SECRiw NO FOREIGN DISSEM
documentf 'm f" pages, copy
NO FOREIGN_ DISSEM
This contingency plan for Haiti conceives of two categories of contingencies:
Duvalier falls from power and unacceptable Haitians achieve dominance; and
Duvalier remains in office but Communists or other unacceptable Haitiansotentially successful operation to overthrow him.
An external attack on Haitiew guerrillas could occur without detection or interception by the United States and therefore might beosition to succeed before we are able to react. Similarly, the overthrow of Duvalier and his replacement by an unacceptable successor could occur without giving us needed reaction time.
Very little military force is needed to take the capital and no other single city or area is necessary to control tho existing governmental organizations of Haiti. The introduction ofmall military force in Port-au-Prince would thereforeajor, if not decisive, influence on the crisis situation. The employmentS military force is contemplated toommunist government from controlling Haici and, if necessary, to evacuate American and other foreign nationals whose lives are threatened.
Duvalier's successor will probably seek our military and/or economic assistance to stabilize his regime, but withholding that assistance would not necessarily insure his downfall.
II. Table of Concents
Annex 1 i
Situation in Mid-66
Objectives in the Area
Communist and Non-Communist
List of Unacceptable Haitians
Haitians Who Might Take Positions
Government Successor to Duvalier 52
Summary of Possible
Capability for Landing Men and
Personnel with Experience in Haiti
Requirements in Haiti Crisis
Communications Media in Haiti
Coordination of Operations
The US may be confronted with two basic types of situations involving Haiti: a) loss of control by Duvalier with resulting internal chaos; and b) his removal from the scene by natural causes or otherwise. In such eventualities wc rosy be faced with decisions regarding the possiblo deployment of US forces in order to protect the lives of Americans and third country nationals, in order touccessor government, or both. Having an important bearing on our decision would be the attitude of the OAS toward participating in or sanctioning such actions and the extent to which any unilateral steps the US might take could commit us to an unacceptable degreeong term, co3tly involvement in Haiti's internal situation.
Objectives in the Area
Deny Haiti to Communist domination, control or significant influence.
Prevent the loss of American and third country-national lives.
further deterioration in Haiti's political, economic, and sociallaw and order and respect for civil liberties in Haiti.
The Dominican Republic will not invade Haiti or openly support efforts to overthrow Duvalier during the foreseeable futuro.
A permanent IAPF will not have been established.
Duvalier will not significantly ameliorate the undesirable characteristics of his regime.
A. The Political-Military Equation
The Duvalier regimerutal dictatorship that has successfully eliminated all major internal opposition, cowed potential enemies and rendered itself relatively immune from external pressures. Duvalier has eliminated virtually all professional military officers. (Police functions have always been and continue to bo performed by thenjoying some popularity with the rural masses, Duvaliervolunteer militia"ounter to the military but does not permit the military nor the militia to have access to more than token quantities of arms and ammunition. Ho created an armed terror group known as the Ton Ton Macoutes whose organization and command are obscure but which is clearly responsive to Duvalier'3 will. Money to pay for Duvalier's security apparatus is extracted from legal and extralegal taxation, from "contributions" from those granted special privileges and from outright extortion and gangsterism. The economy continues to decline, but Duvalier is still able to obtain the resources necessary to maintain his rule.
Haiti's two Communist parties, tho principal organized opposition to Duvalier within Haiti, do not currently at least have the membership, leadership, organization and capabilities necessary to move to overthrow Duvalier, nor could they be expected at the outset totrong positionost-Duvalier struggle for power. In either case they would require tho support of the military, militia, or the TTM's. It is unlikely that they could attract such support openly, though they would no doubt try to infiltrate any group that has the potential to succeed Duvalier. If they should receive substantial assistance from an international Commi-.nist organization in the fora of trained men and funds, they could be expected toore significant roletruggle for power. Communist-trained Haitian exiles living In Cuba and elsewhere are capable of invading Haiti if given adequate support and Castro's Cuba is capable of
providing it. While an open invasion of Haiti would probably bo immediately known Co us, small groups of infiltrators fron Cuba could enter Haiti clandestinely without detection by the United States. (See
There is at present no effective forco ln Haiti prepared to overthrow Duvalier. Unless an external force is supportedhird country, Duvalier will probably be succeeded, at least initially, by one or more persons. Including military personnel, who are closo to tho Duvalier center of paor. Duvalicr's entourage includes some persons whorobably Communists. Dissatisfaction of his key followers might lead to Duvalicr'sower struggle, or at theeriod of chaos and anarchy. Apower struggle would be apt to result in chaos which might threaten American lives in Haiti. rolonged power struggle might also tempt internal Communists or Castro's Cuba to influence the result, perhapsid for complete control.
Except in the unlikely event that Communist countries would be prepared to provide tho required resources, potential or actual successors to Duvalier will seek United States economic and possibly military assistance for their successor governments.
In considering requests for long-tarm support, account should bo taken of the country's ability to use development assistance effectively.
Ii. Summary of Possible Developments of the Situation
Duvalier falls: an acceptable successor assumes control of the country. (Contingency A)
Duvalier falls: an undesirable non-Communist individual or group assumes control of tha country. (Contingency B)
Duvalier falls: truggle for power ensues among non-Communist groups. (Contingency C)
Duvalier remains inanarchy and chaos occur, no group moves to take power. (Contingency D)
Duvalior remains inCuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts toE)
Duvalier remains in office: an initially unidentifiable force infiltrates Haiti, if itell planned Communist infiltration it night well go undetected and unintcrcepted and could, therefore! succeed with surprising speed. (Contingency F)
Duvalier falls: ommunist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti threatens to succeed to power. (Contingency G)
Duvalier falls: ommunist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti succeeds to power. (Contingency H)
Use of military force to prevent Communist or other unacceptable government from achieving or maintaining power.
aitian crisisilitary-supported evacuation operation.
Any landing of United States military forces in Haiti, even to evacuate Americans and third-country nationals, will influence tho crisis, perhops decisively. Rapid withdrawal would not return the situation to the status quo ante and we would be held responsible for the result in hemisphere opinion. ey issue will be whether to withdraw the troops upon completion of evacuation or to maintain them in Haiti to control the situation,
and assisting acceptable Haitian exiles to try toart of ain Haiti.
1, Conditions under which use of unilateral US military force is contemplated Unilateral military force is contemplated:
a. inperation when commercial evacuation is not feasible because present Haitian security forces could not effectively cope with widespread violence threatening American lives.
b. in an external attack upon Haiti by Communist forces since Haiti is noc able to defend itselfell organized and determined attack. Other OAS members might join us in the defense of Haiti from external aggression but this is not certain.
c. in an internal and relatively non-violent assumption of power by Communists> because means short of military force would notommunist stateultilateral force under OAS sponsorship in this situation is unlikely. In thisilitary evacuation of Americans might be the means of introducing the US force.
2. Intelligence on possible infiltration from abroad
Since there is no AID mission in. Government personnel are resident onl areas of Cap Haitien and Port-au-Prince. Embass^an^Defens^attach other parts of the country with sotne frequency!
the event the
might not would
| Our Embassy wouldalace revolution or trouble within the Duvalier regime within eight hours after but it might not learnoreign infiltration in isolated areas any sooner than Duvalier Government, Although it is unlikely it is possible that Duvalier himself know of itonsiderable time following the infiltration. OAS members st3tes probably not accept and act upon intelligence presented by the Duvalier Government unless it were substantiated by their own embassies or by documentary evidence we are able to produce.
3. Willingness of the OAS to actaitian crisis
The OAS would probably muster tho necessary majority to sanction military intervention and economic pressures on Haiti in the eventommunist invasion, infiltration orif clear, convincing and publishable intelligence could be provided the OAS showing that Communists are, in fact, controlling or dominating the operation. The CAS would probably sanction operations not involving military intervention such as fact-finding commissions, cease fire supervisory groups and the like in crisis situations even in the absence of convincing proof of Communist involvement.
4. The Problems of acceptabilityuvalier successor
Few Haitians who might succeed Duvalier are likely to be wholly desirable rulers of Haiti. Those who can be identified as acceptable (see listing in Annexre mostly in exile and have probably lost much of their following in the country. They could not by themselvesiable government and would therefore have to be allied with lessor unknown Haitians. Haitian exiles cannot be kept out of Haiti once Duvalier falls and regardless of what we do many including acceptable ones would return hoping toew government, . encouragement and assistance to those considered acceptable would improve their prospects of success but would not insure them,
5. Reestablishmcnt of public safety capability
easonable degree of control of Haiti has been establisheduccessor regime we consider acceptable, it will require our assistance in reorganizing its public safety forces. Prior to the Duvalier regime police functions were performed by the Haitian military who, in fact, have not had any other achievable mission. Duvalier has greatly weakened the military forces and createdrival voluntary militia to counterbalance it. Reestablishmentublic safety capability will involve delicate political decisions.
Courses of Action
(see following spread sheets)
EOTI.MATED DEVSLOPiaffiT 0? SITUATION
Reaction in othertrios
Soviet, Cuban end Chicas Reaction
and ecovo civil disorders may develop as the now government consolidates lte position.
