NIE 13-3-67 - COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND ITS GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Created: 4/6/1967

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Communist China's Military Policy and Its General Purpose and Air Defense Forces

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THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

L FACTORS AFPECT1NC MIUTARI POLICIES

IX THE OUTLOOK POR THE GENERAL PURPOSEAIR DEFENSE

Tha ChoMW Cammtnkt Amy

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The Ooiloolt

ANNEXES

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82 13

COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND ITS GENERALAND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To assess Communist China's general military policy and to estimate tlie strength and capabilities of rhe Chinese Communist general pur-pose and air defense forces

CONCLUSIONS

the outcome of the current political crisis, anyleadership will probably continue to work towards ain Asia and great power status on the world scene. Itcontinue to be concerned by tbe danger of conflict withand possibly with tbe USSR. Thus China will almostto give high priority to Improving its military capabilities.

the threat of force and its actual use beyondare significant elements in Peking's outlook, Chineseplaces primary emphasis on defense. With the possibleof their nuclear/missile activities, we do not see in trainprograms, the development or deployment of forces, ordiscussions which wouldore forwardleast for the short term, tbe high priority nuclear program Isviewed by the Chinese as primarily for deterrence, thoughin this field bring substantial prestige and politicalm Asia.

our view, Chinese forces are capable of providing aof the mainland and launching significant offensiveneighboring areas. Thus far the political turmoil does nothave affected these Chinese capabilities or military productionin any significant way.

D.reed policy of modernization.ursulug the fouowing programs and objectives:

Tht Army. Improvement of firepower, mainly by supplying new tanks and heavier artillery. The army's organization and size has remained static: aboutillion menombat divisions of uneven quality and strength.

Airrowing inventory of fightersof better radars, and preparations for production of therobably as partoint defense system for key target areas. Production of theonth) and production of thes expected.

The Sccif.lass submarines have been produced and aboutore will probably be builtonstructionfor guided missile patrol boats began6 and isat an estimated rate ofer year. The South China Fleet Is being strengthened by deployment of patrol and torpedo boats and by expansion of shipbuilding and shore uistallations in South China. K Nevertheless, the limitations and demands oo Chinas economic

and technological capacities are such that conventional forces willdeficient in modern equipment at least into the. There ti little prospectignificant increase in die mobility of Chinese ground forces; the air defense system will still be unable to copeajor air attack; fighters will bo atenerationthe US and USSR. Naval capabilities will still be mainly limited to offshore patrol and escort

F. The current nx>derniratxm programs for conventional forces plusodest effort to produce and deploy advanced weapons systems will, in our view, put pressures on an already strained economy. Thus China will face an increasingly difflcult problem In allocating scarce economic resources between civilian and military needs and within the military sector. Resolution of these problems mayause of continued dispute, both within the miliary and at the top level of national decision-making.

CT?Ef

discussion

1 For well overyear Chine hu been caught npni great potalral crisis. The People's UberaiMo Artny (PLA) has been mvMved, partSruloriy In recent Mages, Mi saasWsbtp has been shaken and present and hiturr military poUWa may have bean In dispota. TheoU highly uneeRaki. andIts outcome, the PLAer tfisBtuoco. is bound to be aiaOad For scene One Ciena saey beeriod of transition.

I. FACTORS AFFECTWG MILITARY POUCKS

1 Prom the outset. UaoM Ocon bas aspiredominant position lo Asia, to great power fatm In the world, and to leadership ot* the world's revolutionary torces. These ambitions hare brought China face to face with tha US In Aria and caused Pairing to view the US as its principal enemy latent on theand over throw uf Ilia Chinese revolution. And theie tamo ambitions led to the Sino-Soviet dupute and the eventual end of Soviet military, technical, and economic uiiitamc

n this situation, Chineae military polfcy has had lo provide list of all for the defense of tha mainland, beyond thai, however, there haioquecmenl to nawaiap tha mlhlory strength that wooU give weight to Peking's ambitions tn theworld So for tbe sohitioc seems to resturious blend of the iBflaary doctffaaa derived frosp the recedaas,lea soejt ippre-ctatson of the reahrMs of tba nuclear era.

4trtoe oat of the oeceautees bstxeed by hmtted material re-sourcea and near isolation, Chinese defenseontinues to emphaitre the virtues of self-reliance, tba lapremacy of men overnd the tactics oi people's war. Their basic strategy far defansa of the mainland still rebel on mass, distance, time, and superior ideology. But (he Chloase raoognete that material means are Important, even If not paramount. Thus, support programs for tba armed service* have always beeaigh priority arid support tor nuclear weapons devolopmHni hat had priority above all.

n tha mate, tho Chinese are not building toroei or developing great ca-pabtubes ta tlworetlcal doctrines for onl-of-country operation" Much of the conventional equipment being produced (ftg, Wig-Hai radars, and motorboots) ii beat lulled to air and navalyatara of strategic petroleum storage areas has beeo constructed In loceOoot which would serve mainly to support wartime mihiary and oviltti operations wKhis the country. Equipment prupesat that would unprove Chine'i anSey to prefect na power over loDg daroaees oasMd* ka borders do not seem to havaigh prtorfty. Not much has beea done to aalargc air aad seahft wpeoFy. and there apparently has been no ma .or effort to Improve troop transporta of the ground forces.

ft Tha positioning of the forces-to-bdng aba refcets concern with defense. Large ground forcer are stationed opposite Taiwan and idhicaat to Korea, and

the bulk ol Ibe pound farce* are deployedue deep etrlp slang Chansj! The bulk erf the naval forces ate positioned to deteod ibaand central coastalwcognltkm of lha area'i particular vulnerability to the powerful naval and amphibious capabdtues of lha US. Tha air defense forces arc oriented toward defeW o! coastal area*.

Tiough we cannot ba Hire how tbe Chinese view their emerging nacsear capability, tl could alao fitpnsorally di'msli* strategy. Given Ihe Irs-nsendous unbalsnce in strategic strike capabibnaa which the Chawee cannotnpni tohe rorejeeebk future, then- development ef such weapons woukl presumably be aimed atuclear attack in the hopes ofar within limit! mart favorable to China. In any event, tbo Chinese are aunoet certainly motivated by prestige conons, by thrir judgment that the acquisition of nuclear wee pom willonsiderable infect on thetr overall potxtrsu pasirloo, aad by the* desire toore favorable mifitsry posture to tupport tbetr foreign revoiaQonery pregism.

