6
6
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
6 (Sopersedss5 ond)
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Capabilities of Soviet General
Purpose Forces
Svbmrlted by
DIRECTOR Of CENTRAl INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD6
Aulhonlicoted.
CONTENTS
fan
T(IE PKOBI.EM
CONCLUSIONS
L SOVIET POUCY TOWARD CENERAL PURPOSE
IL CENERAL PURPOSE GROUND
Ceneral Characteristics
Categories and Number* of Division
and
Tactical Missiles and Rockets
Other Land Armaments
Ground Force
AIR DEFENSE AND TACTICALU
Theater Air jj
Tactical
llanlefield Reconnaissanceli
OF MASSM
V CENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL15
15
Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and Sea Unas of
Capabilities Against Submarines 17
Capabilities for Minewarfaro
Logistic Support Capabilities10
VI. AIRLIFT AND SEAL!FTiq
Airlift and Air
Sealih and Amphibious 20
ii.i
SCCRCT
Page
VII. CONTHIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES21
Warsaw Pact
CroundSI
Air Force*
Naval Forces
Nuclear ami Chemical Weapons23
VIII. CAPABILITIES ACAINST THE CENTRAL REGION OF4
Ciinenl Deployment24
Reinforcement25
Molnlizalkm Base27
IX. TRENDS OVER THE LONGER
General Considerations28
Ground Forces
Tactical
Naval Forces30
East European Military Capabilities32
TABLE MX
-SCCfief-
CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the piesent strength and capabilities of Soviet and East Kuropeim general purpose forces, especially against Uie Central Region ol NATO, and trends in these forces over the nextears.
CONCLUSIONS
A. The Soviets retain their belief in the primacy of strategicand defense forces for deterrence as well as for foreign policy support. At tlie same time, they are increasingly interested inthe eapabililies of llieir general purpose lorces and in making them better suited to meet contingencies short of general nuclear war. We believe that this trend results partlyoviet expectation tosubstantially their stralegic posilionis the US, thereby increasing the relevance of geuerat purpose forces. We think itesponse also to earlier improvement in US and NATO capabilities in Kurope and to US advocacy of flexible response. In addition, it is probably attributable to the tensions arising from the Vietnam war and thc resulting US military buildup, as well as to Chinese hostility towards the USSR. )
D. Despite the evident Soviet desire to broaden the optionsto the USSR in the application of its military power, the regime's ability to improve and diversify general purpose forces is limited by tlir sheer bulk of those forces, by thc momentum of existing stralegic and research and development programs, and by thc increasing cost of competing against the growth and diversification of Western,US, military capabilities. Moreover, the competitionSoviet civilian and military claimants for skilled personnel and scarce economic resourcesajor domestic constraint. Wc believe
sixHr.r
improvement wilt probably be gradual, without drastic clianges in funding or manpower strength. (Para. 5)
C. We estimate that the USSR nowine divisions capable of early commitment to combat. These divisions, which are almost completely equipped, have peacetime manning levels which range from at leastercent of TOE strength in lhe Soviet forces inEurope to about GO percent in thc intehoi of thc USSR. Inwi: eslimatc that there are aboutadre divisions manned at an average of aboutercent of full strength. While there have been no major redeployments of Soviet general purposeradual increase of troops and materiel near lhe Soviet borderChina, as well as certain local realignments, have improved the Soviet military posture in that area. (Paras.)
D. The numbers of tactical missile and rocket launchers allotted to Soviet ground forces have increased significantly in some areas, although deployment has not been uniform throughout. Further increases are probable, as is the early introductioo. ballistic missile system. The continued introduction of new equipment into Tactical Aviation has improved its capabilities. The current Soviet interest in improving general purpose forces willpostpone for the next few years any significant decline in theircraft in Tactical Aviation.)
E. The increased tempo of Soviet naval operations which we noted last year has continuedoviet out-of-area submarinedoubledver the level observedarge number of submarines and surface ships have operated far from home bases. Continuing Soviet concern about the Polaris threat isby submarine and trawler patrols off US Polaris submarine operating bases. We expect operational and materiel improvements in Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, but their open ocean ASW capability will probably remain severely firnilcd for thc next several years- )
V. Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. Naval infantry appearsto fight primarily on thc coastal flanks of larger land formations. Tbc expansion of the Soviet tncrchanl fleet and thc development of
2
Sfietf-*-
very large transport aircraft will improve Soviet capabilities to move unopposed forces to distant areas, but the Soviets lack the sea and air combat escort capabilities necessary for opposed distant operations. Developments thus far do not signify any urgent Soviet program to achieve such capabilities. )
C. Soviet war planning relies on the availability of the increasingly effective East European forces to perform important tasks.ol recent ticnds loward East Euiopcan autonomy will work to nanow the taitge of contingencies in which the Soviets can rely on effective support from their allies, but wc believe Pact members will remain persuaded tbat their ultimate security rests on the protection provided by Soviet power and influence. Wc believe that thc Pact forces would be reliable in thc event of war, at least initially,)
fl. The Soviets, East Cerrnans, Poles, and Czechs now have aboutivisions andombat aircraft available for earlyagainst thc Central Region of NATO. Wo believe,that if circumstances permitted thc Soviets would reinforce these forces substantially with additional ground and air forces from the western USSH before initiating ait attack against thc Central Region.)
I. For the near term, we think the Soviets have probablyto maintain tlicir general purpose forces ut about the present size and composition. Over the longer term, however, considerable change is likely in force levels, organization, and deployment. In the ground forces wc expect an eventual transition to smaller numbers of larger divisions with better support, more capable of conventional as well as nuclear war. In numbers of men and quality of equipment, the Western Theater will continue to have priority. Tacticalwill probably acquire more complex and capable aircraft; its numerical size will probably decline ins, but its overallwill probably increase.' We Iwlieve tlic emphasis in naval
1 Ma| On. Iw* K. Thomas. UV Arabian!SAF. svould eVIeie (hrs tentencr ot llili parogiapli and tohitllulo uW following'
'Tacticalwill probably acquire rooir nmpln and cipoblr men!', lb nu BwrKal Mar. rtaVcCng Soviel feataeat mi MpfnvWsgoe weaMrrl co-by gii.orm, probably will ranszinvf ai luff, in ibe lO'.'O'i ai at picterrt."
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GEN li PAL PURPOSE FORCES'
he pranacy ol forces lor strategic aitack and dcfeme remains undisputed among Soviet military thinkers, but since lhe oustci of Khrushchev and patticu-hirly during the past yeni lhe Sovicls have been paying nsore attention to the role of lbc general purpose forces Titerc hai long been concern among live miliiary that Khruslschev's decisions, which tended to make thc buildup of strategic forces at tlie expense ol general purpose forces, neglected an important elemciii of Soviet capabilities for general war and deprived the USSH olin dealing with contingencies short of general war. General purpose forces were restructured for nuclear war under Khrushchev, but their reequip-mcnt and modernization svere evidently stretched out because strategic forces had tbe priority dalm. The restructuring itseir resulted in certainwhich could be handicaps in nonnuclear warfare, particularly if at all prolonged.
ecent Soviet military writings and statements haveearch for. svays to loosen tlse rigidities once imposed on strategy by Khrushchev'sthat any war involving the great powers would inevitablyeneral nuclear conflict, and that Ka outcome would be decided almost exclusivelytralegic micloar exchange. Over the past year, Defense Minister Malinovsky and olher top military leaders have underscored the importance attached to the ground foices in Soviet military thinking, both for general nuclear war and for 'war in which conventional weapons areuring the past year also, some Soviet military spokesmen have implied that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed in war without cnliiiling immediate, automatic escalation to general war. There have beenew such references to limited warfare involving tactical nudear weapons, and they are couched in terms of anot to be excluded, but they arc thc first indications that the Soviets may be modifying their views on this question.
mong the factors contributing to the increasing Soviethe role and capabilities of general purpose forces is the substantial improvement we think the Soviet leaders eipect to achieve in tlieir strategic positionis the US in thc next few years. They moy beheve thatituation of mutual nuclear deterrence the capabilities of general purpose forces for noonuclear contingencies would have increased relevance, although we do not think they expect such marked strategic alterations as would permit substantially more
'istn riMBihc discuafaxi oi. ir- NIEreed* hiUtedECRET.
aggressive Sovicl courses ol action. Olher important contributing factorsinclude US advocacy of flexible response and past Improvcinents in US and NATO conventional strength in Km ope. Finally, the Soviet leaden are probably concerned over increasing tensions in tbe Far blast, including the Vietnam svar and the resulting US military buildup as well as lhc implications of Chinese Inutility tosvards thc USSR.
