TOPn.67
7
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Military Research and Development
s*tm#Hd ft,
.XjL. |. ,
DIRECTOR Of CENTRA! INTEUIGENCE
Co/xvrrWbr m* UNITED STATES INTRIKJBKE tOAJfO
r
APPROVED2
Aufhanficattdi
SKBPAiry/UBlB
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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contents
?4g0
THE
1
4
I. CENERAL FEATURES OP SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT 4
f Military Research and 4
The Growth of Soviet Miliary MrD 4
Ouality of Soviet 0
II. US KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 7
Nature aad Quality of tbe Evidence 7
Intelligence Lead-Time on Soviet Weapon System*
SYSTEMS UNDER10
Weapon Syitruu
ICBMs ami Space
MinikIi
Long-Range Aircraft and 12
Defensive Weapon 13
Ballistic Missile13
Air Defense
Antisatellrte
for Genera) Purpose Forces 14
Ground Force14
Tactical
Naval
IS
15
LaunchIS
High Kocigy Propeltsnts18
Other Space Technologyle
AFFECTING SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCHPOLICIES AND18
Military Policy, Strategy, and Foreign
soviet military research and development
THE PROBLEM
To uiess the scope and nature of Soviet military researcho estimate the types of weapon and space systems likely to emerge from that effort ln the next few years, and to discuss factors that will affect the course of Sovietver the longer term.
CONCLUSIONS
research and development) has been andto be one of the highest priority undertakings In theSoviets regard such an effort as imperative In order toUS fromechnological advantage, to gain, ifadvantage for themselves, and to strengthen theof Soviet power. Most Soviets directedqualitative improvement of existing kinds of weapon systems,believe that much is also devoted to the investigation of aof new and advanced lechnologies having potential
the rapid technological advance of the postwarreat expansion in the funds, personnel, and facilitiestond the space program. We6 expenditures for these purposes increasedIt is impossible torecise comparison of US andour analysis suggests that If Sovietprograms at their present levels were purchased in the US,generate an approximate annual expenditure more thanthe amount of US outlays for the same purposes. Andeffort restsonsiderably smaller economic base.
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advanced research in fields applicable to militaryis probably now about equal to that of the West.theoretical work, however, Soviet military hardwarehas not reflected tbe most advanced state-of-the-art inIn large part, this can be attributedonservativewhich emphasizes proven technology and favorssimple equipment In part, however, this Soviethave been forced by deficiencies in manufacturing andSoviet production technology generally lags behindthe US, although the Soviets are taking steps to correct
is almost certain that the Soviets have some type ofin every important field of military technology.security practices normally prevent us from detectingat the laboratory or drawing board stage. Wo can,major weapon systems during testing or earlythe basis of evidence of development activity, our judgmentrequirements, and other considerations, we can makethe nest generation of major Soviet weapon systems.estimate, however, the specific weapons which the Sovietsfor Introduction in the longer term,r more years from now.
expendituresre continuing to grow, butweclining rate of growth, probably because thestages of expansion have been finished. With the higherthuslower growth rate still impliesincrements. We estimate thatandnd the space programbyercent annuallyf, as wethe Soviet space effort is leveling off, even this moderatewould permit an increase in allocations totrongffort
Soviets will continue to press their search for newand systems that offer the prospect of improving theirsituation. We see no areas at present where Sovietsignificantly ahead of that of the US. Considering the sizeof theffort, however, it is possible that themove ahead of the US in some particular field of strategic The Soviet leaders would certainly seek to exploit any
significantjpcul advance for political and military advantage, but In deciding to deploy any new weapon system tbey would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and theof the US to counter it
DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL FEATURES OF SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH ANO DEVELOPMENT
Priority of Military Research and Development
Military research and development) has been and will continue to be one of the highest priority undertakings to the Soviet Union. The Soviet* regardffort ai imperative in order to prevent tbe US fromechnological advantage endto gain, if possible, advantage forMan Soviet military RSiD ii directed toward tbe qualitativeof eriarirvg kinds of weapon systems, but we believe that much i* alio devoted to the investigationroad range of new and advanced trsrhnologies having potential military apphestttons.
