A CHINESE DEFECTS

Created: 6/1/1967

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STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A cotlcclion ol articles on the historical, operational, doclrlnol, and theorelical aspects ol Intelligence.

All statements ol fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

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Conclusions from the case of Miao Chen-pai.

A CHINESE DEFECTS Fred A. Markvart

On6 Miaoyear-old aw Want in Iheoffice of the Chinese embassy in Damascus, was busyaller at lunch time. The fact is. he had purposelyfilmed an appoint-mentebanese merchant so that he would still be bed up when his colleagues in the commercial attaches office eft for lunch at the embassy building. They would bring himnack, as they usually did in such circumstances. Miao had found ain the tight Chinese personnel security system.

After saying good-by to the merchant. Miao went to his room in the same building, unlocked his closet, and tookmall suitcase in which he had packed most of his clothes and personal effects. Donning his suit coat, he went outside, carefully locked he door of the commercial office, and beganinutc walk to the American embassy. There he presented himself to the receptionist, saying inave something very importantiscuss with the American politicalm from the Chineseithin two minutes he was making his plea for asylum to two officers of the political section.

Motroctfcm

Miao's decision to defect was sparked by no climactic event or personal problem. He was In no sexual or financial trouble, had three years yet to serve in Damascus, got on smoothly with hisand supervisors, andaultless reputation in his mission. Heormer navy officeren-year party member. He was bright. reUable. and efficient in bis work. He was well1 re-garded by his boss the commercial attache, and he was somethinget of the ambassador, wbo frequently used him as interpreter because of his ncar-flawless Arabic. With his party membership, class background, and professionalould look forward confidentlyuccessful if modest career with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, in which alternate overseas and home tours might

eventually leadection chief position in the Ministry. He wasood living, in Chinese terms,osition of respect and trust, and because of his rather ascetic personal tastes had no hankering for the material advantages of the West

His initial disillujionment with Chinese communism stemmed from the period of tbe Creat Leap Forward. An intelligent man. hesoon after the movement began that itatastrophic mistake. Not the mistake, but the leadership's failure to indulge in any self-criticism aflcr its dc facto abandonment of the Leap led him to conclude that thereual standard of communist virtue, one for the leadership and another for the led. Tlie party's hy-pecrisy^-ihe gap between theory "andthen/what started his progressive disaffection.

What carried it on was the thought supression and constant political indoctrination of the system; he gagged on the pabulum that was supposed to nurtme his political growth. He waseasonably reliable party member with no idea of defecting when he left China on his first overseas tour inut further exercise of thought control within the Damascus mission and the suggestiveprovided bv service abroad gradually had their effect. As embassy "study sessions" mounted to overours per week with the advent of the ^cultural revolution" ine began weighing seriously the pros and cons of defection. By early July he had made up his mind and started his detailed preparations lo escape.

Earmarks?

How could we have spotted Miaootential defector? He is confident that we couldn't have. He gave no hint of his plans to anyone, continued diligent in his work and in study sessions, and was careful in his final letters to his mother and girl friend in China lo betray no sign of his intentions. The system had taught him lo keep close-mouthed and rely entirely on his own resources. Had heefection-inducement letter even in his last week, he says, he would unhesitatingly have reported it lo his superiors. Had he beenbyAmerican, orwithout the most convincing bona fides, he would similarly have reported this. Yet during the same week be was taking advantage of the free time in embassy discussion sessions after he had delivered his own speeches to think out the precise steps of his defectiool

Miao might besychological rather than ideological defector. He did not reject communismobtical system for China

oray of life for others, only for himself. He does not think his dissatisfaction with the communistarity among cadres overseas, but he adds significantly. -Personalityreat deal to do with what one does aboute regards himself as independent-minded and willing to take considerable risks to preserve his right of intellectual privacy. He recognizes that his desire for privacy and distaste for the enforced group activityollectivist society arc unusually strong: in the Foreign Trade Institute be would try toclassmates wbo insisted on joining htm when he hadolitary walk, and if he was unable to talk them out of it be would give up the plan and return to his room alone. Tm ooe explains, "but thereart of everyone's life that has to be livede docs not think, however, that this mdividualistic tendency would be evident lo an outsider, earmarking the potential defector.