Generally favorable or disinterested.
If widocyrcad violence occurs and lives arc lost, scac LA countries vill'be concerned for the safety of their*nationals in Haiti.
Cuba attenrotc by uso of propaganda to weaken or destroy the new Government in ordor to increase Ccra-aunist influence;.
nt unable to consolidate itspouer fitraceio occurs.
undesirable concessions to Coiwu-
Cuba nay attempt to infiltrate events and supplies into Haiti
'Uircats to American lives.
POSSIBLE lUfSULTS/liEACTIOKS. CCUSSHS OF ACTIOS
covcrrcacnt begins proccrr of reform and de-volo>niont in order to attract _US andassistancerivate Investment and to increase tourian.
new coveraaant undertakes reforms, reaction will be favorable.
Some additional LA "ovemmentu may ectabliohrelations with Haiti.
Rest of free world vrill havo little or no reaction to nev Government.
attempt* to mint new noverrcacnl tic uS .puppet.
CWWXaCiiiCY ii: Duvalier folic: An undesirable ncc-Cowuniat individual or croup otcuw* control
of the country
bshnassif ibe sowzrea
ond soma civil dis-
if any, will be
Bay develop nc the new
videspreod violence occurs
lives are lost, cone IA
will be concerned
the safety of their nationals
nay otteapt to
cuppllos icto ilolti
CONTINGENCY B: Duvalier falls: an undesirable non-Communist Indivlduol or group assumes control of the country.
SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS
to influence the government to eliminate its undesirable characteristics, using means short of US military action.
A cessation of acts of violence against American lives.
with other LA countries concerning Haitian situation.
Maintain US presence in Haiti. Discuss with the government means of making it acceptable includinguid pro quo US assistance.
If the government takes action against US citizens or is unable to prevent attacks on American Uvea, implementlan by commercial means, if possible. In advance of such action notify LA heads of state of the planned evacuation, inform them (and other countries having cltixens in Haiti) that the OS will assist in protecting their nationalsilitary evacuation bo roquired.
Request an immediate meeting of the COAS to apprise the memberscf the situation and to request convocation of an MFM under Articlesf the Charter, to seek approval for Joint action to protect lives of foreign nationals.
road Informational campaign to explain events and enlist support for US policies and actions.
N Security Counall meeting is called, defend US actions and urge that the matter be left with the OAS. SYO of the OAS should inform the Security Councl of the OAS actions being taken. If there is subston-tlal pressure for debating the issue in the UKCA,carefully the political implications of opposing it.
air ond sea surveillance of (the area and be pro-pared to interdict to prevent Cuba-lased Communists from infiltrating laiti.
Implement approve^ evacuation plan if commerciolis not possib end toS force capable of evacuating US Withdrawat earliest
Obtain the assistance of tlie Haitian exile leaders to utlllza their media in support. policies.
COJ.TIKGSJJC* B: Duvalier folia: on undesirable non-Ccouucist individual "orassuaos control of tba country
POSSIBLEACTIOi'S. COURSES OF ACTIOS
demands "no strings ottachcd" old; foils to abide by conditions for granting aid. ay take action ocainot US interests such as travel restrictions and discriminatory actions against US flms.
Govcra^ont micht peruit non-Com-nunlit Cuban exiloi to use Haitian territory to carry out actions acainst Cuba.
LA Governments way refuse to
r;ec. tilC nCV if it
clearly tied to Duvalier supporters. Thoy may criticize U3 efforts to deal with new covcrnrcent. US nay face criticise in Europe and elsewhere for dealing with "unacceptable" recine.
If evacuation required end undertaken subsequent to OAS notification, IA reaction will be generally acquiescent to this action to savo US and foreign lives provided US forces ore United ln nur.ber and. withdraw upon completion of the evacuation.
propaganda conpalen to ciic-credit US.
If US recognizes ^cvsrtsent and grantsacciutcr.ee, Corrjunirts cite thiso;nplc of US support for "opprer:cr" goverrdiient:?. If US undertakes evacuation, Cocnunists use thisa:=plc of "military intervention."
Cortainicts nay take issue to UI', particularlyn-Coarnunist Cubonro-eiatcd with new government plan actions against Cuba.
COHTXEGEECY. C: Duvalier falls: truggle for power ensues aeons non-Cconunist croups.
CaiWlKGEKCY C: Duvalier foils: truggla for power ensues among oca-Communist groups.
SPECIFIC UHITED STATES OBJECTIVES AtfD ACTIOirS
end to violonca.
The emergence of an acceptable stable non-Cammunlst goverot sent.
Protection of American live
with other LA countries concerning Haitian situation.
Alert the Ewiinican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, each of tho Leouard and Wind-vard Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Motherlands Indies, the Central American republics. Pa nana, and Venezuela to the possibility that Communist groups ray attempt to dispatch Haitian Communist exiles from these territories to Haiti in order to take advantage of the .situation in Haiti. -
We may encourage acceptable Haitian exiles to return to Haiti to assist intable government.
If American lives arc tbreatcnad, implementlan by commercial moans if possible. In advance of such action, notify LA heads of stato of tho planned evacuation, inform them (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the "US" will assist intheir nationalsilitary evacuation be required.
Pursuant to prior consultation with OAS members,an immediate mooting of the COAS to apprise members of the situation and to request either convocation
air and sea surveillance of the area and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuba-based Communists from infiltrating Haiti
Implement approved evacuation plan if commercialis notd toorce capable- of evacuatingitizens.
Withdraw forces at earliestunloes these troops are committed by the US Governmentart of on OAS sponsored peace keeping forco.
Arrango for the return to Haiti of responsible-Haition exiles who mayopular following in Haiti and who have governmental, labor, and administrative experience. These some people could assist In preventing Haitian Communists from taking over.
Assist Haitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtainpositions in the public Information media field inside Haiti to. interests.
HKSX C: Duvalier falls: truggle for power ensues roups
CKCIFIC UlIITIiD STATES OBJECTIVE: AKD AMICUS
an ISH under Articlesnd 'to of the Charter or invocation of the Rio Treaty, whichever scctos preferable. In either case,nitially OAS cellease firo, the dispatch of OASand, possibly, authorization of tho use of military force for peace keeping purposes under the control of the OAS.
H .Security Council Beating is colled, explain US ction ond urge that tho Haitian problem be left with the OAS. SYG of the OAS should infera tho Security Council of the OAS actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UXCA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.
If OAS action results in the formationrovisional government, use the enforced peace toccmitaenteturnrcoly elected Government and initiating sound cconouic and social
roadampaign to exploir. events and enlist support for US policies and actions.
CCoTICCagi C: Duvalier falls: truggle for power ensues among Ma-Ccmmuinlst croups
. cajwz'. c? actioi:
group achieves reasonably clear control of tho country ana casks economic and/or military- . from thaf assistance rejected or not forthcoming, newis unable toato its control and otruggl for power among opposing groups breaks out again.uch group night be Communist controlled or upported.
of rVee Worlt. generally favorable to OAS involvement.
If there is military intervention with or without (US' troops, some popular criticism.
So direct involvenont in the Haitian situation.
COimilGSICY D: Duvalier remains ln of/ice: though anarchy and chaos occur, no group coves to take pouer
CCItfUlGEXCi D: Duvalier remains in of rice: though anarchy and choos occur, no group moves to take power
POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTICKS. COURSES OF ACTIOS
US simply carried outoxercise, internal situation affected hut chaos/anarchy could begin again and Duvalier or one of his cohorts likely to eventually prevail.
Duvalier might aek military evacuation force to remain and maintain order.
Sane popular criticise of US along "imperialistic" theme hut generally sympathy regarding humanitarian aspect of action.
Widespread diplomatic support by frea vorld nations.
Soma anti- Ui propaganda.
Chinesecf Duvalier; point mede that original US "support" of him had "causae."
Cuba urges throughuprising against Duvalier.
COIITIUCEflCY E: Duvalier remains In office: uban supported force or" Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade
Reaction in other LA Countries
Soviet, Cuban and Chlccn Reactions
requests US and/or OAS assistance.
Groups within Haiti seize on this opportunity to try to assassinate Duvalier.
Duvalier retreats to Palace and loses control of Port-au-Prince area.
reaction couldthe invasion be
expected. Certaindiscussed in any
Mould advocate OAS action and international forum others would publicslly say (Uli-OAS) the Soviets nothing and await US reaction would warn the US not to
' take any action against Cuba.
Chicom reaction might be that of announcing readiness of Chicoai volunteers to assist in freeing Haiti from imperialism of the US.
Cuba intensifiesurging liaitian people to rise against Duvalier though not admitting Cuban cociple-city in invasion.
UuG niiitnry response to assist Duvalier would commit US to open support of an unsavory regime in haitl.
Threat of/or real invasion could canso Duvalier to panic endtruggle within thoth subsequent chaos and disorder and no organized resistance to invasion force.
A Communist oriented government coulu be established in Haiti.
Threats to American lives.