& Maoist revolnnocoiry doctrine taught respect (or the enemy acd the need to avoid direct encounter* with superior forces; this banc caution continues to guide Chinese military policies today. In our vJow thb altitude- alao reelects Peking's continuing awarenest of its own military and economic weaknesses, the nibs ofajoi uttsri, and. tleaptto soma bravevopii-licn that nuclear attack Is not oaky possible but would be1 liia

his la not to say that Peking'i military and political strategies are pamive. The threat of force and its actual use are still slgnlflcsnt dementi in Peking's outlook. There are several circumstances ta which resort to mfliinry action ts porsible They would ehnost certainly fight if attacked or If (bey believed the security of the mainland were threatened. If tho collapse of ComfMnttat power Id North Vtetnsoo or North Korea leemeal Uhety, from wherever causa, thai would iiccbablj be regarded Irosinghreat bos] rjRMU tbui lead to Intervention with armed farce. In the special drcomsranoes of Vietnam, however, we cannot bo ooofldent at what point slsortrge-scale Invasion tbe Chinese might feel compelled to use (faati owe combat forces In other areas, such as India. Banna, Laos, and Thailand, tha Chinese also might use farce, if theyecessary to protect Chine or to advance vtal Interests.

ursue Peltier/ Problem oiidn Ms broad oodaae, China'sdoctrines and poucsss realistically reflect the herd facts of tha current strategic lotting, the type of foroea available, and the kind of war these forces could fight best. Ai for the future, it seen likely that the Chinese have not yet workedoram* strategic concept mireo*ing thea conventional aad prosoecOve nuclear capabOtles. Scene aspects of present cuhjary pcognunsack of coordination and phasingosssrJe lhat suave proe-ana. particularly tn the advanced weapons Said, are being pusbed hard for political rcjons and with leas regard lo practical military mid economic consider*tioos.

ll it olio poadbw thai the Chinese unckraUmale tbe ccett and compleiitlit ofodem military eatttbhihareot-

il. Onceroad range ol economic and strategic question* will probably be reviewed Hi In en oop'rations for great power statu hava created basic, long term policy problem* Probably the recet cribeal of theie Ii bow lo divide reoouioaa brtween aauCary and cnaaanebodiaryow to oTajrrfbuat reeeurees between rreivniHoawJ and advanced weapons progressa and between the various branohei of the Armed Forte* And those issua cannot be saperatad irom rucfa pcteottalh/ divkm and key foreign pobcy queeOceu oi Sinn-Soviet reunions, the proper portvre toward the US, or rapport to Ifbernrlnri struggles" on the periphery of China. That then amconflicting oreniotit on theie isouea within Ihe leadership of thaiven added lignsScante by the political oonvulttont now wracking China.

IS, Tha PI A's FoUttcti Position. No one con tay with much confide me when or bow theee political convulsions wilt and or what tltay will mean for ihe role of the military In national politics, for military policy, or for the oapahtlity of tbe Armed Force* Ar praaent there seems to be an affort at itabiUranon and consolidation. It cannot be excluded, however, that disorders win again 'oeecrne Wvere. If oo. tba economy ind central authority could be dbrupttd, and Chine's mdttary programs, porticakrly thoae in the advanced weapons field, could conceivably sssffer serious delays or even total diarupttoa.

arringollapse, howews, ibeneosatsirai In China would srens toreater role for the na&ary ta the dertsicn-maklng procees In January, the FLA waa otacsatty ordered tohe pobTsBil struggle,o proaect theheir atlaenpt to sense power.eouh, the PLA now seems to be asaummg aa ever rnoraaamg sola not only In adrntntstrntive and oontrol functions Bi the ptovincei, but Inolitka as welL Indeed, events of the past year have to dlaruptad tha party and other traditional control elements and created ao much tenalon In Chineae society that It at difficult to see how anyorIdtha heavy reliance on the Armed Fortes tor Internal control

Despite its enhanced political influence, we cannot be confidant ol tha PLA'i oobmlonommon position. Factionalism has alreadyin the top command and there have been purges of Important mCitmy figures. The ok) issue of professionalism vernas political indoctrination may have contributed to the downfall of the Chief of Soul, Lo Juiefcing. But it is alao poaafbkroader range of issues waa to dispute, for ooareplc, the Vietnam war amy hare provcecd debate oree tba boelmood of war warn the US, tha proper strategy tn the facexsrfruotation with the US eves Vietnam, aod Ihe advtsabatfycboa" win the USSR.

Io the provlnoea. the rcsrjonae of individual connmisdors to the colturol ravolistica bas been ambiguous. Some inflHaiy figure* may hove opposed the "cultural revolution" within the army, and others may have been reluctant to see the FLA used In tba political straggle. In any cose, many commanders were

TOP^dfETT

forced to nil on their omi judgments. In general, the army tee on tn have maintained in discipline and moat of iu Bottom tn the "cultural revolution' aogjBrat met fts primary rotxera. ia wtth stability.

lfl Economy Frobkm* Even with potltioaJ Cabdsty and united councils, the Chineae will have to cope at some point with aorne dulrcixtag economicheurdao otnumuy and rnOrmry erialed program* ta heavy aod will alroort certainly become heavier. Although the data for nyaldreg compu-tAtioiu ere molt inadequate, wo calculate tha* expenditure* oo there programs may be as Ugh aaereent of China's gross nations! productore significant than tnai highly generalised acoauatiag Is the fact that woe poos programs use manpower and materials of tlw highest quality andery high pioponion of China's modem Investment. The cumulative effecteriod off than oi concentrating scarce teaoutoss on weapons programs couldto threaten Chsna'i ability to solve Mi basso economic problems.

of usa|or Items of military equipment enter slowed downceased after0 icilowiog dM cutkpae of the Greet Leapthe withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance. Real arch andand D) costs, on the other hand, probably Incrcued after the Sovietand enrrtrued to dtmbrograms eipanded andinclude actual tasting progrema. Annual eipendeures foran haw fallen well below theirevel,to climb again3 and rose mora rapidly la the yearstotal oirwrsartures for the military are now probably at an tUtbe* high.