Soviet military doctrine and lorce structure continue to emphasize thc requirements of general nuclear war. The main thrust of tbe recent mibtary writings is slill on thc need lo Iiave lorces forar. with tho need to meet otherecondary but increasingly important aspect. Ouris inconclusive as to thc views of the top political leadership oo these questions, bul we third: the presentenerally receptive to thc military argument for greater strategic ttnibility. particularly as the leaders consider the various crises and confrontations they must allow for as they contemplate future developments in llie world situation.
In our evidence there is no suggestion of any sweeping current program to improve and diversify Soviet genera) purpose forces. Indeed, tbe regimes ability to carry outrogram In these forces would be limited by thcir sheer bulk, by the high priority obviously attached to strategic forces and to research and development programs, and by tbe perennial competition forbetween civilian and miliiary claimants in the USSB. It is probable that the Soviets will seek to improve general purpose forces gradually, without any sharp change in their funding or manpower strength.
G. Soviet general purpose forces remain deployed in greatest strength in the west and focuiod predominantly agaiast NATO in Europe. Thc deployment of forces has remained generally static over the past year, svith the exception of continued changes in thc Sino-Soviet borderradual Increase in troops and materiel has occurred in this arean addition, daring fhe past year or so the Soviets have improved their military posture (notably opposite northern Suskaang and eastern Manchuria) by placing some combat units in better strategic locations and possibly by making provision for quid reinforcement and resupply. Tank units in lhe Transbautal region haveadditional equipment and hove probably been brought lo an increased statu of readiness. Tactical Avialion east of Lake Baikal lias been modernized and somewhat increased. Moreover, Soviet equipment, military advisors and technicians, and construction and railroad personnel coniinue to bc sent to Mongolia under thc Soviet assistance program. These several developments in the Sino-Soviet border region have involved relatively small numbers of troops and have almost oatainly caused no reduction in Soviet strength facing NATO.
n NIE IHffi, "Main Trends In Soviet Military Policy" datede estimated tlie total military personnel strength of thc Soviet armed
-SECRET-
-SGCBCT-forces loillion men.
jrces toillion men1 Current indications point to the highhe spread. Tbc general purpose forces, estimated at about Iwo million men. absorb by far the largest portion ol military manpower, particularly ofWc believe that for the next few years the strength of general purpose forces will be maintained approximately as at present; it may edge up slightly.
II. GENERAL PURPOSE GROUND FORCES
General Chamclcrislits
8 The Soviet ground forces are structured in accordance with the Soviet concepteneral nuclear war with NATO This concept calls for the giound forces lo advance rapidly in the aftermathassive nuclear exchange ond to seize critical objectives before the NATO forces have recovered from thc disruption and demoralization caused by the Soviet nuclear strikes In thendhc Soviets restructured tlieir forces for this mission, subordinating other considerations to thc achievement ol speed and shock affect. They concentrated their combat strengtharge number of relatively small tank and motorized rifle divisions, radically reducing their provision of non-divisional supporting elements. The divisions are Itcavily armored, but the ratio of infantry to tanks is low; in general, the ratio of men to equipment Is* low. The provision of divisional artillery was reduced. Noodivisional artillery was drastically reduced and substituted for with lesser number: of rockets and missiles, many of which require the use of nuclear warheads for effective cmploymenl.
f events should not develop according to theuclear war Ihe Soviet advance should be held up by NATO icslstance, or if the conflict should boSoviot ground forces would beby their relative lack of provision for sustained action. They do have substantial inlsercnt capabilities to wage nonnuclear warfare, but theseare not what they would have been if this contingency hadrimary consideration in Soviet planning. The Soviets may reckon, however, tlsatonnuclear conflict they would have tune to provide more infantry, artillery, and nondivisional support to the division* engaged.
The component fJcmeaU of this nafliUry manpower tola! in the Soviet militarylo be appparMutdrlows:
Or-erallCO
Strategic DdeaM
Sttitrgsc Attack
Comma nd and Ceneral
Thea* tparet do Mt ladudc mmradiUrUnd aexnrity lotta noto the Ministry of Defame and ao uncertain numlm oimployed In th* mil itary ettabllihmcoL
-seeRti-
i
indications suggestn piogressSoviet Crottp ol Foroos, Germanylic implies!.on* ol thisas yet unclear. Il mighl indicate (he development of morn flriiblcor tbc transfer of major units from one army lo another, llbc preparation for tho eventual withdrawal of some unils Irom thcwe have no positive evidence ofoviet intention.Soviet purpose nvay bc. the process appears lo he as yet incomplete.purpose of this activity in CSFC does become apparent, il may prove toimplications regarding the structure of the general purposea whole.
Categories ond Numbers of Divisions
Soviet line divisions are maintained at three diffrrcnt levels of strength and readiness lor commitment to combat. Those inre at or near full strength and readiness. Those in Categoryre al reduced strength, but are intended for early reinforcement.eek or so they could be filled up with reservists and made ready to move out. They would not initially be as effective asivisions, butrief period of training or combat they would become so. The Category III divisions are essentially cadre units intendedervease for further mobilization. They too could be filled up with reservistseek or so, but would require two or three months tram-ing to become combat eOeetive. They would, however, be available for earlier use in mopping up operations, as line of commurueationi guards, or for internal security and reconstruction duties.
We estimate the ublc of organization (TO) strengthotorized rifle divisionhatnk division. and that of an airborne division.oviet divisions in Cermany, Poland, and Hungary, are probably manned alercent of TO strength or better. Tlse manning levels ofivisions are probably lower in the border districts of the USSH and lowest in interior districts. We estimate that Category II divisions are manned atercent of TO, in some cases having one regiment in cadre status. It is difficult to distinguish Category II divisions at Iheir highest manning levels fromivisions at their lowest. Category III divisions arc believed lo be manned utew of these may have one regiment capable ol early employment.
The total number of Soviet ground force divisions has been relatively constant over the put four years. We estimate that the Soviets nowine divisions atr Category II readiness.f the former andf the latter. Somef these are motorized rifle divisions.re tank divisions,re airborne Ji visions.* We estimate that there arc also someate-
l-uaiu lypk-D, are caranun! inio three nutorlsod nfir .egimet.li and one rank regimen! ai maneuver elements, while tank dmwm bave UW Unk rcgimenU aod one motorired iiile ieRiment. Tank regimeou are equipped with medium Unks.hatew UnV diviiieeu onequipped wiih heavyV regiments have or- organicattalion. Airborne divmboi are sorular in ilructure In use wotorired rifle divukint. tint ara mnitderably smaller, hiving no Unk iinlli aivl Ion artillery.
im/;nf T
gory III traotorizcd ulle divisions, although tha number may be ai low ai* as highhisffects uncertainty as to wbethcr all of the entities conn ted arc in fact divisions. As in approximate estimate, we consider the total number of divisions of all three categories to be.
Armies, Fronts, and Theaters
hcre areoviet ground armies.orps,roup of forces each in bast Cermany. Poland, andoviet corps is not an infetmcdiato echelon betsveen division and army, but is rather, inmall army, with reduced provision of combat and service support. Most Soviet divisions are subordinate to these higher echelons, butnd II divisions are directly subordinate to military district headquarters or are of undetermined subordination Finally, seven airborne divisionsnd II) are ceo-trally controlledirectorate in Moscow.*
The Soviets maintain two types of ground armies, the divisional composi-taoo of which variesto their misuon. tbe terrain, and the opposing forces The combined arms army (CAA) usually consistsifle divuaonsank division, plus tsoodivisional combat and service support troops.AAs in CSFC have00 men. Existing tank armies in the USSRank divisions; however,nk armies in CSFC each currentlyivisions,otorized rifle division, and contain0 men.
In the event of war most Soviet armies would be grouped into fronts. The CSFC can bo considered thc nearest equivalentartime Soviet front cuitently operational. ItankAAs.actical air armyronr-Ievel ground uniu iu Ihc CSFC indudeen in combat0 in headquarters and service support, and0 in miscellaneous housekeeping functions. In wartime the military districts (MDs) on thc borders of the USSR would provide the basis for the creation of additional fronts.
The evidence on nondivisrarul support uniti, especially those within thc USSR, is insufllcient toefinite estimate regarding their promptWc believe that most army and froru-lcs-ef combat and servic7support units arc manned at greatly reduced strength in peacetime; some may be ooJv papert appear, that service support units are likely to be drawn in part from various state-owned dviliannizafions. (In somein Eastern Europe, Soviet units have been supported by East European service units of this character.)
In thcivision force (CSFC division slice) is currently estimated0 men, excluding the air army. The Soviet wartime front division slice is estimated toeinforcement of0 men, mainly (a
' For (he climated number oi Soviel Une divisionspaphic area, aiemrr oftype of divaifln. km Tahl*
6ECIUI
rca
combat and service support elements, would therefore lie required lo bring lit* CSFC up to full wartime strength, assuming thai il woulddivision front
lie Sovicti ruirrotly envisage general war campaigns broken down into tlicaters of military operationshose in Europe arc designatedNorthwestern, and Southwestern The Soviets may plan toheater headquarters for each TVD.
