Copy No. /
SURVEY OK MILITARY INTELIJGENCE PRODUCTION IN THE
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 3
rs
(s)
7
TO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The CLA. Role in Military Intelligence
II. Military Intelligence Production in the DDI:
Rcaourcos, Activities and
The Office of Current
The Office of Research and
Thoconomic Research
The Economic Research
21
Problems in Military Intelligence
Diffusion of responsibility within the
Separation from the Deputy
Competition between OCI and
Duplication and gaps in
1 .ark of suitable publications
Relations with components outside the
The Imagery Analysis
The shape of tho
Communist China and non-Communist
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Page
Technical
Disarmament and arms
US defense
III. Alternative Courses of
Responsibilities affecting
Alternative A: No
Alternative B: Transfer Functions Between6
Alternative C:ew
Plan end Feasibility of Alternative
Mission and
Personnel and
IV.
TABLES AND FIGURES
Page
Table L Staffing Under9
Table 2. Staffing Under Alternative
Following Page
Figure 1. Organization of the
Figure 2. Organization of
Figure 3. Organization of
Figure 4. Organization Under Alternative
Figure 5. Organization of the DDI Under Alternative6
Figure 6. Organizationew Office (Alternative
Figure 7. Organizationew Office, with Partition
of Forces
Figure 8. Organizationew Office, with the
Inclusion of
1. Thi8 survey reports the results of the broad review of tho activitiea of the Intelligence Directorate in tho production of intelli-
gence on military matters undertaken at the request of the DDI Executive Council. The survey contains four main sections:
I. The CIA Role In Military Intelligence Production
II. Military Intelligence Production in tho DDI: Resources, Activities, and Problems
HI. Alternative Courses of Action
IV. Recommendations
2. Definition. The term "militarys used in the contexteview of CIA responsibilities, means intelligenceby CIA, either unilaterally or in coordination with other TJSIB components, that is primarily concerned with the armed forces--regular, reserve, andountry, its military expenditures and their relationship to the country's economy, its military policies and doctrines and their relationships to national objectives, its military and military-related scientific and technical objectives and accomplishments (including both civilian and military space technology andnd its actions in directing and employing military organization, manpower, and materiel.
ultimate purpose of all production of militaryCIA Is to describe, measure, and forecast the weight of acapabilities (especially in tho field of advanced weaponsystems) on its national goals and Its foreign policyas they affect the national security intorosts of tho To do this requires an appreciation of the politicalwhich military programs and forces exist. But more than that,
it requires an understanding of the military forces (in the broadest sense of the term) themselves.
be able to achieve this understanding requires far morestudy of military equipment and tablos of organization. It isnow to know the influence of economic forces andas well as strategic concepts and tactical applications,
of political Influences and scientific trends as well as theories of escalation and patterns in command and control. The analysis of these factors and of theirandhe availability and use of specialized acnircos, methodologies, and skills. This means organization, training, specialization, and concentration directod to achieving the level of knowledge, understanding, and expertise demanded by the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibilities in producing national intolligonce.
I. The CIA Role In Military Intelligence Production
5. The Agency's responsibilities in the production of military Intelligence are broad and varied. Something of their scope is suggested by the titles of estimates published or in process over the last few months:
examination of tho individual Intelligence production Offices in CIA would show analytical work in progress on many countries
and many subjects-
from an assessment of bomb damage
report
systems. All of this CIA activity involves
production of intelligence that is basically military in charactor, requiring tho work of persons with some dogroe of specialized experience in military analysis.
6. Becausexplicitly gives the Department of Defense primary responsibility for the production of military intelligence, there has been some diffidence in the Agency about openlythe naturo and extent of its involvement in the production of intelligence that is primarily or solely military. It is worthwhile, therefore, to examine what responsibilities relating to military intelligence CIA possesses under existing directives:
defines current intelligence as "thatall types and forms of immediate interest which is usuallywithout the delays incident to complete evaluation" The directive authorizes CIA to produce(by definition including military intelligence)meet the needs of the Presidont and the NSC, and the needsdepartments and agencies for current intelligence whichnot themselves produce.
defines "national intelligence" as "thatwhich is required for the formulation of national security
policy, concerns more than one department or agency, andthe exclusive competenceingle department orational Intelligence isresponsibility of the Director with the support of the USD3 agencies. The Director, with CIA as his working tool, therefore, has principal responsibility for seeing that nationnl intelligence, including thatilitary nature, is produced.
with, CIA has assumedfor certain economic aspects of foreign militaryweapons deployment, and broad military and space programs.
authorizes CIA to produce "such othermay be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities ofof Centralhis is an open-endedsince the "statutory" responsibilities of the Director are,
tn the final analysis, determined by his interpretationariety of documents, including the President's letter to the Director. Tho only limitation upon CIA production is that implied by theforontinuous program of evaluation and coordination by the Director to promote an Integration of erfort and tos specified in NSCID-3.
7. In light of the CIA responsibilities outlined above, it is clear
recise delineation cannot bo made between CIA and Department of Defense responsibilities and interests In the production of military intelligence. Often "order ofnd all that the term implies of minute military detail, is cited as the breokpoint. However, CIA military intelligence offices must keep highly precise order of battle on strategic missile deployment, for example. Anotherfor drawing the line that is sometimes put forward is that CIA should concern itself with "strategic" matters but not with "tactical" onos. Unfortunately for this point of view, the President and his senior advisers are concorned about matters called tactical as well as strategic, and they look to the Director and the Agency to be able to speak with authority on such matters.
s, The result of this is that there is duplication between tho work being done In the Agency's military intelligence producingORR, OSI, andthe work being done in DIA und the service intelligence agencies. The duplication is not complete, of course, and it varies from subjoct to subject. But since it exists, it raises the crueetion whether this degree of duplication of effort and analysis in the US Government Is defensible
9. Onelieve that tho record shows that the level of the Agency's involvement in military intelligence production is
desirable. The military judgments of the intelligence community have implications affecting the expenditure of billions of dollars. This being so. It Is Important that analyses. Interpretations, and conclusions are forged and refined under competition. In this area of activity, DIA is the better because of CIA, and vice versa. CIA has many assets for the production of military intelligence, but probably the most valuable is its unique freedom from vested departmental interests. It is this freedom that gives the userin the analysis and judgmonts of CIA-produced military intelligence and the assurance that, whatever its limitations or biases, they are not those imposed by self-serving organizational Interests or predilections. Every time the Secretary of Defense calls on the Director for an Agency comment or publication in the military field, he is giving recognition to CIA's professionallsm in the field of military Intelligence and expressing his confidence in its ability to produce judgments free of parochial service considerations.
10. Not only is some degree of duplication tn this field desirable, but it is also necessary. The Director of Central Intelligencenique responsibility for providing the President with theneeded to insure the national security. In recognition of this.
tho Central Intelligence Agency has from its Inception been an active participant in the preparation of community-wide military intelligence estimates and,onsequence, an independent producer ofintelligence as well. ualitative diminution In the scope and nature of ihe Director's responsibilities and his position in tho Executive Branch, it la difficult to seo how he could effectively operateubstantially lessoned capability for independentanalysis in the broad military and space intelligence field.
H. Military Intelligence Production In the DDI: Resources, Activities, and Problems
11. The Deputy Director for Intelligenceualin the production of military intelligence. As DDI, he haa, in the words of the DDCI's memorandum ofover-all responsibility for production and publication of finished intelligence, and its dissemination outside ofhia over-all responsibility for finished intelligence applies Irrespective of subject or type of intelligence produced, is Agency wide, and holds therefore forintelligence produced in the other Directorates. The DDI is also responsible for the production of military intelligence within his Directorate.
ecause the concept of "military Intelligence"istinct category has not been regardedajor organizationalin the past, sub-units responsible for achieving the necessary specialized competence in this field are found in both OCI and ORR. (This is true also of OSI and ONE; only FMSAC is engaged solely in the production of military intelligence as definednthe DDI is responsible for the work performed by the Imagery Analysis Staff (IAS) In support of the Agency. The work for the
intelligence-producing components accounts for j
of IAS's monthly production and the greatest share of that is on military or directly related requirements. (See Figure 1)
European
13. Within the definition of military intelligence set forth above, the production in the DDI can usefully bo considered in two categories. Oneet us call it the "first category"is the analysis ofmilitary forces, the development, production, and deployment of modern or advanced weapons and weapon and space systems, and the doctrine and experience in the use of these forces and weapons. It involves being constantly on the alert for signs of intent to attack the US or its allies; It involves short-run reporting as well as In-depth study. This is the work being donein; and in
and
It accountsthe DDI personnel directly engaged
in military intelligence production.
