THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TODAY CONTENTS
Page
Summary
I. Introduction
II. General Deployment of Torces
Division Alignments
III. Capability as Effective Fighting
Leadership in
Employment of
Effectiveness in Large-Unit
IV. The Manpower
Defections to Viet
V. Changeover to Pacification
NOSKM
SMCRET
SEg^ET
SE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The South Vietnamese Army Today
Plans are under way to shift the SouthArmy (ARVN) away from large-scale offensive operations against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army main force units and employ It largely asforce to support pacification activities. The problems and characteristics of the ARVN as it exists today will to some extent determine Its performance in this mission. This study sets forth some aspects of the ARVN's current status and reviews many of its more important problems on the eve of its.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports, the Office ofEstimates, and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnam.
SljdfiI. I
NO fOR^CN DISSEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Up to the present, neither the sharply increased level of US military assistance nor the large-scale commitment of US combat troops to South Vietnam appears to have resultedignificant improvement of the over-all operational posture or combat performance of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) .
The inclusion of major ARVN elements in the planning and execution of combined operations with American forces has, to some degree, improved the morale and aggressiveness of certain ARVN units,two of the three divisions based in the western half of III Corps. In much of the rest of the country, however, ARVN combat performance has been generally unsatisfactory or, at best, marginal, with the result that US and third-countryhave been required to counter major Communist thrusts in most critical areas.
During the past year, the ARVN's forces have been most effective in the IV Corps area south of Saigon, largely because Viet Cong main forces in this region have been weakened by sizable cadre and combat troop withdrawals to the III Corps and
While there hasenerally favorable trend6 in terms of the number of ARVN units considered combatthe over-all capability of the regular army has, nonetheless, continued to be adversely affectedumber of important factors. Among them has been the general expansion of Coamunist military resources In the I, II, and III CorpsZones. The ARVN is unable, in many instances,
to engage Communist main force units in the field on equal terms because of understrength units andfirepower. Another problem has been the ARVN's training. It Is considered poor in quality and
As offaneuver battalions were rated by US advisers asarginally combat effective, and four combat Ineffective
-2-
towa^ conventional warfaretactics The Jn-
sjfjajs*eraggressive andh? iceps 8nd NCOs iain
ofe8!rtion rateomponent arBed forces- especiaUy that of the
J?ouih ?si -uch Al-mc - t 1b', declined somewhat in recent months 1 rP flB8Ucal -hether the induction system or the armed forces can continue to keep pace with losses from desertions and combat casualties.
capableth- ARVN iS "OMWwed generally
internal security in mostew outlying areas, and along
ines of communication. It is considered onged effectiveits!if t0 the "il^ary threat posedrol?Arm* (NVA>tm rftl,?H whether
alone with tne Viot Cong, were Allied and North Vietnamese combat units to befrom South Vietnam.
-3-
NO FORE|^DISSEM
secret
SE0RET
FOfflGN DISSEM
GENERAL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
an ARVN is the predominant force within the South Vietnamese militaryand comprises aboutercent of the personnel strength of-the regular armedRVN forces are deployed by corps zones north to south. For purposes of military command,and logistics, the corps are further subdivided into division tactical areas. 0 ARVN combat troops,0 Id the 1st and 2nd Divisions, operate in the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam which formorps area. 0 regular army0 of them subordinate todd Divisions, are based in the centraland central coastal provinces of II Corps.
The heaviest concentration of ARVN units is lnorps area, whereroops,0 attached to theh,h Divisions, are deployed in an arc screening Saigon and its suburbs on the north, northwest, aod northeast. 0 combat0 of whom are organized under the 7th, 9th,t Divisions, are stationed in the IV Corps southern delta araa below Saigon. Finally,an Airborne Division, reinforced by five South Vietnamese Marine battalions, composes the ARVN General Reserve headquartered in tbe Saigon Capital Special Zone.
Division Alignments
3. The present pattern of ARVN deployment has existed for the past two years, the sole major
akvm combat units presently include four corps headquarters, ten infantry divisions, one airborne division, one Guard Brigade, one separate infantry regiment, four separate infantry battalions, seven separate artillery battalions, nine armored cavalry squadrons, one Ranger group headquarters,aDger battalions, and two Special Forces groups.
SE0RET
NO PO-tfrGN DISSEM
exception being the creation ofh Division in III Corps late
3wo ARVN9th andmoved from Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces to reinforce the delta because of concern over the deteriorating security situation there. These redeployments, which brought the number of ARVN divisions stationed Id the southern III Corps and IV Corps region to four, significantly improved the government's military posture in the delta.