OOMQWCI E: Duvalier remains in office: uban supported force of Cuban trained Haitiansottempts to invade
SP!-CI?IC UNITED STATES CDJECTIYES AKD ACTIOi.S
of US and foreign nationals in Haiti.
Prevention of tho establishmentommunist government in Haiti.
Replacement of Duvalier with an acceptable regime.
vith other LA countries concerning Haitian situation.
If American lives are threatened, implementlan by commercial means if possible. In advance of such action, notify LA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protacting their nationalsilitary evacuotion be required.
Procure and assemble the best available evidence of outside Communist interference.
Request immediate OAS action toesolution under the Rio Treaty recommending that governments of member states take iridivid-ually or collectively such steps as may bo necessary toember state against This may Include the dispatch of OAS representatives and an inter-American peace force.
Urge the Latin American govornmento to act quickly on the OAS resolution.
H Security Council meeting ic called, explain US actions and urge that the Haitian problem be left vith the OAS. SYO of the OAS should inform tho Security Council of tiie OAS actions being taken. If there ic substantial pressure for debating the issue in tho UKOA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.
air and sea surveillance operations and be prepared toto provent Cuban support of invasion force.
Implement approved evacuotion plon if commercialis cot Send toorce capable of evacuating USend other foreign nationals.
De prepared to provide military forces to on IAPF should the proposed resolution of the OAS sanctionorce.
Be prepared to execute CIUCIATJTo contingency plan for lioiti should the OAS foil to take adequate action toommunist government from being formed in Haiti.
Publish list of Haitians trr.lne in CcisTunlctand rc-pub-llflh hrc-dcastsio Envana which hi.vc urgcw thecv cf Duvc.lior end the estajllchr-cnteoples'
Constat vith responsible Haitla exileiYic-ialo to prc-cto the forr-itior. of en acceptable eovcrr. .cni to succeed Duvalier.
CGIJI'INCEHCY K: Duvalier roLclno ln office: ubcn supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or atteapts to invade
SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AKD ACTICfK
whether the tiac has arrived to achieve the departure of Duvalier. If so decided,
Immediate steps to locate ana promote thoof an acceptable Government to replace him. easonable decree of support if it achieves power.
Duvalier to leave Haiti in hia oim andinterest. Should he fail to departto ecploy forco to require bio to do so.
CAS action should result in the formation ofaovcrnnentociftitmenteturnfreely elected Govcrment and the initiation ofand social measures.
DIocuse possible US" assistance. Xocp US plans and Haitian expectationsery low level ln view of the inherent limitations upon (a) the stability of ony Haitian regime and (b) the ability of Haiti to moke effective use of external assistance.
road informationalto explain eventsjind enlist support for US policies and action's.
CCirrLNGEKCY S: Duvalier remains In office: uban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invade or attempts to invade
POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIOIIS. COURSESCTION
of tho US to respond to Duvalier's request for assistance could resultakeover by the Cuban sponsored invaders.
Use of US forces to implementlan could strengthenosition.
US surveillance and/orperations could be used by Duvalier as propaganda! for US support of Duvalier and could also demoralise tha invasion forces.
An IAPF deployed to Haiti would bo welcomed by many Haitiansovernment' could be established In lieu of Duvalier.
sufficient support of OAS aethers could be obtained so that icot countries would provide units to form an IAP7 in Haiti, particularly if Duvalier should leave.
Some criticism could be expected from OAS and African nations.
US and CAS would be the object of the "imperiilist" propaganda from tho Communist countries.
Castro might be ofrald of being attacked by the US endargo invasion threat propaganda campaign to strengthen hie position in Cuba. He might eventhe US by shootingurveillanro pinna or harrassing the Cuantannmo Havol Base. Cnctro might olco use US intervention in Haitieasonuild up ln Soviet military assistance ln Cuba.
Communist directed disorders might occur la tha DR.
SPECIFIC anSD STACKS OBJECTIVES AID ACTIONS
US and foreign nationals in Haiti.
Prevent tho establishmentcxnu-niotat in Haiti
Estobllsh an acceptable government in Haiti.
LA countries ceo corning situation.
If American Uvea are threatened implementlan by commercial means if possible. In advnnco of eucn action, notify LA heads of 3tatc (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the U3 will assist in protecting their nationalsilitary evacuation be required.
Should Duvalier request US assistance send specialized US personnel to Haiti to evaluate the extent and nature of the infiltrating force. If tho force i3 non-Cc=aunist advise Duvalier to appeal to tbe OAS for assistance.
Should Duvalier foil totomal assistance, assemble tha best evidencaregarding the identity of tho infiltrators
If the infiltrators arc Ccmaunist request ismscdiate OAS action toesolution under the Bio Treaty reccrmsncling that govem-[centa of cesser states individually ortake sucb steps as may be necessary toember state against Ccsaualst This may include tho dispatch of OAS representatives and an Inter-American Peaco Force.
Urgo Latin American governments to act quickly on tao resolution.
air and sea surveillance eperationo and bo prepared toto prevent Cuban support of infiltrators.
Implement approved evacuation plan iftransportation is not possible. Send toorco capable of evacuating American clti-zeno and other foreign nationals.
Taito Immediate steps to assist in dctcraing tbe identity of the Infiltrators.
So prepared to provide military forces to anhould the proposedof the OAS sanctionorce.
Ee pro parod to execute CITICLAKTs contingency plan for Haiti should the OAS fail todequate action to prevent agovommcst frca being formed in Haiti.
Encourage recognized Haitian exile groups to petition OAS to reestablish ordor.
Consult vithHaitian exile leaders including former government officials to promote the formation of an acceptableto succeed Duvalier.
Persuade Haitian emissaries to advitic Duvalier to leave for good of country, and/or infiltrate certain Haitians with contacts in military for purposes of pressuring Earallcr to leave. If Duvalier agrees torange fo; the return to Haiti ofHaitian exiles whoopularin Haiti end have governmental, labor and administrative experience. Thccoeople could assist in preventing Haitian Ccs-ausist3 frca taking over.
HESULTS/REACTIONS. COURSES OF ACTION
of surveillance and/or use of military force inction might *top bid for power by Ccsnunlst group, even though this vac not intended. An acceptable group would bellove the actions were intended to support it.
An IAPF deployed to Haiti would be welcomed by manyovernment could be established in lieu of Duvalier.
Criticism could be expected from OAS, African and other non-Coraunist countries.
Depending upon tho clarity of Ccetsunlst throat to assume power, sufficient support of OAS members could he obtained so that some countries would provide units to fora an IAPF in Haiti, particularly if Duvalier should leave.
' *JS and the OAS would bo the object of "imperialist'* propaganda from Communist countries.
Communist directed .'iEorfers might occur in the Hi.
UaffXHCrfATI U: Uiwalter foils: i-r Ceramist uouinatcd croup of Itxitlnnoiti threatens to succeed to power.
Igtcdiotc Developments -Internal
in other IA Countries
Cubnn end Chicon Reaction
individuals or groups maneuver*within power structure to achieve dominance.
Violence breaks out among competing successor groups.
Communist group'begins to achieve dominance in power struggle and may seize tho major instruments of power.
. Threats to American lives.
' ' . . /
violence ie involved reaction, if any, will be minimal.
Kany'IA governments and public do not understand nature of new government"and Its participants,of "Communist domination.
strong anti- US propaganda cwipaign but no open or identifiable support for Communist group.
on Communist involvement may be inconclusive.
Violence cay become widespread.
Cuba mayo infiltrate ocants and supplier into Haiti
u.ux JAivaiier falls: eanunict or Cojiiunlst-Jcalnr-tod group of Haitians In Haiti threatens to succeed to power.
SPECIFIC UTilTED STATESkid ACI'IOHS
vith othor IA countries concerning Kai-ui situation.
If American lives are threatened, introduce US troops to protect lives of Americans and other for cign nationals and tocmciunist govorrsncn' frca controlling Haiti. In advanca of such action, notify IA heads ol* state (and other countries bavin; citizens in Haiti) that tbe US will assist intheir nationalsilitary evacuatior1 [be required.
Maintain US presence in Haiti.
Take immediate steps to locate end prccotc tho formation of on acceptable government. Assure it of reasonable degree of support if it achieves pa.-or
Procure and asseablo tho best availablo evidence of Ccassinist involvement.
request immediate CAS action to obtain aunder the Hio Treaty rocconcnuing that govom-onto of member states take individually or colloc-jtivcly such steps as cay be necessary toerbcr state against subversion. This cay include tho dispatch of OAS representatives end on inter-American peace force to caintaiu the poaco, using US forces ii. Haitiontingent, if desired.
Urge tho Latin American gewerraents to act quickly on tho OAS resolution.
air and sea survcillarc operations and be prepared toto prevent Cuban and/or othersupport.
Scad toorce capablo of evacuating OBand foreign nationals anda CoBsnunlst govamcant from achieving pever.
Ec prcparad to provide military forces to on IAP? should tho proposed rasolution of the OAS sanctionorce.
ago recognised Haitian exile groups to petition OAS to re-establish order.
Consult vith responsible Haitian exile leaders including former government officials to promote the formation of an acceptable government.