14. The "second category" can largely be summed upord: Vietnam. It la the work now going on in parts of the IR and in the
Area of OCI. The separation between the people engaged In the category and those in the other is surprisingly complete. Despite its responsibilitiesilitary research area,as little to
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OCI:
OHH:
TOTAL
(The figures ore approximations. On-board figuresigures do not always reflect actual numbers in-
n addition, there are
Wng to produce
Analysis Staff. This adds up to
or to support the production of military intelligence In this
17. The number of persons elsewhere in the Intelligencewho huvc analytical concerns that occasionally involve them in military matters or who support military intelligence production in some way is much larger. OCI, for example, estimates that
its country-desk political analysts spend betweerj
of their time on military-related matters. Some of the branches in
to the
Area provide largo and continuing inputs
Area. Pooplo in OCI, CGS, DCS,
and OCR all provide valuable supportariety of ways.xclude these persons from further consideration in this study, however, either because their involvement in militaryproduction as defined herein is essentiallyupport nature or because it normally represents less than half of thoir day-to-day professional responsibilities.
The Office of Current intelligence
responsibilities for military intelligenceopen-ended and subject to continuing redefinition in responsedemands. Basically, the Office seeks to report, oncurrent and broadly evaluative basis, militarysignificance to national policy-makers and to respond quicklyon military intelligence subjects.
intelligence is handled differently tn each of OCI's
four geographic Areas. In the eparate
Division exists to handle military intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe bocause of the volume, complexity, andof the subject. To the degree that military developments in Western Europe are covered at all, they are genorally taken care of by country-desk analystsart-time function. In the Far East
Branch to concentrate on
Area,has a
military developments in Communist China and Division has
chiefly on Vietnam,
nalysts specializing in military reporting.
Military
developments in North Korea are the part-time responsibility of
jjMvision. In the Middle East-
Africa and Western Hemisphere Areas, military inteUigence is of less intrinsic current intelligence significance than in the other two Areas andelatively minor responsibility of the political analysts. An exception to OCI's focus on regional organization for analysis and reporting is made for military-related scientific and technical intelligence, which is handledorldwide basis
the
(See Figure 2)
OCI also supports the National Indications effort, which is
21. Specific requests for current military intelligencecomeide variety of sources. These requests are usually answered with special memoranda or briefings. Most of OCI's total military intelligence output, however, is self-generated
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In response to the general requirement to keep policy-makersof significant developments. This type of production appears in OCI's various daily and weekly periodicals and in formalMemoranda, and is part of task force reporting on crisis situations.urvey of OCI's publications for the first six months
ware involving US forces, operational military information becomes an important input.
he sources used by OCI in producing military intelligence vary with the subject. In general, the most valuable intelligence on
Communist Bloc military developments comes
OCI's basic problems in military intelligence are how much emphasis to give it and how best to organize for analyzing andit. In components dealing with non-Communist countries, the staffs generally consider military subjects of minor importance and rely mainly on outside sourcessually DIAor InputB when
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needed. The resultairly low and uneven level of expertise and background in military affairs In these countries.
24. In components dealing with Communist countries,intelligence has more intrinsic interest, is more complicated, and requires more effort. These considerationsilomma: It is desirable to integrate military intelligence with political analysiseographic basis, but the nature of militaryrequires subject matter specialists for proper treatment. The present OCI organization attempts toiddle way, but lt leaves problems of jurisdictionispersion of the limited personnel trained in military analysis.
The Office of Research and Reports
ORH's capabili-
ties in military intelligence production, chiefly on the economic and strategic aspects of foreign military production, weaponsand broad military programs, have evolved out of its general economic intelligence mission. MRA's growing competence, together with the increasing complexity and sophistication ofestimates, has led lt to undertake more and more work in the related areas of strategy, doctrine, policy, force structure, and
programming. By far tbe greatest share of MSA's work has been on the Soviet Union. The Area also works on the other Warsaw Pact countries of Eastorn Europe and, increasingly of lato, on Communist China. In addition, research is underway on certain non-Communist countries having advanced weapons programs or the potential for such
27. MRA produces numerous intelligence reports andeither as the result of self-generated research or into ad hoc requirements from senior officials in tho Agency,
the Deportment of Defense, ACDA, and elsewhere. In calendar
As such they generally were among the more
complex and difficult to prepare and required time out of allto their numbers. Moreover, their publication did not release tho producing unit to go on to other things, but usually was only ono step In the total process of MRA's estimate supportsuch things as attendance at lengthy meetings, review and revision of estimate drafts, and resolution of new problems raised as meetings on estimates proceed./
28. Because of MRA's central position in tho production of military intelligence in CIA, it plays an important role as the major,
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or sole, DDI representative on such bodies as the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee.roat deal of MRA analyst time also goes into framing collection requirements with the Collection Guidance Staff, advising COMOR on critical target needs and the most effective use of technical collection systems, and helping in the planning for future collection systems.
Area out of ERA has not eliminated ERA's involvement inboth category one and category two military intelligence.
29. MRA's unique competence in the military intelligence field In the Agency and in the community at large la well established. Its problems now are those of continuing to recruit and develop the types of talents and skills needed for effective production. It also has an unresolved problem in how to respond quickly andto demands for intelligence for policy support whileits heavy commitment to the estimative process. It also has the problem of getting its own views in printay that enables it to address analytical problemsontext other than that of an estimate contribution. MRA is too largely confined to speaking through ONE's voice.
Aa noted above, certain ERA branches.
engaged in analysis connected with the Vietnam war.
of actual or potential damage to an economy from bombing or interdiction requires the skills of specialists in trade, transportation, construction, and the like. In addition, ERA makes substantial contributions to MRA as it goes about its "first category" work in support of tho military NIEs and the NIPP. ERAto MRA provide information on production of electronicconstruction features of military Installations, military command and control communications facilities, and the general capability of an economy to support alternative military1
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32.
33. ERA'S greatest problem in producing military-relatedat present arisesarge part of it is devoted to the current crisis demands of Vietnam. Tho need to shiftanalysts from assignments on other geographic areas to support military-related work on Vietnam in their particular economic specialty creates difficulties In meeting ERA's regular commitments in areas of lesser immediate
Problpmn inIntelligence Production
he Intelligence Directorate components discussed above have all proved their effectiveness in their respoctivo areas of
military intelligence production^
The concentration on
which follows is not meant to deny the realachieved day in and day out by the producing components in OCI and ORR.
The major problems within the Directorate growing out of the present situation in military intelligence productionbut they fall basically into two categories: organizational and substantive. The three problems arising from organization are the diffusion of the Directorate's responsibility for military intelligence production, the access the DDI has to his military analysts and they to him, and the effect of all this on theexternal relationships in the military intelligence field. The three problems that affect substantive production concern ihe nature of the OCi-ORR relationship, the existence of bothand gaps in the work of the two Offices on militaryand the effect on both of noterial publication mediumH material. There obviouslyariety of other problems in this field but most of them either would be solved by any action that substantially resolved the six problems discussed or they lie outside the purview of this survey of the military intelligence activities of the Intelligence Directorate.
Responsibility for military intelligence production in the Intelligence Directorate is diffused. This makes it difficult to marshal the full production resources of the Directorateto respond to new and changingf the
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top^ecreT)-
Deputy Director for Intelligence is called uponpokesman on some aspect of the Soviet military posture, where does he turn? If the question is fairly general anduick reply, he may
knowledge of Soviet ICBM deployment, he probably will
to the
But neither of these
necessarily speaks for tho other, and the pressures of time may prevent the capabilities of both from being tapped in reply to any given problem. Because the Intelligence Directorate lacks an organizational focus for what is an important, complex, and active substantive area, the DDI spokesman may come from ONE, in part because ONE remains to some degree within as well as without the Intelligence Directorate, but largely because it is in many respects the only point at which the lines of militaryeffort in the Directorate come together.
his problem of who speaks for the Deputy Director for Intelligence shows up in other ways. In the preparation ofNIEs, no one Office is responsible for formulating andthe view of the Intelligence Directorate. The MRA person present at meetings with the Board is not the DDI representative and docs not normally feel he has any recourse to the Deputy
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Director for Intelligence if he finds the chairman riding roughshod over MRA analytical judgments. At other meetings, such as COMOR or GMAIC, the representation from the DDI may include both ORR and OCI persons, none of them able to speak as the DDI representative. esult of this situation, the question of what is the DDI view on matters that come before the DDC1 as the CIA Member on USIB is often difficult to answor.