In addition to military considerations, scientific achievement has Ijecome for the Sovietsmeasure and symbol of the strength and progress of socialism. Advanced military end tpaoa developmentsay of demonstrating that the USSR has permanently emerged from its early decades of backwardness and Is now in the first rank of technologically advanced societies. Moreover, tbe significant psychological impart of early missile and space successes has almost certainly led tho Soviets to rsmphaslze nuuilee in military displays and to seek further apace spectacular*.
The Growfh of SovM
With tbe rapid technological ad vane* of tbe postwar era therereatbe Soviet RAID effort This was reSortcd first of all in tlie increase of esUblohments andresearch Institutes,and laboratories, installations for design testing, and numerous major facilities up to tbe great complexes at lapurtin Yar, Tyuraum, and Sary Shagan. In general, any scientific program that in the view of Soviet leaders has important military application ii given adequate and in some initancosacilities. Tbe resort isbe vigorous Soviet space program and in the successive generation* of new weapons deployed to the field.
The most convenient measure of this expansion is in terms of costs or eapenditures for resources. We estimate with fair corJidcncc thatis, outlaysillain andnd the spacetaken allfromillion rubles0 toillion. Within this total the breakdown is less clear.nd the space program have between them taken the lion's share, rising from an estimated si billion rubles to moreillion during tbe sametenfold increase. As betweennd the spacewe can only say that both are large, and that since tbes
the greater part of the increase can probably be attributed to tbe riling cost of the apace program,wtH include* some military projects.
S. In the RflrD field, the c* elation of rubtedollar ratio* fa particularly uncertain, and comparison* between the Soviet and tbe US efforti can be only rosrghry approximated. In term of total RrxD expenditures (civilian, military, tadhe USSR appears to lag behind the US: we snOraata total Soviet expenditures at something over two-third* tha US level Meet of this difference, however, is attributable to the larger US dvilian programs. Our -Mily-ii suggests (hat If the inputsages, materials, and overhead) for all Sovietnd space programs were purcluaed In tho US, they would generate an approximate annual expenditure in excess of thiee-fou/th* of current US outlays for Ibe samend the Soviet effort rests on an economic baa* corojirlensbly smaller than that of tbe US
& Trends in expewditujee fornd space ta the USSR bave roaghly paralleled those bi the US. In both countries these actrvrries havesteadily sWreajirtg shares of availablehey aceouriled for about fl percent of total Soviet military and rpaca expend shires, and tn IBM sotneercent; comparable figures for ihe USiseoercent. Ia recent years, however, the rose of growth of expenditures onD and space has declined in both countries, rtfesumably because th* building of new facilities and creation of new cegaolBitjons have passed through then- most costlyuch higher hen has been achieved, and the lower carrent rale* of growth stiD add very substantial rncrsnarts each year to total expenditure*.
anpower. One of the most Important mean* used by th* Sovietto improve and broaden its scientific and technoJogJcal base has bean the national system of higher education, which for many years ha* emphaitted scientific and technicalarticularly tha priysscal sciences, mathematics, aod engineering. Tbe Dumber ofhese field* has steadily increased, particularly in the postwar period. The USSR, with soxoc IS million engineers andorders of advanced degrees, nowarger pool of scientific and technical manpower than tbe US. and Ihme winontinuing increase in saentlfic and technical graduates hi tbe nextoears. Maay of these people, however, are employed In ailmtnis-traiiva or other duties outside the imec of their specialized training.
S Tbe Sovietso sought to improve tbe quality of their higherand most of the advanced degrees currently beingHenHsV and technical fields are roughly comparable to Ainerican fVD.'a. IB certain fields, however, such as tbe leoiogkal and chemical sciences, ihey are still below US standards.arge number of advanced degrees awarded in the past represent academic achievement inferior to present Soviet standards.
for tha US, these tne Soda th* total budget at NASA aad tha HAD budrets ol Depart-asset ol Ushoes and Atomic Enerfy GoksjUssIod.
