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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
6
The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL.
SfbmrfrW fa -
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAl INIELUGENCE
n If fflfl UNITED STATES INTEIUGENCE BOARD
Al litdkaHd erwlaef
16
Authenticated-
SECRETAByO;
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimaloi
lha Central Intelligence Agiru, oed the intelligence organ-rations ot lhcefam.NSA-
Concurring.-
Mr. RiclordDepv'y Di'ceicu o' Cenlrol Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr. lo> Ihe Directoroll>ge/sce and doieooli, Deparl-man) of Stoic
levtenoni General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF,efense Intelligencevlenant General Marshall S Corter, USA, Director ol Ihe Notional Security Agency
Abifoiiing:
Dr. Charles H. ReicWcft for Assistant General Manager lor Admirmrralion. AtX and Mr. William O. Cregar for Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of trweili-gation. the tub|ect being outside of their |uriidkiion.
CONTENTS
PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
L INTRODUCTION
IL RECENT BACKGROUND
HI, CURRENT PROBLEMS AND.
IV. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
V. THE OUTLOOK AFTER MAO
A Radical Dcteiior.tion of Relations
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Prospects for an Easing of theof an ImpioveincotLong-Term View
SEGnsr-
THE OUTLOOK FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
THE PROBLEM
To examine current developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute and their possible significance for the future relations of thc twostatos.
CONCLUSIONS
believe that Sino-Soviet relations will continue tolong as tbe Maoin Piao leadership group retains' But we do noteliberate break in state relations;are apprehensive about the costs ofevelopmentCommunist movement and the Chinese probably fear itson Hanoi
so, we cannot completelyudden explosiondisputeew and more virulent form in the near term.war has added to thc uncertainties and the urgencydispute, the emotions of thc principals involved could come torelevance, and unplanned incidents could provokeand more forceful retaliations. Moreover, the situa Jtiis fluid; it is possible that domestic requirements orcause the leadership toeverance of all remainingcontact with the USSR.
the longer term, prospects for major changes leadinga further deterioration or an easing of the dispute appear toon what happens in China after Mao. The emergence ofregime even more anti-Soviet than its predecessor isof the possibilities. In this event, hostility could reach newintensity. All forms of cooperation, including even theChina of Soviet supplies for North Vietnam's war effort mie,ht
ccasc. 'lliough serious military incidents along the Sino-Soviet border are also possible, both sides would almost certainly seek to avoid war.
emergencenore flexible leadership in Pekingto some easing of tensions. We do not believe ihat anywould offer thc Soviets substantial concessions, but incertain benefits, such as renewed economic and militaryChinese leaders might be willing to damp down thea limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be likely to haveeffects on the international scene since world opinionto expect active discord between then easing ofcould also lead to greater Sino-Soviet harmonyiswar, assuming Its continuation.
arty Sino-Soviet rapprochement in either thelonger term is likely to have definite limits. We expect little orexoneration at the party levelontinuing generalof barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust Moreover,relationship would remain highly vulnerable tonational interestsroad range of issues, and ii China'sto give punch to ils national assertiveness, serious troubleparticularly over the frontiers.
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DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sino-SOviet diipiiii- has greatly mtcnsiCed in recent months. Peking has stepped up (be frequency and fury of its attacks oa tho USSR. Moscow, which for almost two years sought to convey an image of reason and restraint in the dispute, has since August begun to reply forcefully in kind- China accuses the USSR of acting in collusion with the US, and Moscow charges that Peking serves the imperialist cause by refusing to cooperate with the rest of theworld. China claims that the Soviet* leadership is deliberatelytbe USSRourgeois society, Moscow asserts (hat currentand pottcJea io China have "nothing in common withnd each side now publicly contends (hat tho other is beyond redemption so long as its present leaden ere in control.