Toctieal Missiles ond Rockets
Some! ground forces have tactical missile and rocket systems available at division, army, and front level. These systems can deliver nudear. chemical, and high explosive warheads. In general nucleai wai llicy would probably be supplemented by some of the medium and intermediate range missiles of Iho Strategic Rocket Forces, which initially would bc directed against strategic targets of importance to theater operations and subsequently would probably be used specifically in support of such operations. Over lhe last few years there hasignificant increase in the number of tactical missile and rocket launchers allocated to Soviet ground foroes. Recent evidence suggests, however, that allocations arc not uniform throughout llie USSR or within any one category of divisions.
We believe that Sovietnd II divisions (except au-bornc) have mi organic Frog battalionaunchers, each mountedight tank chassis, and thai some Category III divisionsuch launchers. We estimate that there arc aboutiacked Frog lamichers in the CSFC Evidencerog launchers per division in parts of thc western USSR mayimilar number in CSFC and other forward area divisions. This trend is probably responsive lo the complaint of Soviet division commanders, revealed in the Soviet press, that they lack sufficient Frogs to provide the continuous fire support for the fast moving maneuver elements called for ia Soviet operational doctrine.
We believe also that many of the brigadesm Scud ballisticwhich support ground armies ihioughout thc Soviet ground forces have been significantly augmented during tlie past two years by the addition'hird battalion,otal of nine launchers per brigade. We estimate that there are aboutcud launchers in CSFC. In addition, wc believeurface to-surface cruise missile called Solishodification of the Kennel alr-lo-surfacc cruise missile} is in East Cermany for tbe sup|Mirt of GSFG ground forces, but wo Iiave no basisefinite estimate of (he number available.
dditional improvements are probably underway fn bolh the Frog and tlie short-range ballistic missile capabilities of Sovietew Frog systemas displayed within the past year and has since been observed in the Moscow and Bailie MDs. Thc wheeled launch vehicle evidently hairange and road mobility and the rocket probably has greater range and shorier reaction time than previous models. One version of thc Scud has boon
displayedew. wheeled launch vehicle which will improve the toad mobility and possibly the reaction time of the system. This vehicle has not been coo-fitmed in tlie Geld; its deployment may await an improved missile.
our knowledge, the Soviets have not yetacticalwitb the range and mobility required to support front opcialiiimthe depth of the fronl- Evidence indicates that tbe Soviets haveSibling) from service in this role and are usingcud despite its inability to lumish coverage throughoutdepth of the baltle rone. Them. mobile cruisesystem, lias lieen seen in parades. There are recent indications that itempluyedoastal defense ioie. it could also be employed in arole. The Soviets abo. ballistic missiletho development of which was probably completed inthis would extend missile coverage to the full extent of thc battlethe front.
Other land Armaments
2 tanks have been gradually introduced inlo thc CSFC and it is expected that by tlie end0fank battalions in CSFC will have theii full complement. Thc newer model armored personnel carriers (Al'Cs) which continue to appear in CSFC include all known versions of tbe eight-wheeled. including one model with overhead coveriurefed model However, the olders are still thc most common APC in CSFC. Tlie new antitank missile. Sagger, has already appeared In tlie CSFC. None ol thc new ground force weapons observed in5 parades has yet been confirmed in GSFG troop units, although theround multiple rocket launcher may be present in token quantities.
lhc issuanceew major item of land armament is usually very gradual; the issuance of an item of new design throughout the ground forces canoears. Resource demands by other military forces have probably had thc effect of stretching out tlie production of materiel for tbe ground forces. In general, huwever, the equipment available to units Is combat serviceable and is gradually being improved and modernized. Soviet ground equipment is rugged and easily-maintained, and the Soviets devote considerable attention to conserving it. New equipment on hand is often kept in storage except oo held maneuvers, while older versions are used foi training. Equipment which has been retired fromse Ls retained in reserve. Wc estimate thatequipment, including superseded models, is on hand to equip existing divisions of all thiee categories at wartime strength.
Ground Force Training
peacetime Soviet conscripts are assigned directly to units andalmost entirely within those units. There is no large separateestablishment. Tlie one-third turnover in conscript troop strength each
11
SSCfffT-
autumn, due to the three-year draft period,rop in combat efficiency from about November to April This problem, as well as the increasingcomplexity o( Soviet theater forces, has caused the Soviets to offerinducements to technically trained enlisted men for rccnlistmcnt and may cause changes in thc conscription system.
Soviet ground forces conduct extensive individual and unitThere is no reason lo doubt thc professional competence ofcorps. Training of commanders and staffs at all echelons receivesHowever, there are some deficiencies in thc nature of Sovietoccasioned in pariesire to conserve funds and to avoidon thc most up-to-date equipment and alsoenchant fortraining methods. Tltcre is good evidence tliat training ammunitionand artillery is allocated sparingly. Tank main armament firing isbut extensive firing practice is conducted with subcaliber weapons.
III. THEATER AIR DEFENSE AND TACTlCAl AVIATION Theoter Air Defense
Soviel theater air defense is providedombination of the fighterof Tactical Aviation, surface-to-air missilesndhe defensive capabilities of Tactical Aviation have continued to increase over thc past year with the introductionew variant of the Fishbed.odel,oken number of thc Firebar. Fishbed Ds and Fs. which have an all-weather intercept capabilily, now make upfr so fighters in Tactical Aviation. An air defense control system withfeatures has been deployed within the USSR and in East Germany. Poland, and Hungary; this system is employed to control Tactical Aviation interceptors on air defense missions.
Wc estimate that Soviet theater forces are presently equipped withOOaunchers, most of them in SAM units assigned to the field armies and higher headquarters. The Soviets have voiced dissatisfaction with then its role with field forces, because several hours are required to setite for firing or to dismantle one for moving. In addition, thes vulnerable to low altitude tactics. Main reliance is placed on automatic AAA for low altitude defense and for protection of swiftly moving forces when fighter cover is not available. The latest development in AAA is the radarm weapon which was observed in the5 Moscow parade and last Julyarade in Warsaw, but it has not yet been identified in troop units. The Soviets have developed therack-mounted dual missile system, which may be as vulnerable as thco low altitude tactics, but is designed to provide more mobile missile coverage for Iroops in thc field. We believe tliat they have begun issuing these weapons to field forces, though positive evidence is belong. Theay be retained in thc field forces for defense of rear area headquarters and other installations which move less frequently.
!2
(ho Soviets piobably have conducted researchystemtactical ballistic missiles, no such system is now operationallyarc unable to estimate whether or when the Soviets might achieve asueh ballistic missiles.
Taelical Avialion
Soviet Tucliea! Aviation has thc missions of securing and maintaining local air superiority, supporting ground operations, and providing air defense for the theater forces. There arcoviet TAAs. with three located in Germany,and Hungary. These armies vary considerably in size and composition;h TAA in East Germany hasombat aircraft, while others range in strength fromKiev MD)Carpathian MD).
There arc nowperational combat aircraft in Tactical Aviation.f these arc fighters assigned to someight bombers, includingrewers, arc assigned to thcomber regiments.ther aircraft arc in reconnaissance units. In addition to these aircraft assigned to tactical air icgimcnts. we believe there arelder combat-type aircraft colocated with units of Tactical Aviation.1
Most of the fighters assigned to Tactical Aviation were designed asTheir utility as fighter bombers for other than ruclear operations would he limited by their small payload capacity, relatively short range, and lack of an all-weather bombardment capability. On tlie other hand, Soviet tactical aircraft are designed to operate from unimproved or relativelyauxiliary airfields and bases. Soviet tactical air units practicequickly with all their maintenance and support equipment and haveapability to operateery short timeew location. In Eastern Europe many auxiliary fields are prestoeked wiih fuel and munitions.
The Soviets emphasize flexibility by employing the same fighters for ground support, interdiction, reconnaissance, or air defense missions. Some lighter units appear lorimary mission of air defense and others of ground support, but pilots are trained in both missions. For example, thc Fitter, which is best suited for tlie fighter bomber role, has been employed in the Interceptor role. Thcnd F, whose search/track radarrime requirement in thc interceptor role, are also used in thc ground attack; role, performing air-to-ground rocketry and bombing.
The continued reequipment of Tactical Aviation56 has improved its capabilities to carry out its missions.ignificant devclop-
II and HI give eatimated Dumber! anil deployment of Soviet tactical alrcralt tn operational unils. by location and types, ar6
' Seeegardingddiiiooat old node! fighter* and Jirtfit bomben available In reserve status.
mc-nl in thi* program hai been lhe assignmentew Firebar interceptors toh TAA in East Cermany. This is the latest Soviel lighter tot.eivue and its assignment to TAA unitsontinuing interest in Ihe an defense role of Soviet tactical ait. Firebars aie estimated to have an intercept capability as krweet and to have better all-weather intercept capabilities lhan other current Soviet fighters.