He did agree that our most likely Chinese defector candidates would come from among the lowa-ranking, junior cadre who had lessstake in their present careers and whose betier education would give them greater confidence in their ability to make their way in the West. He also recognizedack of strong ties to family members left in China wouldecision to defect

He himself, like most previous defectors tohad no strong family ties. He had left home at the ageis father was dead, ho mother retired from school teaching. While in Damascus he had writtenonth to his mother andirl with whom heague undmtanding about future marriage He had written an older brother, the only other member of his family, only twice in all. The looseness of these tics probably accounts for his rationalizing that his defection will not adversely affect his family. He recognizes that it would notood idea to write to them now, but be feels that the regime will take no drastic action against them.

Choc-ringHaoen

Miao was unequivocal in his reasons for selecting the United States as his preferred safehaven. First, it was ao enormously strongwhere his safety would be guaranteed- (This same thought has been uppermost in the minds of all Chinese defectors who have walked.econd, although he bad only the haziest notion of the American political system, its ideology had been presented to him as the polar opposite of communist China's; since

he found China's totally ^compatible with his needs, therefore, it seemed logical to try the opposite.

He bad an early and dim favorable impression of Americanssecond-hand through hisecondary-school English teacher who bad been acquainted with some American missionaries, but this vague impression was of oo consequence. The regime's anti-American propaganda had worked effectively oo him, be declares, and heenerally bad stereotype of the United States and of Americans when he walked into our embassy. His reception there, the official treatment be has had suce,,and his limited contacts with ordinary aspects of American life have all come as pleasant shocks to him.

He deprecates the material attractions of American life for him. "My hving was not soe says, "and I've never wanted toillionaire"

He knew tliat there were Chinese nationals in tbe United States but had no idea of the size, composition, or location of these overseas Cruhesc communities. The question ofife among Chinese here had not concerned him; once established, he says, be would be willing toompatible mate of any race.

Pfcrining the Break:

Miao studied different possible ways of defecting for three to four mootlts before his actual break. His planning was rational and fairly well conceived. As ho cxainined his situation, be saw three possible methods of escaping from the mission in Syria:

The Erst was to go to. embassy in Damascus and request political asylum. There was no question in his mind but that the Americans would be able to ezfiltrate him successfully; he hoped they would put himiplomatic car and spirit him over the border into Lebanon right away, before the Chinese mission had time to report his disappearance to the Syrian authorities. {It did not occur to bim that the United States would report his defection lo the Syrian government and request its acquiescence in hisis only doubt. wiUingness to accept the prospecturther deterioration to the alreadySyrian relationsather low-ranking Chinese defector. He reasoned, however, that "they accepted Tung Cbi-p'ing innd decided that they would probably accept him.

' Fwsketch ol this case see Sfuditt IX.f.

If be were turned away from the American embassy, be decided be would next apply al tbe Italian embassy. It was nearly next dvx. and Syrian-Italian relations were so nominal that there was unhraly to be any popular outcry if the Italians exfiltrated him. He did sot seriously consider the British embassy; it was too far away, and the British diplomatic tie with China might be an obstacle to accepeng Chinese defectors. In retrospect, however, he feels that he woJd probably have approached the British if turned down at the Arncruan and Italian embassies. He bad determined, if denied asylum in me West, to try Erst tbe Yugoslav and then the Soviet embassy; be believed on the basis of study-session propaganda that the "revisionist" missons would probably accept him, and while be could not hope to get to die United States through their doors, asylum in any country was Vx-rer than returning to China in disgrace. Life in Yugoslavia or the USSR was not an attractive prospect for him; he doubted that they were "revirionist enough" to satisfy his hopes for personal freedom.

The second plan he considered was getting one of the Arab ever-chants he had met in tbe course of official business to help smuggle him over the Lebanese border. He focused particularly on anUAR national who, after his business in Egypt had icon natioriaiized, had fled with some capita] to Lebanon and now, es.-jb-lishedrader in Beirut had major business interests in We^-em Europe. Miao thought of sounding him out cautiously on Syr-jo-Lcbancsc border-crossing and document procedures and. if the anr-*rs indicated that there would be little risk for the merchant in tbtthen asking to bo taken along in his car. He finally teje-ied this plan oo the ground that no merchant could be expectedlea based on humamtarianism or friendship; merchants werronly in money, and Miao's total available cash amouued to the equivalent