Just as thore is no one unit charged with formulating the Directorate view and communicating it to other Agency components or to other USIB agencies, so there is no one unit to answer for the Directorate up the line. This is not to scant the work that CGS does do in pulling together the Directorate viewpoint on various intra-and interagency matters. But CGS can speak onlytaffon nonsubstantive issues, while the problem is one of line and substance
The existing division of production responsibility in the Intelligence Directorate also means that there Is no central authority in active daily contact with the Pontagon, with State, with ACDA, becoming conversant with what the users of the Directorate's military analysis need, getting their reactions to past products, and feeding this information back to the producers.
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Except when the Deputy Director for Intelligence and tho Assistant Deputy Director involve themselves in such matters, no one officor of the Intelligence Directorate can deal with its consumers in the military field in the knowledge that he can speak for the fullof the Directorate to respondequirement. The demands are many and varied; to namoecent few: support of Mr. McCloy in the Trilateral Talks with the UK and Germany; Agency participationoD reassessment of the North Vietnamese air defense system; briefing of the Administrator of NASA on various aspects of the Soviet space program. Under present arrangements, there is always an element of improvisation in putting together the Directorate's response to these requirements.
in short, the problem is that no ono person at the Office level feels responsible for operating ImaBinaUvely and aggressively in the broad, competitive interagency field of intelligenceto military, strategic, and tactical needs. It's Just that simple.
Military intelligence input to the Deputy Director forand feedback from him are hamperod by the number and kind of administrative layers between him and the military analyst. to the problem of the lack of any organizational focus is the problem of layering. Both the MRA analyst and
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i-'i ECRI?
analyst are five organizational echelons removed from the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The line of direct supervisoryfor military intelligence production activity as such stops at the Area level in OHR. and in OCI at the Division level in the
Area and at the Branch level In
Above those levels, military intelligence production becomes only one part of the total responsibilities of the supervisors. OCI is olitical intelligence office. ORR an economicoffice, and the backgrounds and experience of the senior supervisors reflect these substantive interests.
45. The problems of layering arc not unique to thecomponents of ORR and OCI, but they arothe low priority accorded military intelligence production inof the Office managers. The ERA analyst has greaterthat his work will be read, understood, and reported upby the Director and Deputy Director of ORR than is true ofanalyst. He feels cut off from the Deputy Director forin terms both of being able to get his views reported updirectly and, possibly more important, in terms offrom him on work done. Partly because of theaccess ofanalyst to higher echelons by
nature- of the current intelligence reporting process, the problems of layering appear to be somewhat less in OC1.
46. The OC1-ORR relationship in military intelligence produc-
tion tends to be competitive, rather than complementary, and
divided, rather than integrated. This statement applies primarily to military intelligence of the first category. Tho work done on Vietnamese mlUtary matters in the two Offices tends to be highly current andharp policy focus. esult, the "current versus research" problem that affects relations between MRA and
work on the Soviet Union and China is muted or absent.
along these lines: Since OCI is charged with currentwhile MRA undertakes work in greater depth, it follows that MRA provides considerable Bupport to OCI but the reverse is seldom true. MRA views its efforts in coordinating OCI-produced intelligence as meaningless unless the resultant product incorporates not only tho current event but the meaning of the event as soen in perspective. MRA feels that, in the name of current Intelligence, OCI frequently writes articles which contain serious substantive error, are ill-timed, omit pertinent information, or are badly biased.
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48. For its part, OCI feels hampered In producing militaryby what OCI conceives to be ORR's attitude towardproduction and its philosophy of publication. The OCI views run about like thia: Many ORR analysts do not understand the needs of current intelligence and are uncomfortable when confronted with the requirement to produce or coordinate production with the typically short current intelligence deadline; they arc unaccustomed to the necessarily straightforward, nontechnical, and brief writing andBtyle which OCI is enjoined to employ. MRA'a concentration on estimate support and its research orientation tend to limit itsin responding toublishing on now developments. OCI finds the review and publication process in MRA painfully slow, which not only denies the results of MRA'a research to othersimely basis but may also estop OCI publication on the same Finally, OCI feels that MRA fails to call attention to newof current intelligence interest which emerge from its research, and that MRA is often less than frank when queried about the meaning and future implications of new analysis or new developments. OCI feels this derivesack of trust in the judgment of the OCI analyst andcalre to protect an MRA view from "premature" OCI publication.
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49. It should be noted that tho overlap in res pons ibillty between MRA and the two OCI military components is total; that Is, there is no subject within MRA's range of competence on which OCI does not believe iteporting responsibility if the circumstances so warrant. The practical problem in their relationship thus becomes one of deciding what military intelligence is "current" to be reported by OCI and what is "military-economic research" to be reported by ORR.ew military development worthy of reporting iBesponsibility for OCI publication as things now stand (although MRA would Insist that its analysts are charged with alerting management to new developmentsurrent basis also). However, an OCI report no matter how "current" must contain necessary interpretive Often OCI derives this background either from ORR's depth analysis or from separate OCI analysis duplicative of ORR's work. In either case, ORR fouls to some degree used or imposed upon by OCI when the report is pubhshed in the current intelligence series; for its part, OCI feels that it is just doing its job and that ORR is being unnecessarily sensitive. esult the overlap becomes something of an irritant to the relations of the two Offices,in the absenceechanism for the resolution of
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50. In my discussions at all levelshiefs andith ORR and OCIave been struck by the apparent lack of continuous contact between personnel In the two Offices who are working on the same substantive problem. The chief of an OCI branch concernedarticular aspect of the Soviet military establishment had not mot the new chief of the corollary MRA branch although the new man had been on the job several weeks. Contact between analysts is better but even there the record appears to be very spotty. Tlie ORR analyst tends to believe the OCI analyst really has little to tell him; what's raoro, the ORR analyst is too busy with his duties to find out. The OCI analyst tends to be less desk-bound because he must, but he usually favors seeing his ORR counterpart only after he has sometiiing to coordinate, rather than before. esult, their encounter is carried out under the pressureeadline andime tliat may be most inconvenient to the ORR analyst. The situation described above is not new, nor Is itof all ORR-OCI relations in the military production field. But it does exist.
51. Coordination is the process by which the problems of overlap are overcome and contact is assured between components on matters relating to publication. Because of the multiplicity of
SHH1T
Agency components involved in the general military intelligence area, coordination is something ORR and OCI military components
understand well. MRA generally givesgood
marks for coordinating prior to publication but feels that the reclame process is lacking in the event OCI does not accept an ORR view. OCI has few problems with items for publication prepared in ORR by
r under its auspices, but feels that longer MRA studies and reports are often not coordinated with OCI before they appear in print.
52. In short, the relationship between the military intelligence producing components of ORR and OCI is imperfect. It may not actually impede production in either Office but it appears to do little to help. elieve that the reasons for this state are primarily structural. Despite the common subject matter, each Office marchesifferent drum. Current and ad hoc requirements are the bane of those responsible for the planned research program of MRA; current and ad hoc requirements are the Military Division's raison d'etre. This being so, each component tends to concentrate on meeting its responsibilities as autonomously as possible, with as little need to confer outside on substantive matters as possible, the pattern being broken chiefly by the need to coordinate before
publication. These differences in missions and operatinghave given rise to tho mutually uncharitable attitudes discussed above. Whether these attitudes are justified or not, they do Inhibit cooperation and the exchange of Ideas and information.