'.Wu- Is now at the point when) ft laces further and possiblycspeodrturea If It continual Its prevent programs and moves cm toof weapon ussier development Not only will outkyt forJxreete, but, as this more sophsttlcated equipment become*In mtbthiy units, maintenance coats will be growing at increasinglyFor rrsmphi Id the case of radar production it is calculated8 the portion of total output that went Into replacement andIncreased horn one-quarter to ooc-half. There will ba morefor tha tecltoka) qu*Jiflca*Josu and training of ncsaortrsel requiredmore modern equipment and tms, too, will coose costs to rise.

IB. Selattfffio ami Tec'moiogicol ('opaWttiar. The Chinese ure at icast investl-gttfcig tbe raobtaau coruweted with most aspecti of conventionalo0 as the ascre advanced weapons such as mbaflwekar weaponi. If thewere gtvon sutactent prior try and tfene, China's sctest-Ufle and technological manpower is probably capable of providingaeces* try for tha produettoo of snoot any type oior advancer! weapOB China lacks tha scSentllc, technical, and trained manpower base, however, for tha simultaneous tlcvdopraontull range of weapons and their production SD qoontty. This will remain true at least through the.

hen China was cut off from needed technical support by the USSR, the Chinese hava bees able to offset tome of their technological weak-

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by Importing allien'. Hum lhat have materially assisted their militarytilnn kni been purchasing In Increasing qunnHlici suchpecialractory metals,purpose lathes snd othut machine tools, scientific Dutnimentf, and other electronic eunlprneot Chtnn'i purchases of complete plants have also eipanded conitderablycow of these plant* will provide Important moots to the buildup of China'i military Indwtral bote. Moreover, the pcxehose of adnrxal Westxn techLobjCv and equJprncnt fee prtstery ttvikaa lectorsbee addentttial scarce Cbasaaa nlaaimL aad tectaacol traiDpower far sue tn militory programs.

rough Chinas poetical situation is confuted andwc iec little clionce In tbe short runhange In the basse policy of streulng mftltnry development Oveo the military program see con now identify,esptndllurea will aim CM certainly outpace overall economic growth This does not moan that progress In present military programs is likely to stop, but it doe* mean that they cannot be greatly expanded without quickly running into tnore aarloua economic difficulties.

l this tone we cannot predict wsth aaueh ccoUence which programs the Chmes* wtu favor In the fotur* nor can we predict ta what quontstk* Peking wu] decide to turn out varans Herns of equipnsent. Thereood dance that tha Chineae rfaerntelve* do ant yet ooe the way dearly. Tha prcceu of adjuttlng military progroiro may ba slow and painful andouse ofdispute, both within the military and at the top level of national decision-making.

or tha neat few years, we do not foreasa any haste changes In Chinese strategy, which Is likely to remain asaantsally defensive tn nature. In this wrotegk contest, it "odd appear to make ataaa far them to oroceHi up sou for wedtrtaTlijg coorttatkaat! forces at ooberttertorty pregiaas foroodost aieubor of atraOaa^Oaaarfe* to aerva aaolmosl piapcees. On balance, we bateau dais is das course the Chinees wfll toUow, particularlynore moderate leodenbipoking.

a have noted, however, niomolles in the "lie and nature of oartalnfnoflttka which suggest Hint the Chinese may have considerably more ambitious goals. If the Chinese do try toore ambfttoo* course over the neat few aeon, we believe they would risk serious long-term economic consequence* aad the possoble dhroptson of rha military programs taerrawlvea.

II. THE OUTLOOK FOB THE GENERAL FWOSE POKES ANO Alt OEFENSE'

IS. There have been oo significant changes In the org* anration ct structure of the PLA or Itt rnutfruent elements, the Chineae Communist Armyavynd Air Force (CCAF). The Ministry of National Defenae (MND),

rnmmrry of th* area* of-oath* kr th* Array, Aa- Drfena, and Navy.

JOf^EOtEX

under tbo policy control of die Military Affair* Committee of the Party Central Committee, remains the senior military authority. Tbe chief atatT components of the MND are x> three genera! departments: the General Staff Department, the Generalepartment, and tbe General Rear Services Department Most combat arms and services, such as tbo air force, navy, annorod, artillery, and selected supporting orgsnizattons, are represented at the MND level by separate rxodquarters. However, there Is no separate headquarters tor the ground forces which are apparently controlled directly by the staff of tbe MND proper, or through theilitary regions.

The Chinese Communist Amy

While China is giving highest priority to the devtloprncntuclear deterrent, tin main strength of tbo Chinese Comtmialst military establishment will rest for many years on its large army and nearly inerhnustlblc reserves ofThe organ!Tattoo, deployment, and star, of the army has remainedstatic. It numbersillion. We can confirm the esisteoce ofombat divisions, We also behove there are somendependent com. bat regiments, and numerous combat support and service support divisions and regiments. Itikely that the strength and level of ecpiipment of these units varies greatly.ot faced with major oppositionodem outside power, the Chinese could overrun their neighbor. In Southeast Asia or Koreaonventional attack. Moreover, China is in an escedlcnt position to meddle In Iocs bred druaticro across its sooth em borders, where Chinesepresence and aid oculdecisive factorwar of liberation."

