CENTRAL
SUBJECT: : FOREIGN REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
REGARDING US FORCES IN EUROPE
NOTE
This SNTS has been prepared in responsetate Departoent requesteview of an earlier estimate vith the same title, datedECRET/SENSITIVE). The assumptions given for the present estimate are altered, particularly In that the alternative scales of proposed force withdrawals from Europe areoro modest range. In addition, the paper considers certain recent changes in the politicalwhich wouldearing on reactions to the postulated moves. Finally, this paper prismrlly addresses reactions to the proposed withdrawals and docs not attempt to measure the longer term effects.
xcluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
*
J
reicn reactions to various US courses of action affecting
American forces stationed in Europe. Tho oltemativc courses are:
Case 1: Maintain US cround and air forces in West Germany at their present level.^
: Return to the US one division and some support elements, leaving in Germany one brigade of this divisionotational basis. Dual base in tho US 2l6 ofS tactical aircraft now based in Europe, with the result that atircraft are ln Europe at any one* on rotation basis). The total number of US cround and air personnel vlthdrawn would amount to0 men plus dependents.
Case 3- Return to tho US two diviolons and some nondlviaional support elements, leaving in Oermany one brigade from each divisionotational basis. Dual base in thefS tactical aircraft now based In Europe, with the result that atircraft are in Europe at any one8 on rotation basin). The total number of US Ground and air personnel withdrawn would amount toen plus dependents.
1/ The authorized strength of US ground forces in West Germanyen including five combat divisions, three brigades and supportingpresent US Air Force strength in Europe consistsactical aircraft and0 men.
i tii fl1ip
RESTRICTED-
'/yj .hots
TIE ESTU-ATli
I. RECEffT DEVELOPMBerS BEARING OS LIKELY REACTIONS
The idea that American force withdrawals may occur has become core familiar to informed opinion in Europe in recent months. Any agreements reached to reduce American forces, especially if the cuts are of the kind and scale now proposed, would be less likely to produce the kind ofshock they might havo some months ago. Tho broader public, however, is not as well prepared as the Governments, and the decree of generalthat night be manifested would still depend considerably on the way the matter was handled and on the efforts mode by European leaders to nupport and explain the move.
A number of developments have probably worked on European opinion to make some reduction in the American ailitary presence in Europe seem inevitable, and for some, acceptable and perhaps even desirable. Awareness of the scale, cost, and probable prolongation of the American effort in
Vietnam has no doubt increased. Because this effort Is widely disapproved,
-I
there is in some subtleecline in the sense of shared policies and purposes which had earlier characterized the European-American Althouch there is no way of measuring it precisely, the Gaullist
l/jAiUlllY!,
emphasis on "independence- from American influence appears to have gained sore support, even in quarters where de Caulle himself is not much admired. The feeling is probably growing that the Atlantic Alliance is enteringhase in which the roles and relationships which have obtained in NATO hive begun to chance.
3. Developments affecting Soviet policy have strengthened these trends of opinion in Europe about the Alliance. Recent events have lent still greater conviction to the belief that the USSR's desire for detente in Europe is real. Signature of the Outer Space Treaty and reported progresson-Proliferation Treaty Isave been Interpreted in Europe in this sense. But most important in this respect has been the dramaticin Soviet relations with China ln recent months uhich, richtly or wrongly, persuades many Europeans that the Soviets are now compelled to stabilise and improve their relations with Europe. Heightened Soviet diplomatic activity in recent months, markederies of state visits by Soviet leaders, has nourished the Idea that more stable and constructive East-Vest relations in Europe are possible. In turn, such an Ideaa decline of American influence in European affairs.
h. The ningle most important new development in Europe, however, Is the emergenceew Host German Government which has both resulted from and given new impetushift In German opinion and policy. This has
boon manifested primarily in the priority Riven to on effort to restore good relations with France and to inprovc relations with Eastern Europe. The new government has thus soucht quickly to convey an impression of activism and independence, and to reduce the heavy reliance on Washington which proved toolitical liability for the Erhord administration. There has been nothing explicitly anti-American in these moves, but they have nevertheless suggested that the new government would not be disinclined to see some reduction In the weight of American influence in the affairs of the Alliance.