Arrange for ths return to Haiti of responsible Haitian exiles whoopular following in Haiti and bavo governmental, labor and administrative oxporlcneo. Thcco ansa people could assist in preventing Haitian Cccsoinists frca taking over.
Assist Kaitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtain influential positions in the publicticn media field Inside Haiti to. mtcreets.
Publish list of Fhltions trained in Occnunlflt countries and rc-publish broadcasts frca ?adio Havana vkich have urged tha overthrow of Davalior Kd the establishmenteoples't.
CUi'I'lLOtUCY. C: Duvalier falls: ommunist or Communist dominated group. ia :iaiti
threatens to succeed to povor.
failure to respond prowpuly to Communist threat to oesunte power could resultom/.iuniet isovornment of Haiti.
Implementation of surveillance and/or uoo of military force inction might stop bid for power by Communist group, even though this was not intended.
Aorce deployed to Haiti would be welcomed by.cany Haitians.
Criticism could be expected from OAS, Afrieon and other noa-Communist countries.
Depending upon the clarity of Communist threat to assume power, sufficient support of OAS members could be obtained to provide units to form an IAPF in Haiti.
S and the OAS would be the object of "imperialist" prcpogando from Communist countries.
Communist directed disordoi night occur in the ECt.
QfcfflBGrZrCX li: Duvalier falla: camuaist or Cca^unic^ dominated ^roup of Haitians ln Haiti ouccccdc tor.
specific usxsss sjates ceoictives ahd acvics
Ccersunlctin Eaiti vittl an acceptable government.
vith othor IA countries concerning Haitian situation.
If Aucrican livco oro threatened, land US troops to protect American and third-country live3 and toon-Ccsmunist government in Eaiti. In advance of such action, notify LA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that tho US will assist in protecting their nationalsilitary evacuation bo required. oin tain US presence In Haiti.
Take irxodiate steps to locate and promote the formation of en acceptable goverr-xoiit. Assure it of reasonable degree of support if it achieves power.
Procure and assemble tho best available evidence of Cccrranlct involvement. Request immediate CAS action toesolution under tho Rio Treaty rocczmending that govera-Btsatsnbcr states take individually cr collectively such sxopa aa may bo necessary toember state against subversion. This cay include the dispatch cf CAS rcpreccn'.ativeo and onrlcar. pcaco force to maintain tho psaco, us Ins U3 troops in Haitiontingent If decired.
Urge the Latin American govemnants to act quickly on tho OAS resolution.
air and sea curveillaac eperations and be prepared toto provent Cuban and/or other fOSBdil support.
Ee prepared to send toorce capable of evacuating US citizens and foreign nationals and ofon- Ccsisunist government.
Ho prepared to provide nllitary forces to an lAr? should tho proposed resolution of tho OAS sanctionorce.
Consult vith responsible Haitian exile leaders including former gcvcrruiant officials to promote the formation cf on acceptable government,
Urgo responsible Haitian exile leadersere. to return to Haiti as soon as lt is possible and urge their participation in achieving OAS objectives."
- Duvalier falls: osiiunist or Cocjanust-uocinatcu croup of liaitions in Haiti succeeds to pousr.
POCSIDLS ntSULlC/ltEACTIOJCD. COUHSSGCTIOH
of surveillance and/or uee of military force inction mightommunist government even. hough this was not intended.
. force deployed to.Haiti would be welcomed by many Haitians.
Crlticimn could be expected from OAS, African and other non-Coraunist countries.
Da pending upon the clarify of Cosjunist donination of thocnt, sufficient support of OAS members could be obtained to provide units to form an LAPP in Haiti.
US and tho OASbe the object of "iiipcriniist" propaganda frca Communis! countries.
Cccmunict directed disorders might occur in tho Dominicon Hapublic ondountries
Concept of Operations
risis situation involving the downfall or serious weakening of the Duvalier regime* we might have an opportunity to increase United States influence withoutisproportionate price. If the present regime is replacedeasonably acceptable one, small amounts of economic and military assistance would probably be enough to reestablish our influence. If,truggle for power, one of the fighting factions is more acceptable than the other, we could provide relatively small-scale assistance to the favored side to Influence the result, inay that we would notong-term, costly commitment. If there is nothing to choose between two competing factions we would probably not want to influence the power struggle, though we might influence the resultant regime by extending modest amounts of assistance. An operation designed to use military force to control the situation would involve long and costly involvement in Haiti.
The basic interests of the United States would be affectedituation in Haiti in which American lives are endangered or thereerious threat of Communist (probably Cuban) control of Haiti. Every effort would be made in an evacuation situation to avoid the use of military force, but in the last analysis the introduction oforce might be required to ensure the safety of American lives or toommunist takeover in Haiti. The force should have the capability of reestablishing law and order, which may be necessary to permit the withdrawal of the military force under conditions chat would not seriouslyesurgence of chaos.
Communist attempts to control Haiti might be by meansairly open invasion mounted from and logistically supported by Cuba, by infiltrating snail groups of trained men clandestinely, oreizure of power by Communist groups within Haiti. An open invasion might be countered militarily if necessary and if the existence of foreign Communist support is clearly proven, the OASroup of OAS member states would be likely to agree to undertake responsibility for the action. If the existence of foreign Communist support is not demonstrably clear, OAS counteraction wouLd not be forthcoming and we would have to decide whether we should undertake unilateral military action.
An internal seizure of power by Communists might induce the OAS to act decisively but this Is not likely. To the extent we are able we would attempt co counter the Communist effort by means other than military intervention. If all elso failed, however, we would have to decide whether to act unilaterally with military force*
1. Military operations for the contingencies described in this paper could involve one of the following three types of operationsombination of each:
A Surveillance Plan is available which can provide the capability to detect. Identify, track, report. Intercept, search and seize ships/aircraft departing Cuba to the Caribbean Sea. The forces assigned to implement this surveillance plan (See Annexould be made available to conduct surveillance operations
aitian contingency. However, the actual circumstances existing at the time the plan is executed (magnitude of threat, source of threatay require fewer forces. Ac the present time one mine sweeperontin-uous patrol in the Windward Passage and two flights/per day of ASW aircraft are conducted from either Guantanamo or Roosevelt Roads. Under the present circum-stances it would be possible for small groups ofen each) to land in Haiti from Cuba, the Bahamas, or other Caribbean Islands. The reaction time to implement the full scale surveillance plan isours.
b. Evacuation of US and Third Country nationals utilizing US military forces
There are an2 AmericanS Third Country nationals whoour assistance in an emergency and evacuation operation in Haiti. ) of the possible evacuees are located in the The remainder are distributed throughout the country with the in Cap Haitian,iles from Port-au-Prince. military bo requested to assist in executinglan, the
Lift. The Ready Amphibious Squadron stationed inhas the current capability tosome Marines are debarked prior to loading evacuees,can be accomodated, The Amphibious Ready2 hour reaction time from Haiti.
Air Lift. Should that part of CINCLANTscalling for landing an Airborne Brigade in Haiti bemilitary airlift capacity could be mado availableplans utilizing the air lift employed in landing the
Airborne Brigade subjecthe recycle requirements for follow-on tactical and support unitshe capabilities of Haitian airfields toparked aircraft to await evacuation. Evacuation of US and Third Country nationals would require the landing of some US troops In the Port-au-Prince area to secure the airfield and protect the evacuees prior to evacuation.
c. Military Intervention
The CINCLANT Contingency Plan for Haitilexible plan in which show of force operations are planned with other operations with an ascending order of magnitude being undertaken as required. Military intervention, if required, will Include amphibious operations, airborne/air landed operations,ombination of both. Operations will initially concentrate on restoring law and order. If so directed, emphasis could be shifted to reconstituting the Haitian Armed Forces while using. Civil Affairs units to direct government activities. Tho maximum reaction time for execution of this plan isours.
2. Overflight rights would not normally be required for surveillance and evacuation operations. However, if full scale implementation of the intervention plan is envisioned (including the airborne/air landed operations) overflight rights, femergency landing and refueling rights for the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic may be required.
C. Other operations
Should some of the contingencies described in this paper occur, there wouldeed for an emergency program to provide food and medical supplies and..essential services. An annex is attached which provides an outlinerogram of short-tern, emergency assistance for Haiti.
In Dominican Republic operation, Che cost Co the United States of relief and reconstruction of the Dominican economy was aboutmillion. Haiti,er capita GNP one-third that of its neighbor, would be an even more expensive operation if conductedimilar scale. In order Co limit these costs in Haiti to the extent possible, emergency economic programs, including any civil affairs program toilitary operation, should have as their objectives Che reestablishment of law and order and the maintenance of services essential to the military operation and those traditionally enjoyed by the Haitian people. Activities designed to improve basic economic conditions should be limited to those that can be continued after the withdrawal of the military force with Haici's own financial and human resources supplemented by such foreign economic assistance as Haiti can reasonably be expected Co obtain.
uccessor government is installed, it can be expected to. economic and military assistance. ecision is made Co grant assistance* it should not be tn excess of Haiti's capacity Co absorb it productively for development and should be designed to serve as leverage on the new government to promote Che needed reforms.
D. Coordination of operations
1. Washington Inter-Agency Coordination
The Country Director for Haiti is responsible for coordinating this paper with CIA and DOD. He willchedule for quarterly reviews of the paper and will chair the inter-agency meetings (JCS and ISA of DOD, CIA, and State)He will also call additional meetings on the paper should there be indicationsrisis situation may be approaching in Haiti.
Farther Attention Recommended
Which May Increase the Seriousness of the Situation
The declining economy has meant that Duvalier has been under increasing pressure for funds to pay his retainers. At least two foreign companies in Haiti were recently requested to make advance taxbecause of the need for cash. There are reports that some of Duvalier's supporters are restive because of lack of salary payments and declining opportunities for personal profit. These indications of deepening economic troubles and disaffection among Duvalier's clique may presage moves among Duvalier followers to topplet should be recognized that the traditional economic indicators are hardly relevant in assessing the future of the Duvalier The significant factors are those which affect the actual cash available to Duvalier to dispense to his retinue and their prospects for profiteering. For this reason, special attention should be devoted to information on lags in salary payments to Haitian officials, additional requests for advance tax payments, etc. Such reports in themselves cannot be depended on as "signals" of an inrainent crisis but they are useful in gauging the effect of economic pressure on the regime.
Continued attention should be given to reporting on Duvalier's health. Any confirmed reporterious illness would merit reexamination of this paper. Approaches to the Embassy by persons purporting to represent groups ready to move against Duvalier may indicate the beginningrisis but must be treated -with extreme caution because of the possibility that such an approach is directed by Duvaliereans of identifying potential conspirators against his regime.
Which May. Capabilities to React andsee Concept ofilitary)
supporting material available
a.ersons who have worked on this paper who are acquainted with its contents include;
francis x. lambert
ara/car elville e. osborne maureen harris
Department of Defense
Captain K. C. Gummerson
Central Intelligence Agency
Statemergency and Evacuation,
6 from Port-au-Prince
Latin American Policyaiti.iographic information on Haitians
Haiti: Situation in
The Communist and Non-Communist Opposition.
List of Unacceptable Haitians.
Cuban Capability for Landing Men and Arms in Haiti* .
Haitian Security Forces.
List of USG Personnel with Experience in Haiti.
Estimated Requirements for Emergency Relief Operations in Haiti
Mass Communications Media in Haiti.
HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX I
Haiti: Situation in7
Since coming to power over eight years ago. President Francois Duvalier has throttled even the most rudimentary form of political dialogue ln Haiti. He hasacade of legality around his regime but has remained in power only by destroying or neutralizing all sources of opposition. Goveronent and military leaders have been transferred often and, at tines. Involuntarily retired, to keep then from developing personal followlngs or becanlng potential rivals to Duvalier's dictatorial leadership. esult, there is probably no person or group in the government with sufficient backing to be able tooup.
Even so, opposition to the Duvalier regime is believed to be widespread among the relatively few politically minded Haitians. This opposition Is unorganised, nonvocal, and ineffective against the internal security forces, especially the secret police. Two small Communist parties comprise the only organized internal opposition. In the past their activities have been hampered by intramural rivalries. However, there are good Indications that these two parties are attempting to unite their efforts against Duvalier. The politicallyer cent of theilliterate, physically and culturally isolated, and subsists on the fringe of starvation.
Plotting within the military has been the norm since Duvalicr's accession to power. However, premature disclosure invariably has led to imprisonment and death or exile for the plotters.
Two military plots were deflated during the past twelve months. In6 Duvalier
reacted with characteristic speed and ruthlessness to quash an Incipient plot by elements
of the Presidential guard to topple him from power. Rumors of Haitian exile plans to
invade Haiti reportedly led to Duvalier's order to execute summarily all Haitians caught returning
their homeland from che bahamas. when in november duvalior received word of aof haitilorida-based exile group, heumber ofon suspicion of plotting against the regime. ten of the officersasylum in foreign embassies and subsequently were courtmartialed end condemnedin januaryhave left the country.
members of the sano cuban-haitian exile conspiracy rumored in november were arrested7 while attempting to launch their invasion.
contrary to some reports that have been widely circulated, available evidence does not support the belief that duvalier's departure from the haitian scene is imminent. he is reported to be in good health, he has been successful in suppressing all plots to overthrow him, and there is nothing in his past behavior to indicate that he would abandon power willingly, as has been rumored. assassination is of courseossibility.
there has been little in che past six months to indicate that the regime is modifying its repressive political practices or that it is coping effectively with haiti's economic and social problems. corruption, apathy, favoritism, irresponsibility, and brutality continue to permeate the regime. in these circumstances there is little prospect of improving internal conditions. the economy has continued its slow but steady decline during the past year, and all signs pointontinuation of this trend. 7 tho government's financial situation will continue to bo tight, and, on the basis of the general economic conditions, is expected to continue so as long as substantial revenues remain outside the national budget.
thus, the situation in haiti in7 is neither better nor much worse than at any time during "president-for-life" duvalier's regimo.
haiti contingencyhe conxnunist and non-conaunist opposition a. the communists
wo communistparty of popular accord (pep) and the popular party of national liberationre small, lacking in discipline, and poorly indoctrinated. aximum ofembers and upellow travelers, both inside and outside haiti, the communists constitute the only internal opposition with any degree of training andprimitive. the split between the parties stems from personal rivalry among the leaders, rathor than any real ideological differences. ood source has indicated that tho ppln inside haiti now goes by the name of the united haitian democratic party (puda).
the moscow-oriented pep is recognized by the international communist movement as the haitian communist party, it is believed to be receiving soviet financial assistance and guidance via mexicoaitian exile, gerard pierre-charles.
the ppln is castro-oriented and received ideological guidance from radio havana, which beams one program in french and another in creole daily. no direct contact between moscow and the ppln has been detected.
most of the exiled haitian communists are in europe or mexico. the largest group is in france, where there is an organization of. aboutro in mexico, where they reportedlyulletin called ralliement which is also circulated in europe. in addition, there are probablyo so communist exiles studying in bloc countries and in cuba. opln leaders haveroup in canada.
Communists appear to Lack che membership, leadership, arms, andto become serious contendersost-Duvaltcr power struggle. Their fortunes would be improved under any circumstance Inuccessor to Duvalier were not immediately named. They probably would find It to their advantage to prolong any indecisionew government, possibly totab at seizing power themselves. To seize aposition, however, the Communists would require the effective suppor of the military, and probably the Ton Ton Macoutcs and the militia. At the present time there is rio indication that they could attract such support. Latest indications are that these two parties are attempting to solve their differences and unite their efforts.
8- The Non-Conrnuniat Opposition
Most of the non-Communist Haitian exile opposition is located in New York and Miami, with smaller groups scattered around the Caribbean in Venezuela, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and perhaps In the Bahamas. Other large groups of uneducated Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Bahamas are not active politically.
Of those with political pretensions, about ten leaders in New York have grouped their individual followings into the International Haitian Union. It is presently active andalf-hour daily short-wave broadcast to Haiti In Creole over New York Station WRUL. The program, consisting of music, news, and poetry, carefully attempts to avoid any direct inflamatory references to Duvalier or his regime, but does attack their excesses. Duvalier has complained to. Government that these broadcasts are inciting che Haitian population co revolt.
In the event of Duvalier's departure from the scene, the more affluent exiles could be expected co cry to return to Haiti, The exiles.
LlsC of Unacceptable Haitians
Adolphe, Mrs. Max Apollon, Hosnherre Arcelin, Paul
Arty, Colonel Frederic Marc
Blssatnthe, Father Gerard
Borges, Major Jose
Brierre, Jean F.
Brunet, Captain Gabriel
Cayard, Colonel Octave
Charles, Clemarc Joseph Chauvet, Lucien Cineas, Fritz Coulanges, Ernst
Daumec, Lucien (probably dead but in case not, should be Included as he is, or was, Duvalier's brother-in-law)
Day, Windsor Delva, Zacharie Desir, Luc
Dominique, Captain Max
Dominique, Mme. Max (nee Marie-Denise Duvalier,
President's daughter) Duvalier, Mme. Slmone Ovide (Mme. Francois
Duvalier, Jean-Claude (President's son) Duvalier, Melle. Simone (President's daughter) Foucard, Luc-Albert
Foucard, Mme. Luc-Albert (nee Nicole
Fourcand, Jacques Francois, Rodolphe Francois, Mme. Rodolphe Caillard, Fritzler Camille Gaillard, Roger Giordani, Pierre Hector, Michel Jacques, Colonel Gracia Jerome, Captain Abel Jolly, Ulrick Laroche, Colonel Jacques Lasseque, Seymour
SECRET NO FORK
Leroy, Andre Maiere, Elois Moise, Claude Moisc, Rodolphe Philippe, Major Monod Pierre-Ancoine, Paul Pierre-Louis, Le. Colonel Luc Pierre-Louis, Rossini Pecic, Antoine G. Romain. Major Frank Sainc-Amand, Edrls Saint-Phard, Jean
Saint-Victor, Mme. Yvon (sister of Foucard)
Saint-Victor, Yvon (husband of above)
Tassy, Captain Harry
Tassy, Major Jean
ho Might Take Positions in -Government Successor co Duvalier
A. Those Insido Haici as of November6
Kith one exception the Military officers on this list were dismissed from thoir positions on The civilians are not closoly identified with the Duvalier regime and arereater or lesser degrco favorably known to official American personnel, "hey are not of such stature or abilityhey could bo expected touccessorchough chcy mighc occupy positions of cabinet or sub-cabinet rank inovernment.