53. Inhe Deputy Director for Intelligence created an ad hoc group to bring representatives from the four military-intelligence producing Offices then In the Intelligence DirectorateONE,RR, and OCInd NPIC together for weeklyof current problems, substantive and procedural. Theof the group had some impact on the coordination problems of the time, but the group disbanded in3 after OSI was relocated in the Science and Technology Directorate. No equivalent group has since been tried to handle ORR and OCI relations In the military field. esult, when problems occur between the Offices they often are difficult to resolve. No mechanism other than that of the usual office channels exist for routine monitoring of relationships, for liaison, or for improving day-to-day working contacts. And under the pressures of daily business, the office channels are little used.
he work of ORR and OCI on military subjects Is affected both by duplication of effort and by gaps in coverage. Responding
to the needs of the past, both OCI and ORR have builtunits heavily concentrated on the Soviot Union and,lesser degree, on the East European countries and China. has developed much yet in the wayapability tothe increasing number of non-Communist countries thatadvanced weapon forces of concern to CIA. given itsin the area of national Intelligence, or have the potentialforces. MRA has responded to the extent of establishingwith six professional positions In the
Division. OCI handles the research and development aspects of advanced weapon systems in both Communist and non-Communist
countries by giving the
a worldwide chartor. The
olitical) analysts in OCI occasionally work on
politico-military matters.
But neither in OCI nor in ORR is much Integrative work now being done on the military forces and programs of non-Communist countries.
85. Aa noted above, the duplication of subject matter In the military field between ORR and OCI is virtually total. MRA's rango of responsibilities Is limited by the functional aren
of military economics and its implications for production,employment, doctrine, and strategyhat has been the motive power behind the Area's development as an organization. OCI, on the other hand, has been guided by its view that it should be able to take the lead in determining what military and military-related informationrrespective of country or subjectis suitable for current lntolllgenco publication, without rolying on other offices to alert OCI or permitting them to inhibit or vetoof any given material. esult, OCI has a|
ranch
whose duties are concentrated heavily on the
USSR and (he Warsaw Pact countries and duplicate in large measure
the work being done inof MRA, which is also
heavily concentrated on the USSR and the Pact.
56. Some of the duplication is necessary because of thein publication responsibilitiesurrent intelligence office ond on in-depth research office. However, withreater interest in pooling common resources andI believe the same current intelligence responsibilities could be satisfactorily met with fewer analysts. The resources freed by elimination of duplication could be profitably employed to fill some of the gaps In coverage of Important non-Communist countries,
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57. Publication of military intelligence analysis in OCI and ORR is impeded by lack of suitable publication series. Military plans, capabilities, and vulnerabilities are among the most secretation's secrets. This is true to the nth power in thocountries, where the definition of whatstate secret" is very broad indeed. esult, the US haa turnedto technical means for uncovering the informationto on-going analysis of Soviet, and other, military capabilities.
58.
when they areubstantial portion of what ORR and OCI produce in the military and military-related field must be published within codeword control systems or it cannot be published at all.
59. The Agency does not nowegular, periodicseries at the all-source level. The daily Central Intelligence Bulletin and its companion wookly report arc regularly published at the SIGINT level, but the publication of material explicitly based
arrangement has not proved very satisfactory to anyone concerned with the process. There are some in-house publications, such as the Military Division Highlights, which are issuedegular schedule at the all-source level but their dissemination islimited to the analytical or specialist audience to which they are addressed.
80. DDIas issued inB to reduce the number of types of finished intelligence publications produced by the Directorate. The Notice provides that, in addition to periodicals, the Directorate will produce three categories of finished intelligencefor dissemination outside the Directorate: Intelligence Memorandum, Intelligence Report, and Intelligence Handbook. The Memorandum is to be timely and directed at policy levels In the Government, while the Roport is todetailed comprehensivesually less timoly, and prepared for use primarily by research and analysis officers.
The effect of this Notice on MRA (and on
a lesser degree) appears to have been to reduce the amount of
-i1krl
publication it undertakeB. The combination of codeword classi-fication (which cxcludoB publication of material based on satellite photography in the Directorate's periodicals) and the ground rules governing the Memorandum and Report has left MRA in particular with the fooling that it no longer has the same outlet for its views as it did when the Intelligence Brief waa available. This is true especially of papers reflecting views or comments that are of interest primarily to the analytical level (and thus do not qualify for an Intelligenceut are not yet partdetailed comprehensive study" (as an intelligence Report, by definition, is supposed to be).
62. elieve that MRA could take greater advantage of thepublication forms to get its viows and conclusions out into the hands of Interested persons. InRA published only
However, the problem ofin the military intelligence field probably will not bemet until military intelligence has the same access to regular publication that most political and economic intelligence
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now have. This could mean publishing the CIB and the Weekly
at the
oreekly
the Veekly Report.
Directorate relations with the ScienceDirectorate, with interagency groups such aswith other agencies suffer from the number and level ofproducing elements in the military intelligenceis the external expression of the internal problems notedlack of organizational unity and the subordination of thecomponents within offices whose major interests lietend to put those in OCI and ORR involved in dealing onmatters with external officesisadvantage. Theof FMSAC, for example, is responsible solely for production
in one sector of the military intelligence sphere and as an office head haa direct access to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology; his substantive counterparts are an ORR Area chief and an OCI Division chief.
the Intelligence Directorate, the substantiveof the two military intelligence offices overlap substantially
- 40
despite the organizational division.imilar problem in theas largely eliminated5 when the!
>ivision of OSI was transferred to FMSAC, with the result that theiewiven substantive military question usually falls either to OSI or to FMSAC and con be formulated with less Intra-Directorate negotiation than is true of the intelligence Directorate.
65.econd area of problems affecting relations betweenand the Science ond Technology Directorates issubject matter jurisdiction. As noted above, OCI considersto run to wherever news is to be found. OSI and FMSACto accept the role ofand their coordina-
tion in the production of current military intelligence itoms (almost always prepared ot OCI's initiative) is generally good. The same is not as true cf MRA relations with OSI and,esser degree, FMSAC. Differences ariso in substantivo evaluations or conclusions and they are not always easily resolved. One major reason for theIs the degree of overlap in functional interests. It isfor OSI totudy on on air defense system without getting into deployment, which Is specifically an MRA responsibility. Similarly, it is difficult for MRA to publish on the production and
Top
deploymentiaHile system without going bank into tho research and testing cycle, which is the responsibility ofnd FMSAC. Coordination helps but does not solve these problems. There has been greater effort in ORR of late to undertake Joint papers with OSI and FMSACay around the overlap and coordination problems.
66. The so-called interface agreement ofssued by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the wake of OSl'a transfer to DDS&T, is meant to govern relationshipsthe two Directorates, particularly as they affect intelligence production. The agreement allows the Directorates considerable latitude In interpreting its provisions. In general, however, the agreement calls for the Intelligence Directorate to exercisemore initiative and oversight with respect to DDS&Tproduction than ia actually the case. hearries the basic responsibility for the integration of scientific andintelligence produced byith other types of intelligence in the development of finished Productionntelligence reports, especially as they support NationalEstimates and Current Intelligence or other CIA memoranda,
-
7oi> Si-CRITI
will be scheduled so as to be responsive toeeds.ver the threealf years since the agreement was Issued,as become increasingly independent in matters of intelligencealthough it has continued to coordinate its output with the Intelligence Directorate.
There are several roasons for the way in whichelations regarding the agreement and intelligence production have moved. One of the more important is the absenceingle point in the Intelligence Directorate to carry the day-to-dayfor relations withnder the agreement. In general, however, relations between the two Directorates are aa good as the structural differences and tho substantive overlaps (which are probably beyond resolution given existing organizationalwill allow. Although parts of the agreement have been superseded by subsequent events, there does not now appear to be any strong argument for renegotiating the existing agreement solely to make it reflect current practice.
Problems with GMAIC areifferent order. Into providing substantive contributions ono ONE, MRA also is responsible for supporting GMAIC. In GMAIC itself, since the CIA member is from DDS&T, it is difficult to rocolve backing
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Top sfcxitttfrf"
for MRA's views when they differ from those of FMSAC. In the
situation is easier. Tn the
Group, where MRA provides the Chairman, the
Group, where MRA
provides the CIA member, resolution of conflicting views depends somewhat on the DIA attitude. In any case the expenditure of man-hours in making contributions to ONE while supplying GMAIC with substantive support is extensive. For its part, OCI has little direct contact with GMAIC and must rely on its relations with MRA and FMSAC for knowledge of the issues within the committee and its deliberations.
