VIET CONG POLICY TOWARD AND EXPLOITATION OF U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR

Created: 3/14/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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iet cong policy toward and exploitation. prisoners of war

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j^Ji? l' /SUMMARY.. 'VIET CONG <VC) POLICY TOWARD-PRISOfyE.iS. POW'S) WHICH DATES BACK,TO THE RESISTANCEisSPPLICABLE. POW'S. APTURING OFAXIMUM ('JUMPER. FORCES ISN ORDER* THAT THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE,OLITICAL PURPOSES. THIS POLICY HAS NOT ALWAYS, 3EEN V CARRIEDOWEVER, BECAUSE VC TROOPS WERE NOT AWARE OFECAUSE?

HEYl SCTJCHT TO AVENGE THEIR COMRADES BY KILLING THE

BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES^ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSFERRING PRISONERS

TO THE COMMAND POST, AND BECAUSE IT WAS EASIER TO KILL POW'S

'

THE UNIT HAD TO WITHDRAW UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

MILITARY REGION (MR) FIVE UNITS HAD TAKEN. PRLAST TWO YEARS. HREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN

:AS INAUGURATED *IN EARLY6 TO INDOCTRINATE ALL CADRES AMD :, TROOPS IN THE VC POW POLICY, TO DISSEMINATE SLOGANS AND OPERATIONAL

.;PLANS.FORROOPS AS3 TO RECAPITULATE THE- '

E'VARIOUS UNITS Iff, CAPTURINGFORGE J. > .

VC GENERAL'HEADQUARTERS DOCUMENTS WHICH DEALT WITH

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POLICY. POW'S MADE THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTSASSESSING THE POSITION. TROOPS IN SOUTH. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY AID TO SVN FAILED TO

PRODUCE- RESULTS,. WAS FORCED TO SHOW ITS .TRUEBY SENDING TROOPS TO SVN AND BOMBING NORTH VIETNAMAN ACTION WHICH PROVES THAT THEY ARE AGGRESSORS ANDWILL EARN THEM THE CONDEMNATION OF ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLEWORLD. . TROOP STRENGTH^ PROVIDESFOR CAPTURING AND KIDNAPPING AMERICANFOR CARRYING* OUT PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AIMED AT ENCOURAGING DEFYTO SUPPORT THE. VC REVOLUTIONARY.

'CAUSER BECAUSE. TROOPS, PARTICULARLY OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH

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ELL TRAINED, ARE AFRAID OF THE .HARDSHIPS OF WAR. OST

SERVICEMEN ARE DRAFTEES FrtOM THE WORKING CLASS WHO HAVE

BEEN DELUDED BY. GOVERNMENT INTO THINKING THAT THEY ARE

IGHTING TO DEFEND ,THE FREE WORLD. THE' TASK OF THE VC IS TO

AKE. ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT. FORCES ARE FAR FROM

OME AND ENGAGEDIFFICULT GUERRILLA WAR, BY WINNING THEM -

VEJi, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT* CAPTIVES, BY MAKING THEN AWARE

F.THE TRUE NATURE/ of THEIR MISSION IN' VIETNAM, THEREBY DA IN3

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'V'V ' THE.REHREEFOLD PURPOSE IN.

fa THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES; THEY CAN BE

EXPOLITED FOR PROPAGANDA"AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THROUGH.

RADIO BROADCASTS AND INTERVIEWS PUBLISHEDHE NEUTRALIST

i !. AND PRO-COMMUNIST PRESS; THEY CAN BE USED POLITICALLY, TO FURTHER

HE CAUSE OF COMMUNISM BEYOND THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF VIETNAM BY

PROPAGANDIZING THEM, BRAIN WASHING THEM, AND CONVERTING THEM .I

INTO COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST CADRES WHO WILL ;WORK. ACTIVELY

THE PARTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

THE VC ALSO WANT. TOARGE:.NUMBER OFN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CALL FOR AN EXCHANGE- OF POW'S. DURING

hE PAST'HOWEVER, MR FIVE HAS CAPTURED

; -MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SPITE OF NUMEROUS ENGAGEMENTS. THEREFORE,

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AN MR FIVE CELEBRATION HELD IN EARLYN THE JUNGLE

OF SON HA DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, FIELD GRADE

.POLITICAL OFFICER MAJOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN AND DEPUTY FIELD

: .

' RADE. POLITICALENIORRINH CALLED ON ALL UHITS TO MAKE A'THOROUGH STUDY,ARTY AND XVN GOVERNMENT

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,:'VdULD RESULT IN SEVERE PUNISHMENT. COLONEL TRINH THEN INAGURATEDTHREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN BYYPICAL VC UNIT.. "

"SYMBOLIC ROPE FOR TYING*,

"THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN CONSISTED OF AN

INTENSIVE INDOCTRINATION OF ALL CADRES AND'TROOPS ON THE POW

POLICY1 WHICH HAD BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE THE TIME OF THE RESISTANCE'

AGAINST THE FRENCH, BUT WHICH HAD NOT ALWAYS' BEEN CARRIED OUT

EFFECTIVELY. THIS PHASE, WHICH LASTED THREE MONTHS, FROM

THROUGHAS FIRST ORGANIZED BY THE PARTY. COMMITTEES AT

DIVISION, REGIMENT, AND BATTALION LEVELS AND THEN:

MEMBERS WERE SUBJECTED TO INDOCTRINATION. THE ADVANTAGES OF TAKING

LIVE'.PitlSOSERS WAS STRESSED. AND THE FOLLOWING REASONS..WERC GIVEN FORVC CADRES ANp;SQLDIEHS FAILURE TO DO SO IN THE PAST:

VC WERE NOT'AWARE OF."THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING POW'S; THEYO.AVENGE 'THEIR CAMRADES BY SLAUGHTERING THE ENEMY; THERE WERE

DIFFICULTIES AND- HARDSHIPS INVOLVED IN TRANSFERRING PRISONERSR| HE UNIT 'TO .THE'COMMAND POST;' AND WHEN A'UNIT WAS SURROUNDED/ VOR;HAD SUFFERED* MANY -CASUALITES PRISONERS WERE KILLEItW MAKE WITHDRAWAL 1

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THE SECOND/PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN, WHICH STARTED IN rj.frJUNES*AND WAS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE THROUGHli-Ji/ WAS'ENTITLED "EMULATIONAPTURING AMERICANS". SLOGANS SUCH - A5"wA:UVE POW 'IS EQUAL TO. TEN DEAD AMEHICAN AGGRESSORS" WERE J'V ; DISSEMINATED AND.OPERATIONAL PLANS BASED ON' THESE SLOGANSORMUL ATED '" ALL/NDO OBTAIN ROPES. AND RIOR TO AN OPERATION .THE' LEADERS CHECKED TO MAKE SURE THE 'J'-kyTROOPS HAD THEM. THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ROPES WEREf-:PUNISHED.' THE WERE .ORDERED TO ENGAGE IN CLOSE COMBAT INl-QRDER TOPRISONERS. THEY WERE AfcSO ORDERED TO TREAT_ "

FOW'5 WELL, TO GIVE THEM ENOUGH TO EAI; TO a"-AND TO 'ATTEMPT' IP PROPAGANDIZE THEM. ROW'S WERE TO BE'THE COMMAND POST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES.EVEN IF THE PRISONER HAD TO BE CARRIED., UPON. WITHDRAWING; ffijfeyjJEJ SURROUNDED BY* THE ENEMY.EAD SHOULD ''

NS AND FINALLY THE UNIT.

CHEDULED TO BE HELD IN EARLY

OF.'SUCCESSES AND1 ii .

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ACES

WERE TO BE HELDONGRATULATE AND REWARD OUTSTANDINGjflELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV HAVFCRVTK AW FORCETH MIG-CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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CIA (ARMY OCOFSA,

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ADDED DISTR: TPMG (PER MRS. SMITH)

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Original document.

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