ANDRE,residenc of Nacional Bank of Haici. Pro-American, bese
available financial specialise.
BEAUVOIR Colonelntil recently chief of Army Logistics.
Dismissed6 and in asylum in Brazilian Embassy. Energetic, able, with somo influence among TTM's. much among military; somewhat brutal, once had reputation as playboy.
CADET.echnical Director of InsciCute for Agricultural and
Induscrial Developmentgronomisc, uriccr, liked by Haitian exiles. Colorless, moderate, little following but competent in agriculture.
CAUVIN,ormer top economist of National Bank of Haiti.
Theoretician of Personalistc Movement, teacher. Honest, energetic, progressiva, perhaps too idealistic. Cricical of boch Communist and United Statesue said to be capable of playing footsie wich Communists to advance Personalistc Party interests.
CAY ARD, Colonelommandant of Coast Guard. Said to bo able and
respected Army officer, sadistic, open supporter of Duvalier. Friendly but not closo to Americans.
CHARLES, Josephormer Ambassador to United States, former
Secretary for Education, Public Works, and Foreign Relations. Friendly to United States officials, not prominent but good lawyer and statesman. Mentioned as possible provisional president upon fall of Duvalier.
LEMARRE, Colonelormer Chief of Operations, Army Ceneral Staff.
Dismissed6 and probably in asylum in Port-au-Princot. Pro-United States and anti-Communist. op leader but good potential.
- Able lawyer and attorney for all American business firms in Haiti. No government and little political experience. Anti-Duvalier, pro-American.
Former Minister of Public Works, pro-American. Probably associated with Clemard Charlas in business ventures. Said to be honest and patriotic. Seeks out Americans. Specks good English.
MEHU,ormer Prefect of Port-au-Prince and former Minister of
Interior and National Defense. Closely associated with exile Jean H. ELIE (see below). Pro-United States. Has some following in capital and northern Haiti.
NELSON,ormer Army Paymaster, mother is Amorican negrcss.
Respected by military officers in exile. Dismissed6 and probably in asylum in Port-au-Princ
T NO FORN
SKCKKT KO FGLuN
Haitians Outside Haiti, Mostly Exiles
There arc no known Haitians who would be completely satisfactorypoint of view to serveovernment successor toall of them have personal or moral defectsarked degreestandards. Those listed are bolievcd to be the leastknown Haicians and with few or minor personal or moral defectsscandards. Honesty, competence, and other terms used coHaitians listed in chis document are used within Haitian terms Criticism of the United Scates for supporcing these Haitiansexpecced since foreign reporters would apply their own, noc The first four names on che lisc below are those believed tomost reliable and the most likely to bo able co pick up CheDuvali They could ROC
be expecced to assume control if substantial opposition to them still existed in Che Haitian power structure unless they received very strong support from abroad, probably including any necessary military supporc. No Haitian or group of Haitians is known to bo capable of overthrowing Duvalier andeasonably stable successor government. If, following his overthrow, che reins of power arc seized by some Duvalier licuccnanc it is highly doubtful Chat any exile group could dislodge the successor without substantial economic and military support from abroad.
1.. Most Reliable Known (All in United States)
MAGLOIRE,resident of Haiti before Duvalier. Generally
believed to have taken public money for own use, more so than previous Presidents. Only exile wich significant personal following in Haiti. Pro-Uniced StaCes and anti-Communist. Has strength, leadership and toughness necessary for top jobs. States he
does not want to be President again, but willing to do anything that would help his country. Resides in New York City.
FOUCHE,ormer ministerial positions in Agriculture, Education, Labor, Public Works and Interior. Former Ambassr.dor to Canada. Close associate of Magloire. Wants to succeed Duvalier as elected not provisional president. Ablo, moderate, respected generally but probably opportunist. Resides in New York City.
JOSEPH, Raymondoung, noperlence. Educated in
United States universities. Son of Baptist missionaries. Possible Mlnistor of Information in successor government. Married to United States citizen. Excellent potential for future positions of importance in Haiti. Resides In New York City.
M0NTREU1L, Major ephew of Magloire's wife. Former
Presidential Aide to Magloire. Sorlous, capable military officer. Duvalier believes he vas killed in Haitiact that he is alive is sensitive information. Resides in New York City.
DEJEAN,ormer diplomat, Ambassador to Mexico and Creat Britain.
Presently teaching at Howard University, Washington, D. C. Reputation for honesty and integrity.
SECRET NO FORN
SSCRRT NO FOKN
HUDICOURT,ormer Ambassador to Panama. Employed in Pan
American Union in CIAP staff, Washington, D. C. Twenty years ago had anti-United States, racist, pro-Communist biases, but has since moderated his views and is friendly to United States officials.
ROY, Dr.edical doctor, residing Montreal, Canada. Sometimes
mentioned by exiles as candidate for provisional presidency. Studied in Italy, practiced in Canada and United States. Good administrator. Said to be too self-important.
DESMANGLES,ormer labor leader in Haiti of union affiliate of
IFCTU, anti-Communist, possible candidate for Labor Minister. Pro-United States and friendly to American officials. Resides in Belgium.
ELIE, Jeanusinessman, former Haitian banana exporter. Leader
of exile group in Miami. Anti-Communist, pro-United States. Associate of Boilcau MEHU. (see above) Rather emotional and excitable. Resides in Miami, Florida.
BAZILE,ormerly military careerist and Commander of Coast
Guard, but also held civilian positions such as head
of National Lottery. Something of fence straddlcr
but able in civil service. Pro-United States. Friend
or Francois LATORTUE (see be low). Resides in Washington,D
SECRET NO FORN
LATORTUE,awyer and professor. Former Undersecretary of
State for Commerce. Left of center. Pro-United States but somewhat critical of United Stater, policies. Fence straddler and weak personality but xjould do in subordinate capacity in government. Resides in Washington, D. C.
MANIGAT,rofessor, writer, formerly held post in Ministry of
Foreign Affairs- Teaches at Paris, France at Fondation de Sciences Politiques. Has strong tics with Personalistc Movement, if not its head. to Communist influence but has following among Haitian youth and willorce in post-Duvalier Haiti whether encouraged or not- ripple. Resides in Paris, France-
AUGUSTE, Carleturrently Haiti's Permanent Representative to the
United Nations in Hew York. Lawyer, from prominent Cap Haitien family. Cautious, worry-wart, but no fool. Friendly to United States. Supporter of Duvalier at least in the past. Resides in New York City.
FOMBRUN,ormer Minister of Commerce and ex-Ambassador to
Cuba and other countries. Lawyer. Pro-United States. Graduate of Harvard Business School. Modest, friendly individual, presently employed by UNICEF in Leopoldville, Congo.
BOUCICAUT, General Jeanormer Array Chicfcf Staff. Godson of
Duvalier and initially pro-Duvalier but turned against him. Anti-Communist and pro-United States. Competent military leader and good officer, though not particularly forceful. Would be goort reorganizer of Haitian military. Resides in New York City.
ANDRE, Majoradio technician. Former Assistant Director of
School of Military Communications. Pro-United States. Anti-Communist. Resides in New York City
ETTE, Colonelormer Commandant Military Transportation
Service and former Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attache to Washington. Resides in the United States.
ARMAND, Colonelormer Chief of Police in Port-au-Prince,
and former Chief of Staff of Army. Sincere and honest. Resides in New York City.
ALVAREZ, Lt. Colonelne of few Haitian military capable of
good staffwork. Hard worker, keen mind. Line officer. Once commanded Military Department of the South. Resides in New York City.
SECRET SO FORM
BAYARD, Colonelormer CommandanC<fMilitary Department of che
North. Soccer player. Ex-military attache Co Washington. Good leadership potential, compecent officer. Resides in the United States.
CHAM, Colonelormer Chief of Operations and Training of Chief
of Scaff. Intelligent, well educated, and capable Staff officer with good leadership potential. Believed Co reside in New York City.
CHASSAGNE, Lt.ormer officer at National Penitentiary.
Anti-Duvalier, pro-United States and believed anti-Communisc. Resides in New York City.
HONORAT, Colonelormer Chief of Military Justice Section.
Trained in law. Brother-in-law of Victor Constant, current Minister of Agriculture. Well and favorably known co American official Not strong leader. Resides in New York City.