Battlefield Reconnaissance
secret journalsoviet military leaders expressed strongthe USSH's capabilities for battlefield reconnaissance. Thewhich would be availableartime front appear to beproviding nuclear delivery units with timely and accurate target data.uetlal reconnaissance continues to lie the main means totfor nuclear destruction by tactical forces, with lesser dependenceagents, electronic intercept elements, and troop reconnaissancewu have no firm basis for judging what progress they have madethere is evidence that air reconnaissance uniu are testinginfrared apparatus. Bares for night photography, and radioand automatic data transmission devices.
IV. WEAPONS OF AAASS DESTRUCTION
Soviet doctrine groups biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as "weapons of mane beheve that in Soviet thinking the same constraints apply to the use of toxic chemical warfare (CW) weapons as to thc use of nuclear weapons, and that the use of either wouldecision at the highest political level. We abo believe that tlie Soviet leaders would almost certainly authorize the use of toxic chemical agents along with nudear weapons by theater forcesudear war. While research continues in the field of biological warfaree have no evidence of any current Soviet capabilities for applying UW to theater operations and we believe Soviet lactical use ol BW to Im highly unlikely.
Nuclear Weapons. We believe that the number of nudear weaponsto theater forces has increased considerably in the past few yean.weaponsariety of types and yields arc available for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, and aircraft. The Soviet system of command and control over nuclear weapons appears well designed to reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate the use of these weapons. Strict security procedures give Moscow absolute control of all weapons in storage and during delivery to units, through special KGB security units, as well as over thc numbers and yields of weapons to be employed in major theaters. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been firmly identified only within the USSH. For reasons ofeadiness and logistical efficiency, we would expect tactical nuclear weapons tostored in some CSFC depots, but wc liave no firm evidence that they arc.
14
Chemical Weapons. Theave an extensive- sloctpile of various toxic chemical agents and have munitions designed fot employment with tactical aiicraft, rnmiles. rockets, artillery, and mortan. Spray systems, aerosol gen cralors, landmines, and grenades base also been developed. Missile warheads are probably bulklilled with ono of the "V" agents, while other munitionsuse nerve agents of the "C" type or older type agents of Worldintage Production and storage capacily are continuing to expand.
Chemical, Ulotofcical, unit Radiological Defense. It Is apparent lhal Soviet military leaders assume lhat the West would use chemical and biological as well as nucleai weapons in (he eventeneral war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress training lor defense against such weapons. Manual andvices aie available for detection of radiation and chemical agents.
V. GENERAl PURPOSE NAVAl FORCES
increased tempo of activity which clwracterized Soviet nivallast year has continuedontinuous naval presence isin the Mediterranean; submarine and surface ship patrols aremade into the Norwegian Sea and occasionally into tbe Philippineintelligence collection trawlers patrol off all four of the US Polarisoperating bases and maintain surveillance of US military activitySoviet submarines operate almost continuously off the PolarisHoly Look have stepped up thc number of patrols in the north Atlanticregular patrots into the Dorthcentral Pacific Naval-subordinatedaircraft continue to conduct long-range flights over theincluding some flights in the vicinity of US naval operating forces.
Forces
ufcrnariiiej. There areubrriarines in the Soviet generalsubmarinell of these have both torpedo attack and minelaying capabilities. Included in this number are aboutruise missile submarines, all of which are equipped with theissile and nearly half of which arc nuclear-powered. Thean be Sred to ranges upn. depending on flight profile, but the Soviets arc still developing techniques for itsat full range. Thc cruise missile submarinesrimary mission against naval task forces andecondary role against land targets. Included also ate someong range torpedo-attack submarines, of which aboutrc nuclear-powered, andedium-rango torpedo-attaek diesel-powered submarines.
lie independent operations of Soviet submarines, including nuclear-powered units, indicate increasing confidence in die overall reliability ofunits. Existing types of Soviet nuclear submarines can reach speeds of
'Thu t'lL-njie eacludcsbaJliitx nibble rubmarlnes. svhli-li are coniioVred as alialegic
CCRCf
aboutnots. Diving depth capabilities rangeS0foot normaldepth for thc medium-range,lass to aneci for thcI class. Using presently available materiel and technologyew type of nuclear submarine, speeds ofonots nnd operating depths0eet could probably be achieved. Soviet nuclear submarinesubstantial amount of noise, especially at speeds abovernots. The attainmentelatively quiet submarine over all speed ranges probably would require the developmentew class ofincorporating extensive design changes.
oastal Defense. Near the approaches lo Soviet naval complexes and focal areas are at leastoastal defense sites which employ thc. Samletruiseoastal defense version of. Shaddockruise missile is believed to be operational and assigned to tlie Navy, but its deployment pattern is not known.
Surface Forces. In thehe Soviets began to iricreasethe firepower of tbe tlcet by installing missiles on converted and new construction surface ships. The Soviet Navy now hasombatant ships soruiserestroyer-type ships cany SAMs:estroyer-types carry theruisearry both SAMs andruise missiles. In addition to their missile armament, these ships are equipped withsystems and conventional guns. Other combatant ships, not equipped with missiles, includeruisers.estroyers, andscort types, most of which were completedS. Five additional cruisers,estroyers, andscorts are in reserve status, but most of these could be ready for sea in two lo eight weeks. In addition to the SAM-equipped Kashin-class frigate and thc Mirfca-class escort, current major surface ship construction programs consist of Uie new Krcsta-class large frigateew class of probable helicopter carrriers. Boih of these new classes probably will be equipped with missiles. The navy alsoarge number of smaller combatants andatrol boats equipped. cruise missile andine war fare vessels.
Naoal Aviation. Thc main missions of Soviet Naval Aviation arcstrike missions against maritime targets, and antisubmaiine warfarehe navy possesses no fighter aiicraft, relyiog for air defense onSAMs and AAA, or on air cover provided by other services, wliich would be limited to thc operating radii of shore-based fighter aircraft. The force is composed largely ofet medium bombers, moref which are equipped to carry, Kipper or thc. Kennel Alr-to-surface missilehc force also includes jet light bombers, seaplanes, and helicopters. The number of Blinder supersonic-dash jet medium bombers in Naval) has not increased during the past two years, and we believe that most of the Blinders produced in tlie next year or so svill go to Long Range Aviationevertheless, wc estimate that Blinders equippedew antiship ASM will be deployed with Naval Aviation startingur-
-
ing thc same lime, phaseout ot the ASM-equippedill continue and ii reduction in thc inventory of reconnaissance/tanker versions of the Badger will begin.
cconnaiHance-conRgured Bear heavy bombers continue to be introduced. One of thc missions of these aircraft probably is to provide long-range targeto cruise missile equipped submarines and surface ships. Bear deliveries to thc Northern and Pacific Beets svill probably continue through, by whichotal of aboutrobably will be in service. Support of naval operations by LRA aircraft is expected to continue, at least until such time as Nkv-siI Aviation icceives its quota of long-range reconnaissance planes.
Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces ond Sea Lines ol Communications
Soviet naval capabilities to combat carrier task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication arc based on long-range, missile-equipped aircraft and thc world's largest force of submarines. Missile-equipped surface ships serve to back up these forces. Thc Soviets, by sending their ships to sea In greater numbers and at greater distances from tlie USSR than previously, are learning to operate their naval forces more effectively. They arc still hampered,by the necessity of operating their submarines at great distances from home bases.elatively small number could be maintained continuously on patrol off the US mainland for any length of time: we estimate this number, at aboutorpedo attack and cruise missile submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off the US west coast. If the Soviets were able to provide logistic support for submarine patrolsorward base, such us Cuba, thc number of submarines in the western Atlantic could be more than doubled.
The Soviet naval threat to sea communications' continues to be greatest in thc northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Of thcorpedo atiack and cruise missile submarines available for deployment in tbe Atlantic approaches to Europe, wc estimate thathird could be maintained continuously on station. Patrols by cruise missile and attack submarines to more distant areas doubled5nd this increased tempo of Operations is continuinghc submarines employed for these patrols arc well suited for attack against carrier task forces and sea lines ofThc threat to thc more distant sea lines of communications will continue to grosv as the Soviets extend these patrols further seaward in greater numbers.