Thus,SMI may have lower really qualified persons capable of sleyiiflcant. independent research at thia level than the US.
mala no meaniiiglul oat una la of lha Dumber of peoplenub-ary RaD projects In the USSR,ear that tbecho real manpower trapeses no wararmrrM on priorityprograms Soviet statistics indicate that the number of tcfenflSeaD types of scSerttrfic research otpxdunont bas nwre than doubledand the proportion working onnd spaoa haseven more rapidly. Indeed, there are lncbfatioas thatsupport of civilian product ion activities has suffered because tbeare attracted to, tbe space program, and certain
OVoliry of Soviet Jt&D
have no firm basis for Judging whether or not tha militaryb managed with significantly greater efficiency than otherof the Soviet economy. Frequent administrative reorganizationsacme dtasalisfaction on the part ol Soviet lee dan with theirOne of tho complaints in the USSR bas been that the high qualitywork In the USSR has oot been matched by the technologydevelopment. The top leadership has always eahlbatedcloseirtfereet id military PSD programs, and is clearly corteensedtbe quality ol lhe entire assort.
oviet theoretical work In fields applicable toa probably now about equal to that of tbe West. Thereew areas, tudh si pure ma thermites, where the Soviets may be sftghtfy ahead of comparable Western research. There are other fields, such as areas oi chemistry relevant to solid propellent technology, where tbey are apparently behind the US. In general, however, they are probably capable of conducting advanced researchevel corn parable to the West In any field to which they decide to devolo thettmo and reenurcea, hut Ihey may not be able tu umrluct advancedin ai many fields lirnultaneousry as in the US.
espile Users etranent theoretical work, there have been manyhe pest In which the Sovieti have not produced military hardware which fully reflected tbe most advanced iUte-of-tbe-jrt in the USSR. In large part, this wee almosteliberate choice. The Soviets hawsonaervatrvo design priilceophy; tbey have profaned to carry through theebpment of weapona wstb weIVproven technoo^y. thus rrunlmorrig the chance* of delays and dtrfkuMrs. On the whole tbey have ftvored cepiipmenr and hartSware of nigged and relatively lirnple dealgo, comparatively eery to tnainiain.
n part, however, this Soviet ebcee* may have been forced by drd)ciericies in manulactunng bim) fahiltiiticin inhniques. Tbe general level of Soviettechnology attll lagi behind that of the US, and thii factor may have
restricted th* variety of weapons of very advanced design which could fbatibly be produced in quantity. Jn recent years, however, tbe Soviets have taken steps to correct these drfejeocies, and in some special fields of manufacturing methods they have advanced their technique* beyond those in the US.
n extremely Important asset of Soviet military PAD is the large amount Of information which the USSR obtains on US and otherD efforts. Information about Western programs is clearly of value to thevercoming technical problem* and avoiding tmprofltabJe avenues of research. Moreover, it helps Soviet planners to direct and time their military RctD effort in the light of anticipated Western capabilities
rs (S)
rs
IS)
US KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH ANDPROJECTS
NoJure and Quality of the Evidence
bo early phase* ofrogram arearge extent Invulnerable to technical collection systems and Soviet security has succeeded in preventing US totelhgence from gathering any jnore than bntited, iionrpeofic infecroation.
once the testing phase isa uus phase, however, the amount of infcarnation which we cana Soviet weapon system varies withvumerabllity to oursystems. We can usually obtain data on Ihesyttem*
W some cflaca from those major systems 1
]we can usually
Identify new aircraft In the prototype stage. Large systems such as ICBM* and ABMs require extensive facilities which cap usually be detected andidentified before testing begins.
rs IS)
Soviet military displays are
of informaUan on new weapons of certain types. These displays, of course, are mstters of Soviet discretion and policy. In recent year* then order to project their Imageilitary power, haveumber of advanced weapons which were either in service or in late stage* of development. But they have withheld some major weapons from display, and some of the weapons
rs
Base
many ot our estimates ol future weapons on indirect evidence aad analysis. By analyzing tbe lift cycle of previous systems and known or estimated deficiencies In their present systems wa often estimate that the Soviets require and will probably deveew waa poo. Analysis of thee-art and of the preferred Soviet technological approach is often of assistance, as Is analogy with US experience. It should be noted, however, that these indirect methods can do no more than Indicate what RAD wo believe the Soviets should be pursuing In order to remedy weaknesses in existing weapon systems ar to develop newhey do not enable us to determine In tbe pretesting phase whether the USSRart nurrolng such RAD or how successful Soviet efforts to date have been. More knowledge of tbe early phases ofould serve to narrow the spectrum of potential weapon systems. We would still have to consider other factors, however, such as production capabilities, costs, and military objectives. In estimating which systems the USSR would be likely to develop to tbe point where they could be deployed.