RAMIREZ, Capcainttended United States radio school Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey. Pro-United States and anti-Duvalicr. Held privace business and Army positions simultaneously. Resides in New York City.
haiti contingencyuban capability for landing men and arms in haici
cuban air and naval forces have che capabilicy co put considerable numbers of men and amounts of material into haici quickly--by sea, air or airdrop. moreen could be landedew hours' time, if the cubans were not constrained by the need for secrecy and by che recognicion chat us countoraction would, at che least, prevent resupply and support of their force. in any case, wo have no indication thac che cubans are considering such offensive military action.
cuba's military cransporc fleecapability of airliftingroops ofons of cargoingle lift, buc little training has been conducted on logistical support operations. the cuban civilian airlineapability of airliftingingle airlift as manyroopsons of materiel if its resources were pressed to the limit.
altogether, cuba has approximatelycrate) transports, which could be used to support insurgency operations in haiti. each of these planes is capable of carrying up toersonnel orounds of military cargo. the cubans also haveocolt) short-takeoff-and-land planes capable of carrying up toenounds. in addition, the cuban air force67 transports which could be used. cuba also has abouchound) cargo and croop carrier helicopcers. they canaximum ofassengersounds of cargo.
the cubansapabilicy co provide arms assistance by means ofairdrops. uban cadet who defected co che us in4 reporcedaratrooper school had been escablished ac libertad air base near havana innd that classes of several hundred men were being trained there each year.
Consideration roust be given to the availability of Communist-oriented Haitian exile manpower in Cuba and their potential for directing the activities of an invasioneading Haitian Communist exile in Cuba, Rene Depestre, reportedly said in6aitian citizens resident in Cuba have had military service in the Cuban Army or militia andf them haveillingness to participate in armed action against the Duvalier regime. However, the bulk ofre from Haitiano were brought in originally as cane-cutters and have lived in Cuba for many years; they most probably regard themselves as Cubans rather than Haitians and probably have little desire to return to Haiti.
Although we have had occasional reports that Haitians have been among the groups from various Latin American countries receiving guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, we have not been able to confirm this. It is probable that some Haitians have been given this kind of training in Cuba; it is also probably that the number has beenr less.
Haitian Security Forces
The Haitian armed forcesncluding air and coastnumberfficers and enlisted men. police, immigration, fire department, commercial airother service activities in addition co their regular "military" The continuing deterioration of equtpmenc, che removal andcapable officers for political reasons, and the lack of anprogram have made the armed forces only marginally effectiveorganizations. However, the armed forces continue to beinstrument in Duvalier's hands for his special, limiced purpose
of keeping order inside Haiti and suppressing any small opposition groups
that may appear. Sweeping reforms in the military, though needed, are
unlikely to be undertaken in Duvalier's time in view of his deliberate
policy of keeping the armed forces divided, relacively unorganized, and
responsible directly to himself. Poorly equipped and led, the armed forces
could, if united, defeat the even more poorly trained, equipped and led
miliciaost,Duvalier struggle for power. The secret police (TTM's) have no military capability.
The National Security Volunteersivil militia ofas manyembers, was created by Duvalier as athe regular armed forces. The VSN is made up of weekend soldiersadministratively separate from the regular military but assist They are poorly trained and armed--abouC one third have
could not coperained and disciplined foe. Many of the VSN leaders have been hand-picked for their personal loyalty to Duvalier and for this reason as well as their personal brutalicy may become the objeccendecca by parctes injured by them personally or by the regime should Duvalier be toppled from power. The resulting moves and countermoves could leadidespread breakdown in law and order. The
lack of training, discipline and tight control overarge group plus the possible fanaticism of some of its leaders could seriously hinder efforts to stabilize the internal situation in Haiti in casehange in*
C- TTM: The secret police (TTM) have no official name or status nor is it an organized cohesive group and little is kncwn about the internalof the group. Haitians refer to them as the Ton Tonreole phrase meaning "bogeyman.11 Numberingsome are members of the armed forces or thehe TTMs are littb more than armed thugs who carry out specialmurder, arson, extortion, and other violence. Occasionally, the TTMs overstep their rather broad authority and Duvalier Is forced to curb them temporarily; however, they are too useful to him to limit their power for long. If an antl-Duvalier group took or threatened to take over the government individual oroup TTMr might resort to violence for reasons of self-preservation, striking at members of the former ruling classes out of fear that those groups would seek revenge against them. Many TTM1s, however, would fade Into the background or go into exile to avoid such revenge. If power were assumeduvalier lieutenant he would probably seek to gain control of the TTM's in order to secure his position.
United State* Military
A. Outline Contingency Plan for Haiti
of Operations. Thislexible plan In which chow ofareother opcraLlono with an ascending orderbeing undertaken as required. Military Intervention, ifinclude amphibious operations, airborne/nlr-landed operations, orof both. Operations will initially concentrate onand order. Emphasis will then shift to reconstituting theforceo, using CA units to direct government activities andHaitian counterlnsurgency capability.
Objective Areas. Port-au-Prince (Dowcn Airfield, Mais Gate Airfield, the Presidential Palace, dock facilities, national Penitentiary and Fort.
Base and Overflight Rights Requirement. Rights Tor overflights, emergency landings and refueling for the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic nay be required.
1 Abn2ivil Affairs Co. Psychological Opnpecial Forces Co. Command, Control and
Support Forces asir Mobile Cobn BdeCT) (on call)
Support Ships Carlo Araph Readyine Divtrlon Marine Expeditionary Force Do NEB
lV/vtlngiv/Wlilfl Team on call lieal Contingent
2 Tactical Fighter
Troop Carrier Airlift
as required Special Air Warfare Contingent
Surveillance Plan for Caribbean Area. This plan provides for surveillance of the Caribbean llai;in uy nnvnl tea hna air forces to control the clandestine chlpwnt frosaf personnel, urns, one', other materials into countries in or bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Forces earmarked under this plan could include:*
1 CVS (CVSG
3 Dcsub Div
* This force represents the requirementside surveillance effort. If intelligencehreat directed onlyarticular area, the force may be decreased accordingly.
Arrival tlite on station for the total force wouldays after tlw liny the plan Is ordered executed;however, certain forces could initate curveo immediately upon exertion and other forces would arrive on station duringay deployment period.
United, States Government Personnel Experienced in Haiti Who Might be Available for Temporary Duty Assignments Co Haiti on Short Notfce
A. Statein Haiti
Wro. Thomas Norman A. Warner
R. Thomson Donald W- Bonn Robert B* Hill Valentin Blacque Ralph C. Porter
Hugh Douglas Harry M. Montgomery Richard Hines Robert W. Maule
W. Garvey Harry E. Christie Kenneth J. Ruch
Col. BatcerCon, Roy J.
Col. Quint, Frederick A.
McLean, Donald H.
Col. Beckett, John W.
. Scabaugh, Raymond R.
Babe, George A.
. Magruder, Bruce, Jr.
iJ^Lillich, Gerald ,L.
Klinedinsc, John C.
Angelo, Leor. N.
Cueroni, Richard P.
Layne, Donald F.
Paul R. C.
Richard Curtis Lt. Col. Gatl Poulton Capt. Eugeno J. Heider Capt. John G.gt. Maurice F.gt. Jeangt. John W. Davis
Defense Attache Personnel
Present ARMA Present ALUSNA Former ALUSNA Former ARMA
Lt. Col. James F. BuCler Lt. Cdr. William F. Hahnert Cdr. Comer H. Byrd, Jr. Col. John Warren
Estimated Requirements in Haici Crisis A. Firstmergency relief i. a> Commodities foreeks
milk Rice Beans Oil
mounts by area
Cap Haitien Port de Paix Gonaives/St. Marc Cayes/Jacmel Jeremie
Capabilities by distributing agency (one month period)
a/ Depending on the distance of the localities from the distribution points
b/ In Cap Haitlen, Port-au-Prince, fort de Paix, and Gonaives.
c/ Truck transport availability has been taken into account in determining food distribution capabilicy In first column. Although only the number of trucks owned by each agency is listed in che thirdarge number of trucks are availableental basisew hours notice. CWS uses such rental trucks for most of its regular program distribution
d/ In Port-au-Prince.
e/ In Port-au-Prince and Cayes.
tocks and Consumption: Commodities and POL
Estimatedcor, sump -
(at Port-au-Prince mill)
Rice (at Sc. Marc)
Gasoline Kerosene Diesel oil Fuel oil Avgas JeC fuel
unknown--depends on time of year. Annual0 MT
Corrjzerctal banks needed
maintain flow of
and to service
nd 5. Public Health and Medical Supplies (both existing resources and anticipated assistance requirements from abroad)
Water: It is unlikely that water supply would be seriously disrupted during an emergency. Furthermore, much of the population is accustomed to prolonged water shortages and to use of impure water, with or without treatment. No special contingency measures are therefore advocated.
Garbage collection: Thereery limited organized program of garbage disposal, and evon complete breakdown of this program would not constitute muchroblem. All it takes to restore service is local manpower, which is readily available,ew trucks, which would also be available in sufficient numbers.
Sewer cleaning: Of more importance in Port-au-Prince, and to some extent in Cap Haitien, is the necessity, after every heavy rain, of cleaning the sewers of rocks and debris. Otherwise, parts of the city become quagmires.
But again, this simplyew vehicles and abundant local manpower.
Insect control: There is no organized program of insect control in normal times. Fesc insects would notroblem during an emergency. The density of malaria mosquitoes might increase at certain times and mightealth problem. However, SNEM could cope withroblemombination insecticide/drug program.
Emergency medicines and medical supplies: There is probably little stockpiling of medical supplies in Haiti, and during an emergency thesupplies probably would soon be used up. The necessary supplies and equipment could be provided quickly by making one or more completelyportable hospitals available. Additional supplies could rapidly be flown in, but it is virtually impossible at this time to estimate the nature or quantity of such supplies.
B. Secondeestablishment of civil order
1. Reorganization, training and reequipment of public safety forces in Haiti. MAP and AID Public Safety to send advisory teams promptly afterequest from the Haitian Government.
IDB sponsored water works project has been haltedesultcrisis or for other reasons, take prompt action to reactivate it.
providing funds needed for street and highwayand maintenance. This should extend only to rehabilitation of streets
and highways damaged during Che crisis. Maintenance should be Che minimum CO which Haitians have become accustomed over Che past years. Any other rehabilitation should be scudied as partider and longer-range economic development assistance program.
temporary repairs to wharf in Port-au-Prince todamage incurred during che crisis. -
rehabilitation of tourist facilities (roads, pathsof scenic interest,f public works projects arean emergency measure.
A. Summary Mass Communicacions Media in Haici (as of
Thereelevision sCaCion in PorC-au-Prince andadio scacions inin Che capical ciCyn other towns.
There are an0 radioelevision receivers in Haiti.
Princing machinery, supplies and equipmenc are noc manufacCured in HaiCl. Manufacturers' agents carry only minimal stocks; raosc icems muse be special -ordered.
There are six daily newspapers in Porc-au-Prince (none outside) with an estimated total circulation. They are, in order of importance:a Lin, Panorama, Lo.ti Journal
There is one large weekly newspaper, Le Nouveau Monde, now publishedew and expanded plane in Che capital cicy. There arether small weekly and irregularly published newspapers.
Mr. Max Chauvet, Editor Rue duu-P
Mr Franck Magloire, Owner Mr Dumayric Charlier, Editor Rueu-P
Mr Edouward Charles, Editor Rue Hammertonu-P
Mr Jean Magloire, Editorueffice: Cite1r Paul Blanchet, Editor Rue duu-P
Staff: Wilson Florestal
Hermann Louis Charles
Mr Weber T. Alexander, Editor Av Marie Jeanne Cite de l'Exposicion
Chief Editor: Andre F. Bistoury
C. Weekly Newspapers in Haiti
HEW HAITI TIMES (English
LE NOUVEAU MONDE
AD LIBITUM TRIBUNE des JEUNES LE CITOYEN
Editor: Victor N. Constant, Rue Dr. Aubry Chief Editor: Roger Constant
Editor: Alcide Edouardvenue N
Editor: Cerard de Catalogne tel: ffice du Tourisee Cite de l'Exposition
Office: Placeotel de Ville
Editor: Dr. Andre J. Cantave aculte d'Art Dentaire Rue Oswald Durand
Office: Etage Dry Cleaning Bouchereau, Rue Pavee 7
Editor: Frederic Tardieu Duquella Avenue Ducoste
Editor: Max St.ue du Centre
Editor: Claude Cerose Blvd
Weekly Newspapers in Haici (cone LA LANTERNS
LA GAZETTE DU MIDI LE SEPTENTRION LA MONTEE
ACTION DOCTRI KALE
Editor: Raphael Laianno Etago Blanchisserie Bouchereau Rue Pavee
Edicor: Michel C. Ambroise Ecage Dry Cleaning Bouchereau Rue Pavee
Editor: Yves Fourcand Avenue Marie Joanne Cice do l'Exposicion
EdiCor: Paul A. Severe
Rue Pavee, ApeCago Dry Bouchereau
EdiCor; Henriquez Viccor Cap-HalClen
Editor: Nelson Bell Cap-Haicien
Capt Jacques Joachim, EdiCor
cole Freres Sc Louis, Rue duu-P
Moliere Joseph Cocipaz,u-P
Michal Aubourg, Editor Jacques S. Andre, Chief EdiCor Camilla M. Pierre, Adminiscracor
D. Radio Stations
Voix de la Revolution DuvalierisCe (Govt, owned)
R. Diffusion Haitienne -
4VC 4VB 4VA
MEDIUM SHORT AVE WAVE CYCLES METERS
3.5 Georges apt. Borges
Route de Carrefour
Rue Traversiere 3
Ave John Brown
.cade Sylvio Cator
Weekly Newspapers in Haiti (continued)
Depc. de l'Interieur Rue de lau-P
St. Louis, Editor Administrator: Renaud Pierre Rue duu-P tel:
Labonte, Editor Odette Cajuste, Chiefmpricierie La Phalange, Rueu-P
Rue Americaine (local le Matin)
Louis Markwood Coteu-P
Cite Lumiere, Cages Cap-Haitien
F. ithographers, Engravers and Publishers in Haiti 1. Port-au-Prince
a. PUBLISHERS, BOOKBINDERS AND COMMERCIAL PRINTERS
**Compagnle Llthographlque8 Rue Eugene Bourjolly. Publisher and commercial printer. Publishes maps, textbooks, poetry and advertising literature. Printing by engraving and lithography. Printer of all types of postage stamps for the Haitian Government. Also prints commercial labels and calendars for most local firms. Largest lithographic company. No representative in. Haitian.
*lmprlmerie Boaubrun. Rue du Magasln de I'Etat. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes novels, history books and textbooks. Printing by letterpress. . representative. Haitian.
*lmprlmerie Blssalnthc (Sergeue Dantes Destouches. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes poetry, textbooks andpamphlets and leaflets. Printing by letterpress. Haitian.
mprimerlc Deschamps. Rue Bonne Foi. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes novels, books on Haitian literature and history,maps and magazines. Modern printing shop and bookbindery. Printing by letterpress. Most important publishing and printing establishment in Haiti. Importer, wholesaler and retailer of complete printers supplies and equipment including printing paper, printing inks, etc. Representative in 3 Ponce de Leonoral Gables, Florida. Covers Haiti. Haitian.
du Commerce, Ruo du Peuple. Commercial printer. Printing by letterpress. Haitian.
**Presses Natlonales Rounls (formerly Inprimerie de l'Etat, Government Printingue HammerCon Kllllck. Publisher, bookbinder andprinter. Publishes all official publications including the state budget, regulations of various ministerial departments and official speeches. Also publishes books on Haitian history, poetry and novels. All Government offices give their publishing, binding and printing jobs to the Government Printing Office. Printing by letterpress and engraving. Imports directly from abroad or through local agents printing supplies and equipment for personal use. Haitian.
*Imprimerie Les Presses Llbres, Blvd Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Publisher and commercial printer. Publishes historical brochuros, novels, books on poetry. Printing by letterpress. Haitian.
*lmprirr.erle Telhomme, Ruo Dr. Aubry. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes novels, books on Haitian literature and history, Printing by letterpress. Orders printing papers and paper envelope Haitian.
**Imprimeric Theodore, Rue Dantes Destouches. Publisher andnovels, books on Haitian literature and history,and advertising literature. Has recently printed deof works of President Duvalier. Modern printing shop. letterpress. No representative in. Imports directly printing paper ink.
**Scminaire Adventiste (Seventh Dayiqulni. Publisher,and commercial printer. Publishes biblical pamphlets, textbooks.
**Imprimerie Na2arlen (Nazareneffset andequipment. Prints religious, educational and, small job commercial. American.
*La Falange. Catholic diocese, religious and commercial.
**Imprinerie des Antilles, Rue Bonne Foi. Commercial, offset and letterpress.
Industries to Printing Industry
There are no service industries to printing industry in Haiti.
in Printing Supplies and Equipment (also see under 1)
*Dantesvenue M. Commission agent handling general merchandise including printers supplies and equipment. Covers Haiti. No representative in. Haitian.
*Carl H. Decatrel. Rue Dantes Destouches Commission agent handling general merchandise including printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, printing ink. Covers Haiti. Haitian.
*ftG. Gilg, Rue Roux Importer, wholesaler, retailer andagent handling general merchandise including printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth and printing ink, etc. Number of employees: Covers Haiti. . representative. Swiss.
*L'Abeille. Place Geffrard. Importer, wholesaler, retailer and commission agent handling various lines including newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth, printing Ink. Number ofo representative in. Covers Haiti. French.
**Maison L. H. Deschanps, Rue du Peuple Commission agent handling complete printing supplies and equipment such as printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, took cloth, printing ink, etc. Number of employees: 5. Representacive in Rue Forwarding2 BeaverewY. Covers Haiti. Haitian.
*Don Mohr Sales Corporation,ue Roux Importer,retailer and commission agent handling general merchandise including printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, hook cloth, printing ink, etc. Number of employees: No representative. Covers Haiti. American.
**Valery Sicard, Avenue Marie-Jeanne. Commissionvarious lines including printers supplies and equipment suchmachinery, newsprint and ocher printing paper, book cloth, Number of employees: 2. No representative in the U. S.
LEGEND: denotes size of firm mall