His third alternative entailed waiting out the anticipatedar remainder of bis tour in Damascus in order toreak from the mission tbe night before his departure, when he would have for the first time both his service passportalid Lebanese transit visa in bis possession. Having fled the mission, he wouldaxi forour ride to Lebanon, fast enough, be hoped, to be ahead of any border guard alert for him. The drawbacks in this plan were the needear wait, uncertainty that his air route home waild necessarily involve transit through Lebanon and therefore thevisa, and worst, the absolute necessity of effecting his break from

frill a

the embassy on one cri(ica) m'ght; he could not be sure oftbe embassy's routine personnel security measures on any given night. lie did not seriously consider tryingreak at the Beirut airport on the way home; be could be sure of neither the attitude of the Lebanese police nor his ability to escape from his escorts.

of Prior Defections

Miao had learned through various means of several previous actual

Tung Chi-p'lnge had read of Tung'sin (he Peoples Dflihy and bad been told by Ministry of Foreign Trade personnel returning from Burundi in5 that Tung was then in the United States. These MFT people made no pretense lhat Tung had been kidnapped.

Unidentified officertudy session, one of Miao's colleagues mentioned bearingember of the Chinese Warsaw embassy had defected with his wife in the Soviet Union while en route by train to Peking. No names, dates, or other details were given, but Miao concluded from the fact that the officer's wife had beenIn Warsaw with him that he must have been of senior rank.

Fu Tsunghile in China he hadrief item on this pianist's defection to tlie United Kingdom in "Referenceestricted-circulation summary of items from tbe foreign press produced by NCNA

Unidentifieduring the6 study session referred to above an embassy colleague who had previously served in Cairo (oldyear-old in the embassy there had fled inpeaking only Chinese and unable to make himself understood, be had been jailed by the Cairo police. After two weeks Chinese inquiries led to hit identification andto the embassy.

Unidentifiedhe same colleague on tbe same occasion also mentioned the escape of anfrom the Chinese embassy in Cairo. It was unclear whether this man was ever found again.

NCNA mant the same study session another colleague, who had previously served in Switzeriand,zech attempt to induce tho defection of an NCNA reporter

stationed in Switzerland but transferred for hospitalization to Prague. Tbe Czechs were said to have seatoman, with whom he fell in love, and to have tried twice to convince him to stay in Czechoslovakia. Although be refused, be continued to cones pond with the woman after his recovery and return to Switzerland. The embassy, discovering this correspondence, bad him recalled to Pekingn the way he tried to jump In Prague but was physically restrained by his escorts. He was kept under guard in the Chinese mission in Pragueonth until secure arrangements were made for taking him on lo Peking.

Chang Cb icn-yuiao read the Chineseof this trade officer's defection and quick redefectioh9engthy People's Daily article. Its line was that Chang had gone to the American consulate merely to inquireisaelativo and that once there he had been threatened by the guns of Marine guards and interrogated in an attempt to make an agent of him. Miao thought tbe visait fishy, and later he heard from colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Trade that Chang had actually tried to defect and later changed his mind; he was now undergoing labor reform in China, they said.

Chou Hung-chingiao's only knowledge of this case (of the interpreterhinese delegation in Tokyo who climbed the Soviet embassy wall was turned over tn the Japanese, asked first to go to Taiwan, then decided to remain in Japan, and finally chose to return to China) cameong article in People's Daily

Tzu-ts'ai (Theiao had heard of thedefection and subsequent death of Hsu (delegate toconference in The Haguerom BBC,Peking, and Jordan radio broadcasts.

In all Miao thus had some knowledge of about orse-third of previous Chinese defection cases, and tbe bulk of his mfonnation came from Chinese sources. He says that while it would be bad form formembers of his mission to take the initiative in raising theof defections or to ask questions about them, when the party organization in the embassy set up study sessions on this subject ones personal Vnowlcdge of past defectors could be mentioned during the discussions. In6 party members of the Damascus embassy had read topeech thatad made in February to an

ambassador-level conference in Peking touching on the subject of defection:

Some would-be defectors have been caught, but tome, throughOil* teetiilty system,people who ciraped were ml always

the *nm o( landlords or capitalists, and we should rrroeniUi ihut curreet it.t'i origin tin't everything, we have lo eiamlne more clmrti the actual polltual uml'iittiiidiiig ol our personnel. We must put politic* In com. irtund,ase political study, and masler Chairman Mnn'i thought.

Ch'cn also tnenlioned tliat not only the imperialists but some rcvi-sionlil countries as well svere actively trying to induce defections among Chinese personnel overseas.

- In Mfao's case there is thus the double irony that most ofknowledge about the procedures past defectors had used came from discussions designed to discourage defection and that the official remedy for ideological wavering, more study of Mao's thought,ajor factor in alienating him

Miao says that party discussions of Ihe defection problemthe need for unshakable ideological purity in order to (oil the activities of outside "special agents" using money, women, threats, ami materialistic lures. Besides tbe general reading of Mao's works to combat bourgeois thinking, lie classifies types of antl defectionunder three headings:

Tight physical security controls on mission rnemberi, Frequent emphasis in study sessions on live defects of capitalism

and the social rottenness underlying its surface glitlcr, and Use of lhe cases of Chou llung-chitig in Tokyo and Chang Ch'lcn-yu tn Bombay to dramatize the hostile reception and cynical exploitation any Chinese defector must crpect in tlie West. Miao believes that this line of Chinese propaganda is effective in heightening Ihe already costing fear of the unknown that any potential defector feels. In his words. "Ihe party tells us that Chang was threatened by armed Marine guards In an effort to coerce him intopy and that Chou wat asked lo make propaganda, go to Taiwan, and parachute back into China. Chinese cadres do not want to have guns pointed at them, to be spies, lo drop out of airplanes, or to go to Taiwan."

The death of Hsu Tzu-tsai in The Hague underlined for Mian the inherent dangers in trying to break away from communist control and the need for careful planning if his own project was to succeed. His

knowledge that Tung Chi-p'ing wns 'living the life of an ordinary man" in the United Slates was for him the most effective rebuttal to his fears about treatment by the Americansery impottant factor in making up his mind to defect. That this was the only successful Chinese defection to the United States he knew about and lhai be never heard of rl through the Westrin press or radio broadcastsour inadequacy in publicizing successful defections.

In Amrrioon Ifandt

Some of Mimo's reflections about his approach to Ihe Americanhis reception ihcrp Include the following;

Several times, while passingembassy by car, hehance to case it quickly. The presenceyrian policeman outside the chancery gate disturbedit. Did the policeman challenge or register visitors to the embassy? He considered walking into the military anrtci where the gate was unguarded, but decided not lo out ofwhether anyone there would bave the authority to deal with him.

Hc look the Syrian receptiotiivl in the embassy lobby foi aAmerican; be would not have announced his own ctnltauy affiliation bad he realized the manyrian. The removal of thr> policeman and this Syrian receptionist were the only sleps he could recommend lo improve tho embassy's defector procedures.

He wis surprised and pleased by his reception. He was taken in quickly, did not have to walloom full of curious visitors. The officers receiving him gave an impression of courtesy and compeleryce Herelieved when an asvtum request form in Chinese was quickly produced, for he regarded this as reassuring evidence that we were prepared With the allegations that defectors are iinpit-ssed ns spies in mind, ho asked just one question before signing the request,e permitted to go to the United Slates and live as an ordinaryssured that he could, he signed unhesitatingly; he had not anticipated that things wnuld go so srnoothy.

He svas not alarmed when told that the United States wasthe Syrian governments acquiescence in" his removal. He was not sure that his idea of czfifaatton was best. Cetting him out safely was now the Americans* responsibility and be was confident they

rCMlMI it

He listed three reasons why ho had not brought any documents from Ills mission when defecting, lint, he just wanted freedom, not

afaanisJ

to hurt the commuriists. Second, (he documents to which he had immediate access, though classified, all dealt with specific commercial Hansactadns between Syria and the national trade corporations he represented, and he thought they would be of little interest to us. Third, he was not certain that the Americans would accept him, and his having taken documents would have compromised him further if he had had to go back.

The Quid pro Quo

The single most useful point brought out in Miao's debriefing about his reception is that he came "prepared toe wasotential tum-aiound for penetration of his mission. What is important bere is not that wc may have missed an opportunity in this case, but raUier that Miao's attitude confirms our belief thatChinese concepts of mutual obligations and mutual benefits are still very much alive and can be exploited to turn defectors around. This vulnerability was probably what made Miao reluctant to admit that he had considered what we rnigbt demand in return for ex-filtrating bim; you don'tand oot called.

In planning his approach, Miao reasoued that even if the initial reaction to bis request for asylum were no, he could discuss with the embassy officers the conditions under which they might say yes. With the limited means at his disposal, he had researched the legal aspect* of defection fairly thoroughly. Heook on international law in his mission's library and found that the granting ol asylum meant that the granting government undertook to guarantee the petitioner's safety and Uvchhood. He thought these substantialmust entail some conesponding obligations, and these he could discuss with (he embassy toutual understanding.

Since Chinese propaganda stressed lhat the Americans would try to turn would-be defectors into spies, he thought "Well, what aboutnd turned for referencehinese reprint in his mission bbrary of the Soviet Information Bureau book on CIA, Caught in theere he read that the CIA pressed refugees and defectors into working as tramlators, propagandists, radio announcers, refugee relief office employees, spies, and parachutists. This gave him to reflect that the US. governmentarge aod varied organization with many different jobs for people of different talents, and that reasonable men could be made to see thatan like him

Tfcscribed in Shutter VI.t passim sex).

to China was both impossible and useless. Implicitly, he was prepared to discuss anything short of that

The idea, however, that he might bave been asked to icrura to his mission quickly, cover his absence as best be could, and work out his passage to Americaear's service there be says simply never occurred lo him: the Soviet book sard that CIA always seizes its prey first ami only afterwards forces the victims to its uses. What if this proposition had been putim? "The first thing I'd have done was look at my watch;ad lime to getould haveitould have arguedad locked the door to the comrrtercsal office, andight haveocked out to my colleagues, there were the realty serious problems of ray clothes and my suitcase. Howxplain to my colleaguesad taken, quite unusually, my ruiteoat? Andeft Ihesuitcase at the American embassy, howater rap lain its loss and the loss of ray other twohat other arguments would he have used?ould have stressed the danger and difficulty ofater chance to break away, doubt about my ability to endure another year under communist control, and the limited value of anyould furnish*

To Turn or Not lo Turn

Every officer fared with th* decision of whether to try to turnefecting Chinese official will be faced with arguments simitar to thrtte. Routine Chinese personnel security practices virtually guaranteo that every Chinese walk-in will arrive. instaltahon agitated over his safety, full of tingle minded concern for getting awayafchaven. and with very little if any time left in whscfa his absence will not be noted or can be plausibly explained. This orua-tioo, plus the probaburty that the walk-in would be aware of previous free acceptance of defectors, would probably necessitateairly hard Bne to convince him that he really had to eam his passage. To takeine risksalk-in who cannot or wif) not return to his installation on Our behalf. And given the effective Chinese use of the Chou Hung-ching and Chang Ch'ien-yu cases in indoctrinating their personnel overseas, we can be sure that the story of an iidsuccessful effort toalk-in would be given rapid circulation In Ch tnese missions abroad (though it might not be believed by those wbo knew about the acceptance of such as Tung Chip Ing or Miao Chen-pai).

Nevertheless, Ihe importance oi* effecting penetrations ofand the example of Miao's sense of "mutualfor adoptingess passive attitude towardthan we have in the past. It is true that time will usuallyshort to wrap up the turn-around process neatly.an usually hope for at best will simply not accerrunodatcof probably unfounded fears of provocation, the filling outand asylum requests,ympathetic listeningwalk-in's pilch, let alone protracted negotiations abouthis mission and the patching together of improvised

The essence of what needs to be done, however, is to identify quickly which walk-ins can safely return to their missions, turn these without alienating them, and furnish them with basic recontactThere is no universally applicable formula which will guaranteealk-in's rejection of our proposition or the loss of himefector; we must be prepared to take these risks. The professional case officer, aware of the limited time he has to work in. will take these necessary steps:

Immediately after establishing the walk-in's identity and purpose, explore whether the way he made his break would permit his return to his mission. {This basic information must beearly, as it will affect tho whole course of subsequent handling. If the circumstances ruleeturn eitheror explainable, there is no point in pushing the walk-in to desperation by trying to turn him; if they do not, every effort should be bent to do so. even if this risks losing himefector.)

Assure him in unequivocal terms of the American government's ability and willingness to guarantee his future safety and(This assurance will both relieve his major anxiety and increase his respect fpr the handling officer's stature, since only an official of authority could giveuarantee.)

Without apologies or equivocation, make this offer contingent on the walk-in's returning to his missionixed period of service for us. (No Chinese walk-in will be pleased by this turn of events, and it may be helpful to point out thatfor his safe exfillrarion will take time in any event and to hint that previous Chinese defectors to us have similarly earned their passage. The basic point, however, is that the

Chinesein probablyeal,ut; his ail tura] conditioning predisposes him to sec the equityargain advantageous to both sides, especially if it is presented syrxtpa-fhcticallv but authoritatively and with evidence of professional planning to minimize his personal risksave communications arrangements ready in advance, so thai the officer can quickly and confidently (and in written Chinese text if necessary) set forth the mechanics of basic two-waybetween himself and bis new agent

Success^uj^ction^under this proposal will requiie^pbnning aod rtoughtful preparation. Prior'cotisideratioa ofvesTe<iJve argunwrts for the immediate return of the defector to his office is essential Chinese-bnguage texts of these arguments and instruction* should be prepared for use with walk-ins whose knowledge of foreign languages isuitable accommodation address must beafehouse address should be ready for the rare walk-in whose duties will enable him to cover brief unescorted absences from his mission for personal meetings. Drop sites or brush contact plans to permit the passing of instructions will be needed in most other cases; and these will require some prior mvestigation of where Chinese mission members normally stroll on Sunday afternoons, get their Hair cut have their film developed, and so forth.

Guaranteesalk-in that if he works for us he cannot be forcibly returned to China under escort should often help conviuce him to turn. These could be credibly given only In countries friendly to the United States- Host-country relations with the United States are carefully followed in Chinese missions, and it is unhkelyalk-in could be hoodwinked by unjustified claims in this regard. Miao's own listing of countries in which he felt defection would be no problem wasercent accurate; only an estimate of his that France would probablyhinese defector for itself but not for tlie Americans was questionable.

Communications Prospects

Miao affirms that he would have had no trouble hiding secret writing suppliesiniature camera among his personal effects. He kept his suitcasesocked closet in his room, and staffers' personal effects were never searched or disturbed. Many members of the embassym cameras of their own.

Mailing letters to an accommodation address would have posed no problem to any member of Miso's commercial office. Outgoing letters were thrownommon wire basket, and any member of the office could at any time call the embassy driver and take the accumulates) mail to the central post office. The driver stayed with the car on these occasions, so the commercial officer would have had no difficultyetter of bis own unobserved along with the office mail Miao was uncertain whether other sections of the embassy used the same Dialling system.

Obtaining privacy to do the secret .writing would havegreater problem. Although Miaoumber of free hours every Saturday evening and Sunday, he could never have been sure ofprivacy in the room which he shared with another officer, and which other staffers frequently visited. He believed, Irowever. tltal hy pretending to be writing personal letters or taking notes while studying Mao's works he could have covered, albeit with interruptions, Ore composition of operational letters.

Getting messages in to Miao would haveore difficult matter, but even here some prior surveillance of the pattern of embassy staffers' activities would probably have enabled us to lay on secure initial communication. For example, the staffers normalh-stroUcd on Sunday through the local market on the Street of Congress, providing an opportunity foread drop or brush contact. Although they sent for nearly all their personal need*ommunist store in Houg Kong, most of them would buy fruit, for example, from the Ismsel Fruit Store near the embassy. They had their haa cutearby barber shop, developed tneir films at one of two local photo stores, andyrian doctor. HecruitiiH'nl of aagent in any of these establishments would have made it possible to pass written instructions, and the doctor would have provided cover for occasional meetings.

Miao was also one of tbe few people in his embassy who were allowed contacts with foreigners. (The others were the ambassador, the political counselor, the diplomatic secretaries, the NCNAand tbe representatives of other Chinese nationalMiao received Syrian and Lebanese merchants in his office and often talked to them atone at some length. He was also permitted to visit their offices, and though he was always accompanied by another mission staffer, this man would often stay in the car or hate his own business to transact with others in tbe office,

tree for private conversation with the merchant. Recruitment of one of these Arab merchants would therefore haveeans to pass both verbal and written instructions to him.

Defection Inducement

Asked for his suggestions on encouraging dissatisfied Chinese officials to defect, Miao could offer no dramatically new insights or proposals, but his views are worth summarizing.

Wliile he does not completely exclude the possibility that aChinese might betray some hint of his feelings, he believes this is most unlikelyajajhe systemjjrr^ true thoughts to oneself and in iruuhtamuig at all times the mask of doctrinaire conformity. Thus even audio access to group discussions and private conversations in an embassy would not necessarily lead, in bis view, to the identification of the staffer most likely to defect; he may appear orthodox and dedicated even to his colleagues. Miao takes little stock, therefore, in the spotting aspects of defection

Nor docs he think we should spend much time in propagandato convince targets that communism is bad for China.essage is futile for the true believer and unneeded by the doubters, who know more about the shortcomings of Chinese communism than wc can ever tell them.