intelligence Leesd-Tim* on Soviet Weapon Systems
or purposes of this discussion, we define Intelligence lead-tune as the period between tha time when intelligence identifies the general nature and purposeew weapon system and the tune of Its initialhat constitutes useful Intelligence lead-time will dependonsiderable extent on the problem* facing the user of tbefor example, an intelligence finding that Ibe Soviets are Intensively developing ABM systems might be sufficientS decision totudies on ICBM penetration aids,ecision as to which penetration aids to develop might require detailed inteUigence on the specific characteristics of Soviet ABM systems.
10
buQl on covered ways, are not normally detected or identified aj to typo until they have been launched and are being fitted out, which takes2 rrKJOths.
With the exception of certain missiles, there fa usually little if anylead-time for ground force weapons and navel ordnance. In manyour first bidicalion of the development of new ground force weapon systems is their utilisation in field training.
Tbe provision of sufflcaent lead-lime will continue toajor problem for US intelligence. I
Vrs fS)
| It Is highly unlikely that major strategic weapons sucQ as ILriM and ABM systems could be developed without extensive activitiesind which would be vulnerable to our technical intelligence collections systems, but these activities might not provide theinformation about performanceoreover, significantIn existing weapon systems could occur which would go undetected or not be correctly identified.
MAJOR SYSTEMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT
t Is abnosl certain that the Soviets have scane typenderway in every important field of military technology. These programs range from basic research, through applied research with military application, to thoof specific weapon systems. The USSR, like any other highly developed nation, undoubtedlyreat many concepts applicable to advanced weapons which never leave the drawing board or laboratory. Their long-rang* programs are almost certainly subject to change burn time to time in the fight of their estimate of US plans and intentions. Moreover, of the Soviet projects in various stages, some will be abandoned because they will prove iofeasible, not worth the cost, or not applicable to rexnibements.
rs (S)
his section discusses those weapon and space systems which we believe are currentlyn the Soviethese aro major systems for which we feel there Is either sufficient evidencectivitylear Soviet requirement on which toeasonable estimate. We cannotwith any degree of confidence the specific weapon and space systems which might conceivably arise out of tbe various fields of scientific effort which Soviet scientists, like others, arc pursuing. We have found no way of estimating which
fields of research will in fact lend Io weapons application, what progress the Soviets may make In them, or which successes in research they may choose to push Or) into weapons development and dep'oymer.'.
A. Strategic Weopon Systems /CflMs ond Space Weoports
The Soviel Union appears to be about as techrucally capable aa the US of developing new ICBM systems and subsystems which its leaders feel are important enough to justify the expenditure ofost of tbe facilities at the Tyuratam tost range can beith existing ICBM systems or witb the space program. Some of those recently completed or underare probably associated with ICBM systems still under deveteprnentof some new missiles appears likely during tho next year or so.
Current RaD activities provide clues as to the types of follow-cm systems that the Soviets might deploy in Ihe8 and. During the past year they have been conducting tests that we believe relate toractional orbit bombardment systemepressed trajectory ICBMrOBSICBM could serve to degrade the value of US antimissile detection systems and complicate the US problem of developing effective ABM defenses. These tests could also relate Ioultiple orbit bombardment system, but we bclfcvc it unlikely that tbe Soviets will deployystem in space.
Soviet interests in solld-psopellant missiles and mobile systems suggest other rsossible trends fn ICBM development. We have estimated that the Soviets will develop and deploy inmall, more accurate, solid or storable liquid propellent ICBMard and possiblyobileThe liquid propellent system deployed in fixed sites would be more likely lo appear, in tbe carry part of the period; solid or mobile systems could be achieved somewhat later. Mobile deployment would greatly decreaseespecially if it featured esmcesJmesit or rsixlum movementossible that they will alsoew large liquid propcllsnt ICBM with highfor deployment fneriod.ystem would have improvod capabilities against hardened targets.