Subsequently, the Viet Cong began to skim off cadres and combat elements from their main force units ln the delta to permit expansion of their regular force structure in the III Corps area. The withdrawals lowered the combat effectiveness of the Viet Cong main forces ln the IV Corps. Communist regulars were largely obliged to disperse and revert to small-unit operations in conjunction with local force battalions. For this reason the ARVN has generally held its own in the delta over the past
onths, although large Communist forces remain there and the area still servesource ofand food for enemy units elsewhere.
the redeployment of the 9thARVN Divisions to the deltasituation ln Quang Ngai and Binhwent rapidly downhill. During thehowever, the deployment of US Marines toand of South Korean forces to Qui Nhonto stabilize the military situation inand Binh Dinh. Offensives by these andunits In the area, culminating In thesuccessful Operation IRVING, havereduced the Communist threat, at leastDinh Province.
1st and 7th ASVN Divisions, basedand Ny Tho, are generally considered thetbe major South Vietnamese units apart fromand ranger outfits. Until six months1st Division was more or less holding itsCommunist main forces in Quang Trl and Thua
_5-
NO FOREU^blS^Kf,
SWCRET
Thien provinces. The influx of North Vietnamese regulars into the northern partorps,was of necessity met by US redeployments. It is questionable, moreover, whether the 1st Division has fully recovered from the heavyof some of its units and officers on the side of antigovernment elements in this spring's political upheavalorps.
The ARVN 7th Division hasumber of successful operations over the past two years which have kept Viet Cong main force units largely off balance in Viet Cong Militarythe northern Delta area immediately belowhe division hasumber of able commanders andey role in supporting the government against coup attempts.
The 5thh Divisions, based in the III Corps provinces of Binh Duong and Hau Nghia, were for some time acknowledged as the leastmajor ARVN units. However, both divisions have displayed signs of general improvement in the last six months. The greatest single factor in improving tactical efficiency, pacification prowess, troop welfare, and morale of these divisions has been their inclusion in combined operations with
US 1sth Infantry Division forces in the area. The division commanders areigher degree of confidenceesult of their direct relationships with American commanders in the planning and execution of joint operations.
Since no major US tactical elements are permanently assigned to Long Khanh Province,h ARVN Division (based at the provincial capital of Xuan Loc> has notimilar stimulus for improvement. This appears to be the major factor in the continued lack of progress in this unit as compared with others in III Corps.
In the provinces adjacent to Saigon, and in the Capital Special Zone itself, political as well as strategic considerationsajor role in governing the disposition and effectiveness of ARVN units. The screen of ARVN forces around
-6-
til
FO
Saigon is designed to block any major Communist military effort against the capital as wellossible movement on the city by coup forces from distant corps areas. Regular army units operating in the capital area thus must be loyal to the government in power. -Therefore the zone commander and the commanders of the airborne division, the marine brigade, and the guard brigade which are headquartered in Saigon and make up the ARVN general reserve and the palace guard, are selected as much for their political reliability as for their demonstrated effectiveness in combat.
iii. capability as effective fighting force
umber of years, the performance of arvn combat units in the fieldis tho viet cong has been adversely affocted by the nature of the training they have received, first from the french during the indo-china war and then from the us ia essence* arvn units have been trained toonventional-type warounterinsurgency environment. this, of course, would apply as veil to the great majority of us combat troops presently in south vietnam, who are on the whole outperforming enemy main force units chiefly through the application of conventional warfare techniques. the basic difference, however, lies ln the mobility and in the massive logistics-support base available to american combat forces in thetactical aircraft, heavy artillery, and naval gunfire. us forces, therefore, enjoy an enormous firepower and quick-reaction capability over any communistapability which is simply unavailable to most arvn units on any comparable scale.
the large number of automaticain force viet cong/north vietnamese army (nva) unit gives it an overwhelming superiority in firepower against the average arvn infantry unit equipped primarilys and carbines.* the bulk of the viet cong main forces in iii and iv corps, as well as nva unitsnd ii corps, are equipped
arvn units have been supplied mainly with us arms and military equipment, most of which is of world war ii design and manufacture. in addition to the usual inventory of small arms and automatic the regular army's heavy weaponsocketecoillessndm. self-propelled and pack, mp, andm.J
-8-
JPGN DISSEM
mm. family of smallma. rccoilless rifles, mn.mn. AAA machine guns,0 rocket launchers. Faced with such superior firepower, ARVN units are generally very wary of closing with the Viet Cong, and rely heavily on artillery and air support in situations where close-in combat Is almost mandatory to achieveresults.
