Created: 6/1/1967

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Soviet Military Research and Development


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Concurred in by ih* UNITED STATES INTEILIGENCE BOARD At Indlcuied




Thv following intelligence organizations participated in tho preparation of Ihis estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency ond lhe Inielilgenco otgonizaKont of theof 5tote. Defense, and NSA.


Akhord Helms. Deputy Oiceolor of Central Intelligence

Mr. George C. Deeney, it. for the Director of Intelligence ond Research, Deport, merit of Stole

Lieutenant Generol Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director. Defense Intelligence Agency lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Director of the Notional Security Agency


Dr. Charles H. Rekhcrdl for Assistonl General Monager (or Administration, AEC and Mr. Wil&om O. Cregar for Asslssont Director, Federal Bureau of Invest!-goiion. the subted being outside of iheir jurisdiction.









Priority ol Military Research and 4

Tho Growth of Soviet Military RocD 4

Quality of Soviet RocD 6



Nature and Ouallty of the Evidence 7

Intelligence Lead-Time on Soviet Weapon Systems 8



ICBMs and Space Weapons11


Miisile Submarines12

Long-Range Aircraft and ASM's 1*

Defensive Weapon Systems13

Ballistic Missile Defense13

Air Defense Systems13

AntUatellitc Systems14

for General Purpose Forces 14

Ground Force WeaponsM

Taotieal AircraftM





High Energy PropellantsM

Other Space Technology16


A. Domestic Factors 17

B Soviet Military Policy. Strategy, and Foreign17





To assess tlie scope and nature of Soviet military researcho estimate the types of weapon and space systems likely to emerge from that effort in thc next few years, and to discuss factors that will affect thc course of Sovietver the longer term.


research and development) has been andto be one of the highest priority undertakings in dieSoviets regard such an effort as imperative in order toUS fromechnological advantage, to gain, ifadvantage for themselves, and to strengthen theof Soviet power. Most Soviets directedqualitative improvement of existing kinds of weapon systems,believe that much is also devoted to the investigation of aof new and advanced technologies having potential

the rapid technological advance of the postwarreat expansion in the funds, personnel, and facilitiestond the space program. We6 expenditures for these purposes increasedIt is impossible torecise comparison of US andour analysis suggests that if Sovietprograms at their present levels were purchased in the US,generate an approximate annual expenditure more thanthe amount of US outlays for the same purposes. Andeffort restsonsiderably smaller economic base.

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advanced research in fields applicable to militaryis probably now about equal to that of the West. theoretical work, however, Soviet military hardwarehas not reflected tlie most advanced state-of-the-art in the

USSR. In large part, this can be attributedonservative design philosophy which emphasizes proven technology and favors rugged, relatively simple equipment In part, however, this Soviet choice may have been forced by deficiencies in manufacturing and fabrication techniques. Soviet production technology generally lags behind that of the US. although the Soviets are taking steps to correct these deficiencies.

is almost certain that the Soviets have some type ofin every important field of military practices normally prevent us from detectingat the laboratory or drawing board stage. We can,major weapon systems during testing or earlythe basis of evidence of development activity, our judgmentrequirements, and other considerations, we can makethe next generation of major Soviet weapon systems.estimate, however, the specific weapons which the Sovietsfor introduction in the longer term.r more years from now.

expendituresre continuing to grow, butiseclining rale of growth, probably because thestages of expansion have been finished. With the higherthuslower growth rate still impliesincrements. Wc estimate thatandnd the space programbyercent annuallyf, as wethe Soviet space effort is leveling off, even this moderatewould permit an increase in allocations totrongffort.

Soviets will continue to press their search for newand systems that offer the prospect of improving theirsituation. We see no areas at presenl where Sovietsignificantly ahead o! that of the US. Considering the sizeof theffort, however, it is possible that themove ahead of the US in some particular field of strategic The Soviet leaden would certainly seek to exploit any




Priority of Military Research ana* Development

Military research and development) has been and will continue to be one of the highest priority undertakings in the Soviet Union. Thc Soviets regard such an effort as imperative in order to prevent the US fromechnological advantage and also to gain, if possible, advantage forMost Soviets directed toward the qualitativeof existing kinds of weapon systems, but we believe that much is also devoted to the investigationroad range of new and advanced technologies having potential military appbeations.