The CCAonscript army, but inasmuch asmall percent of those eligible are taken into military service, tho regime Is able to be highly selective. Even so, the CCA has difficulty in flrding or developing technical personnel The extension of tours cf service decreed5 should help raise standard! of technical training and eopaience. Wehat the canaaston bi service torus was directed rjrtaarfly to this end. There is no firm evidence that the extension resulted In an Increase in the number of major units In the CCA. though there obviously has been some Sashing out of editing units.

f the Chinese Army undertook to engage lo open warfareodem opposition, these strengths in manpower would be offset by sertous deficiencies. Much of the heavier military hardware in general use throughout tbe army is obsoltscent by US and Soviet standards. The army abo lacks tbe organic unit mobility necessary in modem warfare, Furtherinare, Cmoew infantry division* are weak, by Western standards, in organic armor and artillery.

he Ctorese have designated certain "on duty* or "alert" divisions. "There ure indications that the firepower and training activityumber of divisions have increased. We are not sure bow many divisions are involved nor what tbe basts ii for their selection. However, tht) mayrogram designed to bring selected units upigher level of military effectiveness

vnocntkmal Rqulpwt. Tbe Chi new onheof smalland ammunition and are nutb^ prugrau toward tbetr goal of relt-iuflrriency to the raoduetton of heavier pound force eoulpiimt. Prodnctioa al tha Pao-toe tank plant picked tap agatend we mil ma If current output at about SOO mediumear. Scene artillerywithin the CCA haveaaadr recreate at weapcauariety af oaklM-iBBSffJrtnsjM mm laidm andm m* bn aad UD mm raorters) over the peat several vearvairly nbatanrial SJtusery production program. Truck production. however, and there is no evvsence of prograrra toride variety of armored equipment. Despitegeneral progress, we believe the Chinese will not complete their current modernriatMu programs until the. Whins this will resultubitarvtUl Improverisent tn mobility and Irepowei, the technical level of Chinese euurpment al that potnt wffl stfll tnj eemsklorably behind that of the US aad USSR.

aeUool Ai'i.miiW Thesn was some activity8 that could bttohlncsa Interest in sbort-ranee ballistic mlnflee There is currently, how owe. no evident* of troop firing, deployment, or Mrletof such mluiW The Chinese have tatted at least one fairly lightweight nuclear device and probably has* the capability to produce looh weapons for tactseaj dttsrsyrrrant. For the nrit few years the lanled supply of rVownsUe material will probably be committed to theweaporu program. Laclfag the rsoritar warheads far MCtkmJ rraasCes, the fatr.ru. could neini ar high aaaskutuehowever, rsrtce other raora touvanriearal and accurate means of delivery arc rrealsbW for these types cf tmHli) highly aaMMy that the Chtaeae woo Id rapioy rnrarilcs forurpose, li Chrnea* military dootrln* does eel lor the deployment cf tactical mbtlrat aad if they have been under development at the missile rest range, the Chinese probably could begin depaoyrrtent by7 ore rhiak ihi, unlikely, however, and wo estimate that deployinerst of tactical ball title miss ilea will be delayed for some years untiluch greater supply of Ration*bin material There Is no evidencehinese program to develop antitank inliilrra or large artillery-type free rockets.

ir Strpport. The Chinese have no separate tactical air ccnaraand, and we have no lalnrmatlon coocemtog PLA doctrine oo the use of aircraftose aupport tola At preaent any tacriea! strike or ground support mttskai would fall principally oar so ocnoiraeeat lUtSt ia tbe CCAF aad CCNAF, iVboufh aeveral fighter lut^inessu apaitar toround attack faatalBra.

hehaveiernery [tasted aJrbcrne assault eapafaehry. China baa three asrburaa drvtrSooa, al subeedkrate to tbe CCAF, but little Is known about their Orintng. equipment, strength, or of Chinees doctrine corxevrang tha use of luch troops. The principal limitation on the employrnent cf Ountse airborne focoei Is the small tile of tbe Chineae air Uaaaport fleet end the

characteristics of tho available aircraft Available tight and medium rnllltaty transport aircraft could liftightly-equipped troopi or airdrop0 airborne infantry troopiistance of about SOO run. Civil aircraft could augment thii capability by aboutercent The only transportnow In prodoctloo tn China Is the singfe-engbehich canoassengers. We Have no evidence of preparation! foreavy transport aircraft. Mora up-to-date tnmsport aircraft aie beingby the Chinese on the foreign marketate ofer year. In addmOo, acquisition of fourubt In0 has iriereused tbe military airlift oipoMtty of the Chinese Comraumsti. These aircraft are the llrst rear extraction aircraft in de Chinese inventory. Further purchases of this typo aircraft from the Soviets would wibstontialry increase the Chinese CoirjTuuiiit airlift capability over the neat few years.

Iho Air Drjfenso Forces

The overall remor^uJty for air defense Is vested in the Alt Desonsa Command (ADC) of the CCAF. The ADCir defense districts It has at Its command an ertensrve air surveillance and control network comprised ofadarighter farce of about SyiOO aircraft (mclading some navalntiaircraft artillaryimited number of surface-to-air mitsiks (SAMs).

There hasubstantialarly worrang and ground control irstercopt capabilities with the deployment of uidigenously produced radars. The radar network Is now capable of providing warning against ap-prwchlng aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes I

Jow altitude coverage is negligible. Badar aud southern a

the entire length of the eastern aud southern approaches to China and tocomplete on die western approaches. Ibe oorthem border approach to stfll rnostly open, although radars cover avenues of approach from that direction to all important target areas in the interior. Further expansion and improvement of tbe air nirveillar.ee ootwork is srticipated. Tbe electronics industry to one of the most sophisticated sectors of Chinese industry. It it almost coroplotely sey-tuBdent in the rsroduetion of exirting radar types, and Is actively engaged in the development of nevrer, moreequipment.

Iba Urinate bare, on occasionespooiriccthetr afr defense control structure in order to achieve moreof tha air defense organbaSooimited area.at ureaonly rnargtntl aad ibret-terra smprcrvessrertts. Wafle tha Oil taresystem ft capable of coptag stem sataor rtrrsttslsnj* airbauere that tbereauk

lmost ccmplett daroasgraBoo cr" the air deftsaaa tytafaa at the eventarge, coocerted air attack oo the mainland. Than wfJI be Imaaxrvernrsat lehuing the next few yean. However, the costs

ore too high, the technology too nplaxtlcated. and the raraa-croimti too gtcat for thetoyatern capable of notingajor air attach over the nert aeveral yean.