3. Individual ARVN battalions are also often unable to meet Viet Cong/NVA main force units on numerically equal terms. As of the average present-for-duty strength forRVN maneuver battalions, orercent of the authorized strength. Beyond this, the limited mobility capability of the ARVN, and Its continuing requirement to provide security for populated areas, tends to reduce even further the actual number of troops available for offensive operations. Formany infantry and ranger battalions areunable to put moreenield operation, comparedenommunist main force or provincial battalion. This numerical disadvantage is quite evident to ARVN troops as well as to their commanders, and hence limits their confidence and willingness to take risks.
ground forces, on the other hand, havesubstantial capability. In September, thestrength of theS combatin SouthS Army,2 percent. The authorized strength of a
US Army infantry battalion in South Vietnamnd thatS Marine infantry. American units are thus able touch larger combat force in the same number of battalions than their ARVN counterparts. This permits them toenemy forcesnit-for-unlt basis onfavorable terms,
Leadership in Combat
in any army, ARVN combatdirectly related to the capability of the During the first nine months ofinoercent ofwas rated by US field advisers asor marginal. Such factors as the rapid
-9-
NO FORt^Jtmr DISSEM
ret
NO F
expansion of the force structure necessitated by the acceleration of enemy military activity, the lack of an adequate base of experienced leaders, especially Junior officers and NCOs, thewith political maneuvering at the senior officer level, and the^ frequent command changes in top echelons, have all contributed significantly to the leadership problem. The ARVN alsoendency to overstaff its headquarters elements at the sector, regimental, divisional, and corps level with an inordinate number of Junior officers and NCOs, many of whom have reportedly paid for the privilege of avoiding combat duty.
6- The importance of good leaderhip is clear. The 9th ARVN Division, for example, hasood combat record largely because It has consistently had effective and efficient leaders. umber of ARVN regiments have had poor combat records except during the tenure of one specific commander; others, such asdh Regiments, based in Bac Lieu and Phu Yen provinces, haveuccession of able commanders under whom they performedonly to deterioratead one.
Employsent of Forces
the past few years, the mosttype of combat activity engaged in byof battalion strength or larger has beenoperation. The great majority
of these operations have been conducted independently of other allied forces, and have been controlledector, regimental, or divisional headquarters element. When ARVN units have participated in joint search-and-destroy operations with US and third-country combat forces, their role has often been limited to one ofas servinglocking force along enemy withdrawal routes. and larger ARVN forces also have engaged in operations designed to protect rice harvests or clear and hold territory for pacification, and in road-clearing and local security.
haveumber of basicthe conduct of large-scale ARVN operations, first place, many of the multibattalion ground
NO
sweeps have not been adequately coordinated with the general pacification objectives In the local sector and thus have failed to produce lasting results. Secondly, as has already been noted, the relative inferiority in ARVN infantry unit firepowerthe Viet Cong has resulted in an overdependence upon preparatory artillery fire or tactical air strikes against known or suspected enemy positions prior to the start of an operation. In many the enemy, forewarned by the preliminary act iont has been able to elude government forces.
9. hird and often fatal weakness reflected In many large-scale operations has been theof participating ARVN units on the presumed security provided by vehicular convoy deploymentattle area. In many operations, ARVN units are completely roadbound; they often refuse to venture into enemy territory except in large truck convoys accompanied by equivalent numbers of armoredcarriers and other armored vehicles. Such units have often become prime targets for annihilation by enemy ambush units- lassic example was provided in the5 ambush of the ARVN 7th Regiment in the Michelin Plantation area of Binh Duong In which government regulars sustained moreasualties in less than two hours.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, tactical plans for ARVN large-unit operations are normally based on attainment of terrain objectives, and success determined on the basis of executing the prescribed maneuver plan, rather than on the basis of destruction of the enemy force in the area. In addition, these operations are usually planned to terminate at nightfall, thus enabling participating units to return to their cantonment areas either to spend the night with their families or to perform static security duties. This is frequently done at the cost ofotentially fruitful contact with the enemy.
Operatingtrength of three companies or less, ARVN forces have also participated in"small-unitsually withfrom Vietnamese paramilitary units. These actions are normally of very short duratIon, Involving
for the most part routine day or night patrol activity or the establishment of ambush sites along known or suspected enemy lines of
small-unit operations, arvngenerally be faulted for their lack of, and for their failure toactions toward the neutralization ofcapabilities to interfere withaddition, arvn small-unit operationsfrom the absence of clear,and ambush plans. very often,units will establish tactical patternsby enemytilizingambush site for several consecutivetraversing by the same paths and roadsreconnaissance missions.
eness ln large-unlt operations
general idea of the combatof the arvn can be derived from ansome of the statistics associated with arvnandomparison with similarus military activities in south vietnam. is not intended to play upis the arvn. iteneral reference point from whicharvn operations. as noted in thepages, the arvn suffers from manpower,and ground and air support problems whichexperienced in the same degree by us units. unlikely, therefore, that the arvn couldto achieve the level of combat effect 1veness
of us units.
maneuver battalions spent aboutof their available time during themonths6 engaged in large-unitus units spent aboutercent oftime in similar operations. the arvn conducted more largethan did us forces. arvn actions,substantially shorter ln duration,battalion days per operation comparedfor us forces. often, the longer operations
or,
NO FORJ
In Vietnam yield better results, since the enemy is forced to commit himself to combat through the continued tactical maneuvering of the two sides.
15. Aboutercent of tbe ABVK's large-unit operationshe first nine months6 resulted in contact with the enemy. Thisubstantial declinehen the rate of contact during similar actions was aboutercent. US units contact tbe enemy in aboutercent of their large-unit operations. The over-all ARVN/enemy kill ration large operations. The US/enemy kill ratio. ARVN forces captured an averagenemy soldiers per month per battalion, as comparednemy soldiers per month per US battalion. Finally, ARVN forces took an averagenemy weapons per month per battalion and US forces an averageer month per battalion. The latter figures do not include weapons taken from overrun enemy supply caches.
IT. THE MANPOWER PROBLEM
odest manpower buildupby the South Vietnamese Army despiteand battlefield losses. The number ofbattalions"increasedt tbey the fourth quarterhilestrength increased.
while ARVN forcest the end of theuring the third quarter, thegrowth has tapered off sharply. The drop mayin part, at least, to the growingthe South Vietnamese armed forces inductionkeep pace with losses in the regular armydesertions, combat casualties, and otherfactors.
Desertions
nearly continuous rise in militarydating from atonstitutes themanpower problem in all the componentregional andthe South Vietnamese
a orces (RVNAF). The monthly average of desertions increased from5 to0 during the first half At this rate,total desertions6 should exceedthe highest annual total on record.
Moreover, for the first time, the number of desertions in the ARVN or regular army this yearmore than half of the total desertions reported. The average monthly desertion rateersonnel in the ARVN has risen sharply24espectively,3 for the Most of the deserters in all components were conscripts.
The ARVNotal7 personnel losses for the first half7 of whom were dropped from the rolls as deserters. Desertions among officers and NCOs have risenor the first six monthsesertions are heaviest from theDivision.
N'O FORES^'PDISSEM
SLWRET
ShJjtlET
NO FO^TGN DISSEM
number of factors have contributed tohigh level of desertions. One factor isof the army rank and file, like the population
In general,ositive commitment to the Political turmoil, such as6 "struggle movement"orps, has alsoole inthe pace of military desertions.
Another cause of desertions has been the increase in Viet Cong combat strength and firepower, which has resulted in increased physical danger for ARVN troops during contacts with enemy main force units. Other factors include the lack of attention on the part of unit commanders to personnel manage-cent and troop welfare problems, the absence of andisciplinary program, and the lack of prospects lor discharge from military service for many
The dissatisfactions which lead to low morale and heavy desertions within the enlisted and conscripted ranks can often be traced to low pay rates, inadequate dependent housing, concern over the welfare of families, infrequent rotation of units ln isolated outposts, and inadequate medical care of the wounded. Among Junior officers, there is considerable dissatisfaction because rewards, in the form of assignments, honors, andare more often than not predicated on political considerations rather than merit.
A solution to the desertion problem has been of major concern tc the South Vietnameseumber of significant steps have recently
Many reserve officers and NCOs, for exanole. have been on "emergency" active dutyith no real prospects for release. Similarly, feware released at the end of thoir two-year active duty obligation.
NO FOREJf# DISSEM
S0CR
been undertaken In the hope of reversing thet is too early to tell whether the problem will be diminished over the long run by these measures. total RVNAF desertions for the month ofereess than the monthly average for the first halfhile those for July and August wereess. In fact, theas the lowest recorded for any month of
Defections to Viet Cong
10. How many of the South Vietnamese deserters defect to the Viet Cong is unclear. Documents and POW interrogations indicate, however, that there arenumbers of ex-RVNAF soldiers in Communist ranks. Some are defectors, others are deserters who have been conscripted by the Viet Cong after their return home. The percentage of former GVN soldiers is probably much highor in Viet Cong irregular units than in main force units. The percentage in the latter, however, seems likely to rise as the Viet Cong's need for manpowerthe risks involved in taking in their former enemies. This is borne out by the statementsiet Cong lieutenant colonel who defected to tho Vietnamese government He claimed that,ommunist training regiment he had commanded, almost half the trainees had previously served in the RVNAF, The regiment forwarded most of its graduates to regular main force units.