In addition to military coruiderations.chievement has become for theeasure and symbol of the strength and progress of socialism. Advanced military and space developmentsay of demonstrating that the USSR has permanently emerged from its early decades of backwardness and is now in the first rank of technologically advanced societies. Moreover, the significant psychological impact of early missile and space successes has almost certainly led the Soviets to emphasize missiles in military displays and to seek further space spectaculars.

The Growth of Soviet Military

With the rapid technological advance of the postwar era therereat expansion In theffort. This was reflected Bret of all in tbe increase of establishments andresearch institutes,and laboratories, installations for design testing, and numerous major facilities up to the great complexes at Kapustin Yar, Tyuratam, and Sary Shagan. In general, auy scientific program tliat in the view of Soviet leaders has important military application is given adequate and in some instances lavish RocD facilities. Tlie result is apparent in the vigorous Soviet space program and in the successive generations of new weapons deployed iu the field.

Thc most convenient measure of this expansion is in terms of costs or expenditures for resources. We estimate with fair confidence thatis, outlays for civilian andnd die spacetaken allfromillion rubles0 toillionithin this total thc breakdown is less clear.nd thc space program have between them taken the lion's sliare, rising from an estimated Vz billion rubles to moreillion during the sametenfold increase. As betweennd thc space pro-grain wc can only say that both are large, and that since the

ron sec iter

greater part o( the increase can probably he attributed to the riling cost ol tlw space program, which in itsell includes some miliiary projects.

thceld, the calcnjlation of ruble-dollar ratios isand comparisons between the Soviet and the US elTorts canroughly approximated. In terms ot total Per I) expendituresandhe USSK appears lo Lag behind the US; wcSoviet expenditures at something over two-thirds thc US level. Mostdifference, howevor, is attributable to thc larger US civiliananalysis suggests that if the inputs (ias, wages, materials, and overhead)Soviet military ItotD and space programs were purchased in the US,generate an approximate annual expenditure in excess ofcurrent US outlays for the samend thc Soviet effort restseconomic base considerably smaller than that of thc US.

in expenditures for military ItotD and space in thc USSRparalleled those in the US. In both countries these activities havasteadily Increasing shares of available resources.ercent of total Soviet military and spaceandsomeercent; comparable figures for the USise from 6pencnt. In recent years, however, the rote of growth ofnd space has declined In both countries, presumablybuilding of new facilities and creation of new organizations havetheir most costly stages. uch higher base has been achieved,

and thc lower current rates of growth still add very substantial bscrecnent*

each year to total expenditures.

One of tha most important means used by the Sovietto improve and broaden its scientific and technological basethe national system of higher education, which for many yearsscientific and technical fields, particularly the physicaland engineering The number of graduates in thesesteadily increased, particularly in tlie postwar period. Thcillion engineers andolders of advancedarger pool of scientific and technical manpower than the US,willontinuingcientific and technical graduateso IS years. Many of these people, however, arc employed inor other duties outside the lines of their specialised training.

b. Thc Soviets have also sought to Improve the quality of their higherand most ol the advanced degrees currently being awarded in scientific and technical fields are roughly comparable to Americans. In certain fields, however, such as the biological and chemical sciences, they are soil below US standards.arge number of advanced degrees awarded in thc |iast represent academic achievement inferior to present Soviet standards.

' Fur the US, these m, VI* (lie total budget of NASA ami ihr HAD budgets olof Defense and Aluailo Krurrgy Cc-nmiMSaii.


ion srcnrr

the USSR may have fewer really qualified persons capable of significant, independent research at this level than the US.

can make no meaningful estimate of the number ofD projects in the USSR, but it is dear that the supply of

scientific and technical manpower imposes no constraints on priority military RtVD prop ams Soviet statistics indicate that thc number of scientific workers in all types of scientific research organizations has more than doubtednd tlie proportion working onD and space has probably grown oven more rapidly. Inclced. there arc indications thatD effort In support of civilian production activities has suffered hecnusc the best people arc nttrncted to military RfxD. thc space program, nnd certain key institutes.