The Cbmeaa fighter force ccoatts of0 obsoleteadr rnore lafif.Ua.najor ajopro.taaeot hi the fighter capehttrty hoi reeuited fro* the reraaaptson oftueVjctiant asrr^ per rramth. Th*B forte hai tripled5 We think that production of tbaill .or.tlnue at this rote, at leootora modern fighter become, available

In this connection, we believe tliot tba CT'eog-tu plant thould now be ready lo produce Mig-tU aircrafi. If we arehis fudgment,ould be entering operational mvlce an email numbers8 and in Increaiing numbersha Chinese have claimed to be working on an Improved version of the Mig-IB. Even Ifs io and they decide to produce such an aircraft In qoantify. it cook) not be avaUahle tor several years and we contmue to bel-we that Mfg-lfls and Mkf-Us WB be the snanostay of tha CCAP mto the lOTPs.

robaHy leas thanercent of the fighter force has airborneoqu prnent, bul those aircraft that do are dsttibuted among units along the iwirhrintern periphery. Art-to air rnlsai*es (AAMs) of the Sovietype are believed to be available for uie and the Chinese may be producing a

he ah defease system includes, hi addition to tha fighteroint detente system mvofvingrir force AAA and atrmy AAA Ovisaotai which are more hghtfy gunned. Sincehina has shiftedof tlw weight of its AAA to the leutharn provancea adjoining Neath Vietnam

aad Wc Sorti Victcaa

n addition toyreeol of conrerairsnal, tube artillery, thaimited SAM capability Someeployed sites have been built, bul at leastere later abandoned Of the remainingo moro thanre believed to have been occupied at any one time Tbo administrative lubordrnation af the SAM units Is not knowo, but tbey are probably operattonally subordinate to the various Air Defensend function In tlw lame mannerwrveotional AAA unit*.

he Chiiese are working on SAM dovelccanent. The SAM ftacilities at theMtarfl* Tost Bange have been nsodifiod sev. craJ timesew SAM un* tmsasng site was huflthe technical trasreng faeflty wot expended,obd prepeDoat plant Large enough to rajpport series ptodnction oiearmg cornpasrion at Td-yoon, There li also some evidence that tha Chineae areew mttsflei to replenish the smell stock of missile* supplied by the USSR before0 crtra In Slno-Sovlet relations.

e .ni- not sure, however, dint this Activityajor drpfcjynient pTOgwiB. The Chinese musl have learned from North Vietnam's (ajwrlmco that ii large number ofpper ted by heavy exxxeotratkm of AAA, are required to defendelatively limited area. They abo have seen that tbe VS has the capability to counter tho Sovietystem with coranderableectuon logardaig SAM doplcynrenteneral dilerntna facing Chinese military planners: whether to bund and deploy at greateapon system that at beat can only partiallyequircrncrit and which would compete for rreoercci with other high priority rangrara*.

be Chineseno doubt coacsaue dnakrauwrtal work oo SAMs,hofrtng to improve oa thaystem In the raaarrtani, we believe there Is agood chance thataate wairagrtsn to deploy SA-tsoint defenseaw hay targets. We do not knew wrath or bow many targets tbe Chinese would seleet la the luStial stages forcfensc, but fsolibra associated with advanced weapons program arc bkety isndaiitra. This could involve at least torne ZD areas aad If the Qnsrase followed Soviet practice even this limited deployment would requireattalions andrassilee. Wa ratknate that It would take theean to deploy anorce of thai sin.

The Navy

The CCN is growing rapidly but remaini principally an offshore patrol and escort force. It constats ofrtnetpsl rurface ships,btruuaset,maller combatantsariety ol amphibious, audliaty, and service oraft laarJa.WTtriri Is located In Peking and the operational forces art rbstribured among three ma|or fleets.

Several programs now underway are contributing to the gradual develop--meut of Chinese naval eaparalaics. The CCN force of torpedo arrack sub marines ccsYrnues to expand at the nteea.fass submarine has stopped and the Chinese are oatxerstrahng on proctacssop of the ftclasa.st* have already haea bcaa and we beueveotal of aboutere erg be buflthe Chinese have alao

[tad coco-

j! Tent act luEcurv* tarda', provunagjti wtrc soaa capaoiLry For ssnspQtTsag cut-ce-area sufarranne opera tkaaa.

raother significant prograra t* the oorsatrucrion of various type* of coastal patrol craftast patrol boars of native design have been added to theonstruction program for tha OSA/IOMAR gelded miiJile boats began8 and la proceedingn fatlmafad rate of aboutear

kre believe tlie Chinee

are producing missiles for these boats. These craftange of several hundred miles could extend tkedt operation* Into tbe Tonkin Coif and the Yellow Sea.

JOfi^Seittff

iter* tt still no indication thai iha Chinese plan to develop ot furtherand-bated cruise missile for coastal defense. There are threerites: onend training, one for tactical use, and one inactive,

4ft Tba South Sea Fleet, the weakest of Oima's three fleets, is beingNumerous fast petrol and torpedo boats,ative designed hydrofoil type, han appeared ta the South Sea Fleet. Shipbuilding and shore irataflatlons in South China have abo been significantly expendedhe Chinese began producing destroyer escortsative

heroop lilt capability with amphibious ships and landing craft la about two infantry0 troops) or one infantry and one artilleryut we has* not observed any troop training involving aroprtfbfout operations. In port-to-port operations, ships of the merchant marine Beet could deliver about four infantry divisions (up0nta operations where the use of smaller ships and craft I* feasible, the Chineie could employ literally thousands of tanks for traivsporung troops and

Outlook

he present outlook iiradual but general increase in the enpe-hffitiei of the Chinese Corrmiunist general purpose and air defense torces as the process of rnocieritratMri goes forward over the next few years. All armj

CHINESE COMMUNIST ODDER Of BATTLE

A. Ann.

L Tx Chasm Comraaaaatf Aran (CCA)to fcdneW IU cetabet7 infantry.i cceabat uppeni'iW/in tonal defense dMihms,ailway aejpnaer dMrlom. mid tome III comber end combat support reenmeno,ervice nippoctandceder/ltuornal delcoie regiments. TheM until vtjy widely ra equlpfflent and mutrary.

1 Tha eaaan laid command oiganjafton in rha CCA la the army, of which there are aemehe typical CCA mnafantry dKntoo*rtaaary ngaa.wr, aad rauUbt. aaaaaben0 al fol etreagrh There at ii "these, at the OCA aosuogous to the Soviet combinedr rank arnnea

nr tdtrUnlstrative purpoiai. laamland Chin* ii Jiviied tnto L3 muttary tegioni (aa*nd thaw are divided mto toboidlniit* dlttrkts which In moatowform lo proviwwl bourn!nr*n. Throe aro rcmiciii! rather than oooononol command*.

