NIE 13-7-67 - THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Created: 5/25/1967

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intelligence estimate

The Chinese Cultural Revolution

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

r Ih* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai Inattotad overleaf7

Thm following MoliigofKa organixarionthool Ih'a ottimoltt

tbe Ceihol n'ali aoncn Agency ondrganiiolioni ol in* Depart, menti ol j'Lito and Defenw, ond ihe NSA.

Concurring!

VltJ Adr- aylor, Deputy Director ol Cemroltajhn, tW Dndor ol InieKgonc* and RnmroV*

U Gm iotepk ft Carroll. Director,ttHgimoen. MotKoM S. Conor, mo Director, Notional Security Agency

Abtfainingi

Mr.rown,he Atiltiont Generoi Monogw, Atomic Energy Com-mltrion and Mr. VYiltom C.ho AnitloM Director, federal Burton ol Irnenltgarlon, tho wbjeel being collide of their huiidicrio*.

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whhln the mooning of I

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contents

CONCLUSIONS

DKCVSSON

L THE COURSE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

n. MAJOR EFF5CT8 ON THE SYSTEM ANDETY ..

loriltoafafri

to the Party Stoactura

C MilBaiy

lo the Kconooriy

Policy

ERecti on Society

HE OUTLOOK

THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

CONCLUSIONS

political crisis to Chinaonthe several possible outcomes, noistinctly moreothers. Bnt whatever Its ultimate resolution, the GreatCultural Revolution has already done immense damage toleadership and the party, has profoundly altered the Internalhas greatly unsettled all levels of Chinese society, hasnew forces of instability, and has contributed toIsolation In the world.

have no evidence that tbe Cultural Revolution bas yetsignificant effects on tbe military capabilities of the PLA oradvanced weapons programs. Bu' the PLA is assumingmore noncombat tasks and if thb trend long continues Itcertainly affect lb com bat capabilities.

and confusion are likely to persist so loog aasufficient power and vigor to push hb designs forparty and combating real and imagined threats to hbpolicies. Mao could misjudge bis power position and go toola now heavily dependent on the military for support; toolo bridle the armed forces couldoop againsteven fragmentation of the country and civil war. But thesecases and we think it more likelyasic tendencyof national unity will persist, despite the divisivethe Cultural Revolution.

beyond Mao. tbe Cultural Revolution has madelikely that the succession willisorderly andThe military mayecisive role, but Lin Phvonecessarily be their candidate. ollective mcUidlng Chou

En-lfli, (onto of tbe military leaders, and even tome of the nowpartyight emerge. In any event we believe that marry of Mao't dogmas, and practices are likely to be set aside. This mightradual process, though it could come mora rapidly if unresolved Interna] and eternal problems have been aggravated during the last months or yean of Mao's rale.

E. The political crisis, has already focused theenergies and attention on internal affairs and has at least temporarily damaged Chinese prestige abroad. Within this context, however, China haselatively active foreign policy, though It has become more rigid in International Communist affairs, For tbe most part Peking has maintained policy portions which were well established before the Cultural Revolution began. As long as the Maoists retain control, Peking ii unlikely to make any important changes In the general hne of Us foreign policy. At anyhe short term, an remitting hostility to the US and the USSR Is likely to remained eminent feature of Chinese foreign policy. It il possible,that over the longer term, internal changes In the direction of modcratioo, if they do occur, will create more favorable conditions for reappraising foreign policy and perhaps for Introducing elements of greater moderation.

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DISCUSSION

L Only two years ago. tha fortune* ol Ccaronurast China arerocd lo be rtsmg. .'rrtarasllv,rsfeny was im itilinos, (torn the dan it in of the Creat Leerp Foewd and tht apt* wttb the USSH Chancre scJcolWs had already exploded their Snt atomic device Even the problem of tiicceeaion to Ibe aging Mao seemed to bo infely resolved In favor of Lhi Shno-elunified collective leadership.hina was making progress in its dispute with tbe USSR; hnrusttbev. the arch-enemy, had fallen In disgrace; leveani Anon Ccanrraaniat PariSr* adhered to Onan'i bloc and there ami sap-poet road sympathy fromwide variety of other Cornmuolstt as Km ope, Latin America, nnd Africa. In Vietnam, the nrcceai of the Viet Cong pronnsed early vindication of Moo'i hiso on urrned liberation Trendi In Djakarta aho held out the prospectornirrunbt weena that would outflank all ofAlfa.