Quality ot

We have no firm basis for Judging whether or not the military RtVD effort is managed with significantly greater efficiency than other important sectors of the Soviet economy. Frequent administrative reorganizationssome dissatisfaction on the part of Soviet leaders with their scientific effort. One of the cocnplatnts in the USSR has been that the high quality of theoretical work in the USSR has not been matched by thc technology of product development The top leadership has alwayslose and continuing interest inrograms, and is dearly concerned with improving tbe quality of the entire effort.

Soviet theoretical work in fields applicable to military RcYD is probably now about equal to that of the Wert. Thereew areas, such as pure mathematics, where thc Soviets may he slightly ahead of comparable Western research. There are other fields, such as areas of chemistry relevant to solid propellant technology, where they arc apparently behind the US. In general, however, they are probably capable of conducting advanced researchevel comparable to the West in any field to which they decide to devote thetime and resources, but they may not be able to conduct advancedIn as many Gelds simultaneously as in the US.

espite their excellent theoretical work, there have been many cases in the past in which the Soviets have not produced military hardware which fully reflected thc most advanced state-of-the-art In the USSR. In large part, this was almosteliberate choice. The Soviets haveonservative design philosophy; they have preferred to carry through theof weapons with well-proven technology, thus minimizing the chances of delays and difficulties. On the whole they have favored equipment and hardware of rugged and relatively simple design, comparatively easy to mam tain.

n part, however, this Soviet choice may have been forced by deficiencies in manufacturing and fabrication techniques. The general level of Soviettechnology still lags behind that of tlie US, and this factor may have

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the variety of weapons of very advanced design which couldroduced in quantity. In recent years, however, the Soviets have taken stops to correct these deficiencies, and in some special fields of manufacturing methods tlvey have advanced their techniques beyond diose In the US.

extremely important asset of Soviet military RorD is the largeinformation which the USSR obtains on US and other Western RorDabout Western programs is clearly of value to the Sovietstechnical problems and avoiding unprofitable avenues ofit helps Soviet planners to direct and time their military RetDthc Ught of anticipated Western capabilities.


Nature and Quality of the Evidence

early pliases ofrogram arearge extent invulnerablecollection systems and Soviet security has succeeded In proven tin?from gathering any more than limited, nonspecific information. ^

J The problem changes once thc testing phase is readied. Even in this phase, however, the amount of information which we can obtainoviet weapon system varies with Its vulnerability to our technical collection systems. We can usually obtain data on the characteristics of those major systems^

"^and In some cases from those major systems^

jwe can usually


identify new aircraft in the prototype stage. Large systems such as ICBMs and ABMs require extensive facilities which can usually be detected andidentified before testing begins. ^

oviet military displays

of information on new weapons of certain types. These displays, of course, matters of Soviet discretion and policy. In recent years the Soviets, in order to project their imageilitary power, haveumber of advanced weapons which were either in service or in late stages of development But they have withheld some major weapons from display, and some of thc weapons


have been prototypes which never reached the production stagebc Bounder bomber). Indeed, the Soviets may have attempted ro mislead us on occasion, by displaying prototypes or mockups which tbey never intendedeploy.


we must base analysis. By

analyzing die life cycle of previous systems and known or estimated deficiencies in their present systems we often estimate that the Soviets require and will probablyew weapon. Analysis of thc state-of-the-art and of the preferred Soviet technological approach is often of assistance, as is analogy with US experience. It should be noted, however, that these indirect methods can do no more than indicatee believe the Soviets should be pursuing in order to remedy weaknesses in existing weapon systems or to develop new ones. They do not enable us to determine in the pretesting phase whether the USSR is in fact pursuingr how successful Soviet efforts to date have been. More knowledge of the early phases ofould serve to narrow the spectrum of potential weapon systems. We would still have lo consider other factors, however, such as production capabilities, costs, and military objectives, in estimating which systems the USSR would be likely to develop to the point where they could be deployed.

intelligence Lead-Time on Soviet Weapon Systems

or purposes of this discussion, we define intelligence lead-time as the period between the time when intelligence identifies the general nature and purposeew weapon system and thc time of its initialhat constitutes useful intelligence lead-time will dependonsiderable extent on tbe problems facing the user of thefor example, an intelligence finding that the Soviets are intensively developing ABM systems might be sufficientS decision totudies on 1CBM penetration aids,ecision as lo which penetration aids to develop might require detailed intelligence on thc specific characteristics of Soviet ABM systems.