5. These recent developments do not mean that thereesire in Europe to see the Atlantic Alliance dissolved. The overwhelming weight of opinion no doubt continues to regard the American com!treat to Europe's security as vital. But there iorowing feeling that the time has come for Europe toore independent course. Moreover, although the NATO Governments recognise that the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact countries are Improving, they feel that the threat of war has diminished and that this, together with the changes in the general climate in Europe in recent months, lias made acceptanceeduction of the American presence and influence more palatable. It Is probably also true that the shift in European attitudes toward the Alliance and the European-American relationship described above ia likejy to develop further in any case, whether or not the American forces are reduced.
II. WEST EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS
The substantial American military commitment in Europe for the lastears or no hasajor instrument, though not the only one, of our effort to preserve security and our influence in the area. n the American military presence would probably give some added stimulus to the trends described in the preceding paragraphsecline in American influence, even thouch these trends seem likely to continue in any ease. It might contribute to the feeling that the relevance of American power and presence to Europe is declining and that American influence and policies merit less attention and accccaodation from the Europeans. And, generally speaking, it is to be expected that the larger cuts envisioned inouldreater potential for adverse developments in American relations with Europe than would the core modest cuts under Case 2.
The political context in which the cove was made and the tact and skill with which allied assent was obtained would perhaps be more important than the difference in the size of the two drawdowns. If agreement is reached, after duo deliberation in appropriate Allied councils, that the move is acceptable und perhaps even advantageous In the present stage of East-West relations, the political risks would bo small. If the US makes what is seen oo innilateral decision, for reasons of its own which are not persuasive to the Allies, the political risks could be The Europeans vould then be less concerned about the actual
.Jii liE
! i
elxo of the cut than with what they thought it meant for the general direction of US policy, and in particular for the future of the American commitment to Europe's security.
8. Underhere would bo some political risks but these would be offset by definite political and military advantages. Uncertainty about possible future US moves to reduce forces would remain as an unsettling factor in any case. But there are Important differences betweenndnd 3* Those Vest European reactions of suspicion and concern which might arise from US force cuts in the present atmosphere within the Alliance would be avoided under Caseince the visible symbol of the US security commitment vould not have been altered. West European doubts about NATO's validity and longevity wouldertain extent be mitigated. Finally, creator flexibility would be retained for approaches to the USSR onforce cutseciprocal beols.
A. West Oermany
9- We believe that the Kissinger government would bc much more willing than its predecessor to accept US force reductions. The new German leaders apparently already expect that some cuts of US and British forces in Germany will be made, and they are almost certainly considering, not how to forestall this development, but rather how to react to it and perhaps capitalize on itolitical issue. Bonn would probably agree
U^mVE
fairly readily to the smaller of the proposed cuts. At present it might be reluctant to accept the larger reduction, but it could probably be brought around to do so by careful and deliberately-paced negotiations. Iloreover, the Federal Republic wonts to hold Its offset payments tonimum in the future,ower level of US forces would allow It to argueeduction of such payments. In oneS cutback might be regarded with positive favor by the new Bonn government. In their present efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe, Kicsinger and Brandt could exploit the US cuts, and Bonn's acceptance thereof, botherman contribution to detente in Europe andasis for urging reciprocal Soviet moves.
10. The new government in Bonn with Its large parliamentary majority would also be much more capable than its predecessor of managing therepercussions inside Germany of us force cuts. Gerran politicians who wished to appeal to nationalist tendencies and to reduce the US role in German affairs would of course cite any cutbacks as evidence of American unreliability. Efforts by the Bonn government could, however, help to minimize tho effectiveness of such appeals. This could be best donenited coalition, but there is soce risk that moves to redefine the German-American military relationship could in themselves be divisive.