'Oe* mnj,tr Aimy. osaatlinr. jt tU mm nk-.m. ivUuju. Ii wtordHu

to bbs CCU, batar tht porpo* of aw papa,>tth aw fTTA

4 We attirnata that at fall atraneth tha itmnUrd infantry cUvuioa woald aunber0 cancers andt principal combat atauaaatt woaldafantryiar mt.afltVeasouh gen legjram'. Ib heavyaD of Sovtat typo, weald84ndndssault bud* Tha drvinon wouldarge Dumber ofm, ISO mmell a*an,im.m gmi and lit mm howflaera In addition to tha standard kiUntry division uioe light divisions fur use In rrtfKintaincot and other danVult lerrafn. These type units are aunilu to tha itandard division, but do not have tbe tank/ assault gua regSnvnt aad an equipped with Hghra. artifer.

oe Cranage armored drteka at full atravgth woald ausahar scout 8JM0 oficers aad sasns. Its priarapal lean betraxrw)rtlltv regiment,nfantry nf^meot. Its heavy aquhomse* woald k>94ewreavy' tanks, ami

andnanlt guns. In addition the division wouldrneD. rtnrober of mortars,m, (ft mm, andm gum,m liowllrar*.

ba CCA ant lwo type* ot Bald artillery dMstoos. Tbe pa divtuoo would btveen at toil Krength, It usuallyegiraenti equipped withaw guna aad LSI rnro gai aowtaao Tbe bewSaer dlvMou weald have0orandry organisedrrferyaqufcydanm bowmen, aadocket Mnaxbar regiment, aojeappedmun multiple rochet launcher*.

"It appears likely that dm so-railed "alarf dlvi-ive had prbeiry io ma rreotleriiixsrion program, Tbey may be at or

pear the personneland equipment levels of the formal TOoE described above; Other* probably fall fhort of what theill lot. and aome may be well below tha standard

TABLE 1

tsrutaiED Nxuan or ana cwxs ia hamm tear*

Ccoful

nfantry

7-1

3 AftxKTtfrJ

3 Cavalry

WK.irrniltVWore

Ceuatut Seraist Qhttloffi

in ArflhMy

8 AAA

U

.

Carnbat Bccidmb (lEeananJeat) 21

8 Tint

fen*aaft. (Itdcuerdeot) 40

Canbat Suprat Hoitrnenha*ert)01

Artfln,

0 Keen* Laoaehiu SI

Sen-ice Su?pirt RrgliBrttt (lndit*edeat) ..

JO Macr

W* imtinitufcnnpi in IFw Hj;.eMIW

1 Oik umy,Ota Ai? Arary, MssbHag at the thrte aaboro*abor, oaata to the CCAF. bat H, for ta* purpsre of rati caper, irteJuOrd with the CCA.

TO^arrtfT^

B. Ah Force

he Cfatoeae Air Force ipd Navel Ah Forot (CCAF and CCN AFX number lightly moreen ind are equipped wtthir-cralr. The Urgert active opereUooal unit In the CCAF It the Air Division, with each <Hvision consistingegiments. The CCAFotal ot* some SB regiments includingighter rogtoenei0 attack rcgimatvttet right bomber regimentsrop light bomber regiuxertiedium bomber regiraent (TIM/Seeoe strcraft totals by type)

ti. Attrition la tiuciog an mcreasmg tol of the jet light bomber force and has already reduced the original force ofo it* present strength ofbe raanber of static* Sown par month by the averageilot is probably rasrely suff.der.it to maintain mroimurn proficiency. However, the fact that many pilots ban been aying these same aircraft for up toears would probably provide tbe bomber force with tumctent esperience to conduct daytime medruroelttlude bombing maniocs. With leaf thanercent ofdona at night, st seem* liaely that the night and radar tombing caparanace of most crews would be very marginal

The strarsgth of both bomber and Igheer mitts baa been graduallyduring tbe past few years.S regiments, originally consisting of aboutircraft each, now are believed to rstaaest only aboutircraft per unit. Fighter rrsgioienta,teviou* strength ofircrafi, have abo beendoe to attrition, and now have no more thanar craft Witt the advent ofroduction, however, tms trend wiB be ievened

Tbe Air Defense Command (ADC) is tba only major command hi Ihe CCAF. For air defease pesrposea, both CCAF aad CCNAF Sgblors areby tbe ADC through Ib nine air dafeaea dktricts. These district* ore further subdivided into tones and sectors.

U The air defense weapons system toerodet- le. oddrbon to tbe fighter force,rntiaircraft artillery (AAA) division administratively subordinate to the CCAF. The AAA dlvirions are operationally lurxadicata to tho CCAF Air Defense Heodrrtiarters in the area In which they are located.s arc other CCAF air drvistcaas. Tba administrative subotdiratrmo of the surface-to-air mltsiie (SAM)iot known. Undoubtedly, however, these units uo operationally lubordiuate to tlw various Air Defense Headquarters, and function In tho same meaner as luniaaaSnuol AAA umta Someeployed SAM sites have been built, bur at leastere later abandoned. Of the remainingltra, no more thanre believed to have been occupied at any one time.

TABU 1

ESriMAIJO NUMEXBS OP MHJTAJIY

aho.

CCA* CCN

rKi,L,

My-lS/l'KpM

its

Fii-nli=-

*W

in

*

18

ISO

0

om. dUwrihtr npablny.

M aerat pam KroMou-edfl,.