Information permitting an analysis of system characteristics is usuallygradually during thc course of theesting and deployment. In some cases, we canystem's characteristics with high confidence soon after initial idenHBcation. while in otl>ers it may take years to gain an appreciation ofystem functions. Intelligence lead-time will also be affected by how long thc Soviets take to develop the system in question, and this in turn depends on tlie complexity of the problems involved and howand efficiently tho Soviets seek to solve them.

^ In most cases, we have been ablethe basic characteristicsew strategic ballistic missileits flight test

This lead-time will probably remain substantially unchanged, btrt may vary ^depending upon the complexity of the system. ^


Defensive missile systems present even more difficult problems of lead-time than do ICBMs. We have generally been able to detect such systems well in advance of IOC, but we have not always been able toystems characteristics before it became operational. We have been aware, for example, of Soviet efforts to develop ABM defenses for at least seven or eight years, and3 we detected the beginning deployment of an ABM system at Moscow. We have estimated that this system will become operational7ut we still cannotonfident estimate of its capabilities. Wc alsodeployment of the Tallinn defensive missile system when it beganhis system ls probably now operational, but we still have little knowledge of its characteristics.

Very large radars associated with defensive missile systems generally require two or more years to build and check out, and we will usually be able to give one or more years' advance notice of new systems of this type.the electronic characteristics of most radar systems have not become known to us until thc late stagesr until after IOC.

In recent years, wen most cases identified Soviet combat aucraft some three to four years prior to their operational deployment. Future aircraft will probably he even more complex and require more testing than current models. It is unlikely, therefore, that intelligence lead-times will be significantly Shorter.

In most cases, major surface ships can be detected and identified one or more years prior to IOC and useful intelligence on tlie type of weapons and electronics being installed can sometimes be obtained. Submarines, which are

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bull! on coveted ways, are noi normally detected or identified as to typo until they have been launched and arc being fitted out. which takes2 months.

With the exception of certain missiles, (here is usually little if anylead-time for ground force weapons and naval ordnance. In manyour first indication of the deveioptivcnt of new ground force weapon systems is their utilization in field training.

Thc provision of sufficient lead-time will continue toajor problem for US Intelligence.

It is highly unlikely that

major strategic weapons such as ICBM and ADM systems could be developed without extensive activitiesind which would be vulnerable to our technical intelligence collections systems, but these activities might not provide theinformation about performance characteristics. Moreover, significantin existing weapon systems could occur which would go undetected or not be correctly identified.


It is almost certain that thc Soviets Iiave some type ofnderway in every important field of military technology. These programs range from basic research, through applied research with military application, to theof specific weapon systems. The USSB, like any oilier highly developed nation, undoubtedlyreat many concepts applicable to advanced weapons which never leave the drawing board or laboratory. Their long-range programs are almost certainly subject to change from time to time in the light of their estimate of US plans and intentions. Moreover, of tbe Soviet projects in various stages of HAD, some will be abandoned because they will prove infeasible, not worth thc cost, or not applicable to rcqiilrcrnonts-

This section discusses those weapon and space systems which we believe are currentlyn tho Soviethese are major systems for which we foci there is either sufficient evidencectivitylear Soviet requirement on which toeasonable estimate. We cannotwith any degree of confidence Ihe specific weapon and space systems which might conceivably arise out of the various fields of scientific effort which Soviet scientists, like others, are pursuing. We have found no way of estimating which

'Theseol* systems underara drawn froa uy-

The Soviet SpaceOP SECRET, forth-comlnR NIE "Tha Sovtoi Atomic EnergyOP SECRET.

eO, "Soviet Strategic Air and MissileatedIDAS, TOP SECRET;. -Soviet Ctpabdilim lotM46,

of Soviet General PurposeKCnBT.


of research will in fact leadeapons appllcalion. what progress the Soviets mayhem, or which successes in research Ihey may choose to push on into weapons dcvrdoprnonl and dr^kayment.