69. As with DDS&T, eo with DIA, NSA, State, and the other agencies with whom ORR and OCI do business in militaryproduction. The organizational division within theDirectorateultiplicity of contacts, reduces the Directorate's ability to respondnity of action, and leaves the Directorateocal point to insure that incomingia disseminated to all interested components in MRA and OCI, Working relations with other agencies are generally good, especially at theanalyatlevel, but difficult problems do arise. The Agency's position in the dispute with NSA over the inclusion of
a knotty techni-
cal military problemrobably suffered from the organizational
-'IUI' sktJkEli
subordination of the responsible military analyst in an Office primarily concerned with political reporting. There is in our relations withesidue of resentment on the part of many in that organization that CIA should presume to have opinions in the military field athink this is inherent in the Director's position in the Intelligence structure of the Government and in his relationship to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of DIA. It isajor problem today and has been getting better over the last few years. The division of military intelligenceresponsibility within the Intelligence Directorate does little to help the Agency cope with this problem, howevor.
70. OCI and ORR receive support from many directions in their production of military intelligence. IASpecial position, however, because of the importance of photographyource in military intelligence analysis. Information from
nature of CIA's military intelligence analysis
that many of its requirements are handled by NPIC at the national level. However, being responsible for producingimagery intelligence, IAS is important because the military intelligence producing offices can task it directly in the support exploitation phase of photo interpretation.
71.
-
fblJ 'o'bLRHTT
72. Problems. From the standpoint of military intelligence production by OCI and ORR, the major problem with IAS is that of establishing and maintaining effective working level contacts with the photo-interpreters. Two obstacles are cited, onethe other physical. The bureaucratic problem cited by the analysts in OCI and ORR is what they regardrend toward greater formality in levying requirements for photo interpretation. It takes too long, they say, toequirement, transmit it to IAS, and get the reply in writing from IAS. The more Intractable problem affecting the analyst-PI relationship is the physical sepa-
The ahapc of the future
Before going on to consider the alternatives open to the Directorate, it is necessary torief look at some of the matters that will affect us in tho future regardless of whatstructure we adopt.
Communist China and non-Communist countries. The past concentration on the USSR, almost to the exclusion of all other countries, is changing. For one thing, we have created anbody of knowledge on the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and have moved into the exploitation phase. The Intelligence problem posed by the Soviet military forces is no longer soquantitative in character, but has become Increasingly qualitative. At the same time, the spread of advanced weapons technology has begun to be reflected in the military plans and accomplishments of other countries. Foremost among these in terms of US defense planning is Communist China and this country must receive increasing attention from all phases of theprocesscollection, analysis, publicationfor years
to come. But thiB is going to be true of other countries as well. Japan. France, Israel, India, to nameew, are moving in directions that will require the kinds of military intelligence
analysis that the Intelligence Directorate haa given to thecountries in the past.
75* Technical collection. *The amount of Information coming
Increasing.
on the intelligence producing offices. They not only have to be able toreater volume of incoming material, but increasingly they must find effective ways of bringing nil the input from all the sources together to produce finished Intelligence worthy of the term.
as
7fi- Disarmament and arms control. The traditionalIntelligence concerns are to disarmament intelligence needs matter Is to anti-matter. Work by the US Government in the arms control and disarmament field la only just beginning and. over time, will almost certainly increase. The requirement for effectiveaupport in this area already exists and will probably become more demanding in the future. Difficult problems of
comparability, verification, and levels of assurance require the same expertise and knowledge regarding weapon systems andforces as military capability and vulnerability studies.
77. US defense planning. The last force shaping the future of military intelligence production in the Directorate that should be mentioned is the need that US dofenso planners have for sound, disinterested intelligence Judgment.
reflects, among other thingo, the Intelligence community'sof the status of the Soviet ABM program and the expectation that the community will be able to give timely warning of future developments in that program.
here are two facets to the planning-intelligenceso far as implications for the future are concerned. One
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relates to the informational demandB of the planning process, the other to CIA's role.
in the Pentagon has been revolutionized overfive years. The process has forced the community toits judgments and quantify its views in detail. Thethe NIPP as tho necessary planning adjunct to the ostimateevidence of this. This thirst for detail will grow as theoptions facing the military planner increasingly turnsregarding marginal benefit. It will be up to ub tothe kind of detail required.
past experience is any guide, one thing is sure:elements in the Office of the Secretary of Defensein the defense establishment will continue to call onfor its analysis of the diroction of developmentsweapons and forces, the doctrine and tactics of theirand tho relationship of military, economic, and CIA hasey role in this work over the pastand can expect to be involved even more in the future asmultiply with increasing costs, new technologies,varied and intricate military applications ranging fromsoldier to outor space.
III. Alternative Courses of Action
81. The responsibilities affecting decision. eneralthe assets of the Intelligence Directorate should be applied against its responsibilities inay that the responsiveness, productivity, and flexibility possibleiven level of resources are optimized. The question, of course, is how to do it. The responsibilities of the DDI pertinent to his decisions onarrangements can be summarized as follows:
Intelligence Directorate is responsible foron all factors that affect the US estimate of theor weakness of foreign states; military, as well asand geographic.
Intelligence Directorate is responsible for theof intelligence on military and military-relatedwith respect to the production, deployment,operation, doctrine, and economic implications ofand military forces.
the field of military intelligence, theis responsible both for highly current, highlyintelligence production and for analysis in depth and In detail.
Intelligence Directorate is responsible forproduction on military subjects on the USSR,and other Communist states in particular, but onand regions of the world as developments or policydemand,
the field of military intelligence, theresponsible for analysis in terms both of the militarya given country or region and of the developments withinspace or weapon system or military force.
Intelligence Directorate is responsible forwith other Agency components and other USIB andto produce military intelligence of the kind andby the national security Interests of the US Government.
82. There are basically three courses of action open to the Doputy Director for Intelligence in applying his resources forintelligence production to his responsibilities as summarized above. Briefly stated, he can leave the present organizational arrangements essentially unchanged, he can transfer functions between existing Offices, or he canew Office. Each course of action provides benefits, but with attendant costs which must be balanced against them. Briefly, to leave the situation as
it is, while not disturbing existing relntionships and efforts, would prevent the solution of the major problems.ransfer of functions within tho existing structure would solve some problems, but not the most important ones. The creationew Office would provide the greatest potential for dealing effectively with existing problems, but would create some new problems in turn. This Section of the report examines each alternative and its attendant favorable and unfavorable factors. In connection with the third alternative, it discusses the conceptew Office-its plan and feasibility-in detail.
first alternative is to make no essential changesorganizational arrangements, keeping the productionfor both first and second category military intelligenceas they ore now to OCI ond ORR.
for adopting this Alternative wouldability of existing arrangements to produce military
intelligencenown and. although imperfect, thereditable job with available resources.
-
existing relationships within the Intelligence Directorate and with other Agency and extornal components would not be distrupted.
--Granted there is some duplication between MRA and | [Division, nevertheless duplication has some utility in providing competition in the field of ideas and analysis, and in nssuring
intelligence would continue to be influencedby political factors (In OCI) and by economic factors (In ORR).
Both the current and research functions in militaryproduction would continue to be performed by Offices with that primary production orientation.
85. There Is fundamentally one reason for not adopting this Alternative: It would do nothing to solve the major problems, and only little to solve the minor problems, affecting production of military intelligence, particularly of the first category, in the Tho problem of diffusion of responsibility and resources, the problem ofirectorate view in this subject area, theof representing the Directorate's views and needs In intra- and interagency forums, all would continue to exist in much the way they do now. Thoso are not problems that can be solved by exhorting OCI and ORR to work together better than they do now. There is a
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TOP SECKH'h
gap between the responsibilities of the DDI outlined above and the effectiveness of the Directorate In meeting those with oxisting resources. With no change, the gap will probably widen; It almost certainly will not close over time. Some changes will be necessary.
sum, the coats of Inaction appear to be greater thaninvolved in taking steps to meet the problems.