There is no evidence that the Soviets have initiated develctprnent of MRVs, MIRV. or penetrationelatively simple MRV delivery capability could probably be achieved withinonths after tie start of flight testing.of MIRVs involves greater compiles Hons than MRVs, particularly inand control; operational capabilities could probably be achieved two to throe years after flight testing began.
MRoWtRBM
Soviets are currentlylight test program whicha solid propellant MRBM/IRBMnder developtneni. This sys-
been fired. from Kapustm
Yar and lo. from Newts*.achieve IOC in7
inixed oi mobile configuration, however the ilow[ flight teat program suggests that IOC will probably bo somewhat later.
S)
The Soviet! are alsotd-propellent ballistic missik,
iThfj mliiile ii being flight tested from Kaptatin Yaru Men dw to. impact area. It ts still too early to define the cbaracieristics of thfs system; however, our evidenceigh accuracy potential.
Submarines
e believeew class of ballistic missile submarine is underIt wiD almost certainly be nuclear-powered and may carry eight or moro mlasilae.ew weapon system would probablyewor improved liquid-peopelTan! missileange ofOOO not. Some recant teet.fb-iog activity at Eapusttn Yar may be related toruaaue, but it Is alao possible that an appropriate rstsssila has not yet been teat fired In any case, we believeew rruclosu-powered balhstK missile aobtrtartne equipped. missile could become operational by mld-lOW The Soviets wfl] probably not undertake the developmentew das* of cruise meiiie submarine fn tbe nextears. Tbey may. however,ew type of cruise motile with asaeased range, speed, and accuracy.
Icno-Poncje Aircraft and ASA*/t
hene is no evidence of any specific devearpment rsrograra directedollow-on heavy bomber. Available evidence indicates that Soviet work in large error aft Is directed ptimarily toward the development ofjuports. Thin work advances the state-of-the-art andechnological aodbase which could be applied to bomber devekspment. If tbe USSR hoa without our knowledge activelynd committed funds farandew lebsoruc heavy bom ber wfthightly bettor than the Bear could enter servicee believe, lhat we would obtain indications of the development and production of such on aircraft one to three years prior to its introduction Into operational unlit.
The resrusrerrserst which led to the Blinder, together wtth the troubles ape fenced wtth that aircraft, may lead the Soviets toollow-on medium bomber Tbe Soviets couldupersonic-dash medium bomber with bettor spaed, ertfrude, and radius than the Blinder (orime periodoncurrent developinent with their turssrsunK transport program, tbey couldupersesUc cruise medium tlumber,adius aboul the same as Blinders, in the same time period
Development work on hind attack and anttshtp ASM's lotittnoed during the past year. There is aome evidence that the Soviets ere working to improve the
guidance of (hend it is possible that they willollow-oo ASM for ear wflh the Bear They are continuing the development of the Blinderystem, and we believe that tbey are alioew ASM for use wtth the Badger.
B. Strategic Date nlive Weopon Systems MU Mulle Defame
or the put decade the Soviet* have carried on an extensive, varied, and costly RAD program lo create defenses against ballistic missiles. They probably have explored various ABM techniques, radars,iss ilea, andof system mtegrstiun. The Soviets will probably devote subatantial effort to InrprovioR their present ABM capabilities, and alao to developing new ABM systems, although wa have no evidence that any new system Is underImprovasMsst* mayigh accelaration miasda. pcaaesaing oape-bdtfJea for terminal atmospheric Intercept,ew long-range msastlc. We would not expert such new systems to become opnatirsne) before the
At Defense Sysfams
adm. The Soviets will probably continue to introduce Improved radars with increased power and greater sop rustication.ew radar* may include frequency dlverslflcalion to reduce mutual interference problems aodtoonsiderable- effort will prolsably be aspandnl on the problem of detecting and trscUng low-altrtude tajgeu.