Hostility between the USSR and Communist China of course, t'*'^ for many years. Serious, though concealed, differences arose even during periods of relative harmony in Stalin's time, and open antagonism dates back at leasthe reasons for Sino-Soviet frictioa and for the long decline in the relationship are complex, and over theubstantial number of issues have been involved in the dispute. Underlying everything have been conflicts of national interest and ambition, someargely traditional nature, such as Sino-Ilusslan competition in Mongolia and Korea, and others which haveargely Communist character, such as the rivalry for political and ideological preeminence within the "socialistifferent stages ofment and great Disparities In wealth and power have helped to creSte'attitudeseneral feeling of ill will between tlie two countries. Doctrinal disajn cements and quarrels over Communist strategy, culturaland even personal enmities (as between Khrushchev and Mao) have all played important roles. Certain key moves made in the dispute have also stimulated discord and helped to give (hi.omentum of its owu: for example, tbc USSR's refusal In theo satisfy China's dem/ Ji for the wherewithal touclear weapons capability, and Pricing's decision
tbe same period to challenge Moscow's dominance in tho Bloc
hree developments appear to have attributed the most to the current ibarpening of tbe dispute First, China's internal quarrels have been acoom-panicd by the mounting violence in polemical attacks on the USSR and itsin (lie movement, 'lhe campaign against domestic revisionists and anti Maoists, part of an apparent struggle within the Chinese leadership, has evidendy encouraged comparable attacks on Mao's principal enemies abroad as well. Seexmdly. China's growing isolation within thc Communistis now virtually without significantfrustrated andPeking, and this seems to have reinforced its determination to remain arroganl and intransigentis the USSR. Finally, the war tn Vietnam has
ey aiea ol dissension, since it involves the most fundamental differenees over Communist strategy and tactics.
II. RECENT BACKGROUND
The present Soviet leaders decided latehortly alter theirol power, that Soviet policy toward China was sorely in need of repair. They apparently believed that Khtushebev bad caused unneoessaiy damage to Soviet prestige and leadership of thc Communist movement by his insistence on engaging polemically with Peking and his efforts to commit otber partiesormal repudiation of Chinese views. Tbey did not wish to compromise the USSR's basic political and ideological position in the dispute, and probably had no strong.expectation that relations with China could be sigruficantryBut they did hopeew approach could reverse growing support for the Chinese within the movement and eventually help to isolate Peking from tbe rest of tbe Communist world.
To this end, Khrushchev's successors acted with calculated restraint,polemics, retreating from demands for an end-Chinese internationalconference, and, in general, seeking to shift the blame for the continuing dispute onto Peking. At the same time, partly to disprove Chinese charges of Soviet unreliability and softness, and partly to contest actively with Pelting for influence in Hanoi, they also sought to reestablish the USSR's credentialsajor Asian power and publicly committed themselves to increase their support of North Vietnam. And, in support of this general line, they placed stricter limits on negotiations with the West andumber of cold-war themes into their propaganda.
Tlie Chinese Communists seem initially to have misread Khrushchev'srom powerlow against mvisfomsm andurther vindication of theirown harsh revolutionary hoe- They soon rebuffed the efforts of the new Soviet leadership to mute polemics, and were apparently unprepared for theof the new Soviet tactics. They were also unprepared for tbc series oi setbacks they encountered abroad: for example, the failure of their efforts to
an Afro-Asian front5 without Soviet participation, highlightedhc fiasco over the Algiers conference; the loss of their position in Indonesia; the characterization of their trade policies by thc previously friendly Castro as political blackmail; and, in general, their growing unpopularity among Afro-Asian neutralists.
Chinese became aware that things were going against them andof their early supporters, such as the Japanese Communists and thcwere beginning to drift away from their camp. But rather thanthey persisted in unyielding policies and insisted that "temporarycould not deflect diem from long-term objectives. Even theirto Soviet allegations that only China stood in the way ofsupport for North Vietnam did not persuade Ihem to modifyspring, in fact, Pekingomestic line which could hardly liave
been fj^hiooed to do it more barm la the mcn-emeol or render it more susceptible to Soviet ridicule and cries of alarm. Indeed, all of the world's Cornmunist Parties have been mystified, by the course of events in China, snd virtually all have been alienated by the antinarty aspects of Red Guard rampages, theof Maoist megalomania and Chinese chauvinism, and the general turmoil which seems to have swept over China.
lit. CURRENT PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTS
The USSR and Communist China today End It difficult to maintain even the pretenseeaningful political and military alliance. Party contacts practically do not exist. State relations are minimal formal, and often not polite. Cultural contacts are kept up, butery small scale. Trade, whicheak of over S2 trillion inank to0 million last year and wiU probably decline even further this year. Only negligible quantities of military supplies are still shipped from the USSR, principally certain spare parts contracted for earner and items of eouipment which the Chinese could produce themselves or obtain elsewhere.0 Treaty of Friendship. Alliance, and Mutual Assistance has not been formally rcnornioed, but both sides have expressed doubt as to its continuingeking has indicated that it docs not counteven nooouarilymilitary assistance, and tlie USSR has clearly implied that in many rircumstances it would not feel at all bound to extend such assistance. The two countries do not even cooperate easily or well on problems associated with the provision of military assistance to North Vietnam. Peking has in various ways hampeacd the delivery of Soviet eouiptneat to North Vietnam.