Alternative B: Transfer Functions between Offlcca
second alternative la to concentrate tho militaryfunctions of the Directorate in one of the existing Officesexisting components, personnel, and functions
matters in the
8B. The changes of function and personnel contemplated in this Alternative, and inelow, exclude those units whose involvement in the production of military or military-relatedgrows exclusively or chiefly out of tho present demands of the Vietnamese war. Thus, tho Individual analysts working on military
branchos of
and
Division are excluded, as are the individuals in such ERA units as
Branch. On the other hand.
in OCIncluded because
of its basic concern for the long-term military capabilities of Communist China. There are two principal reasons for leaving category two undisturbed. First, the Vietnam situation should not in my view be an organizational determinant, at least so far as the basic structure of the Intelligence Directorate is concomed; the situation is essentially transient whoreas the military(defined earlier as "firsthat occupy MRA
are essentially long-torm. Second, the
reporting on the Vietnamese situation is highly specialized and is toourrent matter to bo disturbed at this time, or in the near future, by major organizational rearrangements.
89. ould almost cortainly mean transferring functions, and people, from OCI to ORR. The relative size of the components involved
ly as the "current" voice of tbe
of CSS servingould
for givingcurrent" staff made up of OCI elements, rather than givingresearch" staff made up of ORR olomonts. In addition.robably should include the transfer to MRA of some of the ERA branches that are heavily engaged in
supporting MRA. in thef
-
Division and the
In
arc two units whoso contribution to tho work of the Directoratehole probably would be greater ifin MRA--while rendering such support as ERA requlred--
ruther than the other way around.
Under Alternative B,
would
ERA branches probably would be added to (Soo Figureable 1)
91. Reasons for olectingould include:
--It would resolve some of tho duplication andproblems of the Intelligence Directorate without disturbing the existing Directorate structure. Specifically, the overlapOCI and ORR could be reduced and some professionalsaved.
Division, and the resulting component addod to the present MRA structure, functioning as MRA's current support staff. Although no immediate changes are contemplated in the number of branches or divisions, some personnel could prob-ahly be sMfted from the current intelligence components to research because of the closer tics and greater mutual support which would result from the single management by MRA of all the resources.
Division.
--It would centralize under one Office management all Directorate production responsibility for military Intelligence, and would give thoingle point for external contacts and support.
would not require new administrative superstructure us tho creationew Office would.
would accomplish the consolidation of theilitary intelligence resources without making this act highly visible to DIA and other agencies who might be inclined to question tho extent of the Agency's involvement in military intelligence
92. Reasons for not electing this Alternative would include;
would do little to advance the ability of the Directorate to deal effectively with DDS&T, lhe Pentagon, and other external agencies on matters In the military Intelligence field. The head of the consolidated group would still beub-Office position.
intelligence production would continue to be directedanagement primarily intoroatod in and concorned for non-military matters. The fields of economics and military matters are too broad for effective management at the Office level and below by one person. The knowledge and continuity required
eo -
to operate effectively in both of these fields at the level required by the Agency's responsibilities lnovitably meanerson must concentrate on one or the other.
--It would place current reporting under research-oriented management with possible detriment to both.
--It would offer no ready option with respect to possible future integration of components such as the
Staff with the military intelligence producers. The organizational and management problems inherent in adding IAS and its large increment of specialized personnel at the sub-Office level would be difficult to surmount.
93. In sum.ould permit some consolidation to be achieved and some personnel savings to be made fromof overlap withlight disturbance to existingrelationships. It would enable the Directorate to deal with some of the problem areas discussed earlier (competition between components and duplication of effort). Important problem areas, however, would be dealt with only in part: existing resources for military intelligence production cannot be most effectively employed when theyubordinate part of an office basically oriented to other interests, and external relations cannot be fully effective
- 61
when conductedevel substantially below that of components ofnd of non-Agency organizations such as DoD and State, Moreover, the effect ofould be to engender increasing independence of action between the two Areas of ORR, thus giving some of the disadvantages of separating the Areas organ!zationully with none of the advantagesew Office.
Alternative C:ew Office
the and
94. Under this Alternative, the following components of OCI and ORR would be fusedingle Office responsible for the production of military and military-related intelligence: from
Area, the
Staff; from
branches of ERA, and Division, the
Division, the National Indications Center Staff, and INDICO; tho appropriate shares of the administrative components of OCI and ORR. The details concerning this Office and how it would work ore set forth below. As noted in the discussion of Alternative H. this Alternative is directed primarily at meeting the Directorate's responsibilities for first category military intelligence. Tho new Office would inevitably have some association with tho Vietnam
62
problem but it probably would not be great, at least initially.
are many similarities between Alternative CB in the advantages and disadvantages to thesum, however.as the potentialoresolution to those problemslso meets, andundamental attack on the major problems that B
can at best only touch.
of selecting this Alternative wouldprovides the Deputy Director for Intelligence with a
single manager, responsive directly to him, for the militaryproduction resources of the Directorate. Implicit in single management is the greater ability to adjust priorities and reallocate assets as problems change or new demands are received.
--It provides the Directorateingle voice onmatters in Its multiple external contacts. This is particularly important with respect to the Directorate's relations with theof Defense in responding to its needs for intelligence support.
--It gives the DDI an effective mechanism for calling on the special expertise of military intelligence components in other Directorates for support in fulfilling his responsibility for Agency-wide finished intelligence as reaffirmed In the interface agreement
-
ofnd for providing DDI support to other Directorate
consolidates tho military intelligence producersDirectorate at the level necessary for consideration ofsuch as the integration of
--It makes possible faster, moro effective policy support and response to current and ad hoc requirements by eliminating unnecessary coordination within the Intelligence Directorate.
97. Disadvantages of selecting this Alternative would includo:would affect the tics that now exist between ERA and MRA on the interrelationship of military and economic matters, and within OCI between military and political matters, and in time probably cause them to become less close.
--It would cause some division in the organizational machinery that now exists for the production of current Intelligence.
--It would bring into view at the Office level the extent of the Agency's commitment to the production of military Intelligence.
--Of tho three Alternatives, it would involve the greatest change in and disturbance to the existing Directorate structure.
98. In summary.ualitative change in the way the Intelligence Directorate approaches the business of military Intelligence production. re similar In
-
"TOr OLCRIO.
some regards, by choosinghe Directorate elevates to the Office level the responsibility for management and productionield that up to now has been treated onlyubsidiary part of other subjects. The costs of achieving this include the added complexity of another Office within the Directorate structure, the additional administrative super structure that an Office requires (although this would be substantially offset by correspondingin the administrative apparatus of ORR andnd the increased separation of military intelligence from its coordinate fields of concentration, politics and economics.
Plan and Feasibility of Alternative C
section discusses the implementation of Alternativemissions and functions of an Office for the production ofmilitary-related intelligence, its personnel and organization,operations, insofar as these aspects can be described inthe feasibility of this. Alternative.
and Functions. The mission of the new Officeto produce and publish substantive intelligence on militarysubjects as required by the Deputy Director Geographically, the responsibility of the Office would
- 65
be worldwide,one en (ration on the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the other Communist states; functionally, thowould span the subject field of military programs and space activities, with particular emphasis on military expenditures,deployment, employment, doctrine, strategy, military policy, force structure, and programming. Within these subject areas, the Office would be responsible for providing intelligence support to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the CIA Member of the US Intelligence Board. The Office would be responsible for supporting the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates on military subjects or requiring military inputs. The Office would also be responsible for providing support in the areaB of itsto the other Offices of the Intelligence Directorate, and to other offices and agencies as required.art of itsthe Office would provide CIA support to the USIB Watch Committee and to the National Indications Center. (See Figure 5)
OCI and ORR would lose these responsibilities which transferred to the new Office. esult, OCI would become moreolitical intelligence office than it now is, although the irreducible residue of poUtico-military concern that each OCI country analyst has would and should remain. ORR would
become almost exclusively an economic intelligence office, although its involvement in things military, exemplified at present chiefly by Vietnam, would continue. The management of each Office would lose certain responsibilities and certain manpower, but would gain the freedom to concentrate on those matters of primary interest to the Office.
ersonnel and Funds, The following units and personnel would be transferred from OCI to the new Office:
he
An important objective in establishing the new Office is to improve the Directorate's ability to respond quickly and accurately to the needs of senior Agency and Government officials foron military developments. Tht
are vital to achieving this capability in the new Office. Both arc now engaged in the production of first category military Intelligence on the USSR, Communist China, and the other
-
Divisionorld-
Communist countries. In addition, wide responsibility in the production of current intelligence on scientific and technical matters. This latter activity is the basic interface between the Intelligence and Science and Technology Directorates for current intelligence production. It is an important part of the responsibilities
Division and one which would
transfer to the now Office under this plan.