1 Now Iha outlook for Chm* has been dnatftraKy altered. Itsorry eorsdittoa. Tae Chief of State and theret-ry of the

C

ar* In disgrace, ncranes! of ircnrSMvy. Old nvemitinnaiy war heroes are tditod. homiaisg iltnolions abroad have turned sour and foreign fricrxb hove been alienated.early Isolated.aw wreks early7 there were serious and widespread disorders. The Creat ProielirUnRevolution has plunged China Into the greatest pedhtral ertna as themmMatary-

I. THE COURSE Of THE CWTUHAl IKVCXUThON

neams likely that tension* have been building up In tho political leadership during the yean after the collapse of the Creat Leap Forward nnd tba humiliating .cereal from thategree of .ability and order wa* achieved, bat at the coat of abanrksratng many of Uao'iDaring this period Men was remarkably withdrawn, though the various political and ideological oimjnigns come and worst It may be that Mao's political powen were partially drcssmscribed and his iaitbtivm blunted. It ii likely, as tlie posters liava claimed, that soma of his lleutniaivts did nothim regularly and thus took wove decisiceo out of ha)bb probably led Mao to seek means to reassert hts snrtboelty and drxtrines over the country.

4 Mao has an almost mystical faith so what mobilued end indoctrinated mauei can arcornplrih. This lay behind such movement! as the Leap Forward and tho Socialist Educationrecursor of the Cultural Revolution. His approach itreuet idcolrrgkal (ndoctrinallon and the Inevitability of struggle in political doveloprnent Indeed, has preoccupation with "contradirlicns* may hove Ind ban to exaggerate the dangers of enpsnhstlc andemnants sohai, he rats smhted en 'rirslnieiruptod revolution" as the emails to combat what he teaasraanent threat from tho right Others among

JECgE*^

the leadership apparently believed thnt these matters could and should be in the Interest of getting on with the business ot* constructing a

any case, Mao's dissatisfaction with the poetical situation muttgrowing We know from his couvonuiltoai with foreign visitors thatbtswUng over China's future. He Indicated hb concern over bowmight be left for Urn to complete hit revolution lie eajnosarxlOver the ourtoak of tbe younger generation, unified tnha was more and more obemead that Soviet-style resuncoiirn mightespecially after bas death. Many of the themes which becametbe Cultural Revobfcoo were itrlkmgh/ expressed in the polemicsUSSH, especially la nucblflrH

was In thb state of latent tensions that new policy lasuu mustdifference! with Id the top command In Peking. Tbo Vietnampartloular and tho threatar with the US were such issue*.them was the question of faint action in Vietnam with the USSR.was the practical questionhird Five-Year Plan. Perhaps thetraioneela added to tba strains. Mao's factiousness may have led rumpobry cbsagrecaneot as disloyalty. But to any oven,ao had opparrndy decided toow igaiastWhether these policy differences were the reason or merelyto open no attach Is unoloar. Moo may have decidedIn tbe aftermath of the Croat Leap, that Us opposition In tholo be removed if his general Una wero to bo bimlernented.

Ac underlying Issue roust havo boon the question of Mao's sucooaaor. For years ii hod been widely known thai Mao had designated Lou Shoc-ehi. But ai hat distrust of the party apparatus grew, he began to build up tbe Peoples liberation Army (PLA)odal of orthodoxy and to eobaoca tbe preatJge of sn Wader, Mirabel Urn Tma. TMs taustrion added to th* concnortano aad struggle and becsmte porticuhuty acute after the Central CcmmOtr* plenum last August, which connrtned Lbs aa the beerhoie wbo had staked tbatr careers on Ii* went struggling to survive his decline and downfall, aod those around Un were probably trying to capital Ire on his new piurntawee.onaoquonce, political maneuvers have been tense and convoluted. Not only were leaden acting to protect their own careen, but we assume tfut, wherever possible, they took the oppornmtly to embarrass or eliminatebe curtoe* charges against Implausible culprits suggests tbatocks were rkfldrriii* to setuc olde cannot completely discount repeated references to an attempted 'coop* r*l that time Mao may have detectedbat hes ottos/apis to usurp hot power. Or, more likely, those loaders who saw UsrnaeJvos rJuueteeed by the campaign launched in the fall of ltTO may have taken deJeruiv* measures to counter Mao.