The Situation on Ihe Border, Tension has existed along the Sino-Soviet frontier since at2 (when0 border tnoesmen in Sinloang, apparently stirred up by the Soviets, emigrated en masse to theoscow has undertaken some modest rednXorcement of its military and security forces in regions near China, especially opposite Sinloang and eastern Manchuria. It has also stepped up its military assistanceongolia and this year began the construction of an ah defense system in that country. TTbe Chinese have apparently begun to give some attention to air defensesas of Sinloang bordering lhe USSR. They haw aho sought to impose stiff new regulations governing tbe use of border riven and have apparently harassed the Soviets along the land rrootscrs as we!L
of the Communistino-Soviet rivalry* wirhinCommunist movement is still bilter and Interne. The Chinesevilify the .USSR, and define thoir views as "universalhethe Chinese to discredit themvclvci in this way and try. for the mostto block Peking's maneuvers. Thc character oi thishas changed greaUy over tbc past two years. The USSR mustwiih tlie split, partly because of the maneuverability it gives partiesanxious to avoid Soviet domination, and partlyumber ofa neutral posture in the dispute, including, most notably, the North
Vietnamese. But while Moscow was ccruronted only two years agoerious challenge to its leadership, today ithina which can count ou full support only from Albania, the Ccounuoist Party of Newandful of tioy splinter groups,mall number of front groups which are obviously Chinese controlled.
Impact of the Vietnamese War. Thc Soviets have increasingly sought to use the Vietnamese war as an issue, against China. They have charged, for example, thatfailure to cooperate had prolonged the war byquick end" to USnd they have employed their aid to North Vietnameans to increase their influence in Hanoi at Chinese expense, and in this they have apparently had some success. But while thus offering Uie Sovieu an effective tool to use against the Chinese, the war also tends to limit the USSR's maneuverability in the dispute Moscow must contend with Hanoi's refusal to choose sides, which means also that North Vietnam ttto accept Soviet political guidance on the conduct of the war.Chinese control over direct land and air supply routes to North Vietnamactor limiting Soviet influence in Hanoi.
The eventual outcome of the war will clearlyajor bearing on thc further course of the Sino-Soviet quarrel The Soviet attitude toward thc war appears to be mired. Tbe effect it has bad in imposing strains on American resources and burdens on American relations with Europe and friendly countries elsewhere must be seen as advantageous. On thc other hand, thc Soviets arc aware also that the situation carries some risk of direct confrontation which. In that area and under present circumstances, tbey must wish to avoid. For them, the optimum outcome would be one which,oliiical process perhapsa negotiation, gaveood prospect of achieving its aims inietnam and thusajor reverse on US policy. Evidently theo not dunk that the moment has yet come when they can set incenario which would end in this way. But should they be able to, in the face of continuing Chinese oppositionolitical solution, they wouldajor blow at Peking's influence among thc Asian Communists which would also go
-far to reestablish Moscow's ascendancy throughout the Communist movement.
their part, the Chinese apparently wish for the present to seestruggle continue, Tbey see itrime examplepeople'sagainst their main enemy, US imperialism. They hope for anwould support their claim that this Maoist strategy is essential toadvance and at the same time diminish Soviet claims to giveguidance to the revolutionary struggle.
IV. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
clear pattern emerges from the most rcccni developments in themutual expulsions of die few remaining students, lite Chinesethc Soviet Embassy in Peking, the exchanges nf diplomatic protestrising pitch of invective, and the hints from lioth capitals of growingover the transshipment of Soviet suppliesorth Vietnam. Ordinarily,
6 ECU EL
an accelerating deterioration of relations such as this might be expected to leadamplelc aad final break. Neither China nor the USSR, however, hu allowed mattersetutaatafL
seems wiUing to run die risk oformal break inrelations, but seems reluctant to take the dual step itself. It almostwants to avoid thc onus for doing so. It may. in addition, wish tototal rupture becauseoncern that this would complicate tbeand relations with Hanoi, and, perhaps, becauseearanoi, ifclioose, might align itself with the USSR.