Capabilities Against Submarines
ince thehc Soviets haveajor cffoit in theof ASW ships, particularly small coastal types. As tlie threat from Polaris submarines grew, tlie Soviets placed even greater emphasis on ASW. New detection devices and improved ASW ordnance appeared. ASW training significantly increased, and intelligence collection efforts against US submarines and overseas support bases became more intensive,
1/
SS. At present, however, we believe tbat thc Soviet ability to search for. detect. ,ind identify submerged submarines in the open ocean it extremely limited.potential lignificanlly increases within coastal areas eootiguous to major Soviet naval bases. Soviet capabilities to identify ami destroy diesel powered submarines detected within lartgc of an ASW platform are considered fair, those againsi nuclear submarines, poor. We believe that the Soviets will continue to deploy new and improved ASW dHcction equipment and weapon systems. Preseni Soviet fixed underwater surveillance systemsery limited range and detection capability, and are intended for inshore defense. There is tenuous evidence, however, that ihey arc altempling loew. longer range system With better 'Boat logistics. ASW surface unrti will eitend their patrols further seaward and the overall eficctiveneis of such units probably will improve, wiih experience.
wo ships now under construction in thc Black Sea area arc probably helicopter carriers- We do not know the reason for this Soviet venture into lhe carrier field, but one mission could be to carry ASW-configuredf this is their mission, these carriers may bc intended to operate with lhe new Krcsta-dass frigates which are being built simultancomly in the Baltic area. Such ships probably would be equipped with the latest ASW weapons. The most effective platform that the SovieU could employ ugainst an enemyhowever, probably is anothero Iielieveow type of altick submarine with an ASW role is planned and may already be inThis judgment is based in part oo the sighting over the past few years of several different, potentially long-range, experimental sonars on modified Soviet submarines, tlie initiation of almost continuous submarine patrols off the Polaris base at Holy Loch, and an increasing Soviet interest in sulmiaririe-vs-submarinc operations. If our judgment is correct, the first sueh submarine could buas soon asafter the first ol llie new frigates andcarriers enter into service. The construction and cfleetive utilization of such ships would improve Soviet capabdilies to conduct ASW operations in the ocean approaches to the USSR. Despite these poteniial impressments, we believe that thc capability of thc Soviet Navy to conduct open ocean ASW will remain severely limited for the next several years.
Capabilities for Mine-warfare
he Soviets possess large numbers of conventional mines suitable for laying by aircraft, submarines, or surface craft, and may havehore-con trolled mineow-yield nuclearignificant quantity of these mines, as welligher percentage of conventionally armed mines with more sophisticated antisweep features, could enter Ihe Soviet mineduring the period of this estimate. Mines could play an important role in Soviet ASW. The Sovietsoored, contact-fir uig mine, with aalenna. It can effectively mine from the surface down0 feet in waters as deep as
* Another posiiWe million ii iliieuueitaragraph on ainjihitMoui oaiult
}'2
eat Existing or new (nil ucnco-firing mines would be used in watets shallower than ISO feet
Logistic Support Capabilities
l present the USSH can logtstsrally support limited naval operations on the high seas tor extended periods of time, and larger operationsew weeks. Sincehey have utilized afloat logistic support toorce of submarines and surface units continuously in the Med iter lancan Sea.uch support was provided to Soviet naval forces cruising in the PhilippineNuiwegiaii Seas. Support capabilities are being improved by the addition o( now auxiliary ships ax well as by improved techniques. Any luilhei major increase in out-of-area operalions would requite an even greater augmentation in existing auxiliary forces, however, lhe Soviets are alsoyslem ol mobile submarine bases consisting ol groups of auxiliary ships which could be deployed to dispersed coastal locations.
VI AIRUFI AND SEAUFT CAPABUIIY
onet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. These contiguous capabilities are beingmarkedly as the capacity and efficiency of air and sealift forces areThe expansion of the Soviet merchant Beet and the development of very large transport aircraft will abo Improve Soviet capabilities to movemilitary forces to distant areas. Developments thus far, however, do not signify any urgent Soviet program to acquire capabilities for opposed dbtant operations
Airlift and Air Assault
he number of aircraft assigned to military air transport has increased in tlie past year. Theight andedium transports ol MilitaryAviation (VTA) now assigned lot the transport of airborne forces are able to lift thc assault elements of one airborne division plus two battalion assault groupsen with supporting equipment)adius of. In an emergency this capability could be augmented by oilier aircralt in VTA and civil aviation. This limited transport capability underlines the importance of tlie greatly increased cariying capacity of,hich i* expected to enter operational service in7 or
SS. Airborne training during tlie past year has included day andimulated nuclear environment and small unit tactical training involving airlanding* of at least battalion size. Some operational exercises have served to develop techniques of command and control for combined operations involving multinational and multilingual forces of both small and large size. Troops and materiel have tseen staged into forward areas by paradrops and airlandlngs.
he Soviet general purpose forces possessook heavy helicopters capable of lifting maximum payloads of alrautonsombat radius of
SL'CRCT
somer SO Ionsadius ofm, and adoound light helicopters. Doth of these nigged and reliable helicopters are available throughout the gcnetal purpose forces and play an important role in Soviet planning for both tactical and logistical employment.
hc Soviet Civil Air Fleet (Aerofiot) is regaidcd as the air transportArrangements enstapid transferart or all of thb fleet to the operational control of VTA. Included in llie inventory of Aerofiot areedium and long-range aircraft which could provide an npprcciablcto the ferry lilt of military personnel in time of war.
ll and Amphibious Assault
hc Soviet naval infantty continues lo be emphasized in the Soviet press. It is organizedrigade structure ofen. Elements of naval infantry piobably exist in each Heel area, but we believe that thc total strength remains small, probably lessen The primary mission of naval infantry appears to be lo support the planned high rate of advance of land operations by short leap-frog landings along tlie coast io coordination with paratroop landings. Naval infantry troops specialize in seizing andeachhead to facilitate the advance of regular Soviet ground forces. Thesmall numbers of troops and landing craft limit the capability of Soviet naval infantry to battalion or brigade-size landings in each of the fleet areas.
mphibious exercises to date have been directed toward improving tin: Soviet capability to seize crucial peripheral areas such as tlie Turkish or Danish Straits or to support thc flanks of the Soviet Army. Two large ships now under construction in the USSR are probably lielicuptci carrien. they could be used in vertical assault missions as well as in ASW. Amphibious ships speciallyfor long-range operations arc in short supply. Deliveries of thc modem Polnocny-class medium landing ship are increasing, but some of these ate being transferred to otber countries- Larger landing shipsew type have re-cently been observed in tbe Baltic Despite such developments, it does not appear that the Soviets arc currentlyignificant capability for amphibious operations beyond waiors near the USSR.
he USSR has been engaged in the expansion of its merchant fleetilitary sealilt capabilities continue to be improved, particularly through the construction ol large-hatchod ships such as those which delivered missiles to Cuba. These and other new Soviet metchnnt ships nro characterized by fairly high sustained speeds, long endurance, and heavy lilt boom capacity, all of which contribute to sealiff value. We estimate that the USSR has the fleet capacity toivisions, under varying assumptions, io the Baltic, Black, and Pacific Fleet areas,ivision* in tlie Northern Fleetuch operations, however, would require ports or other extensive off-lbadirfg facilities in the landing area Moreover, because of tlse lack of air cover. Soviet naval forces would be unable to provide adequate protection for any sizable force of amphibious ships operating at long distances fiom the USSR.
VII. CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES Warsaw Pocl
6*J.vident tliat thc USSH cur. no longer dictate to its Warsaw Paci allies, but must seek Iheir consent in matters which involve them. In parallel with this political development, however, the USSH has been seeking to strengthen thc military command structure of the Pact and lo improve thr military effective nuts of thc Kast European armed forces. Soviet war planning relies on theof East European forces to perform important tasks in Central Europe. Nevertheless, if present trends toward autonomy continue, the Pact will evolve,onvenltonal military alliance and thc range of contingencies in which the USSB can rely on effective support from ils East European allies will narrow.
l* alliance contributes lo the mechanisms of Soviet control in Eastern Europe The Easi European armed forces are heavily dependent on Sovietof materiel and instruction in its use Pact war planning is doneoviet dominated staff in Moscow. In thc event of war most East European field commands would bc subordinated to higlvrr echelons of Soviet command. The Soviets probably believe that these factors, plus strict military discipline. Communist indoctrination, and thc careful selection of East European officers and career NCO's, svill ensure the reliability of the East European armed forces in the event of war. We too believe that this would be tlvc cose, at least initially."
istinction has emerged within Ihe Warsaw Pact between EastPoland, and Czechoslovakia on thc one hand, and Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria on Ihc other. East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakiaearmed Westhreat la their national security. This common appretdiension has ledpecial relationship among these three countries and the USSH which has conferred privileged status on this "first strategic echelon" of the Pact, as Moscow has termed it. Hungary. Rumariia, and Bulgaria, on the other hand, tend to balance Ihe general security offered by the Pactssible involvement in German issues which they do not regard as directly affecting their national interests. In any case, they would be likely to become engaged only in secondary operations.
Ground Forces "
uring thc past year our estimate of the East European forces has changed somewhat. We have reduced our estimate of overall ground force strength sbghtly.nd lhe number of line divissoos irom Out estimate of the number of divisions in Eastern Europe
ore eiiarxivu iliscusiian, ire NIB IMS-OA, "Reliability of tho USSR'sugust)
" Table VIIthe estiraatrd number ofiapron Wuu- Pact line da*<Moa>aad
"Ihrt Kgore dnei noi mitude anm in lhearsaw Pnct imlilai iwil votuuly
Availablc foi early commitment has changed fromis an increaseotorized rifle divisionsankdditional motorized rifle division inank division inotorized rifle divisions in Bulgaria: and, most significantly, we now believe lhat Hungary has ativisionsotorized rifleank) sufficiently manned, equipped, and trained to be considered available for early commitmentartime Warsaw Pact role,"
The equipping of Kast European aimies with tactical rockets and missiles is well underway. Wo believe that most divisions available for earlyhave an organic I'iog battalionauncliers ami lhat each poteniial field armycud brigaderackedn this basis, wc estimate that the Kast European armies currently include utrog battalionscud brigades. There is some evidence that additional launchers may be issued to existing units and that additional units may bc organized during the next several years
The East European countries have detailed mobilization plansanpower pool of several mil boo fit reservists with recent military service. In the event of mobilization ihey would bring their existing forces up to strength and might create new units. The major limit big factor is the availability of equipment. Poland and Czechoslovakia probably have sufficient stocks ofequipment for several additional divisions. Tlic other countries also are estimated lo have In reserve small stocks of major ilaini ot equipment and substantial quantities of light equipment, including viitually all types ofweapons. Wc do not believe tlie USSR would supply much, if any, additional equipment to East European forces during rnobilixation.
We estimate tliat in the event of hostilities East Cermany. Poland, and Caechoslovakia could initiallyotal ofivisions, organized into as manyrmies. Hungary. Bulgaria, and Bumania could probably deploy IS divisions, organizedrmies. We believe the East European Warsaw Pact countries could also bring their remainingivisiorii to wartime strength and augment existing headquarters and support units for deployment withinays, although additional training mighl be required. Because of deficiencies in air and sealift, only small elements of the Czech abhomc brigade and the two specialized Polish divisions (airborne and amphibious) could be.in their nominal rolo if they depend on national assets alone. Should the East Europeans elect to use some of tlieu- low-slrength divisions as cadres for additional divisions, such units would be Infantry-type divisions, poorly equipped by modern standards and with limited organic combat and service support
"However, boo. cfuablaUvemUU--vcbetween the "ln-.Ux.tT "ihrfj Hi-TunJ. aad
Bulgaria tie deficient Ui armored pcraoririel carriers. Tlie tank divuioni la Rumania and Bulgaiia lad. at lea.lt mm tank re/rumen t.
teat-1
Air Forces"
ito East European air forces supplement boih Sovici Tactical Aviation and PVO Thereen increasing indicationi of closer coordination and functional integration among them, particularly in (he air defense role. The East German. Polish, and Czech air forces have been provided with thc Soviet semiautomatic air defense control system. Fast European air defense is thusote effective forward area cttcniion of thc Soviet PVO. Air defense remains the primaiy mission, but al) fighter units are trained and equipped to perform ground attack missions us well. The Czechs and Poles have received Fitters, the best fighter for ground attack now available in Soviet inventory. New lighters such as Fish bed also continue to enter East European inventories.aboutercent of0 combat aircraft in East European air units are older mode! aircraft We now believe that the introduction of Brewer into Eail European foices, which we had anticipated for this year, is likely to be deferred for at least several more years.
European SA-2liave been deployed largely in defense ofcities and other key urban-ind us trial areas. In addition toast Germany. Poland, and Hungary which the Soviets operate intheir own forces, there areites in Eastern Europe.patterns suggest anites may bearc at present noites; defense against low-altitude attacks isby light and medium AAA.
Naval Forces
capabilities of East European naval forces have improvedrecent years. Equipment is becoming rnore modern; thc Baltic andnavies now have missile-armed patrol boats in theirf operational training has abo risen signiGcantly. and lias includedamount of experience In waters beyond the Baltic and Black Seal,Baltic area, thc East German and Polish navies arerowingWarsaw Pact offshore delense and security operations, which suggestsdegree of interflect coordination.
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
umber of years East European forces have participated in Geld trainingimulated nuclear environment. More recently these forces have simulated Iheir own delivery of nuclear weapons. This development, together with lhe acquisition of nuclear capable delivery systems (Scuds, Frogs, and
"Tables VIII aaad* IX pw eatsnutrdand dnjiloyat of Eastarsaw in icerali -il muta. byand^.
European naval strerurlli. bya followi: Balticdestroyr* types,ubmarsnci,imic-armed patrol boats, lot other patrol craft,ndmphibious types; HtaekdettioyriUsCc-amicd patrol boats,liver patrol craft.ursrrweepets, and IS amphibious type).
73
uggests thai East European commanders expect to have access to Mich weapons in the event of war. While we believe that thc Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably bc made available under strict Soviet controL
East European forces hove trained extensively in defenseand biological weapons. All are capable of delivering CW agentsaircraft, and missiles. Tlic Czechs. East Germans, and possiblyhave the capability to manufacture CW toxic agents, but wc haveof stockpiling. We believe thatar thc East Europeanwould be dependent on the Soviets for thc bulk of their chemicalnnd that these force* would not employ sueh agents except uponor authorization.
VII. CAPABILIUES AGAINST THE CENTRAL REGION OF NATO
this section wc confine thc discussion to Soviet capabilitiescritical Central Region of NATO. Soviet units located and probablyfor operations in this area are the most powerful of the SovietOther Soviet forces arc deployed and available for operationsin other regions and to preserve Soviet border securily eLsewherc.
Soviet military writings and exercises generally assumear in Europe would beginATO nuclear attack; war games are addressed to surviving such an attack and moving as rapidly as possible to the offensive. Soviet tactical doctrine thus presupposes Soviet strikes with weapons of mass destruction, in great numbers and in great depth, with thc main target the NATO nuclear capability. They envisage that these initial strikes would bc exploited by the rapid advance of heavily armored Soviet formations at rales of upay.
In such an assault the Soviets would have to relyreat extent on forces already in place, as the lines of communication tu the interior would be subject lo interdiction. They have therefore shaped die CSFCirtual front in being, capable of quick reaction lo various contingencies withoutand have improved tlie capabilities of the East European armed forces to enable them to take part in the initial operations. Although the Soviets proclaim only defensive intentions and observation of theeneral countcroffensive pattern, current dispositions continue lo be sueh as would allow these forces to initiate an attack into Western Euiope.
Current Deployment Pattern
bulk of combat ready divisions and tactical air and missile unitsin East Central Europe and Ihc western USSR for commitmentin the Central Region. If Ihe acmevement of surprise were theconsideration, or if the Soviets concluded they must quicklyoperations, they could launch an attack against thc CentralNATO withmmediately availableast German,
2.5
zech) Anovietolish division.', in Poland,ovietungarian divisions in Hungary arc available for earlybut the divisions in Hungary might not be employed against the Central Region. Twenty-six o( tlieseoviet, East Cerman, Czech, and Polish divisions aie tank divisions: tlse remainder arc motorized rifle. Warsaw Pact air strength in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia consists ofombat0 Sovietast Cerman. Polish, andboutercent ol the aircralt are current models. Apart from thc numbers of combat elements, however, thc fact that thc divisions in Eastern Europe are somewhat undcistrcngth and the support elements arc considerably under-Mrcngth would limit both the radius and thc time of combat which could be sustained without reinforcement.
Reinforcement
Soviet operational concepts for nuclear war, thc reinforcements available, the size and nature of tbe opposing forces, and the geography of the areathat, if circumstances peimitted, the Soviets would seek toorce of aboutivisions before attacking the Central Region of NATO. Ihis force would consisttriking force of someivisionsheater reserve of abouttivisions. Tbc striking force would probably consist of theoviet divisions already in forward area groups of forces9 East European divisions already in placeastnd someoviet divisions from the western USSR. The theater reserve would probably consist ofoviet divisions from thc westernolish divisions. It should be noted that allivisions ofdivision force would be cither Soviet Category 1or East European divisions of the better type
The East European rail and road transportation systemheoretical capacity to accomplish the movement of the indicatedoviet divisions and nondivisional supporting elements from Hungary and the western USSR to the forward area in about two weeks. This theoretical capacity, however, is only one of the considerations involved in realistic estimate of the Soviet reinforce-men! capability- For example. Soviet rcmforccmcnt would almost certainly be by armies. As we have noted earlier, the divisions in armies in tbe western USSR are mannedower level than those in CSFC. Moreover, most of thc army and front-level combat and service support units within thc USSR are manned at greatly reduced strength and some may be only paper organizations. Nevertheless, wc believe that thc last elements of the three or four armies from the western USSR required to completedivlslon striking force could be ready to move forwardeek or so. Tliese armies are composed almost entirely ofivisions; for this reason we presume that their combat and service support units can be made ready in time to move oo schedule. Tlie Soviet armies required for the theater reserve would take longer to be ready to move, but would be the last scheduled to move forward. They would require
Rf+
substitution of availabler II divisions for their present Category III divisioni and would presumably need relatively more augmentation of combat and service supportess effective reserve armies could probably bc in place in Poland within about four weeks.
ther factors bearing on the lime required to reinforce on this scale include the days rcquued toufficient number of Hal cars, delays caused at iransloading points along tlie weslem border of tbe USSR,of the civilian economy whichercent miliiary utilization of the transportation system, and the inevitable confusion common to all large military movements. The assembly of motor transport, which wouldmaller part of Ihc movement capabilily, would impose no delay since vehicles are readily available. Inland waterways and Baltic sealift could contribute substantially lo the forward movement of supplies, but could not materially increase the rate of troop reinforcement. Available airlift piobably would lie used initially for the movement of key personnel and supplies, such as nudear weapons. All of these considerations lead us to beheve thatractical matter, from llie decision to do so. about tluee to four weeks would bo required for deployingdivision force under nortcombat conditions.
oviet considerationround attack In the Central Region of NATO is in thc conteat of an assumed nudear general war. Despite recent Soviet references to the possibility of nonnuclear warfare between nuclear powers, we doubt that thc Soviels have seriously consideredassive nonnuclear attack in the Central Region They would almost certainly expect such an attack to precipitate nuclear general war."
f the Soviets were nevertheless lo decide to deliver such an attack, they might attempt to take maximum advantage of their present deployments and capabilities my assembling in three to four weeksdivision force described above. This would not. however,orce as well adapted for nonnuclearas il could be made to be. As noted above, llie Soviets have suboidinated considerations of nonnuclear combat potential and staying power to tlieof speed and shock effect in Ihe aftermathuclear strike.
lternatively the Soviets, if they decided toassive iiuiiaucleai attack in the Central Region, might take mora lime to improve iheir capabilities for such on operation than is allowed in ibe three to four week schedule. This
" Maj. On. Cheilii L. Johnson, Acting AsiuUol Cliief of SUB lot Intelligence. US Army, believesicaU nonnueUarry real poulbdlty to the Soviets. Ai past NIE* haveThey lealae the advantage* loi an engagement in tbe European theater could be kepi nOnmifJca' and the Sovicl objecUva inonflict would be to preventbe Soviets lealur use raki Unrobed nm there eon be no assurancear wia not eseaiale Manv kading Soviet rnarsaab have argued that tbe USSB mint prepue-foi thc potaibilltyiutracted noiuiuelear wir which (liowi their grave concern over this bkebhocdhiuoearagraph A3 dowagrades Ihehii and put NIE* tbat tbe Sovtei Union haiormidable inherent capability fee nonnuclear war and that they are eipceted to improve there capabilities in (lie futuie.
GCCRCT
timet could be used, among olhor things, to augment the proportion of infantry und to make available more combat support (including conventional artillery) and service support. These adjust menu svouldore extensive rnobili-ration and training ol icservisrs. Tlie end result would probablyarger ['net force in the Central Region,reater weight of conventional attack capabibty. In preparingorce, however, thc Soviets would have to plan
lo keep it balanced against the possibility that conventional combat might
quickly escalate to nudear war.
ttti. The reinforcement possibilities discussed above are subject to manyin scale and in execution Maximum surprise would be achieved by an attack without prcvioui buildup, but we believe llie initial advantageuickly be offset by tlie lack of weight in the altack. Soviet operational doctrine indicates that they svould prefer toarge strikinghc aiea of the main effoit Some reinforcement could even be effected piecemealonger period in an attempt to preserve secrecy. However, the Soviets would have to weigh tbe advantage of this alternative against Ihe value of more rapidly buildingavorable ratio "af forces againsi NATO and to recognize the risk of premature detection with possible NATO counteraction.
Mobilization Base
he Soviets have large numbers of trained reservists to fill out existing
understrength units or to mobilize new units. Thc reservists initially called up would be men who had recently completed a tluee-year lour in Ihc service. About one million of these reserves would probably bc required to till the current force ofivisionsartime strength; thb would involve fleshing out existing units andarge numbci of additional combat and service support units for armies and fronts. We estimate that stocks of materiel on hand at or near existing units would be sufficient for this momliration, although some of lhc equipment would bc obsolescent. Logistic support forobilization would be supplemented by engineer items and motor transport from civilian sources. We believe that manpower would notimiting factor inreater number of divisions, but equipment for such divisions woidd be either obsolete or substitute items. It is likely that such divisions could only be lightly equipped rifle divisions, not comparable to prevent Soviet divisions. In view of the existing structure of their theater forces, it is probable that the Soviets would place initial stress on building stronger support elements rather than on the immediate creation of additional divisions. From what we know of Soviet concepts and materiel stocks, wc doubt lhat any prewar mobilization would go much beyond fully readying tboi vision force.
e know of no organized air or naval reserve units, but the Soviets have sufficient numbers of trained reservists to bring active units to authorized unit manning levels, to create additional units around cadres of regulars, and toreplacements. Wo estimate lhat the Soviets also haveO-
ld model fighters and light bombers in reserve status. These aircraft could be used lor augmentation or replacement of aircraft now in TacticalWe estimate abo that (he Sovietsruisers,extrovcax, andscortseserve status. Aboutercent of ihese reserve ships could be made teady fee sea in two weeks to two months Di an emergency.
IX. TRENDS OVER THE LONGER
General Considerations
Wc can estimate tbe present strength of the Soviel gcncial putpuse forces and the trend over thcyear or two with relative confidence, on the basis of cuirenl evidence. Speculation about possible developments over the longer term must be understood to be highly tentative Thc Soviet planners tiwnsclvii may not yet have established force goals for the periodven if they have, such goals are sure lo be modified from time to lime in response to changes in military technology, in the Soviet senso of tlse strategic relation of forces, and in tin: Soviet view of the world situation in general. In any case, Ihe Soviet general purpose forces6 will differ from those of today and this difference will be the net result of the interaction of conflicting interests and pressures, rather than of any single dear and coherent conception.
An underlying factor which svill hinder any significant change in the diaracter of the Soviet general purpose forces is tbe inertia inherent inarge military establishment, especially one in which the leadership tends to be elderly. The only pressure for change now apparent it the current discussion of the importance of general purpose forces and the need to prepare them for nonnuclear as well as nuclear warfare. This agitation is carried on by men who aie moved In part by the earlier US shift from the doctrine of 'massiveto that of "flexiblet is probably agreeable to tlve political leadership who aie concerned to have effective means to support foreign policyituation of mutual nuclear deterrence, and to vested military interests who seek to |us(ily the allocation of economic resources to the maintenance of large general purpose lorces. Its actual effect on die structure of those forces remains to be seen. We do not think that it portends any radical restructuring. We do believe that it will have some gradual effect over the looger term.
Another factor which will affect thc development of the general purpose forces is the acute competition for economic resources among various Soviet interests. Current Soviet eeonomie planning assumes an average annual rate of economic growthercent- It is likely that current military programs are also based on lhat assumption. We ihink that the actual rate of economic growth is more likely toercent. If that should prove to be the case, some planned military programs might need to be cut back or stretched out. We believe thatontingency would work to tlie detriment o( general purpose foices, laecaute- and tlie sttategic attack and strategic
forces will continue lo have priority in the consideration of (he Soviet leader ship
lie development of thc Soviet general [Mirpose lorces over the longer term will also In: strongly influenced by externalensions arising from the war in Vietnam have aheady contributed to some marginal augmentation of strength in being (as dad thc Berlin crisis. Rising tensions in Soviet relations with China couldimilar and perhaps longerignificant weakening of NATO would also impoitantly affect Soviet calculations regarding their requirements for general purpose lorces, but the Soviets will almost certainly continue to Judge their military requirements primarily in terms of US capabilities and strategic doctrine
Giound Forces
aking these general considerations into account, we believe tliat over the longer term thc existing structure of Soviet divisions, armies, and potential fronts will be filled out more than tbey are in peacetime at present. Tbewill probably be on such active combat and service support units as would improve thc capabilities of tbe force to engage fn sustained nomiuclcar as well as nudear warfare. We believe lhat this augmentation of ma for unit strengths will be accompaniedorresponding reduction in the number of divisions, so that6 there willmaller number of larger divisions with belter support, probably with no significant change in the total number of men in the giound forces. On this basis, wcange0nd IIs compared with the. The difference between the extremes of tbe range leflcds only different assumptions as to the rate at which new-type, larger divisions might be created. Tlie total manpower would be about the same for cltlier side ol (be range.
i Soviel Military
Whether tho Soviets will maintain substantially tlve present number of Category III divisions is problematical The costs of maintaining cadre strength divisions is considerable and they could not be made ready to participate in thc initial operationseneral nuclear war. On Ihe other hand. Sovici historical experience and political doctrine both teadi that wars are won hy the side able to call forth the stronger reserves. On balance, we believe that tbe Soviets will continue totrong bias tn favor otubstantial number of Category III divisions, and that tbe number6 will be approximately as at present,r will be only moderately reduced,
In numbers of men and quality of equipment, the Western Theater will continue to have priority. Equipment equivalent in quality lo that provided in thc West may not lie provided for forces clscwlierc. The lorces opposite China will probably be strengthened gradually toactical defensive force ratherorce capable of major offensive actions. Strengthened airborne
**Tnnar nie&nwly chanjueil In NIL"MainatedECHET.
Pol
79
and amphibious elemenls will probably also bc maintained al combat readiness so as to bc able to engage quickly in key border ureas, and perhaps lo belor limited military actions in other possible theaters, both near and distant.