The Cultural Revolution has passed through various phases. When It first became public In the springt appeared limited to bringing down the

II. MAJOR EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM AND THE SOCIETY

A. Consequences for th* leadership LL The party purge has virtually demolished the lop aeacWthrp. Within the

Central Committne, no raore than otaKtard of the rneonbers ate apporeotly in

goodOf theember InataOed ta theugust 1m&re Mia clearly In goodppear to have been purged, and tbe laraednder have come under varylag degrrra of attach There -eemi to be oe clear pattern tn ihese actsoru.e leftists and presumably loyal Macests have fail ten, while some leaders aim were thought to be more moderate have survived. The beneficiaries of one round of the purge have- Irimnd out lo be the neat victims. In tome cases, loaders who were purged many years ago have baa rconotated and asm mod rrripartaot posit.

ny evert, Mao bat stripped away ansoh of tbe experienced command that bat run China for the pastore. Ho it now reiysngroU, mconaruous poop headed by Lin Ptoo and Cboo En-bu, and trachodmg Moot wife, his ghost writer and ideologue Chen Po-ta, and Kongartytary with long associations with the tecrot police. Beyond this hardhere has been no Matin group that con bo identified, and there ore probably divisions and rivalry within tbe hard core.

It Mao has not ordy demonstrated hii ability ta bring down prestigious leaden but alto his willingness to do It regardless of their poattion or previous allocution with him. In these circumstances no one, rnchtcUng Cboo Eo-lai and Lin Pioo, con be sure of tba furore. There mustreat reauctSBca at all Irrob lo oasunse reopcaafiooiry or to tabs SJtiativcj, The nuvivirg le*deniiporks ta on afrcsestaVae of deep motnol snwaciOn with personal survival on ever present concern. That situation mutt be having highly adverse enters oe tba dociaienvsnoktog proceas al the notional level Not only are many of Ifsa most oiportonced officials bow ta disgrace, but those remaining must And It difficult to carry on objective diicuKions on key economic, miliary, ond foreign policy Issues In tho midst of Ihe strain and suspicion Induced by Ihe Cultural

B. Damage lo the Party Structure

IS. Mao probably hunched hii attack on tbe. party not only to reduce Us role, at least temporarily, bid abo to reconstitute tts Wckrabip. The extent and the tenacity of the opposition, however, may have fcoccd Mao to widen his cam-

paign beyond what ho originally intended and to resort to moss action against the party by eara-porty instruments. Even party officials spared In the purge have beau humiliated by criticism and self^ridsm. Tho result has been coo-fusloa In the party's chain of command, depressed morale,eneral erosion of authority throughout the apparatus.

osMblo that Mao intends to restore the party apparatus to its former place of authority. Thb couldong and difficult process, pariicuhrty if the

central tuithiwitr ibould itsell lock itrcurth(truly. Al present the party apfojatmchicredlted and mat coofend with aa arraeapraar* coudaacned by Mao's own attacks oo tba principle oi unqtcatnned cexdiroo? to party authority. By undermining one ol tho main prop* ai hu power, and pWMi tho enmity of party leaden, Mao tint made hnrnolf more depe&Jenf qq tho military.

C. Military InveJverrierrt

Tba PLA now oocapist sn Important, perhapi decklva role to Peking and throughout China- On tba pobnoal front It haieading poKtloo tn rbo provnaonaJ adroiniitratrra orpni now being retoreover, it has been qerognod admealiti^ln and controlccetwnh1 andecuritythroighoot tho country. Tbut far tbe PLAs ptuury action hu been to reolore order and maintain liability. But in orauming muefa of the party'i taction as an organ of control, th* PLA bat greatly enhanced in already poworful poution.

