strengthened. Inor example, the head ol the SED Control Commission reported that the "factional activity of Herrnstadt and Zalsser must be viewed in relationship to the influence of Beria." In addition, Zalsser was accused ofolicy which would have resulted in Western control of theolicy which corresponded with the "views of Beria."

The Soviet party also linked Beria to the German situation,rivate letter circulated to Communist parties after Beria's fall. According to this version Beria had imposed on the GDR leaders the harsh policies which precipitated the riots in East Germany; the other Soviet leaders were aware of Berla's machinations but were powerless to act.

These accusations are, of course, post facto. But they are confirmed in general by the evidence from former East German Communists Heinz Brandt and Fritzoth of them became aware of Ulbricht's fall from Soviet favor, and Brandt learned ofnvolvement directly from Herrnstadt. Moreover, he concluded that Malenkov was supporting an anti-ulbricht movement as partoreign policy line which foresaw the dissolution of the GDR in return for negotiated concessions from the West. It was believed by Brandt and his colleagues thatwas preparing for or already engaged in secretwith the

Schenk"mmer der; Heinz Brandt, Review, Imge.f.

A connection between Beria and Zaisser, at least, is quite plausible on other grounds. As the now notorious Generalaisser was one of Moscow's agents in the Spanish Civil War. He returned to the USSR and may have been imprisonedime. As chief of Statein the GDR he was almost certainly involved with Beria. After Stalin's death, Beria moved rapidly to regaincontrol over the Soviet security apparatus in East Germany. Herrnstadtournalist who went to Moscow in thes where he served in Soviet military intelligence. East German party functionaries regarded both of them as having special connections with the

Ulbricht was aware of this opposition, although he may not have realized what degree of Soviet support they had. His move against Franz Dahlem in early May wasreliminaryore drastic purge. Just prior to Mayarty members learned thatolitburo member and considered by some as second only to Ulbricht, was to be expelledlansky-like affair. The purge of Dahlem, however, was only part'of Ulbricht's counteroffensive. h party plenum which announced the Dahlemay) two other forward moves were made by Ulbricht. First the work norms were to be raised byercentune. Second,honune, was to be transformedtupendous occasion for glorifying the General Secretary.

Moscow's disapproval of these developments was evident in the public reaction. Pravda and Izvestiya published only short TASS accounts of the plenum which briefly mentioned the Dahlem affair, but ignored both the long harangues on the "lessons of the Slansky trial" and the economic decisions. Tension between Berlin and Moscow is also suggested In the exchange of messages on the anniversaryay. No message from the Soviet Control Commission was published, although an Eastmessage- was printeday by Pravda and Izvestiya.

Moreover, Malenkov's formal greeting to the

curt, with no mention of the usual slogan about building East German "socialism." Molotov and Mikoyan, were the only prominent Soviet leaders to attend an East German

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uho celebrations in Berlinthe GSFG CODUBana*3r. General

The growing tensions inside the East German partv

y8 delay bet*GenoncluUoJ of the party plenum onay and the approval of the

new work norms by the GDR Council of Ministers onayune.rescheduled *'SI in;*ead; baday Pravdahange of policy for Germany. Tho Sovlet-Colvtrol Com-

similarttdigh Commissioni "Vjructure of the Western powers' admlnis-

Geraany- OW

Sbothe occupation functions hitherto performed by the Soviet military in

n early/Une General Chuikov was recalled and replaced by Colonel-General Grechko.

whatajor event' but meant forGermany was not completely clear

une, when Semenov returned to Karlshorst and summoned the East German politburo. He presented fori5 adop?ion outlineew economic policy which hnen?haSllCeonsumer goods and repudiate ttL XlS BOas;rr already tafcon against the populace. Prom that point forward the politburo was almost constantly

lrtual control. Speed, was supposedly of the greatest importance because of the"negotiations" with Churchill. Herrnstadt wasew policySnand Proposing aof the politburo and secretariat. Ulbricht was

leader in name only. Soviet officialsout Bast German officials on their reactionpossible removal of Ulbricht. Semenovas Lenin

titnrtbiJthday' that is' by Siting in a One East German functionary said thatimpatient and simplyussian textPubllca*ion. The politburo's statement

on the new course was finishedune and published on xi June.

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Even so, Ulbricht managed to salvage something in those few days. First, in violation of the party statutes the central committoo did not meet to approve the now oconomic measures. Thiaartial victory for Ulbricht because if the central committoo had been convened Ulbricht probably would have been removed. Second,une did notevocation of the new work norms. Thus Ulbricht managed to withhold some of theof the new policy while formally enforcing it.

Despite Ulbricht's limited success incomplote repudiation of his past policy, the nextafter the decisionune indicated that awas underway. The Soviet occupationthat the new resolutions had greatsignificance." The actual texts of thealso hintedhange of Soviet policy onquestion by claiming that tho new economicwould facilitate German unification. erlin party organization was instructed toall slogans and posters which contained anyto "building socialism" in tho GDR. This is aaspect in view of Khrushchev's accusationand Malenkov "recommended" that the Socialistof Germany abandon the slogan of the struggle"socialism."

After the announcement of tho new course, the struggle continued in Berlin. Onune, Herrnstadt used an editorial to attack the failure to revoke the norm Increaseonth earlier. Byune it was clear to Semonov that further measures were needed.ession of the politburo it was decided to abolish the new work norms and the decision was announced that ovening. it was too lato, of course; rioting had already begun, and it broke out in full fury the following day.

2. The Fall of Beria, the Rise of Ulbricht

Theune uprising and the Soviet intervention did not end the policy struggle, but it must have decisively

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weakened tho position of Herrnstadt, Zaissor and Beria. However, until the arrest ofuno at thethere were signs of vacillation both in Moscow, and Bast Berlin.

The East German party romained overtly divided, as indicated in public pronouncements by the variousuntil early July. For example, onune Zaissor received the traditional birthday greetings from the SED central committee 'and nerrnstadt continued to carp at party mistakes in tho columns of Neuos"'Deutschlarid. At the party plenum ofune there wore" noerson-nel changes, and the "now economic course" was re-endorsed for "many, many years to come." Ulbricht remained in the background, while Grotewohl made tho main address to the plenum. Max Fechner was so bold as to Justify publicly the demands of the workers who participated in theand this statement was reprinted in both Neues Deutschland and Taogllchendune).

The decline and fall of Beria, however, turned the tide in Ulbricht's favor. At first, both Izvestiya and Pravda were reticent on the events in BorlTnl Onune, however, Pravda published an editorial calling for "heightened vigilance" and the suppression of allof "imperialistexactly the same line taken after Beria's fall. But onune and again onune, Pravda and Izvestiya reprinted editorials from Neues PoutschTand (presumablythat were critical of the regime and sympathetic to thepeople of good will who were seized with distrust" of the party. Then onune Pravda published an odi-torial linking the events in Berlin to the release of prisonors of war in South Korea as partestern plot. Pravda stated that: "The collapse of the foreign hirelings venture in Borlin opened the eyes of many who bad believed the false claims of the propagandistspeace." Byhe day of Beria's arrest, there occurrod an obvious change from this vacillation: Pravda devoted its entire second page to reports ofport for the GDR regime; onune, la the same issue of Pravda that carried the announcement that all theexcept Beria attended the ballet, there was extensive

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coverage of Soviet workers' meetings supporting the GDR, and reports of solidarity meetings in East Germany.

The fall of Beria must have encouraged Ulbricht to act against Beria's allies in the East Zone. The official record against Herrnstadt-Zaisser refersweek-long debate" after the uprising ofune. Her-rnstadt supposedly revealed his program for the party,isser proposed Herrnstadt for the post of first secretary. Herrnstadt even threatened to appeal to the "masses." According to the party's versiou, Jendretsky, Ackermann and Schmidt supported the opposition "in theut later abandoned them after they It is not known exactly when Ulbricht carried the day, but on the basis of the change in Neues Deutsch-land tone, this struggle was probably resolved byuly, that is two days after the announcement of Beria's arrest. Certainly Herrnstadt had lost byuly when wax Fechner was removed from office.

The formal charges were unveiled at the central committee plenumuly. The purgeisser and Herrnstadt, however, waa developed carefully. Moreover, they were not excluded from the party. Notonthugust) after the East German leaders had been invited to Moscow by Molotov, did the party issue further indictments against them. And not untilfter Beria's "trial" in December, were they removed from the party.

3. Unanswered Questions of the "Beria Heresy"

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How far Beria was actually prepared to go inaway the Soviet position in Germany is stillon.