Soviets probably hope toormal break in stateprobably find their presence in Peking usefulumber of veryreasons, including tho maintenanceistening post. They maythat the rorirmued show of the SVrvict flag provides someany afassstrM* in the Chinese ratty which oppose present Maoist policiesopportunity for contacts with such elementsuture ccoditioosImportant, tbcy continue to be impressed with the probable costs ofa break In terms of their relations with other Communist parties.
A further deterioration of relations appears to be the most likely near-term prospect Inhe Soviets for their part will wish to exploit what they perceive to be growing Chinese weaknesses. They may, for example, state publicly what they have already suggested privately: the Mao-Lin Piao regime is abandoning communism and becoming, inascisto: ship. Some rise th thc frecjuency. though probably not the magnitude, of incidents along tbe Stoo Soviet border also seems likely. Continuedassociated with the transit across China ol Soviet suppliestnam socm almost certain. Forced reductions la the size of diplomatic msdpras arc possible. But we do notebberate formal rupture in state relations between the two countries' tbe Soviets will probably remain generallyabout its possible costs in tlie movement, and the Chinese willcontinue to fear its possible impact in Hanoi
The Soviets are genuinely concerned about the trend ofhlna. They also wish to capitalize on the apprehensions of others and to Insure China's isolation in the Communist movement. For these reasons. Moscow witcontinue to seek some form of international Coraununlst condemnation of Chinese extremism and obstructionism. But the Soviets know that many parties, though hostile to Peking, would not favor an International conference expllcidy called for that purpose, or any enterprise which threatened to expel the Chinese from tbe movement.
A further intensification of the dispute is not Itself likely to alter China's bellicose international stance or its foreign policies generally. It might, however, have some effects on the USSR's foreign policies- We do not believe thatSino-Soviet friction automaticallyommensurate Soviet effort to improveh thn West. But. as China has become more and more
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isolated and discredited, the Soviets hive become less sensitive to Chinese accusations and perhaps less responsive to Cninese pressures (or militancy. Since August, for example, there haveumber ol signs that the USSR has become more interested in some movement in its relations with tbe US. In any case,imple matter of prudence, Moscow's inclinationvoid crises in the West would probably be reinforcedear of possible major difficulties in the East
cannot completelyudden explosion of the dispute intoand oven more virulent form, even in tbe near term. The Vietnameseadded to thc uncertainties and has no doubt increased tbe sense ofwith the contest. The emotions of thc chief actors in thocome to have even greater relevance, and unplanned incidents couldeven greater hostility and lead to new forms of mutual retaliation.die internal situation in China is fluid; it is possible that domesticor pressures might cause the leadership toeverance of allvestiges of contact
V. THE OUTLOOK AFTER MAO
for significant changes in the Sino-Sovietradical deterioration or an easing of theto rest Inon what happens in China. We cannot foresee, however, what isto emerge from the present turmoil in Peking nor can we estimateof possible developments.
A Radical Deterioration of Relations
hc emergence after Maohinese regime even less flexible and
nationalistic than its predecessor is certainly one of the possibilities.egime, either for its own purposes or because of miscalculation, might bring mattersead with the USSR. Thc ways in which thb could be done, and the consequences of such an act, are beyond counting. Hostility so intense
as" to leadeverance of all forms of cooperation concerning Vietnam is
certainly one possibility. Serious military incidents along the Smo-Sovictre also possible, but both sides would almost certainly seek to avoid war. China probably would be constrained by itsnferiority and tbe USSR hy its anxieties over the military and political costs.
Prospects for on Easing of tho Dispute
he present Sovietany likely successors tolook to Peking for improvements in thc Sino-Soviet relationship. They are notind, and see no need, for any substantial changes in their own position. While thus convinced that most of thc movement toward compromise must come from China, they surely do not expect this from the existing ChineseThey may calculate, however, that thc successor regime will be dominated by men less anti-Soviet than Mao. Thc Soviet leaders may even believe that the
prcsent radical course of Chinese policy will liasten tho day when iliac willeaction against thc radical Maoist line.