The cboco of recent months, however, has also raised doubts about the cohesion of th* PLA'i top leadenhto. Facuoaahsm has abaody appeared ot thai level aad thereeen purges of important mnatory Iguraa. Although the ncmben do aot ccenpore to the karoo In the party, tbe total may be large. Some military leaden may have been irr.plieotod becoua* of Horn personal Dee with disgraced party figures, others may nave ccmoted the Cultural Revobjtkm within the army, ond itill otbert may liovo been reluctant to tee the PLA used in tbe political itruRgle. Tmii far, the PLA has gcorrally rMpondcd to Peking dfeectrvai and utfaarity.

actor which eeofiauej to be dMatva fa the military kedetsbfp tt tbe cad Issue of whether to etnas pahneal todcctria*Oon ot tbaf prcaeo-tiooa! Mining If die wnsroader range of ipuoabtpote; for erarmpeo, lb* Introduction of lorge-tcale US fortes in the Vietnam warprovoked debate over the likelihood of war with the US and the proper Chinese responoo. In thb ennteat, the advisability of "fouii action" with the USSR was akocot certainly debated, both within the PLA aad the top political leadership. Whatever the Issues, tbe PLA haa demonstratedotto tb* pokey dotereraces that ore troufjhng Ihe regime. Whim tins is notnactlon of tbe Cokurol RevokjOoo. the ceoslusaoo of tb* campaign brouglit loteot pnib'emi to the aurtaca aad accentuated tha policy disputes.

e hav* no evidence that tho Cultural Revolution has yet bad anyeffect! on the military caica of Ihe PLA or on Chlna'i advanced woaponi program* But the PLA la uiiiming more and more noncombat task* and if this trend long continue! it would almost certainly allect Rs combat

af On nmiuOamrj mum, *mi ftrear.oMnUtnd

tofeortoeoy'

IL Dcapit* the radical tone of ibe Cultural RevcJuticai. ihc regime's rcorcmic pclkia hive continued generijfy mederair. Tha rsrobnbly naVcts, Inealistic appnctrrtiOn of tha mmmn to tba eos*orry that wcoldfrom serioui disruption* la agric-ltur* end Industrial production. Therefore, the Cultural KcvJutki" wai not directed Into tba ferros aad fartortea until the endoofuifon wa* Irnrnedlato and affected manyorkcri left theirat) treniport was interrupted; pcaaanti dcirurnded more grain, andwa* diiruptod a* worker* demanded moreheac were partly spontaneous rwactiom. Bat, In addition, many local party uutiioritirs, tearing for their own po*ttIona. cormrvod to eniourage the wceieri anda theiropang to spread csxsrautoa and thereby force Peking to pull (sack

tlhaw, Peking anariraptnd to araubtam both prodoetLnigh level of*etrv*y. By lae* January, however, th* rnrloui dlnuptkmsoderating response from Peking. Ai hai come to be eipevted. Chou

served aaaco of moderaMon,tand that irscrltably had tho

effect of pointing up the hazards of rndical actions not only an the rvenomj bed eanswhere athai potest of view has since lott ground toresvgenoe of the radicals, thetillrotected froa* estrcme peaky .htft,

be army wr* brought In lo restore order and to lr.mo.it pweerrteparticularly lo those area* where tba party has lost coo noi. Ton teat of tins rapntSeat Is rot to come. While lite army ha* the power generally to maintain order and enforce raring* from above, It would be surprising If the PLA suddenly displayed talents for managing Ihn increasingly diversified economy. Nevertheless, there appears little alternative to the PLA replacing civilianhortly wberevea tb*neffective In nsanngiog product km (Used on the repeatsed to date, the array ha* more often beent* arole. Where tt has been involved ta csxadaUncSag or *up**Miory week, the rodtrtary has created fescOornsf its Jack of Seasbila. and rspcrience.

e cannot Quantify the costs of th* relatively limited dlrrurstioos which occurred hut winter or thn eeaniniilng deketerlctus fsTetti of uncertain orrport namnnjinan it and adrramnrraOcn of the ncrrncasy. fast they rarely have been MgnSfrant Tranaport and cc>tniisunlrationi, food distribution, *nd foreign trade have all been aciWaery affected for ibort periods. Induntry andmay have been more seriously affected: rudcitry prrjbnbly showed little or no increase during the lost quarter6 and tbe first quarternd in agriculture the disruption* during winter and early spring may have affected planning and preparations for spring farm work.

hale theow eanrrtsmg prudeuce with respect to the ecoimrny.at mm amrhiainlrg Ltn Sharxni for allegedly fnUowing the ataan coarse in

'A MW dot ill at tea praams for mm Cabin inaiij, "Sceninafc Oatboh for CosmraaUt

ihe pott

noT^tTsurent^

tecure against further, and mare rerious, attacks from Moo Chou has remarkable finesse, presumably with Mao's Sttproval, in thus far blunting any radicalfcailon cf economic pohcy. But at long ot Mao lives,osribiltty willignificant threat If Mao ibould derideroduction upsurge in tho manner of the Leap Forward, we wouldrompt dcterlcranon in tho economy.

E. Foreign Policy

t it nicety tbat foreign policy banesole in dividing theIt is obviously absurd to credit Liu Shao-ohl and hb followers with all the pro-Soviet, precapitalist, andjttocist typo policies contained Incharges. Even so, il is probable that there were high-level critics of Mno'i basic line, winch resulted to the lew of Soviet military, technical, and economic

radii* ro!*

assistance. By earlyhina's oltcrnpt toending rote inorld revolutionary movement was failing, with consequent tones to Chinese prestige, particularly in the case of tha Indonesian fiasco. But mealhe Maoist line had left China with few friends or allies at the very moment when Ibe danger) to China, because of the increased US involvement in Vietnam, were becoming the meet acute

be politico! crisis has focused tbe leaderships energies and attentions on Internal affairs. Within this contort, Chine haselatively active foreign policy, though it has become more rigid in inlermtiorul Communist aHfltri. Id general, its notions have tended to consist of positions and policies well eslabltibcd before the Cultural Revolution began. Tns more rigid policy toward tbe Communist world last permittedSSR to score heavily In the world Communist movement Bt China's expense. Even among Asian Corarau-nbts, China has lost friends. In the rest of the 'world, the excesses of tl* Red Guards severely damaged China's image end added to its already declining

or the Northhe Cnltuial Revolution has mrrcduced tension and dOuba eboat Chioo'i roJlabtbty. Moreover, the vehemence oi Pelir.gi )nii-Soviet Una must emphasise to Hanoi Itsn the endong rapply line rnamtaJned by bettarly qwarrthog aDies. Wo cannot be very certain ot* bow tbe Cultural Revofctun hai enVted CaoM'i pcefoon oa Vftnam. Tbey almost certatary wfH concinii to aafsnort llanoi ond torotrocted war.

s long as tbe Maeaats rotate control.nlikely to make any portue ehonges to tho geo-nl hne offoreign policy. OtrpoSj th growiog taxation aad look of rotableLo fact, the Cultural BowraVotsan con he totOrpretod as oa ofort to prnvido tbe rovalotsccary suoceaaors and tbe Internal cctbodoiy wblebhe continuation of tho foreign pohcyover tbe bat seven or eight years. Tbia pohey tavohw tmr-ienring and

for pruomlrurKT within rite rntrrnalronul Communist camp and for leadership within (hoorld, imtllitv toward tke US and the USSR, and ickctlvt pewcefal ttxatMence with the rot of the weald.

F. GeoeroltflachonSrxk.ry

ven before tho Cultural RcAoaanon. the Chinese pcophi wererluerschaniment with the rwirrrer burdcin of mnai campaignsIdeologkal crliorUtiorii. Now,ulogta to Mao and lilibecomeextreme ni to mock all belief nnd tho wo of

spected elden mint have ihocked and repelled much of the populetloti The mtrllretuib bore the Initial brant of iho Red Ctnrrda, thn govra uinentwen drawn In later, and moat of the urban populace has been touched In rone way. OfflUoo people who resade In rural Charaa, reaaanrcty few fch the aspect ofnhatkniiii aetWty, whkh ants eaaentiany est urban phanonaanon. But few people th China could have escaped the message that Mao was having trouble withaited lenders; to some degree at least peasant faith In the wisdom and eJccttvcneu of tho leadership must have luHcred.

he evidence of January indicates that once the workers and realised that they were being encouraged to attach the authorities, "

cjulckly degeneratedout of discipline and. order. The swift spread ofconfusion, and dtarespeet of authority must have;

i jolted many In Peking.

if not Mao and hb most lealoir* supporters. At any rate. Peking promptly retreated and It was at this juncture that (bo PLA was railed Into the picture.

nother group that mayontlnulughe students.entteanent of "rebelling against authority" has probably distractedthey wCI realise, if or when things quiet down, that they haveaside anal have least rii tidaasal Jassssjsfassss^ ar^neetunarb*.add to the bnatratsoni of thb

Perhaps cetuolh- Important, the long disruption fa thn

aaneas| China tn thp behind ta Vs efcrt to overcome nVsstagrs In trained Bias power. Thrs couldon longer range consenjisence* for research and development in both the Industrial and military meters.

ID. IMF OUTLOOK

aaornat PcnWa endhe ranspects ere that, so keg a. hb health persnars him to oercire active leadership. Mao wallontta-lng highof tanetont wbuc some of those artsartd km try to nsxaSerntn thn pace end nutrgain theutocratic tfaraagh he aaay be. Mao apnean to retainpoiSUcel fWmtshcy to respond tobout htm and to be nasuenced by those cejkngues who have Ms ear. As the creator and prune mover of the Cultural Revolution, he must feel hbar from Ontshcd. That, there will prolsably continue to be fluctuations between more radical Initiative* and perlodi of consolidation or retreat We cannot predict precise tactics or individual vldlmi at the top. But we can be fairly confident that ai long as

Mno li capable of political command. Chtnni situation wiH probably bo tenso tod Inherently unaJibip.

hhough ihe eventj of the past year and half haw resultedirpriioig degree of political instability In China, we do not believe inch drastic develop-rneriti as civil war or rragmertBtfoo along regional linos ue likely. Wo do feel, however, that If Mao and his followers attempt to purge the nJiltary with the harshness they applied to the party, thereood chance that they would face dcaance and reautance. Thii safght lead to regional alliancea and loss of control at the center,ffitory coup.

he present prospect of continuing Instability under Mao would become

did, then factionalism would almost certainly grow as each leader sought to secure his position through appropriate alliances. The possibilityoop would exist and its rrallratlon might depend on whether Mao could beouttruggle. An eatteaaely critical situation could develop If tho leaden tried to set Mao asideeriod of poor health, and he revivor) enough to fight back. Iferiod were prolonged, onemight be the decline of Peking's authority throughout China.

f Mao dies aa th* near future wa would still expect the succession to be disorderly aad contentious. Un Piao Is the chosen heir, but he wouldevere test, We are not convinced that bo has the political acumen or physical stamina to survive tho tough Infighting that Is likely to follow Mao's death. His chances may dependreat extent on whether be can command the political support of the PLA, particularly If at that rase thetilleakened state. Recent events, however, suggest that factionaliim based on personal rivalries and policy conflicts have occurred In the army as they have elsewhere.

Also ir tbe Mar terra, Chouigure to be reckoned with. His staying power aad abilities an well known. More than any other leader al preterit, Chou seems to have the versatility end skill to grasp the levers of power and steer the country toward more irtoderate policies. He too, however, would probably have to count oo tho PLA for pcfllbca] support Indeed, it Is possible that his survival thus farorking arrangement between Chou aod hb government bureaucracy and some of the military leaders, Chou appears in good health despite hisears, hut the past year has subjected him to long work days and forxasant stress.