He considers our two main obstacles in defection inducement to be the tight personnel controls on the overseas staff and the inner fears that any Chinese waverer will have about the unknowns he will face in defecting. He believes that tlie message we should try to get across is simply the assuranceriendly reception andree-stable livelihood in the safehaven of the United States for those who make the decision to break away. Recognizing the importance of his own knowledge of Tung Cbl-p'ing's defection in overcoming his fears. Miao has been quite willing to have his defection publicized and has skillfullv emphasized in several press interviews his satisfaction with his life hereeans of overcoming tlie aruieties of my formerPortionsetter be drafted at our request addressed to his former colleagues in Damascus illustrate this theme:

You are turely araious about my fate.ask thislsocod manyas afraid of tbe American Covernmem uuUiing me and threateningas afraidonHn't be able totablean joyously tell you that the facts are completer, contrary lo my expectaUons. As sconeached the America" Embassy.

jot want to gond they anery easy- to

I discovered thai they ate prepared at any time lo betp any person gelll (heave met are eitrsorduistfly polite ertraordUiariiyy have sincerely and earnestly helped me Menur* personal freedom and have helped mo arrange my persons! life snd career. It hasenod ofhort three months,. Washington going to Georgetown Unn-eniryave been formally Hudying Enrlirh for moreonth. As for my privatelready hive my own aparlment andery convenient. The American go.emmenr is in (he midst of helping rneob.ave to do Is learn English sndan be settled down tohe American Ros-cmraentver demandedot toof

How can this message be got to Chinese officials abroad? Miao's preference is through the press and radio broadcasts. He points out that listening to foreign-language (even VOA) broadcastsay of attaining linguistic competence, yet he never hearduccessful defeclion to the West in any foreignis embassy subscribed to eight Arabic Syrian papers, to the English-language Daily Stor and Arufcic World and the French Orient and

lour from Lebanon, and to the Paris Le Monde, the airmail edition of the New York Times, and the Hring Too jih Poo and Ta Kung Pao of Hong Kong. These papers were distributed to individual embassy officers who were responsible for bricGng their colleagues everyon the important foreign news of the day. Miao believes that eveniscreet officer decided against report ing an itemhinese defector at the daily briefing he would be likely to mention it to at least the immediate members of his office-While Miao is sure that any prudent cadre would immediately

receiptefection letter, he sees some use for thisirect means of getting our message to personnel abroad. Theadministrative, and cultural offices of an embassy, as well as the NCNA office,air volume of correspondence from foreigners, most of it addressed simply to the offices but some to per-sonnel by name. This mail is normally screened by the receptionist or searrity officer, but in the Damascus embassy there were only 6ve officers, all in different sections, who could read Arabic, and defection letters in Arabic addressed either to them personally or to their sections would proUbly go right to them, Syrian government censorship of such letters could be avoided by placing them directly in the mail box at tire main gate of the embassy, where the mission received most of its newspapers and some of its mail

Miao also sees some limited sole for foreign agents with access to embassy staffers. While he recognizes the great difficulty of estab-tuning any sort of meaningful personal relationship in this way and the bona fides problem in using such an access agent toitch, he agrees that there are useful lines which such an agent could innocently introduce tootential defectors belief in his 3bUity to cope with life in the West Thus praise of his foreign language ability or of his business acumen might be helpful; Miao himself was subjected to this sort of flattery by several Arab traders, some of whom even jokingly offered him jobs in theirastly, be evenlace to the cold approach, if its limitations are kept in mind. He realizes that only fleeting private contacts arc possible in places like cable offices, airports, and post offices, and that there are very real problems of shock and bona Sdes here. He recommendsaucasian, rather than an ethnic Chinese, for cold approaches, so that bona fides is suggested at least by face and mannerisms; all Chinese officials abroad, he says, are extremely wary of unidentified Chinese, fearing Taiwan special agents orHe believes that we must expect an initial turn-down rate ofercent in cold approaches, since our targets liveilieu thatremium on wariness and suspicion of outsiders. But the official who turns quickly away or curses the approaches- may well be stimulated by the encounter and use the knowledge ho gains from it toefection in his own way at his own time. The cold approach can therefore be justified, in Miao's view,irect means to insure, when necessary,arget has the "welcome" message he should preferably receive more indirectly.

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