INDICO and tho Staff at NIC are not producers of military intelligence in the strict sense of the word, but they are largely military-intelligence oriented as their alerting ond warningrequire them to be. It is estimated that about
their effort is devoted to military indications Intelligence. of this, and because of the mission and responsibilitiesfor the newelieve that these functions should be located innew Office.
The following units and personnel would be transferred from ORR to the new Office:
-
Just as
would constitute tho "current1
of the new Office, MRA would make up the major part of the Office's "research" capability. MRA, in size and in scope and weight of production responsibilities, is the major militaryin the Intelligence Directorate. Much of the rationale forew Office ia linked to the work that MRA now does and the work thatthehave to do in the future.
The need to associate the
branches with the new Office is less immediately ap-
parent. Each of these branches is now in th Area and is regularly involved in substantial support across Area llnea to MRA. Each also undertakes self-initiated activities and provides support to other ERA components. ImleBS we wero willing to divide each branch into its "economic" and "military" parts and allocate them accordingly, which does not seom desirable, theae branches are going to have to perform external support roles no matter whero locatod. Two facte are relevant:ercent of electronic component production in the USSR laercent of the cost of deploying the US NIKE ABM system lies in its electronic sector. The great Importance of electronics and
communications in the effective analysis of present and future weapon systems aa systems, particularly in the offensive missile and ABM fields, argues strongly for placing these branches under the substantive management of the new Office. The obligation for external support would then run out of the new Office to ORR, rather than the. /
responsibilities of the new Office that it should be located therein.
loej-
identified as administrative. Theseough approximation of the share of office administration nowin OCI and ORR for the units that would be transferred to the new Office. These persons would be needed to accomplish the various administrative duties of any Office, such as publication preparation, personnel, budget, travel, training, spaceregistry, and mail receipt and distribution. In additionransfer of personnel and directly connected funds, establishment
ew Office wouldransfer of funds from OCI and ORR for those travel, training, and other costs associated with the personnel of the units involved in the transfer,
The plan ofs based on existing personnel ceilings. No increases are required to implement thearrangements discussed below. It is anticipated that any increase in supervisory positions will be offset by the savings possible throurfi reorganization and elimination of overlap. (See Table 2)
Organization. In considering the organization of the new Office, it is well to recall its responsibilities and functions. It is an Office with both current and research responsibilities, with worldwide interests but particular concern for certain states, with an obligation to perform independent, self-initated analysis and to support the estimative process and others, with
a need to analyze and understand military developments bothunctional, systems viewpoint and from an overall regional or country viewpoint, and, finally,equirement to cooperate effectively in the work of the community on military intelligence matters.
meet its regional-functional responsibilities,of the new Office needs to reflect theso major
-
TQP_SKf:HI'rC
orientationsay thut enables each to work effectively,notthe other.ellove that it is not practicable to organize tho projected Officeurely regionalurely functional basis.urely regional approach would result in dividing tho functionalaircraft systems people, the defensive missile people, forseveral different groups at the coat of technical professionalism.urely functional approach, on tho other hand, would make itdifficult to formulate substantive judgments of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, et cetera,ountryhole. In addition, concentration on one or the other organizational approach would ignore the fact that the military questions askod of the Deputy Director for Intelligence come to him both ways. Some areregional or country oriented, while others areystemorce as such.
Thereurther consideration. Tho new Office must effectively meet both current intelligence needs and research needs, and It must do both with the minimum practical disruption orto either. An organization that was purely regional or purely functional would mean that each sub-component would be equally responsible for both current reporting and research. Where
this happens, both suffer, but usually research more than current reporting because of the higher priority that current reporting by its naturo tends to claim on the time and expertise available. As noted above, an advantage in the existing division of militaryproduction between ORR and OCI is that it tends to concentrate most--not all, but most--current roporting in OCI, leaving MRA relatively free from these distractions.
believe that the new Office can successfullyomposite organization that is both regionalat the major sub-component level. The functionalwould be responsible primarily for the in-depth research
and analysis wMch require specialization, training, and experience that Is essentially technical in character. The regional component would be responsible primarily for the current and ad hoc reporting which requires more general experience and knowledge and less technical immersion. Analysts in each component would have somesome opportunity--to participate in the process, whether current reporting or research, that was the primary concern of the other component.
important thing is that the organization describedI believe, make the new Office responsive to the DDI's, and the
-
Ol' sttJRHlk
Director's, needs (or current information and evaluations onand military-related matters, at the same time protecting the on-going research program from unnecessary disruption. (Another benefit will be the ability,ew Office so organized, to exchange military intelligence specialists between the two types of activity--current andthe stimulus and change of pace that will afford to the people concerned.)
Division would have the following responsibilities; support OCI in the production of currenton military and military-related subjects; provide the DDI interface withor the production of current Intelligence on scientific subjects within the purview of OSI and FMSAC; produce intelligence studies oh military programs, including major weapon systems programs, force structures, military policies, doctrines, and strategics, and overall country assessments; and providesupport to the TJSIB Watch Committee and the National [ndi-
Division would be made
new Office would have three or four lineregional in structure, the others functional.
cations Center. The up primarily from
-
The major responsibility of
would be the effective discharge of the current reporting and ad hoc response function. To do this, the Division would be tied directly into the OCI production machinery. The division chief or his representative would take part in the OCI meetings relating to daily and weekly publication production. Inould propose that
PA'S would function in the same way and
the same purposes as they do now in the Area offices of. The functional divisions would come essentially from the
that now compose the
main responsibilities of the functional divisions would be to produce all-source intelligence studies on the military programs and space activities of the USSR, Communist China, and the other Communist states in particular and or other countries as warranted by technological achievement or policy interest; to assume primary responsibility within the Office for supporting the preparation of
NIEs, NJPPa, and similar intra* and interagency assessments; and to participate with other producing components in the preparation of joint assessments on military and military-related subjects. The particular emphasis in the work of the functional divisions would be on all significant aspects of military expenditures, production, deployment, employment, and future programming of major space and weapon systems and military forces.
The exact organization of the functional divisionsatter for more extensive investigationecision inhas been made toew Office. Tho followingis meant to outline some of the problems and to suggest some possibilities. (It is worth noting that the
Area probably will have to undergo some reorganization whether it becomes partew Office or not.)
Under it.
One approach to the organization of the functional divisions would be to incorporate the two MRA divisions as they are now with only minor changes. This is the approach illustrated in Figure 8.
Division remains the same except that the
Branch is disestablished and its personnel returned to their
functional branches. The
is added
as the more appropriate location for a
systems-oriented component
Thj"
loses the but gains the
from ERA.
would coneolidote in th*
the various
and aggregative activities that would also include thr
This approach would in effect Incorporate the MRA structure essentially unchanged into the new Office. This might ease the initial strains of getting the Offlco In operation. Howovor. MRA is already aware of difficulties with its present organization. These stem chiefly from the heavy burdon of publication review and estimate support that now falls on the chief of the Forces Division. The sizo of that Division and the dopth of Itsin tho estimative (including the NIFP) process causemanagement problems. The unrelenting pace of estimate support end tho inevitable overlap in estimate activity3 begins8 ends, for example) make it almost impossible for one division chief to perform tho necessary review at that level, attend all the meetings he should attend, monitor his division's needs for collection by technical and other sources, and
do the other supervisory work for which he alone is responsible. For these reasons, it probably would be desirable to change the MRA structure at the time of establishing the new Office, or shortly thereafter.
Division.hows this Division's heavy commitment to
econd approach to the organization of the functional divisions would be to make some coherent partition in the duties now undertaken by th
approach. Given thf
NIE support, one way that suggests itself is to let the subject relationships imposed by the demands of the military estimates influence the organizational pattern. On this basis, the six
branchescould be organized into two divi-
sions of about equal size. One primarily for long-rangespace systems8 kind of problems) couldand include the present
branches.
The other would take care of the air defense and general purpose forces3inds of problems) and could be called
Division. It would
include tht
>ranches.