11. The eventual risks which Blenthange in the Cermon-American military relationship are not all measurable now. If the CLU-SPD coalition should prove unstable, if Bonn's new initiatives in its Eastern policy should be frustrated, if US dealings with the USSR nourish the view that Soviet-American detente Is developing at the cost of Germanhen German opinion might in retrospect magnify the significance of aof U3 forces, seeing it as tho turning point at which the American commitment to support German aspirations manifestly weakened. This is why so much hangs on the manner in which the decision for US force cuts is undertaken. An unhurriedot conducted under pressure, which ended with Bonn fully and freely committed to the decision, would help to minimize the long-term risks.
B. Implications for SATOJhole
12. Since cither of the proposed cuts would leave substantial American forces In Europe, they would not, as isolated measures, be Interpretedeliberate US disengagement from Luropean affairs. Some Europeans would sco them, however, as the confiriratlonrend. Either of the cuts would add to the continuing debate that has developed in Europe about the future of the Alliance, but this debatessuming that the threat of war continues to remain remoteill probably intensify anyway over the next several years. In addition, all members of the Western Alliance except
SEIEITiVE
France still want NATO to continue ss on instrument of Atlantic political-nilitary cooperation, in port because it lo neenramework in which to contain the Germar.s. US cutbacks of the size indicated nicht in fact rouse some member states to try to insure thatove did notignificant decline in American involvement with Europe's affairs.
he proposed cuto would to sore extent bolster de Gaulle's efforts to destroy the organizational superstructure of NATO and to undermine the US position in Europe, but probably only marginally. They would generategreater receptivity for the Gaul list argument that the us commitment to Europe is unreliable, and de Gaulle could be counted on to encourage suspicions that small cuto wererelude to larger ones. Such tactics would probably gain some support in other West European countries for French policies, if not for French leadership.
Great Britain will almost certainly cut back the British Army of the Rhine whether or not there ore US cuts, because it is now clear that tho Germans will not meet offset costs to Britain on the scale demanded. US actions might affect the timing of British moves, and would certainly allow London to Justify cutbacks more easily in European eyes. Unless the US Itself helped with the British offset problems, the size of the British cuts will probably not be much affected by what the US docs. On the other hand, among all the allies the British would most clearly understand that
-
Sressttive riitkigtm KTSSSi
US cutbacks of the sizes indicated did cot portend an American pull-out from Europe. T0 allies, such as Canada and Belgium, would also probably reduce tho size or alter the composition of their military forces In KATOS cuts.
15. In general, although some combers of RATO vould be. disturbed by implications they might see in the US move, none of them appears to be particularly worried about an immediate threat of Soviet aggression, and none would build up its own defenses In response to US cuts. But most of them will wish totrong US presence in Europe continue, not only because of the potential Soviet threat, but because they regard itestraintossible revival of German nationalism andranco-German combination prejudicial to their interests.
III. bsortaircsiffi HDDALTTIFS AHD TUQBG OF US FORCE RZDUCTIOHS
16. The prospects for minimizing the adverse effects of forcein ISirope would be significantly influenced by the way in which the issue was handled. If the cuts followed careful consultations in the existing trilateral mechanism and in KiVTO, and if tho result were an agreed drawdown and agreed arrangements on offset, we believe that thein Germany and elsewhere would be nanageable. European reactions would be much more negative if the cuts were carried out precipitately
-
^-cmUH-tVIMIsi'TIVE
and If sufficient tlce were not allowed for careful consultation. It ia especially important that any actions to chance force levels taken by the British and ourselves, and possibly others, be so coordinated and timed aa to reflect KATO acceptance of the strategic as well as other considerations which prompted the change.