Malenkov's role Is also not clear.* Until Ulbricht's speech afterd CPSU Congresso allegations were made about Malenkov*s support for Borla's plan to "liquidate" tho GDR. However, Khrushchev could have had good reasons for avoiding this question. After Malonkov's resignation as Premier int would havo boon imprudent for Khrushchev to accuse himonciliatory policy on Germany, sinco at that time Khrushchev was quarrelling with Molotovomewhat similar(in which Khrushchev was the conciliatory figure) in Austria and Yugoslavia. Also7 after the defeat of the anti-party group it would still have been unwise to link Malenkov with Borla's plans for Ulbricht and East Germany, since tho general line against the anti-party group was that it was Stalinist and opposed new initiatives.

*Malenkov ami Khrushchev have changed roles asof Beria. The original Indictment of Beria credited Malenkov with proposing his removal. Later only tho central committee receivod crodit. In2 version of the party history, however, the central"after hearing Khrushchev's statement adoptod his proposal and curtailod the criminal activity of Beria."

se

such as the rapprochement with Tito, tho Austrian treaty, and the high lovol contacts with the Vest.

Nevertheless, the actual alignment of forces in Moscow id the spring3 is still an intriguing After Stalin's death the entire presidiumaccepted tbe necessity for some major economic changes in Eastern Europe, but thereivision on how far to carry such moves in both the USSR and Eastern Europe. On some Issues, Beria and Ualenkov wore probably naturalallies against the primacy of tho party under Khrushchev. They are believed to have reorganized the top command of the government immediately after Stalin's demise. elations with East Germany were carried on primarily through government rather than party channels. Malenkov obviously had definite ideas about foreign policy and the situation in Eastern Europe. He is closely identified with the fall of Rakosi and the promotion of Imre Nagy. For his part, Rakosi identified Beria so completely with the new economic and political course in Hungary that he attempted to renege on his promises after Boris's fall, and had to be warned by Khrushchev. Ono student of Soviet affairs associates Malenkov and Beria with German policy under Stalin and credits Malenkov with initiating the soft line which preceeded the Soviet notes ofhat

oviet proposals were virtually identical to the4 Soviet proposals on the peace treaty issue. That is,2 and4 Soviet proposals both insisted that the two German regimes shouldconduct their ownthan the Eden plan's call for Big Four election guarantors.

Thus it ^ m" joerman peaceSZtl* ! that both Beria and Malenkov lookedegotiated settlement on Germanyrerequisite

rder to implement

lgast Germans credit Molotov and

Dlbr*oMthe critical moment

he "prising... MolotoVs entire record would

Jn opposition to any experiments in foreign policy Similarly, Kaganovich's recordnkP^wTfhine conservative outlook. Mikoyan also seems

hiS group; his Warance with Molotov atay reception points in this direction re-

rltll. Semichastnov? serylS as General Chuikov's deputy. Obviously, other powerful leaders nust have opposed Beria. But opposition to Beria

hlSpOWer' does "ot moar? Sat

he did not have some sympathy for his policies.

osslblG that Khrushchev and other presidium

wmaylVOCated overlans forUlbrichJ ?ccused Beria and Malenkov ofto restore capitalism in Germany. "

thouioricht did plead his case before'^

erfBeria, as Rakosi did, thenX X no-uallfie* endorsement. Bis men-tn?Z Sh??llov "ay indicate Khrushchev's position was equivocal, because at that time and7 Shepilov was generally regarded as Khrushchev's protege. If

*Hrandt, op.ei5Sner'Die West Maechte und Deutsch-

Sliepilov opposed Ulbricht, and did not subsequently suf-

then he must bave been Protected by Khrushchev.

All this suggests that Khrushchev may have been willing

theof abandoning Bast Germany

APPENDIX TWO: KHRUSHCHEV'S REPORTED SUPPORT FOR AN ANTI-ULBRICHT CABAL IN6

Abandoning Ulbricht6 is one interesting topicook to be published in early March this year by former East German Communist Heinz Brandt (whose earlier work

agef) ontltled Ein Traum, Der -Nicht Entfuhrbar 1st ream Thater Spiegel report onrandt's book, after examining3 Malenkov-Beria

the gdr (the report does not implicate Khrushchev in3iscusses in some detail Khrushchev's alleged approval6 of the idea to oust Ulbricht.