Il li aho posjJhl- itong period of domination by Mao, the political and military iK -en would be Inclinedreater measure of collective leadership. This tendency would probably be strengthened If Moo's excesses contbtue for some time. In any case, coasiderible political maneuvering is lfkely and almost certainly no tingle leader will assume the powers and wield Ihe Influence tbat Mao hai hurl

be crimpoiUloni of llso port-Moo lewctoahlp will, of come, have it grcAl bmrinj ondlrwiion of Cfctocsr roftciet. Once Mao lonsw tho acenc. hsttwevee.wve nannr nf the uniquely Maoist dopn.ii and practice* onr llkeh/ to Optra with hint, not only because tbey hove been discredited In theIvevrJution but aho because they am not relevant to the eeaesging real Bio of rectal and fi^ttinan dawraVipMCni. Indeed, the (act that the Cultural Kevoejtlon was necoaaarythat perpetnatksg Mao'i rrrolutioc dependsreat oner* oa bis pram. Even If tin Ptto plea power, we would stfllo.ciuenl sway from thn estreinee nf Macnat Moroni policies. We cannot nay how fast or bow tar this proems would develop. In the near term, tt might unfold gradually. If Mao stayi on for rente longer period, then the procesa might be much more rapid. partlcuJarly If unresolved Internal androblem* Iravcravitnl during the last monthi or years of moo.

f the patty at nil] enfeebled at the time of change, tho array would probablytronger role In policymaking. In our vlaw, there itautious group within the PLA who would be inclined tor>nimon pound with mode rare pohtictdo would not role cut that thn net result of the pjccculon it niggle weald be toilitary regime ta Chtan,

craacontc conatniMts wffl Inspuec bescrs oa Cbana'i pobeies. Snce the "Creataarang hai used raredeaatc poaVae* to restore hvarrgnnd to cegaatzn It* reoource* lor renewed rscoraorniccmttnuiUicai of these policies could peobabfy lecoee rnoaVst eccavornie growth. Most Oilocte will fudge any ryr-emmcrst on its ability to help them meet their basic needs of food, clothing, and theft or.

adical pollcie* whichore ambrtiom economic goab could not be long maintained if, In the face of population peesnoei ihey reduce or even Interrupt tho growth of production. " apoeoach,

_ already been diieredited. Many Chinese leaden probably feel thatetter model In the more balanced approach ofr even

with lu emphasis on polilkol motivation at tho erpeoso of material incentives, hu already been diieredited. Manyleaders p

Stalinist model In effect during the first Five-Year Plan. The

that Mao's lucceisors will adopt revhtlotuet economic policies may

hard line on

be affected by eoonconle pressures forcing themery austerity and discipline, throughout Chinese society. Wo can be lure that any lately rocceasor group wifj base Its programcntntron, even if It ta strongly Irsnuencrd by military leaden. Brat actual programi wtH probably rcSee; Irscreastngtyhwrxe cf Canaanc esdtssre and the Chines* erivirun-naant. The rrsaosbioiav tornn* developed ta the West wffl almost certainly diminish over tame.

asrW* WnrU Rett. These various perrnotarion* In (he resotutlon of CMna'i political crial* cnroiot help but affect its world policy. Bul we corsnot predict with arty con fide nee how internal developments wil bear on foreign

fiuniri thero !'pinxilcjil in communlsl chlnr;uccession strur^le. slnlinik analogies nro tempting bur pcrhafa mlsl&idtag. much might depend on what irmviplro! while mao rorrvuina in conlrol. finally, ihe world scene changes and creates now situations and problems.

0 succession struggle is prolonged, this would probablyon internal nllairs oven more than it has during the culturalthns, for some time, china'* unremitting hostility toward the usaccompaniedore deiihlc policy toward the rest of the world,to be the predominant trends.

this, tho most wo can estimate is that the forces ofthe countrv could, hut not rrrjcesiarlly would, have the same effect(oiuti conduct; thatore motlcrato intprruil policy might beby some relaxation of external tensions arid some moves loiso tattoo. the last phase of mao and the suvcjessioo, however,coincide with the growth of chinese strategic capabilities, andhighly uncertain how the chinese leadership expects to exploit thisas of now wo would estimate that the sura total of the variousmilitary factors', ns well as mtornattoeial developments willfor adjusting chinese ambitions and resources, as defined andby mao, to the realities of world notltlcr.

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