17. In West Germany, it would probably help to play up the beneficial effect which us force cuts might have on Bonn's Qstpolitik. In Europehole it would probably help to emphoslze the us moveontribution to East-West detente. ersuasive argument could be advanced that increased firepower, mobility, and capability for reinforcement would allow cuts to be made without danger, the us case might also be buttressed. Most other possible rationales which the us could use vould tend to heighten rather than mitigate adverse reactions. Explanations vhlch emphasized the financial and manpower needs of the Vietnam war, or us balance of paymentswould imply to Europeans that the us really was being forced to reduce its commitment to Europe. Explanations which emphasized Germano accept satisfactory offset arrangements, or the unwillingness of othor European nations to maintain adequate defense efforts, would also suggest that the us vas reducing its commitment to Europenot because it had to but (in European eyes) because of pique with the Europeans.
-
i>'llYE
nntn'
The tin!rig of US force reductions would also affect their reception. The German response would probably not te very favorable, and German efforts to cushion their public reception not very helpful, if widespread German uneasiness in connection with the nonprollferation agreement still.persisted. On the other hand, should the problem related to this agreement be resolved, the Gerean response might be oore helpful.
The European reaction to force cuts would also vary depending on the status of the Vietnam war at the time cuts were formally proposed. If tho proposal caneeriod when US activity in Vietnam was still expanding, most Juropenjm would be convinced, whatever the US said, that the cuts were prompted mainly by the var, and that the US was becoming ever nore involved in Asia at the expense of its commitatent to Europe. On the other hand. If the cuts were proposed when the Vietnam var appeared closer to resolution, rationales which at present wouldegative effect on European opinion might then be accepted or eveneneficial impact. Reductions atime might also increase the chance of reciprocal
cuts of Soviet forces in East Germany. Moscow would presumably no longer be under pressure to avoid actions which would mafce it easier for the US to strengthen its forces in Vietnam.
IV. COWOTIST REACTIONS
90. There have been no developments in recent months which uculd substantially chance Soviet or East European responses to UG troopin Germany. The Bloc States would sec the cut as favorable to their present policies toward Western Europe. Moscow would probably continue, at leastime, its present conciliatory line toward that area. Whether or not US cutbacks occur, the USSR in the cooing year will probably accelerate its diplomatic campaign to stir up discussion and ferment on the general subject of European security. It would probably regard US.force cuts as something which night enhance the prospects of these diplomatic efforts, by making Vlestittle more willing to deal with the USSR independently of the US.
21. We still believe the chances are good that the USSR would, after it had taken some time to appraise the political-military effects of the US withdrawals, unilaterally carry out some withdrawals of its own in East Germany.^ Moscow probably would not wish toormal agreement on this, however, at least until the Vietnam war had reached someand probably even then only in the framework of broader East-Vest undertakings which vould have the effect of consolidating the status quo in Germany. We do not believe that the recent intensification of the
Maj. Gen. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that, whilo aof Soviet withdrawals exists, available evidence is insufficient toudgment that "the chances are good that the USSRcarry out some withdrawals of its own
--
y-BsCKfblTIVE
Sino-Sovlet dispute will make it necessary for the USSR to withdraw troops from East Germany.
22. In general, the reactions of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies to the coves discussed in this estimate would be such the same as those of the USSR. The ideaeveloping detente on terms which the East has advocated would be congonial to them. Thoy would welcome the opportunity to develop their trade with Western Europe, ond would hope that military burdens could be eased. Some of them might want to move faster inrolotions with Vest Germany than East Germany, Poland, and the USSR nould wont. Rumania, for example, would welcome changes on the Euro peon political scene which would permit it greater freedom in pursuing its own interests with Western European states. The USSR might think it had reason
to be concerned about the degree of independence that would develop in time
from the assertion of such interests. But unless there were fundamental changes in the political and military structure of Europe, the basic alignment of these countries with the USSR would not be affected.
nipraioTUD praam
-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: