LED DISSEM 1
7
LB]
Case J
. SPECIAL ^ f-
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;;ESTiMAtE;; ; ^ -
0
FOR RELEASE
CONa^flED D
ISSEM
The /allowing intelligence orgaiuzalions participated in ihe preparation of this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and ihe intelligence organizations of the Departments of Stale and Defense, ihe N'SA, the FBI. and the Secret Service.
Concurring:
Dr. R. J. Smith, for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll. Director, Defense Jnteffigence
Agency
Li. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Mr. Williamregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation Mr. Thomas L. Johns, for the Director, United Slates Secret
Service
Abstaining:
Dr. Charles H. Reichardr. for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
CENTRAL
I
AGENCY
April
CONDITIONS EI THEREA OFY
CONCLcSIOK
3bs personal risk to President Johnson during this trip will lie Oenzan security preparations should be adequate toacts of violence which night endanger the President or any other-eater of the funeral cortege. The solemnity cf the occasion reduces the likelihood of even cincr demonstrations like these which met Vice President Humphrey or. his recent European trip, but we cannot exclude the possibility of scce political agitationlacard-vsving or chanting) against the President by leftist students cr others opposed to US policy In Vietnam.
SEgffET
DISCUSSION
The security forces normally entrusted with the protection of dignitaries in the Federal Republic and the special forces which will be called in during the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer will be adequate to deal with possible threats to the President or other prominent participants in the ceremonies. There is no problem of pollticel instability in Vest Germany, and concern for public order, both on the pert of the authorities and the population in general, has always been high.
During Vice President Humphrey's recent European trip, there were no demonstrations in the Sonn-Cologne area. Small demonstrations against US policy in Vietnam, which included plots involving home-made explosivesandful of leftist youths, did occur in West Berlin. (The plan apparentlyto embarrass, but not injure, the Vice President with these explosives.) It is conceivable that certain groups could attempt similar protests during the President's visit. The organizations most likely to be involved would be the Federation of German Socialist Studentsmall radical leftist group;
the Communist-front German Peace Union (DFUj; and the Easter Marchers, an assorted collection of antiwar protesters which usually includes supporters of the SDS and the EFU. The demonstrations sponsored by these groups have never exceeded the capacity of the German security forces to cope with then, end are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable
future.
3- The nature of the occasion will also dampen the enthusiasm of potential demonstrators. The respect for ceremonial mourning is so high in Germany that political preteststate funeral would be widely condemned by the public at large. On the whole, we think anyare highly unlikely, and if any occur they will almost certainly be mild and nonviolent.
1*. Coordination of plans for the protection of guests at the funeral will be in the hands of the Security Group of the Federal Criminal Police,arge number of security forces will beto the task. Additional protection will be provided by local police forces in the Bonn-Cologne area, and elements of the armed forces will also probably be called in fcr police duty.
5- In view of the recent visit by Vice President Humphrey, the security authorities have an up-to-date coir.pi.latior. of known crackpots who night possiblyisiting US leader- We are confident that the authorities will carefully review this information and that their preparations to nullify identifiable risks of this sort will be thorough. German security officials willomewhat more difficult problem Ining many foreign leaders than they would if only the US President were visiting. For example, they must watch the activities of individuals In Germany who might be hestile to de Gaulle, or of exiles who might wish to injure possible Moroccan, Iranian, or other representatives. (There are substantial numbers of Moroccan and Iranian students In the Bonn-Cologne area who are antagonistic to their own governments.) We believe, however, that the German authorities will be fully competent to the task.
Original document.
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