' Wu weald na*Ni rtn> Ben* to ba la* if anrcthidfcn)aonn

C Navy

eneral. Present thip rtreogth of the CCN toehide*estroyer escorts, andmaller combatants, iix-ludin* atuided mieHle patrola-tonne*wimited atCC0 to the naval a* force,

dmtWtrarfve and operaOorul control over tho naval forces Is eaercued trrcujdi the CcnmusDOer-lrrChlef of the Navy. Orders from the Minister of National Defense are passed to tbe Commancteein-Chief of th* CCN via the General Staff for information and coordiiMtion. CCN Headquarters is looted in Peking- Tbe CCN Is oorrajrtsed of three major Boots! North Sea Fleet with heed>arten In Tsiogtno, East Sea Fleet with headquarter* In Shanghai, and South See Fleet with headquarters to Chan^niang (Fortha North Set Fleet Is tha major Chinese fleet nod includes over half of the submarines and destroyers. Submarinei cuiwetJy operate Only in the North and East Sea Fkets.

h* CCNaP fighter regiments, charged with the protection of Chinese tentorialte orhntmsbarively cormoOcd by CCNAP Headquarters at Peking ihiougfa the Beet headquarters. In (heir air deaeoae role Bgbrnr unit* are optnttonauy controlled by the ADC of the CCAF. The bomber meanest* ore controlled by the fleet headquarters.

he CCNAP fndudes IS fighter regrmeoti of aboutghten each,ts ijghtLIS. each]. Naval IL-S8 bombers lave

hetn detoaccl in activity which rugges**aircraft maycvpadc Attack

TABLE 3

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NAVAL UNITS

PrJicfcuJ CcitlbMal:

3uihSSS) .,

(SS)

Old PMrtl Bknt (OFF,

Sub^twaiwtf {PC)

PjMS tat (FTF)

(FT)

otrxlo Bwt)

MJ

OPCM)

CukW Mttffc PutttJ(PTC/FT1

PlM (MSP)

Cttiittl 36

OU) 4

MiiMffwrettr. AurCUty (MSA) M

nij

!LSM)

Ship ItibHify fIJiTU

Utility (IaX)

h Mcd^niz*]

AmiMriai

Mtwdmoi AwOUir (AG)

Light Cup> Ship

{AN)

AO/AOL)

Urfnig OmftSVp (AflL)

SmiJl

Ootm Tt% (ATA)

Sirvb*

ANNEX B

MILITARY INDUSTRIES

A. Prcdireridn of GroundSejuipment

t leastajor plmti an hvoh-cd in tha output of anirhed military equipment andlants are involved la tajiicuiWammimitioaExcept prfatipuDy for infantry weapons, bttl* la known about current pro-ducttor. rater for rpcciiicquipment I

irsr ait mijuiuy or rJirrtaie unwcunlil Aimy ^CCA) weapons ami ve-LfcaW ate if Soviet design, and many of tbe older irtiUrry piecei and ill ofi taaas ate Soetas aumaeairasiJ. ?Ti .artbdaai. tne CVrrnes now appear to produce al of tho steal arms,B tanb. some of tbe Said and arrnasroraft aitltlary and chemical munitions, and most of tbe transport vehicles found tn tho CCA.

St

fatlol

1 Priduct ion of small arms ls behoved to be rnore than adequate to moot CCA nott requirements as weO as to providearge reserve Inventory. Sansceas of Caaaaa* prnrlmurl weapons otsbnoad aa Vietnam haws ahown that small arma can-telly to the beans of CCA soldiers are well-made, ragged, and rntsoly adequate for their iatenoed use. Future jaodnetJon rates are contingent on several factors, tbe most Immediate of which li tlie conflict in Vietnam. However, tha Chinese will probably not produce above the present rale and will probably reduce sroaD anus production over tha oast few years.

plvstoejapby radicate that can eat prodaattoa of

an3sneUrrraft -mOaq MmaaB HI I MtM

mm fieldm howHeen. and,m bowitsen Etwnubstantial port of the OCA's total inventory of medium and self-propelled nr-tfiery was obtained from the USSR. Major Chimuo aitiUery plants areb'l-chTha-erK Fsotou, and raJ-yuan.

5o evidence that the Chases* an nows suit paw, or heavy tanks.B. raurenCy an productioii. appears toopyoviet medlam. The Chineae ore bollovod to have begun jacductog

9 in1 tbe combined cflect of tbe Soviet withdrawal nod failure of (beLeap forward" caused production either to stow coossdenbl. or perhaps to stop entirelyime IfMit probably was resinnedlntrM .case tautnot recover rrrtker.e now beoeveateear. operaScg took lactase, tadode oo ssseeobty roani itosedtefiftng sad pa.ii pZor* ta lisrUn.esearch andnd D)eared ta Changbsto-tiea

be current CC* taventory of wheeled transportehaved lo be ta the vlcattyehicle, and ii composedeterogeneous collection of Soviet, Chinese, and Europeeo-bullthe majority of the Chtaeie trucks are producedhe Vehicle Plantn Chsng-eh'un which wai completed with Soviet technical and materiel assistance in

have ilvem the fot^pmect of military .lm.fi

. Aircraft Industrybe Chine

lbeee are Bve renter. rV

- Cbrnrnunlri Chtaa: Sbeo-ysng. Stan, Ch eng-tu, Nan<hW aa rssansn. Three of there centres. Shrn-yano, Nan-esVaag, and Harbin see cumsrty producsng atrcraft The faabry tt dftw-tu spoesuw! completed by late KrH end tbe facility al Stan ta rate 1M& although then hi no tadjeatsonl "

hineseducQon beans, ta IBM with producHon of thet Sheo-yang. where the Soviets had helped the Chinese buildframe avlietensnnepIanLood avldeuce thatwu reWosed in tbe, and that9he Chinese began to assemble Mig-IB. from Soviet supplied compouenU. Assembly apparently ceased0 with the Stac-Scvietrift.elay of several yean, the Chinese resumed production of thet Shen-ynng. TMi plantunentty believed to be producmgata ofircraft per mouth, with moresince the resumption of production.

ft la the, tha CUneee began corutructicnecond tegulart Chenf-tu Cccuttuctkn continued at the plant ta the carry

t engine platts were apparently ear to berder typean atrapadty. o. delay ta

advanced type of bt Ightar. praaurrstbfy thefl be produced at Chengtu.delay tn the appearance of such aircraft may result fromties ta producing thb

actory at Karbht is currently producing MM helicopters,ate ofer month.elieved to have resumedhe

JOf^KrfEtj

plant ol Nan-chang which hat been In production tlncn titsi cuf'BiHtv pro*hieing AN-2transports and eailc (raining aircraft of (he Yafc-lS type. While aircraft production bt (hi* plant never ceeaed eiMhufy In (beV, it tiereduced. Athe plant it eullmated to be producing aircraftate ofN-k> oitd Ithe Yah-type trainer, per month.