A. Strategic Weapon Systems

fCSMs and Space Weapons

The Soviet Union appears to be about as technically capable as the US of developingRM systems and subsystems which ils leaders feel are important enough to justify lite expenditure of resources. Most of the facilities at the Tyurtitam test range can be associated with niiting ICBM systems or with the space program. Some of those recently completed or underare probably associated with ICBM systems still under development.of some new missiles appears likely during the next year ot so.

ctivities provide clues as to thc types of follow-on systems that thc Soviets might deploy in thend. During the past year they have been conducting tests that wc believe relate toractional orbit bombardment systemepressed trajectory ICBMrOBSBM could serve Jo degrade tbe value of US antimissile detection systems and complicate the US problem of developing effective ABM defenses. These tests could also relate toultiple otbit bombardment system, but we believe il unlikely that the SovieU will deployystem in space.

Soviet interests in solid-propellarrt missiles and mobile systems suggest otber possiblo trends in ICBM development. We have estimated that the Soviets will develop and deploy Inmall, more accurate, solid or storablc liquid propellant ICBMard and possiblyobileThe liquid propellant system deployed in fixed sites would be more likely to appear in the early part of the period, solid or mobile systems could be achieved somewhat later. Mobile deployment would greatly decreasespecially if il featured concealment oj random movement. It Is possible that they will alsoew large liquid propellant ICBM with highfor deployment in2 period.ystem would have improved capabilities against hardened targets.

here is no evidence that the Soviets have initiated development of MRVs, MIRV, or penetrationelatively simple MRV delivery capabiUty could probably he achieved wilhinonths alter the stari ol flight testing.of MIRVs involves greater complications than MRVs, particularly Inand control; operational capabilities could probably be achieved two to three years after flight testing began.


he Soviets are currentlyight test program which suggestsolid propellant MRBM/IRBM system is under development. ThiVsys-


been fired. from Kapustin

Yar and. (tornachieve IOC in

inixed or mobile configuration, however the

-flight test program suggests that IOC will probably be somewhat later.

The Soviets arc alsoew Itquid-propellant ballistic

J This missile is being flight tested from Kapustin Yar and has been fired to0 rum. impact area. It is still too early to define the characteristics of this system; however, our evidenceigh accuracy potential.

Missile Submarines

believeew class of ballistic missile submarine is underit will almost certainly be nuclear-powered and may carry eightmissiles.ew weapon system would probably employ aor improved liquid-propeliant missileange of Some recent test-firing activity at Kapustin Yar may be relateda missile, but it is also possible that an appropriate missile has not yetfired. In any case, we believeew nuclear-powered ballisticequipped. missile couldhe Soviets will probably not undertake the development ofclass of cruise missile submarine in tbe nextears. Theyew type of cruise missile with increased range, speed, and accuracy.

long-Range Aircraft and ASM't

is no evidence of any specific development program directedfollow-on heavy bomber. Available evidence indicates that Soviet workaircraft is directed primarily toward the development of newwork advances the state-of-the-art andechnological andbase which could be applied to bomber development. If thewithout our knowledge activelynd committed funds forandew subsonic heavy bomber with capabilitiesthan the Dear could enter service We believe that we would

indications of the development and production of such an aircraft one to three years prior to its introduction into operational units.

Tlie requirement which led to the Blinder, together with the troubles experienced with that aircraft, may lead thc Soviets toollow-on medium bomber. Tlie Soviets couldupersonic-dash medium bomber with better speed, altitude, and radius than the Blinder lor deployment inime period. Alternatively,oncurrent development with their supersoiiic transport program, they couldupersonic cruise medium bomber,adius about the same as Blindcr's, in thc same time period.

Development work on land attack and antiship ASM's continued during the past year. There is some evidence that tlie Soviets are working lo improve the



of lltund fl is possible that llicy will developfollow-on ASM for use willt the II-.u. Tliey am continuing the development of the Blinderystem, and mi txilievc that they arc alsoew ASM for use with the Badger.

B. Strategic Defensive Weapon Systems Sofhsfic Missile Defense

or the pest decade the Soviets have carried on an extrusive, varied, and costly. fUiD program to create defenses against ballistic missiles They probably have explored various ABM techniques, radars, interceptor missiles, andof system integration. The Soviets will probably devote substantial effort to improving their present ABM capabilities, and also to developing new ABM systems, allhough wc have no evidence that any new system rs underImpiovcmcnts mayigh acceleration missile, possessingfor terminal atmospheric intercept,ew long-range missile. We would not expect such new systems to become operational before the.