Interceptors. The Soviets are continuing BAD on advanced taterceptnr akcrafr. We believe that the present BAD activity is directed towardof aircraftaximum speed oo the order ofn altitude capability ofeet,ombat radius ofn Such aircraft could enter aarvtce as thehe Soviets probably see the need for even more advanced Interceptor systems lor use tn* and may abeady be testing such models. An advanced all-weather interceptorruising spaedadiusrn. could enter service ineriod.
ssuere know of no wholh/ new SAMunder development; HAD activity appears to ha directed towardof existing systems. The Soviets could improve their system* byetter low-altrtud* acquisitionodrfied Rracontrol radar and guidance system, and possible terminal homiag. No Soviet SAM* deployed or under development are estimated toapability undereat. Th* Soviets probably canaot significantly improve their present krw-ahsrude capability by modifying existing SAM systems, and they mayew krw-artrtude system. We would not expect any new low altitude system effectiveeet to be operational before
AniitanUHa Syifrmi
he Large Hen Haute radon nt Sexy Shagan and Angartk will havepattern Indicativepace anrvelTlanceovietemploying these radars could use an existing missileuclearNonnuclear kill, on the other hand, would probflblyroundmissile system of high precisionoming missile capablehieither of which could be developedoat two years afror
decision to do aa. I
"IfiaT
lor trier note in* Hfcri Hftuses Become operational inffnc period, tha Soviets could have an antssateDfte capability with either nuclear or norinuclnar kill.
C. Weapons for General Purpose Forces Ground force Weapons
4ft The Soviets will almost certainly continueir II efforts hi all types of ground force weapons and continue to introduce improved ground forcD equipment. Major new weapon systems which could enterbe next five years or so indode:edium tank aimedissile-firing system; we would not exportank to be deployed untilh) an improved version of the Scud tactical ballistic missile system; the Soviets are currentlyew system at Kapustm Yar which may be the fed low-on Scud, and could be operational within the next year en ao;actical krw altitude SAM system; we would not expect any new low-altitude system effective,eet to be operational before
lacficaf Aircraft
believe that tbe Soviets are waking on an improved tacticala foltow-on to lheFitter series.ighter could becometnime period. In addition, the Soviets areon various designs for advanced tactical fighters, includingwhich could attain IOC
Naval Sysftms
believe that the Soviets areew class oftorpedo-attack submarine, probably designed and equippedoperations, it could enter service as earlyhe only newmajor surface ships currently under construction in the USSR arelarge frigateew class of probable helicopterKrcsra-crass is equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and SAMs,fitted with helicopter facilities. The Soviets are cootmuing RccD ondesigns, but we believe that anolher new class of mayor surfacenot emerge before the.
unr
The USSR almost certainly will endeavor to improve rts ASW capabilities by the development of impioved sonar and more effective weapons for surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. We believe that tbe Soviets will corstJnue to deploy new and Improved ASW detection equipment and weapon systems. Present Soviet filed tsnderwater surveillance systems have very limited range and detection capability, and are intended for inshore defense. There is tenuous evidence, bowever, that they are attempting toew longer rangeery great improvement in tha quality of Soviet naval forces, togetherignificant expansion In size, would have to take place In order for the Soviets to be able to conduct effective ASWpen ocean areas. There Is no evidence that such an expansion Is impending or planned.
h'ooolew type of ASW helicopteratrol plane probably wul be developedew supersonic-dash jet medium bomber might be introduced tneriodollow-on to the Badger and Blinder bombers, but there Is no evidence that such an aircraft Is under
Weapons
Since the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty four yean ago. tbe Soviets have continued underground testing of nuclear weapons at the rate of about one test per month. The number of tests and associated yields suggest that the Soviets could have made advances in weapons ranging in yieldsew kUotons upew megatons. It is possible that they could haveariety of weapons In the low megaton and submegaton range with abetter yiekl-to-weight ratio than those weapons tested In the Ifrtl-IOfla series.he absence of debris from underground tests which would permit weapon analysis, we cannot determine what specific progress the Soviets bave made.
In addition lo their current ABM warhead capability, we believebout an even chance that the Soviets have developed an ABM warheadarger oicetmosphenc kill radius against unshielded RVs. If the Soviets bave not already developedeapon, we believe they could do so on tbe basis of existing technology without violating the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
SyVehicles
Soviets currently have under development two large boostersbelieve will be used solely for Uiinchrng space vehicles. Tbe first ofwe designate theas an estimated first-stage thrust ofopounds and has demoststrated an earth-orbit payload capability ofpounds, and ofpounds with the additionhird stage.
here is evidence that the Soviets areery luge hunch racQfty at Tyuratam which hi probably of the same magnitude as the US Apollo launch complex at Merritt Island. We estimate that tbii facility will be ready for initial launch opaatiooa in the first half8 at the earliest. We have no direct evidence on the characteristics of the new very large booster to be launched from this facility, but consider ft likelyillirst stage thrust inound range.