Under this arrangement, the Division chiefs would each be responsiblearrower and more directly manageable share of the Office's substantive support to ONE. Each could pay greater attention to tho preparation of the DDI contribution to the individual estimates, to representing the Intelligence Directorate at the various meetings, and to accomplishing needed publication by his Division outside the estimative process.
Chiefly becuuse of the way uir and naval forces have come to be involved in both strategic and general purpose roles in modern military organization, this arrangement means that analysts in one Division would have to support work in the other Division. For
estimate. Tho same would be true of the aircraft systems nnalyst but in the opposite direction. However, the onlyis to divide these air and naval specialists between the two Divisions in terms of force concepts, and this seems neithernor necessary, at least at thia stage of organizational
Under either of these two arrangements.
-
rop skcrTtT
Division would continue toairly large unit as numbersgo. Because of the nature of its work, however,that make it desirable to divide
are not present and in my judgment it is not necessary atto plan any such move for the
To summarize, the composite regional-functionaldescribedelieve, be able to respond effectively to the full ranee of requirements that would be laid on it forreporting, preparation of briefings, support of estimates and NIPPs, and original research in the general military and Bpace field. The research components would be buffered from the untimely intrusions of current and ud hoc needs by ageared to those demands. That component In turn would draw upon the integral relationship with the functional research components in meeting its assignments. All the components would benefitingle management directly responsible to the Deputy Director for Intelligence for producing the military intelligence that, along with political, economic, and geographic intelligence, makes uparge and Important part of tho Directorate's production responsibilities.
In addition to the line components, the new Office will
require certain staff elements. Without attempting toolueprint at thiselieve we should plan in terms of four staffs: administrative, publication, plans and support, and
direct organizational transfer with no change in present mission, functions, and method of operation.
The administrative staff would be charged with theofnit. Perhaps only one special note is neededintelligence organizations primarily centered on foreignand military-rotated developments have always had atime finding enough of the right kind of training for theirlong time ago said that "the trouble with
most US military analysts is they don'tamn thing about what the US is doing in the militaryhe situation is better now but it must be worked at constantly. ajor responsibility of the administrative staff would be actively to develop training opportunities for tho personnel of the Office.
It is important that the new Office have an effectivo review and publishing mechanism. ajor objective in creating the Office is to enable the Directorate to speak more vigorously and forthrightly its views in the military field and to lessen
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.the submergence of its product in the estimative stream. The analysts in the functional research components must have the opportunity for publication no lees prompt than that of the regional analysts working primarily on current intelligence. This means that the new Officemall publication production staff attuned to the Office's needs.
The plans and support staff would have scvoralbut foremost among them would be the job of coping with the demand for guidance of technical collection systems,in the reconnaissance satellite field. These systems are so costly, and their take so critical to military analysis, that an extromoly close relationship between the collection planning mechanism and the substantive analyst is unavoidable. Thoofficesonsiderable price in the process, however, in terms of time spent on collection support, particularly at the branch and division chief level (which is also the importantlovol for publication). MRA estimates, for exumplo, that Its branch chiefs spend as much time on collection support as on administration, Bupervision, and review put together. There is no easy answer to the problem, but an active plans and support staff to work for the Office In this area is an essential element.
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As requested, the question of making the Imagery Analysis Staff an organizational part of the new Office has been considered.hows what the Office would look like under the arrange-
ment that divided the
Jl vis ion in two and with IAS as an Divisionevel with the other divisions. This
from
step would increase the size of the Office
about
It might be desirable under thisto consldor going to an Office-Area-Division structure.
The advantage in joining IAS to the Office would He in the potential such an arrangement hadloser Pi-analyst relationship in all aspects of military intelligence production, from collection guidance to finished intelligence publication. In light of the importance photography has for the production ofintelligence and the importance of guiding and exploitingostly collection systemtrong case can be made for Integrating LAS with the military production components.
There are, however, some practical disadvantages tolan. The physical separation of the two bodies of people militates against their organizational integration within one Office. Moreover, IAS is responsible tond DDP for servicing their needs. the productive capacity
of IAS and raises the question whether it should not continue lo existeparate component within tho Intelligence Directorate to ro-spond to requirements from all directorates,
elieve that the most important consideration, however, is timing. All the practical objections cited could, with work, be overcome. However, the problems ofew Office for military intelligence production, if that course is decided on. are sufficiently formidable without simultaneously adding theof integrating the IAS activity, attractive though that is. Once the Offico was well established, if circumstances warranted, the question of makingart of the Office could be re-examined. In the meantime, consolidation of the Directorate's resources for military Intelligence production would improve the effectiveness of the Pl-anulyst relationship in this major area of the Staff's work.
Timing
Ifas selected, the following schedule could be followed:
bybtain DCI approval to establish Office; name Director-doslgnate
1 JulyOffice established effective this date
Ab Boon as the necessary approvals are received, it would boto name the Director-designate for the new Office, so that he can bogin detailed planning on organizational, procedural, andmatters. OCI and ORR will also need time to plan for the adjustments that the changes will requre. Establishing the Office at the start of the fiscal year would simplify problems of record keeping, budget submissions, and the like for the Directorate and the Offices concerned.
Some period of detailed preparation, such as the two months suggested above, would be highly desirable: Personnel assignments should be decldod, jobs defined, intra-officeworked out. et cetera, before the components begin operating as anowever, all the components that are involved now exist and could, if necessary, be reassembled in Office terms with little prior preparation and on short notive. in that case, tho planning ofpeak would follow, rather than go before, establishment as on Office.
It should be said that no amount of prior preparation is going to anticipate all tho changes that will be necessary in such an Office in the first several years of its existence. Not only will the operation of the individuals and components as an Office give
rise to new ideas for more effective production and new patterns of organization, but the subject field itselfynamic one that will require organizational adaptation and adjustment over time.
Feasibility
Setting aside the question whetheresirable course of action. Is itan it be made to work in the manner described? Or will the problems raised by the changes in OCI and ORR and the creationew Office outweigh the possible benefits?
What is proposed is not an unprecedented step in the history of ORR. That fecund organization spawned OBIPIC some years later,ew geographic intelligence-oriented OBI most recently. Implementation ofould be in line with other Directorate (and Agency) actions in giving Office status to major substantive responsibilities. In the field ofintelligence production, the creation of the Office described above is the logical next step in the sequence of events that includes the development, first,ilitary-economic division in ORR andilitary-economic area.
that part of the proposal that would remove the
1
from
th(
OCI has itB precedent in the reallocation of tho of OCI to ORR This functional uniturrent reporting responsibility in tho field of economics is tho direct counterpart of
As
under the Chief
and now under the
ORR it hae effectively enabled ORR to publish in the current intelligence media of OCI.
These precedents are cited to suggost that there is nothing inherently infcaaible In Alternative C's proposal toew Office, one that would have both research and current reporting responsibilities in tho field of military intelligence. Similarhave been tried before, and worked. elieve that the organization plan discussed aboveractical way to utilize the resources that would be availablo to the Office. Continuity is respected, to minimize organizational turbulence and its adverse effect on productivity. At the same time, adjustments are planned to tako advantage of the changes that now out of operating theae elements together under ono Office.
m suro problems will arise between the new Offico and ORR and OCI. The creation of an Office to concentrate on military
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intelligence will not end the legitimate interest of OCI and ORR analysts in things military. And the OCI and ORR military analyst once located in the new Office, will continue to be responsible for giving consideration to tho political and economic aspects of their subject. These overlaps are not only inevitable, but they nre desirable oven though differences will emerge because ofhink the significant forward step thatromises within the Directorate is that coordination will be lessheel -spinning operation (between the military analysts in OCI and the military analysts in ORR) and canore useful exchange between specialists of different substantive concentrations.
may be somo disadvantages in Alternative CDirectorate's relations with DDS&T, the Pentagon, andoffices. They seem small indeed, however, comparedpotential advantages that can resultinglefocus for military intelligence productiondirected at the Office level.
Ceasible course of action.
1V. Recommendations
It is recommended that the Doputy Diroctor foradopt and take all steps necessary to implement Alternative C. to create from existing components in OCI andew Office to produce and publish suhstantive intelligence on military andsubjects with particular emphasis on militaryproduction, deployment, employment, doctrine, strategy, military policy, force structure, and programming, on abasis hutoncentration on tho USSR, Communist China, and other Communist countries.
t is further recommended that the target date forof this Office
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