Air Defense Sysfoms

Radan The Soviets wiU probably continue to introduce Improved radars with increased power and greater socArjficat>oti. These new radars may include frequency diversification to reduce mutual interference problems andtoonsiderable effort sviD probably be expended on the problem of detecting and tracking low-altitude targets.

IntetceptOTi. The Soviets aren advanced Interceptor aircraft. We believe that thectivity is directed towardof aircraftaximum speed on the order of Machan altitude capabilityeet,ombat radius ol. Such aircraft could enter service, in thehe Soviets probably see the need for even more advanced interceptor systems for use Innd may already be testing such models. An advanced all-weather interceptorruising speedadius. could enter service ineriod.

Snr7.jec.fn.Air Missilese know of no wholly new SAMunderctivity appears to be directed towardof existing systems- The Soviets could improve their systems byetter low-altitude acquisitionodr&ed fire-control radar and guidance system, and possible terminal homing. No Soviet SAMs deployed or under development are estimated toapability undereet. The Soiiets probably cannot significantly improve their present low-altitude capability by modifying existing SAM systems, and ihey mayew low-altitude system. We would not expect any new low-altilude tyslcrn effectiveeel to be operational before




'm- large Henadars at Sary Shagan and Angarsk willoverage pattern indicativepace surveillanceoviet anlisalelliteSystem limploying llxuc radars could use an existing missileuclearNonmiclear kill, on thc other hand, would probablyround-guided missile system of high precisionoming missile capable of exoatmos-plieric maneuver, either o( whidi could be developed in about two yearsecision fo do so. f_

J Wc believe, therefore, that at about tbc time thc Hen Houses become operational inime period, the Soviets could have an antisatellite capability with either nuclear or

1 .1 kill.

C. Weapons for Goneral Purpose Forces Ground Force Weapons

he Soviets will almost certainly continue their RorD efforts in all types ol ground force weapons and continue to introduce improved ground force equipment. Major new weapon systems which couldvicc in the next five yeais or so include:edium tank armedissile-firing system; we would not expectank to be deployed untilb) an improved version of the Scud tactical ballistic missile system; the Soviets are currentlyew system at Kapustin Yar which may be the follow-on Scud, and could be operational within the next year or so;actical low-altitude SAM system; wc would not expect any new low-altitude system effectiveee* to be operational before

Tocficaf Aircraft

o believe that the Soviet* are working on an improved tactical- follow-on

_he Fishbcd/Fitter scries.ighter could becomeinime period. In addition, the Soviets are probably working on various designs for advanced tactical fighters,TOL types, which could attain IOC

Novo! Systems

e believe that the Soviets aieew class of nuclear-powurcd. torpedo-attack submarine, probably designed and equipped foroperations, it could enter service as earlyhc only new classes

of major surface ships currently under construct km in the USSR are tbe Krcsta-class large (rigaleew class of probable helicopter carriers.

The Kiesta-claiv Is equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and SAMs, and is fitted with helicopter facilities. The Soviets arc continuing RtVD on surface

ship designs, but we believe that another new dais of major surface ships

will notre the.

Tlic USSR almost certainty will endeavor to improve its ASW capabilities by the development of improved sonar and more effective weapon* for surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. We believe that the Soviets will continue to deploy new and improved ASW detection equipment and weapon systems. Present Soviet fixed underwater surveillance systems have very limited range and detection capability, and are intended for inshore defense. There is tenuous evidence, however, that they are attempting toew longer rangeery great improvement in the quality of Soviet naval forces, togetherignificant expansion in size, would have to take place in order for thc Soviets to be able to conduct effective ASW operationscn ocean areas. Tliere is no evidence that such an expansion is impending or planned.

Naoolew type of ASW helicopteratrol plane probably will be developedew supersonic-dash jet medium bomber might bo introduced ineriodollow-on to (he Badger and Blinder bombers, but tliere is no evidence that such an aircraft is under

Since the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty four years ago, the Soviets have continued underground testing of nuclear weapons at the rate of about one test per month. The number of tests and associated yields suggest that thc Soviets could have made advances in weapons ranging in yieldsew kilotons upew megatons.ossible that they could haveariety of weapons in the low megaton and submegaton range with abetter yleld-to-welght ratio than those weapons tested ineries. However, in the absence of debris from underground tests which would permit weapon analysis, we cannot determine what specific progress tbc Soviets have made.