High Energy Propellonfs
o date, no Soviet flight testa or space launching* have been detected which used high energy propellents in any of the stages. However, wo believe some phases of static testing are now being conducted and flight testing could begin. High energy upper stages for tber the new very large booster could be man rated and available for use0 or shortly thercaflor. Such upper stages would increase the capability andof the launch systems available to the Soviets and permit considerable Beximlity in planning future apace missions.
Other Space Technology
lthough wo have little direct evidence about Soviet plans for future space rrussfaos, we believe that the Soviets haveanned space flight programure comparable to the US Apollo program. While we are unable to determine if tbe first major goal of the Soviet space programanned lunar landingarge manned space station, either of these projects requires tbe Soviets toonsiderable technologksJ advance over the manned space systems they have demonstrated thus far. We believe that they will not seek to do both concurrently. If the Soviets plan to accomplish either of these apace missions by the, they must currently bavo underway extensive RocDuch fields as reentry technology, power supplies, life support systems, and numerous other supporting technologies.
IV- FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET MWTARY RESEARCH ANDPOlrCIES AND DECISIONS
ecause of the increasing complexity of advanced weapon systems and tbe long lead tones required for their clevelopmenl, tho Soviet leaders must soon decide upon development of (hose advanced weapons which could be deployed in tbe. In the previous section we have considered present trendsD, technical capabilities, and military requirements. Beyond these military and technical factors, however,umber of other, moreconsiderations, which tho Soviet policymaker must weigh in dec id big upon future force leveb and structures. The more important of these are discussed below.
A. Domestic factors
tfiMriy Influence on Ihe Government. The present Soviet leaders seem more responsive than Khrushchev to opinions of the various specialized interest groups, mchiding the military liierarchy, but no single group outside of the party apparatusredominant role in determining Soviet national policy. Nonetheless, the traditional Soviet concern with security and the very sxae of the military establishment enhance the importance of the high command's influence in top level deliberations on basic decisions. Current military writingsoncern with broadening tbe military options available to tha USSR, including Improved capabilities to meet contingencies short of genera] war. At the same time, coolly and intensive duvelorrment of strategic forces Is continuing The military will probably continue to press vigorously foramountsesources for advanced rruirtary technology, and the political leaders have been willing to authorize Increases in th* resource*to military purposes. However, the leadership will not automatically grant everything the military request; they must of necessity balance tbedemands with those of other consumers and weigh their decisions In term* of national interest.
esource Allocation Problems. The resources neededelatively short supply, and the apparent awareness by the leadership of the demands of tbe civilian economy has exacerbated the continuing debate over resource allocation. This seemingly intractable problem of allocating resources among the various military and civilian claimants will continue to plague the Soviet leaders, farcing them to make hard decisions between costly alternatives. Th* lengthy bureaucratic infighting involved la these decisions has undoubtedlyajor contributing factor In delaying the appearance of the new Five-Year Kan,
be Impact of advanced weapon project* and the space program on tbe civilian economy Is greatest in areas requiring high quality resources trs mod manpower, technical equipment, and special materials. Tho large-scalemr*Ionizationood case In point: like the arms and space programs, it requires advanced procructlon technology, electronic equipment, special metals, and first-class production and managerial skills. The drain of these resources from tbe civilian sector has undoubtedly retarded tbeprogram and contributed to the slowing of the rate of economic growth. Although the mflttary and space programs will continue to command top priority, the leadership will be under strong pressure to balance their claims on resources with those of the civilian programs.
oviet Military Policy, Strategy, and foreign Polky
n general, the overall Sovietffort is less subject than force level* or deployments to the Influences of the International situation, levels of tension and arms control agreements- Long lead-times for complex hardware leave loss room for quick changes.s not likely to be stepped up in response to an immediate crisis, nor is an easing of tensions likely to pro-
ducecutback. While Moscow might in some circumstances decide to stretch out or defer procurement. It views cootinueds to essential long-term hrvrartment.