Tactical Avialion
We believe that tlte USSR will continue to maintain Tactical Aviationorce capable of both air defense and ground attack. Continuingis bringing new generation fighter bombers and all-weather fighters into service, but about half of the aircraft of Soviet Tactical Aviation arc still older models. The present modernisation program will probably coniinuend there'is evidence tliat the Soviets arc also delaying thc phaseout of older aircraft For these reasons, as well as our general conclusion that thc Soviets are nosv paying more attention to thc general purpose forces, wc now believe there will be no significant reduction in the force level of Tactical Aviation during the neat few years.
Over the longer lerm, the size of Tactical Aviation will depend in part on how seriously thc Soviets conceive it to be necessary to prepare their forces for the contingency of norinuclear war. Forar (heir requirement for tactical aircraft would tend to be large, since their nuclear-armed rockets and missiles could not be used. OUienvise, the requirement would tend to decline. Additional long-term factors include thc possible advent of newer, more complex aircraft, which will bc much more costly and svill probably not bc required in the same numbers as the older models to perform the same missions. It is also likely that the Soviels have begun to introduce unproved SAMs which could eventually relieve Tactical Aviation of some of its responsibility for air defense of ground forces. In light of these considerations, we think it probable that thc number of aircraft hi operational units of Tactical Aviation will decline in, but its overall capability will probably increase. However, the Soviets may hedge against contingencies byeserve of older aircraft not in operationalractice they have adopted in the past few years.'8
Naval Forces
Soviet naval activity and nesv shipbuilding programs indicateUSSR intends lo increase its capability for condueting sustained, long-range
"Maf. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, Assislant Chief ef Staff, Intelligence. USAF. would delete the last two sentences ot this paragraph and substitute the following;
"In light of these ee-rmdwations, but particularly in view of Soviet interest in improving nonnuclear capabfliUcs, we think it probable lhal the Dumber of aircraft in operational units in Tactical Aviation will remain at least as large ins ar at present. We believe the SovieU also will continue lo bedge ogainst cooUngenciea by nmintaiouig, as they doeserve of older aircraft not in operational unils."
kit
naval operations. VVhilc thc specific scope and ultimate magnitude of new construction programs is not known, the trend probably will be towards increased production ol ships with improved scakeeping. air defense, and antisubmarine capabilities. In the submarine force, we believe that construction of diesel-powered submarines will cease after the next few years, while production of nuclear-powered units will increase. In Naval Aviation, the new emphasis probably will be on thc acquisition of additional long-range reconnaissance aircraft and of new ASW planes.
IO. More specifically, we estimate that construction of cruise missile submarines svdl continue untilut that production of diesel-powered cruise missile submarines will end before then. If thc Sovietstralegic attack role for cruise missile uuils, construction of nuclear-powered types probably would continue into thcew type of cruise missile with increased range, speed, and accuracy could lie developed for use on these submarines.
Wc believe that production of torpedo-attack submarines will continue, and that new construction will focus on nuclear-powered units and probably willew class. Wc estimate that thc latter, which probably wil) be specifically designed and equipped for ASW operations, could appear as soon asonstruction of dicscl-powcrcd boats will probably cease altogetherlie addition of new attack submarines to tlie ordcr-of-battlc svill be accompanied by the retirement of the numerouslass boats during thc.esult, the propoition of nuclear and long-range diesel submarines will increase from about one-third of thc cuirent force to more than half of theorpedo attack units estimated for that period. Of these, someoould be of tbc probable nesv class of atiack submarine.
In the surface ship forces, we doubt that any new major combatants ssill be equipped with SSMs. Tlse emphasis instead will continue to be on air defense and ASW. Surface ship responsibilities foi defense against carrier task forces will decline further as cruise missile equipped submarines and aircraft improve their capabilities against those forces. Construction of SaM equipped frigates of the Kashin-class and of tlse new Krcsta-class probably will continuend several older destroyers may be converted to fire SAMs. Wc estimate that byboutAM-equippcd destroyer types will be in service. Construction could continue through thc, at svhich time another new class might appear. Some additional helicopter carriers willbe built, and production of amphibious ships probably will continuethc period of this estimate.
In Navalew type of ASW helicopter or palrol plane probably will be developedew supersonic-dash jet medium bomber might be introduced in theollow-on to the Badger and Blinder bombers, but there is no evidence that such an aircraft is under development.
31
3
East European Military Capabilities
e beiievc that selective modernization of thc East European general purpose forces will continue. Although manpower levels of thc anned forces will probably remain about the same, thc military capabilities of these forces will almost certainly increaseonsequence of thc continued introduction of better equipment. Militating against this is thc growing evidence of East European reluctance to expend resources on their military establishments.
GCCRET
TABLE I
ESTIMATE 11 NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS
III
HO II Ol'
Si-,
. IIl.IIaLlI TOTAL
Hunjrarr
0
2
0
2 2
0
0
0 0
0 D
2 4
i:
USSR
USSR...
USSR .
USSR
USSit
Eastern USSR
Wc esUmate thai all of these divisions arc motorized riTlc divisions and thato Category III tank or airborne divisions.
Tbis. nu mix* may bc a* low asr tuhis range rcrleeU uncertainty lo whether all ol the units counted are iu fact divisions
SCCHCi -
K.STIMATKI)F SOVIET TACTICAL AI ItClIA FT IN OI'EUATIONAL UNITS, BY MODEL
I iXtobch
Old
Curre.il
Fisl.bed
Plshhcd
Future
Roundel TOTALS.. _ 5
- There are nlaolder combat-typo aircraft, coloeated with uniu oi TacUcal Aviation, and an) older aircraft in reserve statu*.
TABLE [V
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET OlvNEKAL PUltrOSE SUBMARINES BY
CTOBER IW6-BY FLEETS
ACTIO
...
He>
ol Ship *
Missile
Oa**
D
Obot
11
11
6
-25
Ctuiae Missile
Attack
uclear
Class
I&
f
Class
39
Class
g
Class
II
Class
47
Class
Cites
0
Torpodo
TOTAL General Purpose SubmaHnea. 5
* The previous distinction between first and second line submarines has been dropped. This lable shows lhe total number ol submarines, by clan, which are estimated to be operational in the above Riven years.
KtiTIMATKlJ NUMBERS ANI> DEPLOYMENT UF SOVIET SLMtl'ACE SHIPS UYCTOUEUFLEETS
TVI'KS of
nr.
VI.
IS<W
urface Ships
*
Destroyer Typo*
Canto*
-
1
j
2
Operational Surface
Surface Ships
Reserve Surface Ships CKAND TOTAL SURFACE
54
Gl
S3
89
217
225
231
Firsl line-second line category for surface ships lias beenand ships are now listed ms operational oreserve status. Based on limited evidence it iB estimated thatercent of these reserve units could be made ready for ae. in livo weeks lo two months in an emergency.
" One la Ca&piau Sea.
27
TABLE VI
BSTIHATKl) NUMDKKS AND TV PES Ol- SOVIET NAVAL AlllCUAFT
lloinberi
lirf
Mr-lium Do-nbeta
Unrlgcr A
Ht;
Dli
as-i)
AR-I)
. -
I ASM!
ti BaaiDt*
Patrol Aircraft
Made*
Mallow *
Ne- ASW Aircraft-*
Heavy Helicopter*
Uelrt HallemiaM
1
ofcconhafesaoce
and
TABLE VJl
ESTIMATED NUMBEItS AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE DIVISIONS
v
Eeat Cermany
,
Cifclioalovakii.
Hiir
TOTALS.
orviajoNs
Abn
Arnault La rati nf.
figure* iodieate number ol division! available for early commitment.These divisions arc deficient in armored personnel carriers.
divisions lack al least one tank regiment.
GCCRCT
TABLE VIII
TABLE IX
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT BV TYPE EAST EUROPEAN
WARSAW PACT
I per
Current
Fishbed
Fobbed
Fnhpot
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