Shouldeaction occur. Moscow might then Iwpe for some kind of grand Communist unity under Soviet sponsorship, but it almost certainly would not countestoration of the dose relations it enjoyed with Peking in tbe early and. The Soviet leaders probably would try, however, toew leadership in Peking to end China's overt anti-Soviet campaign and Its competition with tbe USSR in the Third World, In Vietnam, and in the international movement. As part of this program, they almost certainly would offer the Chinese economic aid.
A successor leadership in Peking might be'interested in an Improvement of relatiom, but we do not believe thai any Chinese regime would be likely to offer substantial concessions to this end. Mao's personality certainly played on Important solo In setting the tone of the Sino-Soviet polemic and his views also contributed to the substance of the dispute, as didut Mao's departure from the scene and bis replacementoro neriblowould not heal all tlie wounds or remove basic issues. The Chineseas ajustgenuinely to feel that it is the aggrievedhe dispute and that it has been the victimouble-cross, specifically, the USSR's failure to fulfill promises to give China extensive technical, economic, and especially military assistance. More important, any conceivable newin Peking is likely to retain strong feelings about Chinese nationalcultural and ideological superiority, and perhaps racial superiority as well Divergent Chinese and Soviet national interests are likely toource of friction and distrust for many years to
Consequences of on Improvement
evertheless, we believeuture Chinese leadership mightamping down of the dispute andesumption of some forms of cooperation with the Soviets. It might see benefits, for example, in aof Soviet economic, technical, and military aid programs. It inigV see some virtue in attempting to revive the crediDflity of past Soviet commitments to defend Gains. And it might bo willing, in exchange for such benefits, to reduce polemics and to agree to cooperate with tbe USSR in Vietnam If the war was still in progress.
uch an agreement might even include harmony among Moscow, Poling, and Hanoi concerning overall strategy and tbc question of the war's continuation or settlement If, In these drcomstances, tbe decision were made to continue the fighting, Hanoi would benefit from the establishment of Sino-Soviet cooperationumber of ways. It would probably receive military supplies somewhat faster and perhaps in greater quantity; the establishment In China of supply bases for Soviet materiel, for example, would expedite sliipment and perhapsan Improvement In the mix of weapons delivered. iealer degree
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of unity would give Hanoi's political lUtemeots ami wmiings somewhat more force than io the put
a very limited rapprochement between tbe USSR andwould be likely to have an effect on tbe mleanatiooal scene as aopinion has come to expect active discord between the two, andrests in part on the assumption of its continuation. The changesand politics which would probably Bow from any such adjustmentSino-Soviet relationship, however, are not easily foreseen. They mightand verylow renewal of confidence within thefor example,rowth of aoxiety in Europe about thein the West, now that its frontiers in the East were morethey could be more rubsumual, as In Vietnam, and perhaps as in India,fear that any trend toward Sino-Soviet harmony would seriouslysecurity Interests. Some of these effects would probably be presentat we believeimited rapprcchement failed to hide allcontinuing basic differences and clashes of im nests.
The Long Term View
Over tbe long term, to tbe extent that China proved successful in realizing economic, technical, and military progress, Soviet fearstrong China on its borders are likely to grow. The prospectowerful China is probably some way off in Soviet calculations, and would not, in any case, necessarily prevent Moscow from seeking to normalize relations. But It would serve, wo think, to limit the USSR's mclinatlon to consider China as an ally and to reinforce other alternatives in Soviet foreign policy. These alternatives will probably include continuing interest in good relations with Japan and India, as potentialto Chinese influence in Asia, and, overore urgent Interesturopean settlement
On theffr side, while changes in the regime and its policies may produce an interest in normalising relations with tbc USSR in order to obtain economic and military assistance, Peking fa not likely to be willing to pay mucholitical price for such aid. It almost certainly would not accept Soviet leadership in the world Communist movement, renounce its traditional interests in border areas, or forgo its claimseading role In both Asian and world affairs. China's requirements, political and economic, are likely to cause any non-Maoist successor regime to look to Japan and the West as the major source of the necessary capital and technology for China's development
Thus, while wc believe that thc Sino-Soviet relationship could come to be characterized by Improved state-to-state relationshipselaxation in the bitter ideological struggle, wc expect little or no positive cooperation at the party levelontinuing general atmosphere of barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust. Moreover, the relationship would remain highly vulnerable to das!>es of national interestroad range of issues, and if China's power began to give punch lo its national assertiveness, serious trouble could develop, particularly over the frontiers.
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