In addition to their current ABM warhead capability, wc believe there is about an even chance that the Soviets have developed an ABM warheadarger exoatrriosphenc kill radius against unshielded RVs. If the Soviets have not already developedeapon, we believe they could do so on the basis of existing technology without violating the Partial Test Ban Treaty.


lic Soviets currently have under development two large boosters which wc believe will be used solely for launching space vehicles. The first of these, which we designate theas an estimated first-stage thrust ofillion pounds and has demonstrated an earth-orbit payload capability of0 pounds, andounds with thc additionhird stage.

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is evidence that thc Soviets areery large launchTyuratam which is probably of tho same magnitude as thc US Apolloat Merrill Island. Wc estimate that this facility will be ready for

^.initial launch operations in the first half8 at the earliest. Weo direct evidence on thc characteristics of tho new very large booster to be

launched from this facility, but consider it likely that it willirst

stage thrust in0 pound range.

High Energy Propellanls

date, no Soviet flight tests or space launchings have beenused high energy propellants in any of the stages. However, wephases of static testing are now being conducted and flight, High energy upper stages for ther the newbooster could be man rated and available for usehereafter. Such upper stages would increase the capability andof thc launch systems available to the Soviets and permitin planning future space missions.

Olher Space Technology

we have little direct evidence about Soviet plans formissions, we believe that the Soviets haveannedprogramize comparable to the US Apollo program. Whileunable to determine if the first major goal of the Soviet space programmanhed lunar landingarge manned space station, either of thesethe Soviets toonsiderable technological advance overspace systems they have demonstrated thus far. We believewilt not seek to do both concurrently. If the Soviets plan toof these space missions by the, they mustrograms in such fields as reentrysupplies, life support systems, and numerous other supporting technologies.


of the Increasing complexity of advanced weapon systemslong lead-times required for their development, thc Soviet leadersdecide upon development of those advanced weapons which couldin thc. In the previous section we havetrends, technical capabilities, and military requirements,military and technical factors, however,umber of other, moreconsiderations, which the Soviet policymaker must weigh in decidingforce leveb and structures. The more important of these are




MSitanj Influence on tire Government. The present Soviet leaders seem more responsive than Khrushchev to opinions of the various specialized interest groups, including the military hierarchy, but no single group outside of the party apparatusredominant role in determining Soviet national policy. Nonetheless, the traditional Soviet concern with security and the very size of tbe military establishment enhance thc importance of the high commands influence in top level deliberations on basic decisions. Current military writingsoncern with broadening the military options available to the USSR, including improved capabilities to meet contingencies short of genera) war. At tlie same time, costly and intensive development of strategic forces Is continuing. Thc military will probably continue to press vigorously foramountsesources for advanced military technology, and the political leaders have been willing lo authorize increases In the resourcesto military purposes. However, the leadership will not automatically grant everything the military request; they must of necessity balance Ihedemands with those of other consumers and weigh their decisions in terms of national interest

Resource Allocation Problems. The resources neededre in relatively short supply, and thc apparent awareness by the leadership of the demands of tbe civilian economy has exacerbated the continuing debate over resource allocation. This seemingly intractable problem of allocating resources among the various military and civilian claimants will continue to plague the Soviet leaders, forcing them to make hard decisions between costly alternatives. The lengthy bureaucratic infighting involved in these decisions has undoubtedlyajor contributing factor in delaying thc appearance of the new Five-Year Plan.

Thc impact of advanced weapon projects and the space program on the civilian economy Is greatest in areas requiring high qualitymanpower, technical equipment, and special materials. The large-scalemodernization programood case in point: like the arms and space programs, it requires advanced production technology, electronic equipment, special metals, and first-class production and managerial skills. The drain of these resources from the civilian sector has undoubtedly retarded theprogram and contributed to the slowing of the rate of economic growth. Although the military and space programs will continue to command top priority, the leadership will be under strong pressure to balance their claims on resourcesose of the civilian programs.

Military Policy, Strategy, and Foreign Policy

n general, the overall SovietUort is less subject lhan force levels or deployments to the influences of the International situation, levels of tension and arms control agreements. Long lead-times for complex hardware leave less room for quick changes.s not likely to be stepped up in response to an immediate crisis, nor is an easing of tensions likely to pro-


ion sccniT

utback. While Moscow might in some circumstances decide to sttetch nutefer procurement, It views continued militarys an essential long-term invoslmont.

Arms contiol agreements or other international developments could cause some redirection) efforts. Thc most simple case would he agreements which prohibited certain types of weapons testing and thus cutfforts in certain directionsoint in the oWeJopment cycle. But in the case, for example,rohibition against flight testing MIRVs, thc Soviets wouldchoose to carry out laboratory and design work up to the point of flight testing En order not to be caught short if the agreement failed. More generally, an arms control agreement mayfforts on certain systems or types of weapons. Indeed, an arms control agreement which limited numbers but not characteristics of strategic weapons systems would be likely lo spur efforts to improve characteristics In order to maximize military potential within the lirnJta set by the agreement. In any event, the military leadership would strongly resist any arms control proposal which would restrict theffort

Over the long run, changes in the political situation and in Moscow's perception of potential threats from different quarters will affect requirements for! Among purely military considerations, however, the strategic rebtionship between the USSR and Ibe US will remain the most important The strategy of deterrence pursued by the Soviets has led to an emphasis oo strategic offensive and defensive weapons programs that has dominated the Sovietffortumber of years. We believe that the chief concern of the Soviets will continue lo be to maintain Ihe credibility of their deterrent. They will coniinue to strengthen their capabilities for survival and retaliation, and In addition they will probably sock through both offensive and defensive programs lo improve iheir ability to reduce the damage Iho US can inflict on the USSR. Beyond these general propositions, we cannot fudge the effect of theseon the scope and direction of Soviel


Soviets will coniinue loigh priority to researchadvanced military systems. At tbe same time, however, there is evidencecurrent drive within the Soviet Government to increase substantially thedirected to support of civilian production activities. Delay inthe Five-Year Plan suggests lhat this as well as otlicr issues arc notHence, tho relative proportions of resources to be devoted tociviliannd Ihe space program0 have not yet been

'Col. Hurry O. Patlcson. tor thc AsstiUnl Chief of SiaH, Intelligence, USAF. believes that tlie intensity with which the USSR isassive military research and development program could portend far moro than an intent merely to strengtlien Soviel deterrent posture and could well be aimed at attainmenttrategic miliiary position which the US would recognise as providing the USSHredible first strike damage limiting capability as well ai an assured deslmctioo force.


xpenditures for IlorD in tlie USSR an* continuing to grow, but the trend iteclining rate ol growth. We have noted above that this decline is probably explained by the fact that some of the most costly stages of expansion have been finished, and alio that with ihe higher base level thuslower growth rale still implies substantial annual increments. Tho budgetary plan7ontinuation in this decline, showing expenditures lor science7 as only six percent greater than6 (this compares with on average annual rate of growth of abouterceni. It is iruc. however, that expenditures in lhe past have usually been substantially above plan.

e estimate tliat totalmiliiary and civilian IlorD and the space programincrease byercent annuallyhe space program will probably require less sizable annual increases over tho next few years as current programs peak and the effort levels off. This will permit, even with thc moderate growth rate projected, an increase in allocations toD and continuationffort. We do not see on the horizon of the next few years any new scientific-technologicalatomic energy, ballistic missUes, or the spacewould require vast new expenditures for establishing elaborate new research and test facilities on the scale of, say, Tyuratam or Sary Shagan. We believe, therefore, that expendinues on this order will be adequate for Soviet requirements as we foresee them.

n spileonsiderably smaller economic and industrial base, tho Soviets have demonstrated the ability to carryighlyrogram. They will continue to Improve their existing weapons as well as to press their search for new technologies and systems that oBer the prospect of improving thelr strategfc situation. At the present fhne wc do not see any areas where Soviet technology is significantly ahead of that of tbe US: however, considering the size and quality of tbeffort it is possible thai they could move ahead of the US in some particular field of strategic importance. On tho other hand, there are some areas where Ihe Soviets willequirement to develop systems that the US probably would notvice versa. In some instances, they will probably develop and deploy systems which, in the US view, are not justified. The Soviet leaders would certainly seek to exploit any significant technological advance for political or military advantage, but in deciding to deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and thc capabilities of tho US to counter It.



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