5 Inomprehensive "law providing stlfferfor deserters and accomplices, Including capital punishment for those crossing over to enemy ranks, was adopted. At the same time, legislationubstantial pay raise and other benefits (such as PX and dependent housing privileges) for all military and civil service personnel was put into effect.
Other corrective measures include the adoption by military authorities of modern techniques of deserter investigation and apprehension, and the developmentong-range and comprehensive military leadership improvement program. eries of major security operations conducted in the Saigon area by tho ARVN General Reserve and the National Police have yielded excellent results. Several thousand deserters, draft dodgers, AWOLs, and civilians without properpapers have been rounded up.
V. CHANGEOVER TO PACIFICATION ROLE
1. The new mission of ARVN in the Revolutionary Development (RD) program will bo, first, to clear areas of whatever organized Communist forces may be present to disrupt the securing of hamlets, and second, toVN presence among the people. How successful ARVN will be io this transition is
wheJi Xl the IV Corps Zone' forby OS ground unit;,
the VietttSaBainst
lndication of the number of ARVN units Which will be committed to the pacification support
overed in Preliminary reports on the orps, the 1st ARVN Division will commit two maneuver battalions to each of the corps'four of the division'sinitially will support RD.
rhactical area, which covers
Tuong, five of the division's maneuver battalions are initially to be committed to the RD effort.
Ct tne new rai"ion will have on the mo"Jeof ARVN officers and men Is
wi! JUdBe at It may be some time,
rend can be discerned. Since the ARVN's mission will be to keep Viet Cone
on Jul aSv! BOmay beJ?y 1DVolved lo even more combat thancarr*es out. It is possible that the new mission will result io fewer casualties, but
react"eXtenthow tne Viet Cong
h0decide, for purely psycho-scal.[mons' to concentrate their efforts against ARVN units engaged in RD support, casualties could be
If?lght adverselyARVN morale. Also, Bay beto try to portray the ARVN asecondary role in the war, in the hope of fomenting ill feeling between the ARVN and other allied forces. There is evidence in Viet Coob radio propagaoda that such ao effort is already
Si^RET
3. The effectacification support role on ARVN desertions is problematical; but in any event, it seems unlikely that the redirection alone willritical factor in the desertion rate.
6. The probable reaction of the rural populace to the ARVN's presence in the pacification picture depends in great part on ARVN's performance. The main mission of ARVN will continue to bo one ofrather than one of greater contact with the rural population, but the shift in mission from search-and-destroy to clear-and-hold operations will probably increase contacts with the ruralin the future. Although these conditions will multiply the opportunities for the abuses nnd pillaging by ARVN which have been so prevalent in the past, there is now an opportunityloser sense of identity to develop between the ARVN and the people. The critical factor of troop behavior will depend largely upon the ability and willingness of ARVN troop commanders to maintain close troop discipline. In areas where troops are well led, properly disciplined and behave correctly, they may be expected to be an asset to the RD effort, but the reverse will be the case If units Involved do not meet these standards. Because of the importance of harmonious relations between tbe ARVN and the populace, it is essential that concand and troops committed to pacification be aware of tbe need toavorable image to the people with whom they deal. rogram is already under way in Saigon to provide the necessary reorientation of those units which will be committed to tbe support of the RD effort.
7. In the final analysis, the success of the new ARVN mission is likely to depend, to aextent, upon the degree to which it isand accepted by individual ARVN field Political repercussions could be felt, for example, if the present divisional structure is not carefully integrated into the planning of the new mission, or if division and corps commanders feel that their prerogatives are being diminished under the new concept.
NOISSEM
SECRET
8. Top GVN military planners are apparently mindful of these problems in giving their backing to ARVN's supporting role in revolutionary Chief of State General Thieu has reportedly indicated that there willeed to reshape the outlook of many senior officers and that thiswill be undertaken. The chief of the Joint General Staff, General Vien, has alsooint of stressing his own full commitment to the RD support mission byommand letter to his subordinates. Moreover, ARVN leaders have made plans for the training in Saigon of teams from all ARVN divisions concerning the new mission. These teams are to return to their parent divisions and
initiate similar training programs down to battalion level.
NO FOJ
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: