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He has beenand would, beble to live with an occasional nighttime foray by Israeli forces resuiting In the destruction of,olice stationew houses. However, the recent raid involved an infantry brigade supported by armor, aircraft, aod artillery; it resulted in shouteaths half of then Jordanian soldiersand in the destruction ofuildings. Jordan's army was clearly humiliated in the process.
3. The Israeli attack badly damaged Bussain'b position at home. It made him vulnerable to attack by disaffected elements of his population, who argue that his policy of peacefulwith Israel has been dictated by the US ond hasailure. Therelaring contrast between Israeli treatment of Jordan and of Syria, which had severely provoked the Israelis, had received public Soviet support, and had been left alone by Tel Aviv's army. The Palestine Liberation Organizationis now redoubling Its pressure for the establishment of Palestinian military units in Jordanian borderove Hussaln has
* The PLOadical organlxetlon, eBtabllahed by agreement of the Arab rulers during the recently-ended period of Arab harmony. It is strongly supported by the HAP, which grants it extensive radio and other privileges.
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resisted because such units would not be under bis control. The pressures In the Jordanian Armed Porcea for retaliation against Israel are very high.
4. Huaooin le aware that such feelings exist and will probably try to propitiate both military and civilian elements by stationing significant army units, including armor, oa the Weat Bank of the Jordan River. Re say alsoolitical gesture such as changing his Prime Minister. Suasale probably feels he cannot for the present use bis security forces to prevent Syrian-trained saboteurs from operating through Jordan into Israel. The result will probably be an Increase In aabctege lncidenta, which In turn may result in further major Israeli retaliations. Shouldaid occur in the next few months, Bussain would almost certainly feel compelled to retaliate, although he would probably try to keep Jordanian military actionimited scale. Be is aware that retaliation carries tha risk of an expanded conflict, which could involve the bulk of his sray,process In which the latter would almost certainly be defeated.
5- The Israeli raid has caused extensive grumbling and diacontented talk directed at tbe regime, but only one
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and oven et hie best probably commands the allegiance of not corouarterhird of the population. Hence, tho regime's continuity requires that lt not suffer too many public defeats In close succeaalon. Failure of the regime to reapond militarily to incidents oc curing In the near future vould almost certainly stimulate more determined plotting within tbe Armed Forces as veil as widespread public disorder.
8. Tor some time, Bussaln vill feel compelled toarder lino toward Israel. He will be forcedilitary buildup, both for greater border security and to keep the military happy. lie will certainly turn to the US for more military hardware and faster delivery. He vill see* and probably get Saudi money to buy arms. If he does not obtain substantial help from thee* source* and If Internal pre**uros Increase, be will try to repair hi* relations with the radical Arab abates and may turn to the Soviets for economic aid and possibly for arms. Tension along the border will almost certainly remain high. Incidents are likely to be frequent, and Hussein's future will togreat degree depend on the scope and nature of Syrian and Israeli Initiatives in thia respect. Huaaalnla most unlikely to approach the question of Israeli-Jordanian relations aa openalcdedly and aa positively aa he has In th* past.
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9. The Iar*eli raid seems Illogical aod miscalculated to us, and there Is evidence that lt seems so to seme segments of opinion in Israel aa veil. On the whole, and In the absence of further evidence, ve think It most likely that the Israeli act vas one of genuine retaliation, determined to he necessary to satisfy Israeli opinion, and (In the Israeli view) to throw fear Into the Arabs snd restrain them from further forays Into Israel. As for why the Israelis attacked Jordan instead of Syria, on* major concern was the greater military costs of an incursion into Syria. ecision vas probably made some weeks ago toajor raid into Jordan as soonretext arose. It also appears likely that Israel wished to avoid attacking Syria because of Syria's close relation* with the USSR and Israel's desire not toelations with that greet power,in view of the large Jewish population In the USSR.
PGR THE BOARD CO? SATTOKAL
I
KENT Chairman
Original document.
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