'reduction

hlaeae ptndeerioa of air Qeseose type gtrldad taaatoW (lAMs.ho utsdorwsy.

"Tteveral rairtorva io rhe TaK>oan are* are rtmsUeced guST

csracridatsa lor estrttnt rroducooe. Located at Tai-yeen are tolkl proprllarit productloa and taatfcig facCSu* munrncea pleats, and aai rarctwnttsj plant. These factifttea are bebeved capable of pnxladaej bech SAMs and AAMe

n addition to the Trd-yonahe ClBaeae haveaejor toad propallaat production and testing racsbty atnner IfiaajrJle Tats near faculty, currently in tha And stages of orauQuction, la probably capable of producing various solid pr ope Haa grain* lo tubttantfal quantities.

Construction

aval ihlpbuudlng In Corrsnsuala Cham batatina dmlTarhat of oilier military fnduturlesv The Soviets us tiled fa aitabllahtng ibipyards and ivhllo (he Chinese were learning tbe technology, the Soviets suppliedwhich were are un bled in China. Chinese Communist construction of modern until began under Soviet supervBSon duringeriod Following vrtrhtlrowa! of Soviet aid, their coeatruetioo waa severely curtailed and remained to for atveral years. IaK an active program of ihtp pre-docrioD returned The Chin rat hove been rxantructlng tome Soviet clots ships at we* as (recreating numbers of radigmaoly dotlgned orfalpa of various ctaeasa- Tne aaval ihtpSjuoing radurtry has prop'trraadevel tngbc thee that achieved prie.ad severalu,y bringaud enlarged

Chaaeae Cooanunirt subraartoa coasOoeQou, InJtlotid under (ha Soviets, virtually ceased0 Aie to tbe Sirso-Scviet rift. However, thef fouross mmm previously Uurxhed crartuned By logo, aiass lubmarlnea had bora contracted In China,t Shanghait W'u-ch'ang. from Sovlat lupplted component.

onitriietJon of TT class ajbmarlece began at Shanghai and Wu-chnrtg. Currently, fhe Tt" elan units appearo operational, While Ihe Ti" dass comtrucf Ion program Is cooUnulBg at Wo-oh'ang, It appear- to have been interrupted at Shanghai. How marry of thar cloas submarine the Chkvete intend to corntruot It not known, but wc behoveotal of aboutore wul be built by

inglechat balhtuc rn telle submarine wu comtructed at the Luta Slnpyard, Dou-era,2he Soviet* almost certainty provided Ibe hull design, and may have supplied eompooeeti for the vessel, as weS. We have no evidence that the Chinese are now constructing any more of this cross submarine.

Two year, after the withdrawal of Soviet productionumber of nauve-dedgned craft. Twelve Shanghai class PTFs appeared In productioo at Shanghai0otruotion of an enlarged version ol tbe Shanghai cues began at Dasren3 and hu reached tba rata of about BO nnits per year. Other rutWc-oestowd uufri include tbe Hainan claas subchaser and Huchwan dot* hydrofoil torpedo beathret and pos-sfbly four cf the Hainan class subchasers were cootfruottd at tha Husmgpu Shipyard. Canton,4he Huchwan costs PTHs are conitructod lo Shanghai- The eater* of the hitter (PTH) program is not known, although somenits bad been producedhe moat significantof tho Chinese naval design program Is the Kfangnan class desCroyer escort, tlw first of which completed fitting oat at ShanghaiorsstruotMn of Addltiorai! Xiongnans began at Canton5 and la continuing. Three units are currently operational, and two more are under construction at Canton.

Numerous other small combatants and support units, primarily of Soviet design are under construction at the various shipyards, ft baoirM evident tohat Ihe Chinese wc ptcducic* jjutdeu missfie patrol boats of both the OSA anduu.

3 class minesweeper) aro being constructed ailass PTs. Aboutf the latter are believed to have been produced at the Huangpu Shipyard sincend the program may be contmoing.

Naval Strength

COMMUNIST CHINA Disposition,7

i: -t IM

im ire

ub If"

MUM

i at

MAIffmil

NO iWOif ic* '* WORTH SEA HIST

ft

a*a

h

tut.

aai

Off

Of

pw

oh

ill

f*

ft

nt

noi

rm

ft

m

Tt PT

K

m

i in

OfW

HI

rm

n

SEA

fM

tinm

M

ni

aw

ft

FIEET uiwam

Hi

I K

SOUTHI.LKT 'in *OVmu (

i

central intelligence AGENCY

dissemination notice

ttii< ctoeiinam wo% euMnneted by iha central kdalltoanca anency. iut copy fctwtaij eat ol the nil end al aeaaajl mmmeed rokno-dditional eitonae! juimteatka aw, baby maoli within iheir rtapecure deooirminri:

otamardi. farjeaeaaaoarmm

bawjmgency, tar the otve ef ihe watery

debet* end eta ergontiallon ol ihe join! cmelt aleaam cm a> sam* ire irwtbtaaaia, oeperfaei ef atear me

ceearnaeat el aney

d.-it -hid ol novo! ope-ottomordepaflnw" of the

novy

a atetteai chief al strf. imaatjajur. uw. ia>peawair force

2.

oppfeiabl*

aery be umlnj ar aaeaeyee by aeratag k> mmumor returned ta the cam! freitajiaca aeeneyncfitmoi fall-met,whoarteas, ate limn mlafili|eriod ameaeee>se|^cee year. ai me and a* mm pertee,tmur be dtinojtd. relbvwadto the forwarding agency, erii rimed be rtaweeed o1 the tenmntaommm

heof *lt document when vied teporoleiy from the

i. director ol ireeluaeete, aic tor iht atonk therey commlalen o, amteem otnctar. ret for me ft bard fceeaa ela. rxreottr el nsa, (oremondlreclor ol notional Eillmotti. cia, (or any other department or agency

disnttftunoni

whbe Houm nohoool securuy council deportment of stole deporrmeni ol defame atoeik uwroy cunmlaain federal sureoh of liweeanedon

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