The possibility of an Ulbricht ouster6 has been the subject of much analysis. For example, Carola

rJopIUL nofiJenPlary WwPnyoliticalraeger) concluded-thaTTnf luential East Germans viewed Ulbricht's dismissal as the most important

WO trom the dec^ions made ath CPSU Congress Stern's generalis strengthened by Brandt's more specific recol-

tsbll*hts of Spiegel's excerptsnew book

Karl Schirdewan (ulbricht's heir apparent in expelled from Politburo insserted that he had told Nikitathe following on the occasionisit to Moscow afterh Congress, when the two of their were alone:

SK^RKT

had to cope with your Beria, and we have to cope with our Germanthe results ofh Congress of the CPSU will not have any effect among us.'

The German Beria was Walter Ulbricht.

According to Schirdcwac, Khrushchevcaution. He mentioned his own rather difficult position.

Ulbricht will ally himself with all those who can make trouble for you because they think that you are going toochirdewan urged.

Nlkita Khrushchev: 'There must be no new outburst or shake-up in the GDR. The change in the leadership must be smooth. You must guarantee this.'

There is no doubt that Niklta Khrushchev washort time in favor of the idea and even worked toward the idea of having Karl Schirdewan promoted to First Secretary of the SED and toew Political Bureau.

At that time he saw in Schirdewan the German Gomulka and he promised him his support: 'But be cautious, very cautious; you have many duraki (dopes) among you.'

'Ulbricht's crimes are sochirdewan persisted and assured Khrushchev, 'that we will be able to disclose them to the German [Communist] Party only in small doses, drop by drop.'

iscussion of Schirdewan's alleged plans to de-stalinize and liberalize political and economic conditions

within East Germany, Der Spiegelassage of Brandt's new book which discusses elite SED approval of such changes:

So long as Khrushchev gave his well-meaning approval, Otto Grotewohl, Fritz Selbmann, Franz Dahlem, Fred Oelssnor, Gerhart Ziller, Kurt Hager,umber of other high and very high party leaders more or less extensively sympathized with Schlrdewan's plans.* But whenran into growing difficulties after the Hungarian debacle, and after all he was accused of having triggered phenomena of dissolution in the hitherto

he six officials named by Brandt above, three wore accused of being members of Schlrdewan's "anti-Party" group: Solbnann, at that time the GDR's Deputy Planning Chief, was removed from the SED Central Committee under criticism of his support of the Schirdewan group; Ziller, then SED Secretariat member responsible for the economy, shot himself to death7 and was posthumously accused of havingember of Schlrdewan's group; and Oels-sner was expelled from the Politburo8 because of his role In Schlrdewan's "opportunistic group" and because of his criticism of economic and agricultural policy. Prime Minister Grotewohl died inager is currently chairman of the Politburo'sirst Deputy State Secretary forand Technical Schools.

SECfcjET

'monolithic' East Bloo with his secret speech and his thawfound him-solf forced to drop the Schirdewan-Wollweber* front.

Walter Ulbricht once again was firmly in the saddle and nowuthless counterattack.

Like the3 Berlin uprising, the Hungaria revolt which began on6 turned the tide in Ulbricht's favor. Or as Stern concluded in her biography, Ulbricht's stock rose in Noscow since he had made sure that tho Polish example was not followed and since he had prevented the Hungarian revolution from spilling- over into East Germany. However, wellear passed before Khrushchev agreed to Ulbricht's purge of Schirdewan, Oelssner and Wollweber, announced in Neues Deutschlandebruaryyear which marked the beginning of Khrushchev's forceful strategy on the German question.

with ary to the effeW

SED instructions to moveilla he had occupied

7 in the Berlin-Karlshorsthe

"enjoyed the protection of powerful Soviet

new quarters in East Berlin's Stalinalle in late

Wollweber,6 Minister of State Security, was expelled from the SED Central Committee8 due to his collaboration with Schirdewan. Schirdewan, after his expulsion from the Politburoemained chief of the GDR State Archive Administration until Per Spiegel on7 reported that Wollweber8 retiredovernment pension in the Soviet Union. This Information on Wollweber'a whereabouts

skXrkt

"reportormer SED function-ollweber was not pleased about

Original document.

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