Arms control agreements or other international developments could cause tome redirectionfforts. The most simple case would be agreements which prohibited certain types of weapons testing and thus cutfforts in certain directionsoint in tho development cycle. But in the case, for example,rohibition against Sight testing MIRVs, the Soviets wouldchoose to carry out laboratory and design work up to the point of flight testing in order not to be caught short tf the agreement failed. More generally, an arms control agreement mayfforts on certain systems or types of weapons. Indeed, arj arms control agreement which limited numbers but not characteristics of straiegic weapons systems would bo likely to spur efforts to improve characteristics tn order to maximize military potential wrthtn the brrdts set by the agreement In any event, the military leadership would strongly resist any arms control proposal which would restrict theffort.
Over the long run, changes in the political druation and in Moscow's perception of potential threats from different quarters wiD affect requirements for. Among purely mihtary considerations, however, the strategic relationship between the USSR and the US will remain the most Important The strategy of deterrence pursued by tho Soviets has led to an emphasis on strategic offensive and defensive weapons programs that has dominated the Sovietffortumber of years. Wo believe that tbe chief concern of lhe Soviets will continue to be to maintain the credibility of their deterrent. They will continue to strengthen their capabilities for survival and retaliation, and to addition they will probably seek through both offensive and defensive programs to improve their ability to reduce tbe damage the US can inflict on the USSR. Beyond these general propositions, we cannot judge lhe effect of theseon the scope and direction of Soviet
V. OUTLOOK
he Soviets will oontinue toigh priority to reseaich applicable to advanced military systems. At the same lime, however, there Is evidenceurrent drive within the Soviet Government toet anttallyffort directed to support of ervflian production activities. Delay in prcrrnulgat-ing the Five-Tear Plan suggests that this as well as other issues are not yet settled. Hence, the relative proportions of resources to be devoted to military andnd the space program0 have not yet been fully determined
1 Col. Harry O. Patiesoo, for the Assistant Charf of Staff, iDtaUgance, USAF. believes that the taateaisWy wrththe USSR ismsatw muitary research mi deveknrtnent program could portced far mora than aa intent leeraly to strengthen Soviet deterrent pnrtors andwall ba aimed at attalnmrnlrategtc military poaltJoe which tha US winJd rerOfnUe is providing tbe USSRredible firat strike damage brnittng capability aa
wrD as an aaBurad dcRmrOim (one.
GS. Expendituresn the USSR are continuing Io grow, but the trend fieclining rate of growth. We have noted above that ibis decline ia probably explained by tha fact that aome of (he most cosily stagrs of expansion have been Gnlshed, and also that wilh the higher base level thuslower growth rate still implies substantial annual increments. The budgetary plan7ontinuation in this decline, showing expenditures for science7 as only six percent greater than6 (this compares with an average annual rate of growth of aboutercent. It is true, however, that expenditures in the past have usually been suhsUntially above plan.
We estimate that totalmilitary andnd the space programincrease byercent annuallyhe space program will probably require less sizable annual increases over the next few years as current programs peak and tho effort levels off. This will permit, even with the moderate growth rate projected, an increase in auocatkms tond continuationffort. We do not see on the horizon of Ibe next few years Boy new scientinc-tcchncdogicalatomic energy, ballistic missiles, or the spacewould require vast new expenditures for establishing elaborate new research and test facilities on Ihe scale of, say, Tyuratam or Sary Shagan. Wo behove, therefore, that expenditures on this cedar will be adequate for Soviet requirements as we foresee them.
In spiteonsiderably smaller ecouonuC and industrial base, the Soviets have dernonsDated the ability to canyighlyrogram. They will continue to Improve their existing weapons as well as to press their search lor now technologies and systems that offer the prospect of Irripsoving their strategic situation. At ibe present time we do not see any areas where Soviet technology is significantly ahead of that of the USj however, considering the site aod quality of theffort it is possible that they could move ahead of the US in some particular field of strategic Importance. On tbe other hand, these are some areas where the Soviets willequirement to develop systems that tha US probably would notvice versa, ln some instances, they will probably develop and deploy systems which. In tho US view, are not justified. The Soviet leaders would certainly seek to exploit any sigruflcant technological advance for political or mibtary advantage, hut in deciding to deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and Ibe capabilities of the US to counter it.
Original document.
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